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Abstract 
This dissertation examines international mediation 
as an aspect of the international management of internal 
conflicts. It explores African perspectives on ethnic 
and territorial conflict, and the principles, policies 
and methodology of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) conflict management. It illustrates certain 
hypotheses in a case study, the Uganda mediation of 
1985. 
The study reaches the following conclusions. 
Firstly, that the notion of ripe moments for mediation 
can be enlarged, to take into account specifically 
internal conflict situations. Secondly, that 
(im) partiality in mediation can be re-interpreted to 
include psychological explanations. The study finds 
that the diplomatic and psychological environment of the 
mediator influences his ability to mediate effectively, 
and hence on the outcome of mediation. It suggests that 
the ability of the mediator to apply leverage on the 
parties determines whether a passive or active strategy 
is adopted in the mediation: it finds that in the Uganda 
mediation, the mediator's lack of leverage was 
responsible for the adoption of a passive strategy. 
On a broader theme, the study identifies a new 
identity of mediator, namely a heterogenous mediator, 
who it is argued, is not suited to mediate alone in 
internal conflicts, because of his close relationship 
with the conflict. It finds that in OAU conflict 
management to date, track one diplomacy has been 
resorted to in the management of the inter-state aspects 
of conflicts, while track two diplomacy has been used to 
manage their internal conflicts. It concludes that this 
dichotomous perception of conflict and its management is 
ineffective, because it leads to only one dimension of 
conflict being addressed. A dual track one and track two 
diplomatic approach is suggested as a solution to this 
problem. Such an approach would utilise both tracks 
within the same management process, and hence take into 
account the multi-level nature of conflict, and the 
complexity of its management. 
Finally, the study concludes that the Uganda 
mediation made a signal contribution to the study and 
conflict management in Africa. It was a pioneering 
effort which effectively challenged principles of OAU 
conflict management, particularly the principle of non-
interference. It concludes that involvement in a 
conflict by way of management does not constitute 
interference in the internal affairs of states. 
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The idea that if disputes are to be settled, they 
should be settled peacefully, 1S firmly engrained in 
international relations and in international law. It is 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,l and in 
the Charters of regional organisations such as the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) .2 Peaceful 
settlement encompasses certain formal and non-formal 
devices like judicial settlement, arbitration, 
mediation, negotiation, and conciliation, not all of 
which commend themselves to parties 1n conflict. 
Increasingly, parties are choosing the less formal, less 
coercive methods of settling disputes, on the basis that 
solutions mutually arrived at are likely to be more 
satisfactory.3 
The literature indicates that mediation is becoming 
increasingly the frequent management approach for many 
parties in conflict.4 It also suggests that our 
understanding of the full implications of the mediation 
1 Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter. 
2 Article 3(4) of the OAU Charter. 
3 See Bercovitch,J. 'International Mediation' 28 Journal of Peace 
Research (1991) pp.3-6:4. 
4 Zartman, I. W. & Touval, S. ' Mediation: The Role of Third Party 
Diplomacy and Informal Peacemaking' in Brown,S.J. & Schraub,K.M. (Eds) 
Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era (Washington: 
United States Institute of Peace, 1992) pp.240-261:240. 
2 
process is still relatively low, hence disagreements 
about various aspects of mediation persist 
Aims of the Study 
This study investigates some of the . and lssues 
problems lying at the threshold of the theory and 
practice of international mediation. In Particular, it 
examines the following outstanding problems of 
mediation: 
a) the relationship between track one and track two 
diplomacy in conflict management. The justification for 
this is that while many studies have examined the 
process of mediation from either a track one or track 
two perspective, none except BurtonS has examined the 
symbiosis between them in any sustained way. 
b) the place and role of power in mediation, and 
especially the explanations of impartiality as a 
component of successful mediation. Current theory 
postulates that because a third party has power to 
provide acceptable 
indispensable to its 
outcomes, impartiality is not 
acceptability or to successful 
outcome. This investigation is justified because 
although some literature suggests that impartiality is 
not necessary, 6 parties to some mediations and some 
formal mediators 7 sometimes suggest otherwise. There 
exists the possibility that in terms of mediation, 
5 See for example, Burton,J. & Dukes,F. Conflict: Practices in 
Management, Settlement, and Resolution (London: Macmillan, 1990) i also 
Burton,J.W. 'Track Two: An Alternative to Power Politics' in 
McDonald,J.W. & Bendahmane,D.B. (Eds) Conflict Resolution: Track Two 
Diplomacy (Washington: Foreign Service Institute, 1987) pp.65-72i and 
Burton, J.W. 'Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy' in 
Sandole,D.J.D. & van der Merwe,H. (Eds) Conflict Resolution Theory and 
Practice: Integration and Application (Manchester & New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1993) pp.55-64. 
6 Such as Touval, S. 'Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and 
Historical Considerations' 1 Jerusalem Journal of International 
Relations (1975) pp.51-70i also Touval,S. The Peace Brokers: Mediators 
in the Israeli-Arab Conflict, 1948-1979 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1982). 
7 For example, Umbricht,V.H. Multilateral Mediation: Practical 
Experiences and Lessons(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988) p.243. 
3 
practitioners and academics have been perceiving 
different worlds. 
c) the environmental factors that influence the 
process and outcome of mediation, particularly In 
internal conflicts. This lS important because the 
continuing, almost intractable, nature of internal 
conflicts suggests that either the wrong approaches are 
used in their analysis and management, or that important 
environmental influences are not considered. 
d) the identity of the mediator, especially In his 
interaction with the conflict system. This is done with 
a view to finding out the linkage between the mediator's 
identity and the outcome of mediation In internal 
conflicts. This is important because the milieu within 
which the mediator operates is crucial to his ability to 
mediate successfully. 
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses will be illustrated In the 
case study: 
a) in internal conflicts like that in Uganda, there 
exist a 'false' one and a 'true' ripe moment, which are 
manifested at different periods during the life cycle of 
a conflict. The' false' rlpe moment lS the 
conventional, Zartman-type one; the 'true' ripe moment 
exists prior to this. The 'true' rlpe moment differs 
from the 'false' one In certain material respects, such 
as that it is not necessarily identifiable by a hurting 
stalemate. In internal conflicts of the kind under 
study, successful management depends on identifying the 
'true' rlpe moment for mediation. 
b) the successful management of internal conflict 
requlres much more than just a militarily hurting 
stalemate. In order for the successful management of 
this type of conflict to be achieved, the parties must 
also be undergoing an ideologically hurting stalemate. 
Absence of this renders management less amenable. 
4 
c) neither track one nor track two diplomacy 
individually always provide a suitable diplomatic 
context within which to manage (internal) conflict. 
Mediation lS a complex and mul ti-level undertaking, 
hence the need for a framework that draws upon the 
strengths of these two tracks, and so appreciates the 
complexity of the management process. 
d) the identity of the mediator and his relationship 
with the conflict lS an important element In his 
psychological ability to guide the parties to a 
successful outcome. Where the mediator lS 
heterogenous,s the psychological environment renders him 
unable individually to effectively manage the conflict. 
He should therefore be balanced by an exogenous co-
mediator. 
e) Mediator (im)partiality is a salient feature of 
mediation. It is a fundamental concern for some parties 
at certain stages of the conflict, but not to the 
outcome of the mediation. There are however alternative 
explanations for (im)partiality from those offered by 
the power theories of mediation. Thus: 
i) in an internal conflict where the mediator is 
heterogenous, impartiality is difficult to deliver, but 
for psychological rather than power reasons. 
ii) In internal conflict, the party which feels 
itself to be stronger does not insist on mediator 
impartiality, whereas the party that perceives itself as 
the weaker one places a great premlum on mediator 
impartiality. 
f) the ability of a mediator to apply leverage on the 
parties to a conflict determines whether he adopts an 
active or a passl ve strategy In the mediation. A 
mediator who is unable to apply leverage on the parties 
can substitute threats for leverage. However, where the 
mediator lS heterogenous, it lS difficult to lssue 
8 This term is defined and discussed further later in this 
ch~pter, and in Chapter 8. 
5 
effective threats: being too closely connected with the 
conflict system, its pr1mary concern 1S with its 
position in the post-mediation structure of relations 
with the parties, and its own wider individual concerns. 
Because effective threats might affect that structure, 
they are neither made with conviction nor taken 
seriously by the parties. Further, the effective 
application of leverage depends on the state of the 
parties and their institutions. Where the institutions 
have collapsed, it is not possible for the mediator to 
apply effective leverage because it will have no 
discernible effect on the parties. 
g) the transitional nature of (an internal) 
conflict does not necessarily condemn its management to 
failure, although it mitigates the quality of outcome. 
Of more importance are the perceptions of the parties 
and the mediator about the conflict. If these are at 
odds, an enduring outcome cannot be achieved. 
Methodology 
a) Sources 
This study 1S organised around two ma1n parts. The 
first part (Chapters One to Four) will exam1ne some 
important aspects of mediation theory that bear directly 
on the issues under investigation. It will also outline 
the background against which the empirical part of the 
study will be illuminated. This part will draw its 
sources from secondary materials. 
The second part of the study ( Chapters Five to 
Nine) will centre around a case study, namely, the 
Uganda mediation of 1985. This was a mediation 
undertaken by President Moi of Kenya. It was aimed at 
resolving an internal armed conflict for power between 
contending factions in Uganda, following the second 
overthrow of Obote. It 1S expected that this case 
study, which has not been investigated in the context of 
mediation before, will yield interesting insights into 
the process and practice of mediation 1n internal 
6 
conflict. The case study is particularly attractive and 
worth studying because it displays many of the classic 
elements of internal conflicts in Africa, as mapped out 
in Chapter Three. There will be three main sources of 
data for this case study: interviews with available 
participants and knowledgeable persons; original 
documentation from the mediation where accessible, and 
secondary information, primarily the press, for the 
contemporary background to the mediation. 
b) Theoretical Issues: 'Single Cases' 
A lot of problems attend the decision to base a 
study of this nature on a single case. One problem is 
the tension (or apparent tension), between the general 
and the particular: to what extent can a single case 
study, which necessarily displays certain idiosyncracies 
form the basis for the formulation of a general theory? 
Further, if as it lS argued here, while displaying 
generalities conflicts nevertheless reveal certain 
peculiarities, is it justifiable to resort to general 
theories in the analysis of such conflicts? Beyond 
these questions lies the issue of why the researcher 
chooses a particular case study or case studies: is the 
choice random, such that if it bears out a hypothesis, 
then that hypothesis lS very probably correct as a 
general statement? Should the case study precede 
theoretical generalisations and propositions, or should 
they precede the case study? In other words, lS the 
rationale behind the choice of case study the 
expectation that it will bear out the researcher's 
preconceptions, or is the proof, so to speak, in the 
investigation? It is posited below that the answers to 
these questions lie behind a proper appreciation of the 
essence of case studies. 
The Theoretical Background 
The 'truth' behind mediation(s) depends on the 
mediation(s) chosen by the conflict analyst, and on the 
particular elements of each mediation that he chooses to 
highlight. The theorist of mediation must also address 
the problem whether, having studied a series of 
different mediations (or single cases), there exists an 
inherent connection between them, or whether such a 
connection must be contrived. 
The problem is one of colligation: whether, as some 
philosophers of history argue, "single events are simply 
'colligated' to one another and that the historian finds 
these colligations ready made. ,,9 In such an event, the 
analyst would either accept that colligation, or seek to 
re- colligate the events, or cases. But if, as an 
alternative school of thought argues, there lS no 
inherent connection between cases, (that is, if there lS 
a gap between historical cases) then it lS necessary to 
bridge the gap between them by resorting to 
generalisation. 10 In this sense, generalisation can be 
seen as (the foundation of) a framework for analysis. 
The connection, if any, between single cases depends on 
the choice of events wi thin each case, and on the 
framework adopted in their study and analysis. The 
analytical framework adopted must be broad enough to 
permit linkages between different cases, thus revealing 
the generalities between them. 
The Practice 
There are three broad categories of case studies. 
First, there lS a single case study which supports 
certain trends of theorising, and demonstrates certain 
hypotheses derived therefrom. Secondly, there are a 
serles of case studies (or, which lS another way of 
conceptualising these, a series of single cases) almlng 
at performing a similar function. Thirdly, there are 
'case studies' held in data bases, used to support the 
9 Munz, P. Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge: Popper or 
Wittgenstein? (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985) p.120. 
10 The whole matter here is eventually related to the problem of 
prediction, for a good analysis of which see, Webb,K. Preliction in 
International Relations: The Role of Power, Interest and Trust (K~n~ 
Papers in Politics and International Relations (1992) Series 1, ;;.' .11) . 
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sort of theorising being done by Bercovi tch. 11 In the 
first two categories, the case studies can be derived 
from primary data, as has been done by several analysts 
of conflict such as Assefa, 12 and Jabri, 13 or they can 
be gleaned wholly from secondary data, as Touval did in 
his seminal article. 14 The data base approach utilises 
cases derived from whichever of these methods. 
The question whether a single case can enhance 
generalisation and theory development has been answered 
in the affirmative amongst others, by Bercovitch. 15 A 
single case can be useful since its findings may be 
suggestive, and give useful pointers to future 
directions in practice and research. Similarly, 
although several cases may be different and peculiar to 
their circumstances, they enable comparative study, and 
thus enrich theorising: as Nafziger and Richter argue, 
" a comparative case study may help to distinguish the 
idiosyncratic and historically unique characteristics of 
major political phenomena from the general underlying 
conditions. ,,16 Strong views may be held on one side or 
the other in this methodological debate. But it cannot 
be gainsaid that, without prejudice to the need for 
quality research and analysis, whichever method is used 
11 See Bercovitch,J., Anagnoson,J.T. & Wille,D.L. 'Some Conceptual 
Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in 
International Relations' 28 Journal of Peace Research (1991) pp.7-17. 
12 Assefa,H. Mediation in Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies-
The Sudan Conflict (Boulder,CO.: Westview Press, 1987). 
13 Jabri, V. Mediating Conflict: Decision Making and Western 
Intervention in Namibia (Manchester & New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1990). 
14 Touval,S. 'Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical 
Considerations' op.cit. 
15 Bercovitch, J. 'A Case Study of Mediation as a Method of 
International Conflict Resolution: The Camp David Experience' 12 Review 
of International Studies (1986) pp.43-65. 
16 Nafziger,E.W. & Richter,W.L. 'Biafra and Bangladesh: The 
Political Economy of Secessionist Conflict' 13 Journal of Peace 
Research (1976) pp.91-109:91. 
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develops further insights into the field. Indeed, the 
view can be taken that whether a single case or mUltiple 
cases are chosen is a moot point because in either case, 
the conflict analyst will be engaged in an endeavour to 
derive generalisations from the case(s) being studied. 
None is therefore necessarily superior, al though the 
felicity of each and the usefulness of the results 
yielded, will depend on the theoretical framework 
adopted. 
A pertinent issue with regard to the use of case 
studies, (and this is true of all research) is that they 
reflect the subjective temperament of the researcher. 
This is especially relevant where the case studies are 
derived from secondary data. In such cases, theorising 
and generalisations may be limited by this psychological 
element. The later researcher, being limited to the 
questions asked and conclusions reached by the earlier 
one, may find his theorising restricted. 17 Holsti 
summarises this succinctly: 
"But how questions are posed, which questions are 
raised, which are neglected, what assumptions are 
made about causation, and how we select levels of 
analysis and individual explanatory variables 
vitally affect the quality of results. ,,18 
Although this appears to be an intractable problem, the 
way out lies in more and more case studies being done. 
The more studies there are (whether different studies or 
the same studies from different perspectives), the more 
points of view will emerge, and the more both theory and 
practice in the field of research will be enriched. 
Analytical Frameworks in Social Science 
1 7 The later researcher collecting primary data for example 
through interviews is engaged in an important element of communicat±on 
and participation, and can therefore appreciate better various contexts 
and nuances which a later researcher might not. See Jensen, K. B. 
'Discourses of Interviewing: Validating Qualitative Research Findings 
Through Textual Analysis' in Kvale, S. (Ed) Issues of Validi ty in 
Qualitative Research (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1986) pp.93-108. 
18 Holsti,K.J. Peace and War: Anned Conflict and International 
Order, 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p.2. 
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The question of the place of analytical frameworks 
In the social sciences is important. Its centre-piece 
lS the enduring lssue of the relationship between 
methodology and epistemology. It lS, In essence, a 
matter of the criteria of validity to be adopted In 
trying to explicate either observation of the world, or 
findings from research. 19 In the field of international 
relations, especially during the post-behavioural phase, 
these issues have been at the forefront of the most far 
reaching disputations. The issues arising from that 
debate are beyond the scope of this study. This section 
will only be concerned to explain firstly the central 
question of the relationship between practice and theory 
(or methodology and epistemology), and to map out the 
(admittedly pre-theoretical) boundaries of the 
analytical framework that will be used to analyse the 
Uganda mediation. 
The Relationship Between Methodology and Epistemology 
The development of knowledge about conflict 
management generally, and international mediation In 
particular, has taken place on both theoretical and 
practical planes. The relationship between methodology 
and epistemology (or, as it has also been characterised, 
the place of philosophy In the social sciences) lS 
therefore important in this field. Hughes has argued 
persuasively that philosophy plays a 'liberation' role 
within the social sciences: that philosophical questions 
arise in the social sciences in times of disciplinary 
and methodological crises. Thus, he sees the 
"prodigal social sciences returning to philosophy 
when there arises a deep uncertainty about what 
they are about, when human thinking seems to be 
getting out of hand, when barely articulable 
questions seem to undermine our most cherished and 
securely based conceptions. It is at times like 
these that social scientists, or at least some of 
them, begin to speak of 'epistemological breaks' 
19 For a discussion of this see Salner, M. 'Val idi t y in Human 
Science Research' in Kvale,S. (Ed) Issues of ValiJity in • ualitative 
Res e ~ ~ r ~~ iJ 0 P . cit ., p p . -± 7 - 7 1. 
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and 'paradigm shifts' or, more prosaically, 
developments in human thought." 20 
Although Hindess attacks the claim of philosophy to a 
special kind of knowledge as being "at best dogmatic or 
else incoherent", 21 his exposition of the relationship 
between philosophy and methodology is illustrative. In 
his explanation, methodology specifies the procedures to 
be used in either generating or testing propositions. 
Philosophy on the other hand validates those 
methodological prescriptions. In this relationship, 
"Methodology lays down procedural rules for 
scientific practice which it derives by means of a 
'knowledge' provided by philosophy. Methodology is 
the product of philosophy and the sciences are the 
realization of their methodology. ,,22 
Whereas the relationship between methodology and 
philosophy has thus been clearly established, there 
remains the question of which of the two precedes, or 
should precede the other. A claim for the primacy of 
methodology has been eloquently made by Rosenau. He 
argues that any objective truth about the state of the 
world can only be approximated, and that such estimation 
is constrained by the empirical materials available to 
analyse unfolding and persisting patterns. To him, the 
world that scholars reconstruct is a function of the 
data they use. 23 Salner on the other hand makes a strong 
case for the primacy of philosophy over methodology. To 
her, methodology follows philosophy, which reflects the 
purposes of research and the particular relationships 
the researcher is trying to develop. Methodology cannot 
20 Hughes, J. The Philosophy of Social Research (London & New York: 
Longman, 1990) p.10. 
21 Hindess, B. Philosophy and Nethodoloqy in the Social Sciences 
(Sussex: Harvester Press, 1977) p.5. 
22 Ibid., p.4. 
23 Rosenau,J.N. International Studies and the Social Sciences: 
Prel, 1 ems, Priori ti es, and Prospects in the Uni ted Sta tes (Beverley 
Hills: Sage Publications, 1973) ~.58. 
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therefore be applied without analysing the world V1ew it 
presumes. 24 In many ways, the inter-paradigm debate in 
international relations is an attempt to come to grips 
with this question. 25 A middle way between those who 
plead for the supremacy of theory, and those who assert 
the primacy of methodology, is the Lakatosian point of 
view, of having both a theoretically and empirically 
progressive component in any research undertaken. 26 
Back to Mediation: Contending Frameworks of Analysis 
In the development of analytical approaches to 
mediation, two perspectives have striven for mastery. 
These are the power approach to mediation, and problem-
solving. The power approach to mediation was introduced 
in its pre-theoretical form by Zartman,27 and was later 
adopted and developed by Touval,28 amongst others. The 
notion of power as a tool for the analysis of conflict 
and negotiation was later the subject of detailed study, 
amongst others by Bacharach and Lawler, 29 and Blalock. 30 
These various writings pursue the argument that conflict 
24 Salner,M. 'Validity in Human Science Research' in Kvale,S. (Ed) 
Issues of Validity in Qualitative Research (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 
1986) pp.47-71:59,66. 
25 Nevertheless, some argue that the whole foundation of that 
debate is misconceived. See, Nicholson,M. Imaginary Paradigms: A 
Sceptical View of the Inter-Paradigm Debate in International Relations 
(Kent Papers in Politics and International Relations (1992) Series 1, 
No.7) . 
26 See Lakatos, I. 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientif ic 
Research Programmes' in Lakatos, I. & Musgrave,A. (Eds) Criticism and the 
Growth of Knowledge (London: Cambridge University Press,1977) pp.91-
196; see also, North,R.C. & Willard,M.R. 'The Post Behavioral Debate: 
Indeterminism, Probabilism, and the Interaction of Data and Theory' in 
Banks,M. (Ed) Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on 
International Relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1984) pp.22-38. 
27 Zartman, I. W. 'The Political Analysis of Negotiation: How Who 
Gets What and When' 26 World Politics (1973/4) pp.385-399. 
28 Touval, 'Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical 
Considerations' op.cit. 
29 Bacharach,S.B. & Lawler,E.J. Bargaining: Power, Tactics and 
Outcomes (San Fransisco: Jossey Bass, 1981). 
30 Blalock,H.M. Power and Conflict: Toward a General Theory 
(Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989). 
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facilitated by 
of one of the 
parties to the conflict, which in this case includes a 
third party. In terms of mediation, it has been 
contended that once a third party involves itself in a 
conflict, it transforms a dyadic into a triadic 
relationship, and can alter the outcome of negotiation 
by the use of its power. 31 In technical terms, it has 
been asserted that such a third party in exercising a 
mediatory role, must exert some form of leverage if the 
mediation (as bargaining) is to succeed. 32 Thus, 
mediation theory in the 'power' school has inclined to 
the view that where the mediator has power (or 
leverage) ,33 it need not concern itself with displaying 
characteristics such as impartiality. Yet in classical 
theory and practice such characteristics were held to be 
a sine qua non of successful mediation. 34 
The problem-solving approach to conflict analysis 
rej ects the introduction of power ln conflict 
management, and denies its emphasis in the analysis of 
international relations. 35 It postulates that the proper 
path to conflict management - indeed resolution - lies 
in the parties to the conflict re-perceiving their 
conflictual relationship, and in so doing mutually 
31 Bercovitch,J. Social Conflict and Third Parties: Strategies of 
Conflict Resolution (Boulder,CO.: Westview Press, 1984). 
32 Zartman, I. W. 'Alternative Attempts at Crisis Management: 
Concepts and Processes' in Winham,G.R. (Ed) New Issues in International 
Crisis Management (Boulder,CO.: Westview Press, 1988) pp.199-223. The 
literature on this is mentioned in Chapter 2. 
33 In the literature, power 1S often referred to as leverage. It 
is the ability to move a party in an intended direction. See Zartman 
& Touval, 'Mediation: The Role of Third Party Diplomacy and Informal 
Peacemaking' op.cit., p.254. 
34 See, Young,O.R. The Intermediaries: Third Parties in 
International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). 
35 Burton, J. W. 'The Relevance of Behavioral Theories of the 
International System' in Moore,J.N. (Ed) Law and Civil War in the 
Modern World (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974) 
pp. 92-110; see also, Burton,J.W. World Society (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972). 
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building bridges that lead to a self-sustaining post-
conflict relationship. The role of the third party is 
to facilitate that process. It is based on the ability 
to inj ect an analytical perspective 1n the dialogue 
between the parties, rather than on the exercise of 
leverage and power. The problem-solving workshop in its 
diverse approaches,36 however labours under the weight 
of its own inability to define its precise operational 
parameters. Whereas it is argued that the problem 
solving workshop can, 
of conflict, it is 
in itself, lead to the resolution 
also 








formal, track one mediation. Its dominant preoccupation 
with pre-mediation stages has arguably rendered it 
unable effectively to challenge the power approach for 
dominance in conflict management. 38 Consequently, in the 
analysis of mediation, the power approach has held sway. 
From whichever way the power approach 1S 
considered, its influence on thinking about mediation 
has been extremely strong. In a Kuhnian sense, it can 
be said justifiably that the power approach to mediation 
represents the 'normal science' 39 of mediation, In a 
36 See, Kelman,H.C. 'Informal Mediation by the 
Scholar/Practitioner' in Bercovitch,J. & Rubin,J.Z. (Eds) Mediation in 
International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management 
(London: Macmillan, 1992) pp.64-96. 
37 Fisher, R. J. & Keashly, L. 'The Potential Complementali ty of 
Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party 
Intervention' 28 Journal of Peace Research (1991) pp.29-42. 
38 Although not all problem-solving workshops do this. The Yale 
and Harvard groups see problem- sol ving workshops "as a preparation for 
diplomatic negotiation and as an adjunct to traditional techniques. 
Burton views the technique as a replacement for conventional 
procedures, a response to the apparent failure of traditional 
institutions." See Light,M. 'Problem-Solving Workshops: The Role of 
Scholarship in Conflict Resolution' in Banks,M. (Ed) Conflict in World 
Society op.cit" pp.146-160:157. 
39 See Kuhn,T.S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago 
& London: University of Chicago Press, 1962). To Kuhn, "'normal 
science' is a characteristic of 'mature sciences', and mature sciences 
are ... dominated by a single paradigm." See Katouzian, H. 'T. S. Kuhn, 
Functionalism, and Sociology of Knowledge' 35 British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science (1984) pp.166-173:169. Whether this is true in 
social science is the subject of an involved debate. 
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Lakatosian sense, the power theory can be said to be the 
core, whose variations play only an auxiliary role. 40 In 
Feyerabend's terms, the power theory has been "a stern 
and demanding mistress ... and ... dragon" ,41 such has been 
its suffocating influence. There lS thus clearly the 
need for, if not a new approach to the analysis of 
mediation, then at least one with different emphases. 
Such an approach would acknowledge that effective 
'listening' and understanding are a prerequisite for 
relevant and effective analysis. The power theorists of 
mediation have operated under the severe limitations of 
what Stanford describes graphically as 'eavesdroppers', 
or 'phone tappers': 
"Such intruders are not nearly so well placed to 
understand the message as either the initiator or 
its recipient, who are likely to have a much better 
grasp of ... usage, conceptual schemes, and context. 
So often an eavesdropper can hear every word and 
yet fail to understand the conversation. If this 
is a well-known fact of everyday life, how much 
more difficult it is when the conversation is not 
contemporary ... and ... is probably incomplete. ,,42 
The problem 
conflict . lS 
for 
that 
the power analysts 
whereas they have 
of (internal) 
listened In to 
'conversations' about conflicts, they have not always 
understood their language of discourse, 
the world Vlew that informed them. 
or appreciated 
Hence, their 
conclusions about the meanlng and import of those 
'conversations' have been found wanting. As the number 
and severity of internal conflicts In the world 
increases, the conceptual justifications resulting from 
such incomplete eavesdropping have proved at best to be 
suspect. 
40 See Lakatos, ' Falsif icationism and the Methodology o~ 
Scientific Research Programmes' op.cit. 
41 Feyerabend,P. 'Consolations for the Specialist' in Lakatos,I. 
& Musgrave,A.(Eds) Criticism and the Growth of Knowle.j.~Je op.cit., 
pp.197-230:229. 
42 Stanford,M. The Nature of Histcl-ical Knowledge (:)xforj & ~:ew 
York: Basil Blackwell, 1986) pp.119. 
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In mapplng out a framework for conflict analysis, 
two major methodological approaches must be considered. 
Firstly the adequacy (or lack thereof) of the 'closed 
circle' argument (that all "understanding is organized 
around a central core which lS not available for 
criticism from outside the system and which, from within 
the system, makes perfectly sound sense " and that "the 
cores, In all cases, are incommensurable with one 
and the attendant 
incommensurability must be looked into. 
need for a comparative base, which 





historical continuity must be addressed. The problem 
here is one of the role and place of a theoretical 
framework in the analysis of conflict, and especially 
how such a framework might bridge the gap between 
contemporary and contending approaches. These issues 
are suggested by Munz, who observes that 
"In principle, the claim that paradigms and the 
knowledge derived from them are incommensurable 
with all other paradigms and the knowledge derived 
from them, follows directly from the by now well 
established recognition that all observation is 
theory ridden. By this, one means that one cannot 
simply 'observe': always one can observe only what 
a certain theory suggests one should observe, or 
observe what a certain theory leads one to expect 
to find. Clearly, an observation made and 
confirmed under one theory cannot be used without 
a lot of explanation ... In short, there are no 
neutral and absolute observations which float 
around aimlessly and which can be used for purposes 
conceived after the observation had been made." H 
In making this observation, Munz stands at the threshold 
of a pertinent debate in the methodology of mediation: 
should the framework adopted for analysis merely mirror 
preconceived ideas about the nature of mediation, or 
should it also reflect the beliefs, notions, and indeed 
43 Munz, P. Our Knowl edge of the Growth of Knowl edge op. cit. , 
p .145. 
44 Ibid., p.151. 
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utilities of the parties to the conflict? The power 
approach to mediation, and the problem-solving approach 
each straddle opposing ends of this debate, giving the 
impression that each V1ews the others position as 
incommensurable with its own. In their resolute state 
of cognitive blindness,45 they have unfortunately 
contributed much to the underdevelopment of mediation 
theory. The following section suggests a way out of 
this underdevelopment. 
The Integration of Conflict Systems 
Both Vayrynen46 and Mitchel1 47 have argued 
pertinently that each conflict has a life and an anatomy 
of its own, and that the search for its resolution must 
lie 1n understanding its internal dynamics. This 
argument can be extended to embrace the notion that each 
conflict (and indeed each mediation), exists as a 
system which is, so to speak, sufficient in itself. On 
its own, this V1ew sees each mediation as a closed 
circle, informed internally by its own particularistic 
concerns. However, in order to develop a framework for 
the analysis of mediation systems generally, it 1S 
imperative to elevate such closed 'mediation systems' 
beyond the particular. This can be done by designing an 
approach by which mediation 1S perceived from a 
comparative perspective. In this way the common links 
between various mediations can be identified. Their 
analysis can therefore be enhanced from the particular 
to the general level. 
45 On which see Sandole,D.J.D. 'The Subjectivity of Theories and 
Actions in World Society' in Banks,M. (Ed) Conflict in World Society 
op.cit., pp.39-55:40. 
46 Vayrynen,R. 'To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on ::he 
Resolution of National and International Conflicts' in Vayrynen,R. (Ed) 
New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict 
Transformation (London: Sage Publications, 1991) pp.1-25. 
47 Mitchell,C.R. The SU'ucture of International Conflict (London: 
Macmillan, 1981). 
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This integration of mediation systems approach 
allows a comparative study of mediations, and permits a 
general theory of mediation to emerge. Anyang' 
Nyong'o's plea for regional conflict management 1n 
Africa generally, and 1n the Upper Nile Valley in 
particular, 1S an effective application of this 
approach. Having contextualised the peculiarities of 
the conflicts in the countries of the Upper Nile Valley, 
he draws out the generalities between them in pleading 
(all too briefly) for the necessity of a regional 
approach to their management. 48 Put differently, the 
argument 1S that different mediations in different 
geographic localities (or even in different states 
within the same region), can be perceived as a series of 
genetically similar, but anatomically different 
activities. But in order to understand them in a 
historically sound way, their idiosyncratic nature must 
first be accepted and appreciated, and only then should 
efforts made to understand their genetic linkages. An 
attempt to proceed the other way round would inevitably 
lead to failure, or as in Jimmy Carter's mediation 
efforts in Ethiopia, to only the settling of procedural 
issues. 49 There, the parties insisted ori an African co-
mediator. The proper reading of this is that successful 
mediation in Ethiopia would have required a heterogenous 
mediator50 supported by an exogenous one, like Carter. 
In that way, because of OAU conflict management 
48 Anyang-Nyong'o, P. 'The Implications of Crisis and Conflict in 
the Upper Nile Valley' in Deng,F.M. & Zartman,I.W. (Eds) Conflict 
Resolution in Africa (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1991) 
pp.95-114. 
49 Harbeson,J.W. 'The International Politics of Identity in the 
Horn of Africa' in Harbeson,J.W. & Rothchild,D. (Eds) Africa in World 
Politics (Boulder,CO.: Westview Press, 1991) pp.119-143:137; see also, 
Rothchild,D. 'Regional Peacemaking in Africa: The Role of Great Powers 
as Facilitators' in Harbeson,J.W. & Rothchild,D. Africa in World 
Politics op.cit., pp.284-306:298. 
50 This is def ined later in the Chapter. 
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practices,51 the heterogenous mediator would have 
operated from track one, while the exogenous one 
(Carter) would have operated from track two. This would 
have been a good example of the working of dual 
diplomacy as suggested in this chapter and in Chapter 
Nine. 
At the heart of this approach lS the conceptual 
problem that has dogged efforts at regional conflict 
management, particularly in Africa: should efforts at 
such conflict management proceed ad hoc, or should there 
be an effort towards the general management of conflicts 
In a region? Indeed, should these processes both be 
incorporated in conflict management? As Stedman puts it, 
this entails a decision on whether the level of 
management should be national, or regional: 
"The interrelationship between conflict at the 
national and regional level raises the question of 
sequence and conflict resolution. Does regional 
conflict resolution presuppose conflict resolution 
at the national level? Can conflict resolution be 
pursued simultaneously across levels? Do some 
solutions to conflict at the national level 
interfere with conflict resolution at the regional 
level?" 52 
Stedman ralses the fundamantal question of whether 
conflict management should be seen as a single-level 
activity, or whether it should be appreciated as a 
necessarily multi-level undertaking. In terms of 
mediation, the issue that arises is one, as Deng and 
Zartman argue, of tactical and strategic choices: for, 
if in the context of Africa as elsewhere, 
"conflicts ... are often linked to other 
conflicts ... must all conflicts be resolved 
simultaneously, whether autonomously or in a 
region-wide restructuring of relations, or should 
conflict management and resolution efforts in, for 
51 See Chapter 4. 
52 Stedman, s. J. 'Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: A 
Conceptual Framework' in Deng,F.M. & Zartman,l.W. (Eds) Conflict 
Resolution in Africa op. cit., pp.367-399:381. 
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example, Sudan proceed without waiting for parallel 
initiatives in Eritrea?"s3 
Deng and Zartman are not suggesting that all the 
conflicts in the continent (much less the world) can be 
solved all at once, but that note should be taken of 
solutions adopted in similar conflicts. In the example 
they give, the suggestion is that since for instance the 
idea of federation did not work for the Eritrean 
conflict, it is possible that it would not work for the 
Sudan conflict, as indeed it did not. 
Two connected points of Vlew emerge from this 
discussion. The first lS an appreciation of the 
complexity of the process of conflict analysis and 
management. It suggests that the process is multi-level, 
and that its success depends on the linkages between the 
different levels. In practical terms, this means that 
the conflict analyst should not be restricted to one 
conceptual level of analysis. It also implies that the 
conflict manager should not seek to impose subjective 
perceptions of the conflict on the parties. He should 
draw on the generalities of other conflicts as an aid to 
effective management and analysis. Accordingly, conflict 
management and analysis should be treated as a multi-
level, mUlti-approach and hence, complex undertaking. 
Secondly, the conflict analyst or manager must 
necessarily pay attention to the 'closed circle' of the 
conflict at hand. It is important that the management 
process be informed by an appreciation of how similar 
conflicts regionally or further afield have evolved and 
been managed, and bring that knowledge to bear on the 
conflict at hand. 
The first of these points of Vlew lS an attempt to 
come to grlps with the complexity of the process of 
conflict analysis, and the underlying linkages between 
the various approaches to conflict management. The 
53 Deng & Zartman, 'Introduction' in Deng,P.M. & Zartman,I.W. (Eds) 
Conflict Resolution in Africa op.cit., pp.1-15:7. 
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second is a way by which the conflict manager or analyst 
can, while appreciating the differences between varlOUS 
conflicts, construct a pertinent pattern of strategies 
and tactics: a way in which, to use Stedman's apt term, 
such conflicts can be 'bounded'. 54 The case study will 
illustrate how a mediator's lack of appreciation of 
these two points can negatively affect the outcome of 
mediation. It will also be used as a basis to suggest 
how the marriage between these two points of view could 
have strengthened the mediator's hand In the Uganda 
mediation. 
Towards an Analytical Framework 
The previous section argued that mediation lS a 
wide and complex enterprise. The process is broad, and 
encompasses different levels of undertaking and 
activity. This section will propose an analytical 
framework that takes these concerns into account. 
Bordering such an analytical framework is the trite 
knowledge that conflict analysis suffers greatly if the 
history of the conflict is ignored. The history of a 
conflict enables the analyst or manager to understand 
its genesis, and the concerns and motivations of the 
actors. It allows the sources of the conflict to be 
understood, and a comparison with similar conflicts to 
be undertaken. It might also on that basis suggest 
pointers as to the most efficient management approach. 
An understanding of the history of a conflict55 enables 
the analyst or manager to get a feel for the negotiating 
distance between the parties, and hence to formulate a 
strategy by which that distance can be reduced. 
A sound analytical framework for mediation also 
requires that the diplomatic aspects of the conflict be 
54 Stedman, , Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: A 
Conceptual Framework' op.cit., p.384. 
55 See Chapter 5. 
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taken into account.56 Understanding the diplomatic 
aspects of the conflict enables the manager or analyst 
to appreciate the wider relations between the parties, 
and hence the motivations and interests which drive them 
to negotiation. Additionally, the diplomatic context 
points to other parties and actors who have a direct or 
indirect interest In the conflict. Signally, the 
diplomatic aspects of the conflict help to unravel the 
relationships between the conflictants and the third 
party. The past and current diplomatic relationships 
between the parties further enable the analyst to 
determine the current status of the relationship between 
the third party and the conflict itself. Thus, whether 
the third party lS endogenous, exogenous or 
heterogenous, can be discerned through an examination of 
the diplomatic aspects of the conflict. 
The historical and diplomatic contexts provide two 
important levels of analysis. But because mediation is 
much more complex than these two aspects alone suggest, 
the analytical framework should take other levels into 
account. Particularly, the track resorted to in conflict 
management should be considered. The rationale behind 
thus broadening the analytical perspective lS that 
different conflicts call for different diplomatic tracks 
of management, or as is argued in this study, a duality 
of tracks. Thus, before the technicalities of mediation 
are gone into, the issue of the most suitable track for 
management should be addressed. In broad terms, track 
one conflict management addresses itself directly to the 
level of the technicalities of negotiation and 
mediation. Track two focuses on other relations between 
the parties, such as their perception and attitudes to 
the conflict, trust and confidence building measures. 
Neither track individually takes into account the whole 
56 See Chapter 6. 
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complexity of conflict and its management process. 57 
Hence it is suggested that these important components of 
both tracks should be brought to bear in a dual track 
management process. 58 The strength of this approach lS 
that once the vision of the whole management process lS 
thus extended, positive outcomes could be generated. 
Finally, a sound analytical framework should 
appreciate that the regional setting59 of a conflict is 
an integral part of the process of its analysis and 
management. If as lS argued above there are discernible 
threads runnlng through the conflicts in a region, these 
must be pulled together, and their lessons brought to 
bear on the analysis or management of the conflict at 
hand. This analytical level ensures that a simplistic 
view of the conflict is avoided, and that the conflict 
is viewed as part of a broader regional picture. Thus, 
strategies and approaches that have not been successful 
elsewhere in the region can be eschewed, and different 
and more creative approaches to management and analysis 
be designed. 
This section has described the maln components of 
an analytical framework for mediation. This description 
emphasises that mediation lS not a single-level 
activity, restricted 
negotiation between the 
process which embodies 
as a more 
only to around-the-table 
parties. It lS a complex 
broader concerns, and sees 
sophisticated, multi-level, mediation 
activity. The elements of this framework are not, 
however, different and distinct: each of them 
contributes to the larger picture that the conflict 
analyst or manager should have in contemplation. In 
essence, having this larger picture in mind enables the 
57 This 1S the case with OAU conflict management as discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
58 See later this chapter, and Chapters 8 and 9. 
59 See chapter 3. 
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dead ends of a single-level approach to be avoided, and 
for a creative way out of the woods of the conflict to 
be plotted. 
Definitions 
This section will define some key terms that recur 
In this study. The purpose of definitions has been 
summarised well by Vasquez. He notes that they help to 
delimit the empirical domain of inquiry. They also 
provide consistency of usage, since most words have 
more than one meaning and are therefore open to 
ambiguity. Definitions enable people within a 
discipline to talk to each other about the subject, to 
investigate it, research it, and "see it". 60 The 
following terms and concepts will be defined or 
distinguished: internal, international and 
internationalised conflicts; third party intervention 
and third party involvement; international management of 
internal conflict; settlement, resolution and management 
of conflict; mediation and negotiation; track one and 
track two diplomacy; and dual diplomacy. 
Internal, International and Internationalised Conflicts 
The relationship between internal and international 
conflict has important implications for conflict 
management and analysis. However, the connection 
between the two through the process of 
internationalisation was not always articulated clearly 
in the earlier writings, many of which tend to conflate 
the internal and the international, 61 while others 
maintain fairly hard distinctions between internal and 
60 Vasquez,J.A. The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993) p.1S. 
61 See for example, Modelski,G. 'The International Relations of 
Civil War' in Rosenau, J. N . (Ed) International Aspects of 
Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964) pp.14-44; 
Dhokalia,R.P. 'civil Wars and International Law' 11 In3ian Journal of 
International Law (1971) pp.219-2S0; Rosenau,J.N. 'Internal War as an 
International Event' in Rosenau,J.N. (Ed) International Aspects 
of Civil Strife op.cit., pp.4S-91. 
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international conflict.62 Indeed, even those which 
attempt a pathology of internal strife in trying to 
justify humanitarian intervention and the international 
protection of human rights display the dangers inherent 
in too inclusive a definition of 'internal', especially 
where this lS based on the relationships of power. 63 
These writings suggest that the availability of power to 
a third party enables it to define the nature of the 
conflict, and therefore to dictate the approaches to its 
management. This section will explain how internal and 
international conflict are conceptually linked through 
the process of internationalisation, but on a basis 
other than that of power. 
The belief that there lS no truly internal, or 
purely international conflict is based on the judgment 
that all international conflicts have domestic 
sources. 64 This vlew may be justified by the 
interdependence of international society, which makes it 
impossible to draw a hard and fast line between the 
internal and the international. It can also be derived 
from the argument that Slnce all conflict entails a 
derogation of human rights whose standards are now 
international,65 such diminution cannot be seen purely 
within the framework of an international and internal 
dichotomy. This is a rejection of the Realist doctrine 
that dichotomises the internal and the international, 
and of the view of the founders of the United Nations 
62 See for example, Deutsch, K. W. 'External Involvement in Internal 
War' in Eckstein,H. (Ed) Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New 
York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964) pp.100-110. 
63 Meron,T. Human Rights in International Strife: Their 
International Protection (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1987). 
64 See for example, Burton,J.W. Global Conflict: The Domestic 
Sources of International Crises (Brighton: Wheat sheaf Books, 19;;·i). 
65 See Donnelly,J. International Human Right'" (BouLi~r,CO.: 
Westview Press, 1993). 
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that 'the scourge of war' meant inter-state war.66 
Indeed, no analysis of internal conflict can ignore its 
external element: as Duner notes, 
"A complete analysis of [internal] war must ... take 
into account relations of several kinds: 
first ... there is the purely internal constellation 
(the split within the country), then the relations 
of the internal parties to the actors in their 
surroundings, and, finally, the relations between 
the external actors." 67 
Chapter Three argues that 1n the conflicts 1n Africa 
which have an ethnic and (or) boundary component, an 
international dimension 1S necessarily entailed, and 1S 
facilitated inter alia by contagion. In Africa as 
elsewhere, ethnic conflict becomes internationalised by 
a variety of factors. These include the existence of 
ethnic kin in other countries, ideological sympathy by 
outsiders for one ethnic group (in a conflict), 
migrations of ethnic communities to other countries, 
which alters the ethno-demographic balance 1n both 
countries, and which may therefore result in conflict. 68 
Indeed, "international relations between states becomes 
'ethnicised' when potential or actual ethnic conflict 
occurs. ,,69 
There are also var10US external causes of internal 
conflict, such as regional rivalries, and global 
political and economic trends. 70 The conflict analyst or 
manager should therefore appreciate the dynamics of the 
66 Bailey,S.D. How Wars End: The United Nations and the 
Termination of Conflict, 1946-1964 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1985) p.2. 
67 Duner,B. 'The Intervener: Lone Wolf or ... ? Cooperation between 
Interveners in civil Wars' 18 Cooperation and Conflict (1983) pp.197-
213:197. 
68 See Stavenhagen,R. 'Ethnic Conflicts and their Impact on 
International Society' 43 International Social Science Journal (1991) 
pp.117-131:124-127. 
69 Ibid., p.127. Emphasis added. 
70 Deng & Zartman, 'Introduct ion' in Deng, F. M. & Zartman, I . \.; . (Eds) 
Conflict Resolution in Africa op.cit., pp.4-5. 
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relationship between the internal and the international; 
for, as Mitchell notes, internal strife is an important 
element of post-war international conflict. ~1 To 
understand the internal dimension of international 
conflict resort must be had to the peculiar nature of 
each conflict. Understanding the international dimension 
of internal war requires recourse to general principles. 
As Gurr argues, general theories are useful for the 
analysis of conflict ln Africa, even once distinctly 
African conditions are incorporated. 72 
The introduction of external actors or factors ln 
an originally 'internal' conflict internationalises it. 
Such external factors or actors may include exogenous 
third parties as mediators or facilitators. The 
internationalisation of conflict raises certain issues, 
most saliently for internal armed conflict. As both 
Modelski and Assefa amongst others have noted, the 
legitimate government will be unwilling to engage ln 
dialogue with the insurgents because in doing so, they 
may thereby gi ve international standing to the 
insurgents. Institutional managers of conflict such as 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) have tackled 
this problem by insisting on dialogue only with the 
government in power, and reaffirming the principle of 
non- interference in the internal affairs of states. 73 
This approach characterised the OAU's response to the 
civil wars ln Nigeria, Eri trea, and the Sudan. Non-
institutional conflict managers must also address the 
dilemma of how to get the parties to talk, without 
71 Mi tchell, C. R. ' Civil Strife and the Involvement of External 
Parties' 14 International Studies Quarterly (1970) pp.164-194:167. 
72 Gurr,T.R. 'Theories of Political Violence and Revolution in ~he 
Third World' in Deng,F.M. & Zartman,I.W. (Eds) ConflictResolution 
~n Africa op.cit., pp.153-189. 
73 Foltz,W.J. 'The Organization of African Unity and the 
Resolution of Africa's Conflicts' in Deng,F.M. & Zal.-tman,I.W.(Eds) 
Conflict Resolution in Africa op.cit., pp.347-366:358. 
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appear1ng to confer legitimacy on those who the 
government in power considers to be 'rebels'. 
Deng and Zartman ra1se an important 1ssue 
concern1ng the internationalisation of conflict through 
providing humanitarian aid, and particularly the 
legitimising function of such activity. Their 
contention 1S suggestive for the conflict manager, since 
it points to a nexus between internationalisation of 
conflict, and legitimisation of one of the parties. 
They argue persuasively, that Slnce providing 
humanitarian aid to victims on both sides of the 
conflict necessarily entails negotiation with both 
sides, the ' rebel' party thereby becomes ~pso facto 
legitimised. In that situation, both parties cannot 
avoid addressing the reason for the necessity for 
outside humanitarian aid (i.e. the conflict), and what 
should be done to remove that necessity (i.e. making 
peace) .74 This argument 1S meritorious because by 
suggesting a way out of the problem of conferring 
legitimacy, it points to an alternative route to 
negotiation, through internationalisation by 
humanitarian aid. 75 Reisman observes that there is the 
powerful support of history for this argument since 
"humanitarian interventions in the past have gone beyond 
exigent succour to the fashioning of more permanent 
structures of social and political order. ,,76 
The argument being canvassed here 1S twofold. 
First, that although the issues that inform the conflict 
may be 'internal', they are internationalised by the 
introduction of an external manager of the conflict. 
74 Deng & Zartman, , Introduct ion' in Deng, F. M. & Zartman, I . W . (Eds) 
Conflict Resolution in Africa op.cit., p.8. 
75 The Somalia conflict, at least since December 1992 is a good 
example of this. 
76 Reisman,M. 'Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos' in 
Lillich,R.B. (Ed) Humanitarian Intervention and the Unite3 Nations 
(Charlotsville: University Press of Virginia, 1973) 
pp.167-195:168. 
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Secondly, the efforts of such a third party to manage 
the conflict bring into play other factors which justify 
involvement and internationalise the conflict further: 
hence resort to arguments such as the need to protect 
human rights or to facilitate humanitarian aid. On a 
practical conflict management level, the 
internationalisation of conflict enables the conflict 
manager to draw from a wider range of strategies and 
repertoires for management. On the analytical level, 
internationalisation enables the analyst to have a 
broader view of the conflict and the processes of its 
management. 
Third Party Intervention and Third Party Involvement 
The term 'third party intervention' is currently 
used in conflict management literature to refer to any 
of the situations where a third party becomes engaged In 
the conflict, either in the capacity of a court, an 
arbitrator (or arbitration tribunal), a mediator, a 
conciliator, a facilitator, or a provider of good 
offices. Indeed, to Rosenau, a third party's passive 
attitude to a conflict can also be tantamount to 
intervention. 77 
But 'intervention' lS an unfortunate word to use to 
describe mediatory activities, because it connotes force 
and lack of choice on the part of the parties In 
conflict. Indeed, not only are there now diverse senses 
in which the term' intervention' is used,79 but even its 
use to refer to the rendering of humanitarian aid79 
77 Rosenau,J.N. 'Foreign Intervention as Adaptive Behaviour' in 
Moore,J.N. (Ed) Law and Civil War in the Modern rvcrld op.cit., pp.129-
151. 
78 See for example Moore, J. N. Law and Civil War in the - '1- ::: 
rvorld op. ci t . 
79 As Reisman does; see Reisman, 'Humanitarian Intervention to 
Protect the Ibos' op.cit. 
30 
suggests a certain amount of lack of consultation 
between the parties in conflict and the intervenor. 8o 
The general language 
international relations lS the 
of intervention In 
language of interest, 
power, and the use of coercion. 8 ! Applied to mediation, 
it has the effect of reducing (and indeed almost doing 
away with) the traditional, consensual nature of 
mediation. As used from a power theory perspective, 
intervention leads eventually to the unacceptable 
conclusion that mediation can be imposed on the parties 
to a conflict through leverage. The term 'intervention' 
In the international relations of conflict management is 
borrowed from the international law of conflict 
management which lS preoccupied with the use and 
limitation of the use of force. This has led to 
mediation as a form of conflict management labouring 
under the connotation of violence, and the use of force. 
As Moore points out, intervention and its consequence of 
counter intervention can be seen as the counterparts of 
violence. 82 
From this perspective, intervention lS the very 
antithesis of peaceful settlement of disputes, except 
perhaps in the very limited sense of empowerment. The 
current usage of the term intervention leads to the Vlew 
that because an external party has intervened, it will 
(through manipulation and leverage) cause the parties to 
agree to terms of settlement which they may not 
otherwise have agreed to. This goes against the very 
graln of a method of peaceful settlement such as 
mediation, and lS the enduring problem with the 
vocabulary of 'intervention'. Since its etiology is 
80 United States presence in Somalia from December 1992, and its 
unilateral nature, is a graphic illustration of this. 
81 See Nye,J.S. Understanding International Contlicts: . ."'in 
Introduction to Theory and History (New York: HarperCollins, 1992) 
pp.132-139. 
82 M J N Law an d c;vil War in the Modern World op.ci~., p. ix. oore, . . .L 
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deeply coloured by the idea of force, manipulation and 
violence, its importation into mediation theory has 
introduced the suspicion of 'forced' mediation. 
Consequently, the term 'intervention' will be 
eschewed in this study. Instead, the term third party 
invol vement will be used. The intention behind this 
choice of phrase is to plead for a return to mediation 
as a consensual method of the peaceful management of 
disputes. 
International Management of Internal Conflict 
The notion of the international management of 
internal conflict as used here has close links with the 
concepts of exogenous and endogenous management of 
conflict, and with the internationalisation of conflict. 
On the level of actors, international management 
encompasses the introduction of exogenous managers into 
the conflict. On the level of lssues, it entails 
bringing into play external factors, since the exogenous 
manager brings with him concerns which being peculiar to 
him, are external to the original conflict. In effect, 
once issues and actors from outside the conflict are 
introduced, any management of that conflict will 
necessarily be international. This lS the sense In 
which Modelski uses the term international settlement. 
The idea of 'settlement' however has certain theoretical 
implications, in that it ranges itself against the 
resolution of conflict. For that reason the notion of 
international management will be preferred 
study. 
. In this 
International management of conflict lS however 
more complex than just the introduction of external 
factors into the conflict. It is particularly so when 
the concept of regional conflict management is imported. 
The idea behind regional conflict management lS the 
attempt to bring the different conflicts within a region 
together for the purposes of management. Regional 
conflict management also concerns the identity of a 
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regional conflict manager. In the African context, this 
recogn1ses the claim that regional organisations can, 
and should play a facilitative role in the management 
of conflict 1n the continent. Thus, it has been 
observed with approval that though not formed with a 
conflict management agenda in mind, certain regional 
organisations such as the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) and the Inter-Governmental 
Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) have served 
successfully 
conflict to 
as facilitative fora 





relationship. For example, the heads of state of Ghana 
and Togo in 1988, and of Senegal and Mauritania 1n 1989, 
met in this way at the ECOWAS annual summit; 83 and in 
1988, Djibouti (which hosts IGADD) , and the IGADD secre-
tariat acting under the aegis of an IGADD meeting, 
mediated in the Somalia/Ethiopia conflict. 84 At the time 
of writing, a committee of IGADD heads of state85 is 
mediating in the Sudan conflict. 




the international management of 
Although states, organisations, or 
undertaking regional conflict 
management initiatives are endogenous because they come 
from the same regional conflict system, they are at the 
same time exogenous because while coming from the same 
region, they belong to different territorial units, or 
states. The duality of third parties who are both 
endogenous and exogenous 1S a 
regional conflict management: it 







83 Lancaster, C. 'The Lagos Three: Economic Regionalism in Sub-
Saharan Africa' in Harbeson,J.W. & Rothchild,D. {Eds} Africa in 
World Politics op.cit., pp.249-267:257. 
84 Zartman, I. W. 'Inter-African Negotiations' in Harbeson, J. W. & 
Rothchild,D. {Eds} Africa in ffurld Politics op.cit., pp.268-283:273. 
85 Of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. 
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heterogeneous. In terms of the management of internal 
conflict, heterogeneous involvement lS a species of 
international management of internal conflict. The 
notion of a heterogeneous third party will later be used 
to analyse the Uganda mediation of 1985, where it will 
be contended that President Moi was a heterogeneous 
mediator. The implications of a heterogeneous mediator 
in the international management of internal conflict 
will be examined from that perspective. s6 
Settlement, Resolution and Management of Conflict 
Although in common parlance conflict resolution and 
conflict settlement are used interchangeably, 
technically a great philosophical divide separates them. 
Those who believe in the resolution of conflict argue 
that once the causes of the conflict are removed, it is 
possible for the parties to resolve the conflict in a 
permanent, and self-sustaining way. Those who believe 
in the settlement of conflict assert that human nature 
being what it is, the best that can be done is to reach 
accommodations which the parties agree to live with -
this does not address the causes of the conflict per se. 
Others argue that 'management' lS a distinct methodology 
which entails seeking either to prevent conflict from 
erupting into a crisis, or cooling a crisis upon 
eruption. In this sense, 'management' includes denying 
each side the means of combat, empowerment, and 
facilitating discussion rather than fighting. s7 The 
genesis of this philosophical divide lies deep in the 
different views taken on the nature of society, its 
conflicts, and how to attend to them. Realist and World 
Society approaches stand at opposite ends of this 
spectrum. 
86 This is discussed in greater detail In Chapter Eight. 
87 Zartman, I.W. Ripe For Resolution: Conflict and I:Jtervention 
in Africa op.cit., p.9. 
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The intellectual history of Realism is informed by 
the belief that (international) society is anarchical,BB 
and is characterised by power, its use, and 
manipulation. B9 In the Realist view of the world, 
conflict is an integral part of relationships in 
society, and can only be tempered by a balance of power 
(or terror), where in Darwinian terms, only the strong 
survive. This balance is maintained by the manipulation 
and if necessary, 
is the conflict 
the implementation of threats, which 
component of Realism. 90 Given the 
anarchical nature of the international system, conflict 
can at best only be regulated temporarily through forced 
readjustments, based on the current power status of the 
parties involved. Because of the mutual suspicion that 
characterises such relationships, these readjustments 
are achieved by bargaining backed by power, through 
which settlement, which is temporary, is reached. Such 
a settlement subsists only while the power relations 
that informed it obtain. Thus, conflict is zero-sum, 
and in that perspective, can only be settled on the 
basis of power and coercion. 
Unlike Realism, World Society takes a different 
Vlew of the nature of international society and of 
man.91 It regards society as consisting of a cobweb of 
relationships, in the pursuance of which conflicts may 
88 Bull,H. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World 
Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977). 
89 de Senarclens, P. 'The "Realist" Paradigm and International 
Conflicts' 43 International Social Science Journal (1991) pp.5-19, 
offers a good critique of Realism. 
90 See Groom,A.J.R. 'Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the 
Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher' in Burton,J.W. & 
Dukes,F. (Eds) Confli~t: Readings in Management and Resolution (London 
Macmillan, 1990) pp.71-98. 
91 A conscise explanation of which is outlined by Light, M. 
'Problem-Solving Workshops: The Role of Scholarship in Conflict 
Resolution' op.cit., at pp.148-154. Banks puts. World Society i~ its 
historical context: see Banks,M. 'The Evolutlon of Internatlonal 
Relations Theory' in Banks,M. (Ed) Conflict in World Society op.cit., 
pp.3-21. 
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arise. In this perspective, conflict is subjective: it 
does not exist outside the perception of the parties. 
Conflict may be about values, wants and interests which 
are negotiable, and which can be the subject of 
settlement. On the other hand, conflicts about human 
needs are non-negotiable, and are not susceptible to 
settlement. Needs, such as recognition and dignity are 
not in short supply, and therefore satisfaction by one 
party of the others' needs does not entail their 
reduction for the other. Hence, conflict is not zero 
sum. Because both parties can each have their needs 
satisfied, a self-sustaining solution to the conflict 
can be mutually arrived at: conflict can therefore be 
resolved rather than merely settled. 
The approach of World Society doctrine 1S non-power 
based, and non-coercive. Thus, parties to conflict 
arrive mutually at a new re-perception and re-definition 
of their relationship. A new set of values is created 
which they can pursue 1n a non-coercive, mutually 
self-sustaining way. In Burton's explication, there is 
a distinction between disputes and conflicts: disputes 
are negotiable interests, and their outcomes can be 
negotiated or arbitrated, hence, dispute settlement. 
Conflicts are about non-negotiable issues, and hence 
conflict resolution addresses the question of how these 
inherent (non-negotiable) needs can be satisfied.92 
Although this summary of these two widely divergent 
approaches is over simplified, it suggests that to 
espouse either is to make a deep philosophical and moral 
92 Burton,J.W. 'Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy' in 
Sandole,D.J.D. & van der Merwe,H. (Eds) Conflict Resolution Theory and 
Practice: Integration and Application (Manchester & New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1993) pp.55-64:55. van der Merwe argues 
that there is a flaw in this argument, in that it creates an analytical 
independence between causes and process of management. Thus, "If human 
needs are seen as an aspect of many real-world conflicts, rat~er 
than the defining characteristic of conflicts, processes to deal w:th 
this aspect of the conflict can be used in a complementary fash10n 
along with other processes." See, van der Merwe, 'Relating Theory to 
the Practice of Conflict Resolution in South Africa' in Sandole,D.J.D. 
& van Der Merwe,H. Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice op.cit. 
pp.263-275:266. 
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commitment. A third party - and indeed the parties to 
the conflict may be unwilling to make such a 
commitment, but may nevertheless believe 1n the 
usefulness of any method by which a reduction of the 
conflict is attained. Therefore, because the integrity 
of any practical approach to the reduction of conflict 
should not be impugned by reason only of its 
philosophical parentage, 
will be used to refer 
the term conflict management 
to diverse efforts to bring 
parties 1n conflict together. Similarly, the term 
international management will be preferred to 
international settlement or resolution which, in terms 
of the debate outlined above, might connote preference 
for a position in a theoretical debate which this study 
will largely eschew. 
Mediation and Negotiation 
Unravelling the relationship between mediation and 
negotiation 1S important 
conceptual clarity to analysis. 
especially in lending 
Negotiation takes place 
when two parties attempt 
bilaterally: in this sense, 
to manage their conflict 
the structure is dyadic. 
When a third party becomes involved it transforms the 
overall structure into 
interpretation, the original 
parties 1S transformed into 
a triad. 93 In this 
negotiation between the 
a mediated negotiation. 
According to the power theories of mediation, such a 
third party invariably has its own interests in the 
conflict and its outcome. Because the third party also 
pursues its own interests in this transformed structure, 
the mediation can be perceived as being transformed into 
a tryadic negotiation. This is essentially a power 
explanation, but the same conclusion can be reached 
differently. In the alternative explanation, all 
conflicts are trilateral since they do not occur In 
93 This notion and the relevant literature are discussed in 
Chapter Two. See for example, Bercovitch,J. Social Conflict and Third 
Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution (Boulder,CO.: W=t:t:vi·:: 
Press, 1984) p.112. 
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isolation from society. Thus, apart from the 
conflictants, other actors In society also form part of 
the conflict. 
The processes of negotiation and mediation are 
therefore intertwined, and are best perceived as siamese 
twins. Depending on the perception adopted In 
conceptualising them, they are either intertwined and 
hence connote a triadic negotiation, or they have 
different 'personalities', and hence imply a mediated 
negotiation. Therefore, while their genetic linkages are 
the same, their anatomy is, at some points, different 
and distinct. Seen in this way, reference to them in 
the course of analysis depends on the analyst's 
perspective. Consequently, the terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably in the literature. 
Track One and Track Two Diplomacy 
Many analyses of mediation approach it from the 
basis that parties communicate with each other through 
either of two channels: track one, which lS formal, 
governmental, and official; or track two, which lS 
non-formal, non-governmental and non-official. 94 The 
rationale behind this duality of channels is that the 
parties may, because of official policy, have no contact 
with each other, and in such cases non-official (though 
officially sanctioned) communication channels may be 
utilised through track two. Also, track two may be 
employed where, because positions that have developed as 
a result of the conflict have hardened, neither party lS 
willing to make public overtures to the other, lest that 
be interpreted as a softening of position. In such a 
case, track two diplomacy may be used to 'test the 
94 These are discussed further in Char~er Two. 
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water' ,95 with the understanding that it could be 
disowned by either of the parties. 96 
Burton has raised the 






resolution, track two 1S in parallel to track one 
diplomacy.97 He explains that track two concerns itself 
with the same 1ssues as track one diplomacy: the 
difference between them being that track two 
practitioners are free from the formal exigencies and 
limitations of track one diplomacy, including its formal 
trappings. 
Ideally, track two players have no present 
institutional connections with any government or 
organisation. But they may have past institutional 
ties, and often do. In dual diplomacy as it is 
explained below and in Chapter Eight and Nine, they may 
or may not enJoy 
performing their duties. 
Dual Diplomacy 
'national etiquet te' , 9B while 
Dual diplomacy is postulated in this study as 
applying (though not necessarily exclusively) to 
internal conflicts. It is not used in the sense of two 
or more track one approaches operating in the the same 
95 A good example of this usage is with respect to the recent 
South African negotiations, where initial contacts between the two main 
negotiators, Ramphosa of the ANC and Meyers of the Nationalist Party, 
were arranged through a mutual third party, at a fishing weekend. See, 
Time International, 1 March, 1993 pp.30-31. 
96 See, Berman,M.R. & Johnson,J.E. 'The Growing Role of Unofficial 
Diplomacy' in Berman, M. R. & Johnson, J. E. (Eds) Unofficial Diplomats (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1977) pp.1-33. 
97 B t J W & Dukes F Con flict· Practices in Management, ur on .. , . . 
Settlement and Resolution op.cit., p.139. 
98 'National etiquette' is defined as that administrative support 
a mediator is given by the agencies of his country in t~e performance 
of his tasks without however being answerable to hlS country's 
authori ties. 'Such support includes things 1 ike ava~ 1 ing communic:at ~ons 
and secretarial help. See Umbricht,V.H. Mult~!atera.l. Med~at~on: 
Practical Experiences and Lessons (Dordrecht: Martlnus N1Jhoff, 1989) 
p.35. 
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conflict,99 or of track one and track two operating in 
parallel in the same conflict .100 Nor does it apply to 
cases where the two tracks operate in sequence but 
independently. In this study, dual diplomacy means the 
operation of both tracks simultaneously as part of the 
same conflict management process. 101 
In internationalised conflicts, dual diplomacy 
would address simultaneously both their inter-state and 
internal levels. Track one conflict management would as 
for example in current OAU practice address the inter-
state dimension of conflict, while track two diplomacy 
would address its internal character. Dual diplomacy 
would bring these two levels together within a single 
process of conflict management. In essence, while the 
track one component of this process would manage the 
negotiable aspects of a conflict, its track two element 
would address its non-negotiable aspects, such as 
attitudes and perceptions. In dual diplomacy the two 
tracks are not mutually exclusive, but act as valuable 
components of the same conflict management process. 
Burton has argued that the identification of track 
two as a separate track of conflict management was an 
important first step in building a theory of conflict 
resolution. He has further contended that the second 
and vital step of this theory building process is to 
99 As for instance in the Afghanistan conflict: see Bokhari,I.H. 
'Evolution of a Dual Negotiation Process: Afghanistan' in 
Zartman,I.W. (Ed) Resolving Regional Conflicts: International 
Perspectives (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1991) pp.58-68. 
100 As for example in Zimbabwe: see Low, S. 'The Owen-Vance Period: 
1977-1979' in Bendahmane, D. B. & McDonald, J. W. (Eds) Perspectives on 
Negotiations: Four Case Studies and Interpretations (Washington: 
Foreign Service Institute, 1986) pp.165-170:165. 
101 In its conf lict management concerns, dual diplomacy is 
eventually neither wholly track one nor track two. At a conceptual 
level, it calls into question whether, as sometimes appears from the 
literature, both tracks are incommensurable. If it is insisted that 
they are, but if dual diplomacy nevertheless produces successful 
outcomes, then a case would be made for dual diplomacy to be 
identified as a separate track of diplomacy: the term. track thn!e 
diplomacy might accurately describe such a track. Th1.s matter 1.6 
however not taken up in this study. 
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move towards track two as the main track of conflict 





of the salience of track one In conflict 
In arguing for a dual diplomatic approach, 
adopts a less far reaching perspective. The 
(and the case study here) reveals the 
weaknesses of track one conflict management, and the 
shortcomings of track two are noted elsewhere. 103 It is 
suggested therefore that a diplomatic approach that 
draws from the strengths of both tracks ought to be 
adopted. In this process, the general salience of each 
track would be emphasised, and brought to bear within a 
single management process. 
The essence of championing a dual diplomatic 
approach to the management of internal conflict is the 
realisation that mediation is a complex and multi-level 
activity, whose concerns may not be realised within the 
limitations of a purely track one or track two approach. 
Because of their limitations, these tracks are not able 
individually to address the whole complexity of the 
mediation process. Dual diplomacy thus forms a chain 
between track one and track two that, drawing from both 
would institutionalise the unacknowledged links between 
them. 
Structure of the Study 
This study is organised around two parts, eight 
substantive chapters, and a conclusion. The present 
chapter has stated the aims and justifications for the 
study, and discussed the methodological milieu within 
which it will be conducted. It has formulated an 
analytical framework, and defined the major terms that 
will border the study. Chapter Two will review some of 
102 Burton, J. W. 'Conflict Resolution as a Political Philoscphy' 
op.cit., p.58. He had made this point earlier by a~g~ing that. confli~t 
analysis and resolution should supplant .offlclal p~~llcy: see 
Burton,J.W. Dear Survivors (London: Frances Plnter, 1982) p.107. 
103 oS.:".:" Chapt er Two. 
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the ma1n literature on mediation, and spotlight those 
areas of concern to this study. 
Because the general flavour of this study 1S 
African, there will be a thematic concern with African 
perspectives 
Three will 
on conflicts in the continent. Chapter 
try to capture the 
perspectives on conflict in Africa, 
the main themes arising therefrom. 
general African 
and bring together 
The efficacy (or 
lack thereof) of conflict management in Africa is an 
important theme of the study, hence Chapter Four will 
examine the policies, practices, and methodology of the 
OAU's management of the type of conflicts outlined in 
Chapter Three. 
These preceding four chapters will lay the ground 
for the discussion of the 1ssues that are addressed in 
the second part of the study, which centres on the 
conflict in Uganda, and its mediation in 1985. Chapter 
Five will outline the historical background to the 
Uganda conflict, and the events that led to its 
mediation 1n 1985. Chapter Six will exarrnne the 
diplomatic context of the mediation, including the 
reasons that prompted the mediator to involve himself, 
and those behind the parties decision to go to 
mediation. 
Chapter Seven will focus exclusively on the 
mediation itself, and will exam1ne it from the pre-
negotiation through to the 
Chapter Eight will offer a 
post-negotiation stages. 
critical analysis of the 
Uganda mediation in the light of the aims and hypotheses 
formulated in Chapter One. It will endeavour to bring 
together the main threads identified in the first part 
of this study in the light of the discussions contained 
ln the empirical chapters. It will also draw some 
generalisations, within the limitations of the single 
case study. The conclusions of the study will be 
carried in Chapter Nine. 
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Chapter Two 




One outlined the 
concerns that will 
theoretical and 
inform this study. 
Some of the issues raised there have, In varying 
degrees, been the subject of some of the main literature 
on mediation. Because the treatment of the varlOUS 
issues in the literature has been uneven, this chapter 
will engage in a broad ranging survey of the literature, 
and flag those areas which have been underdeveloped, and 
which later chapters of this study will engage further 
either by way of alternative explanation, re-
interpretation, or illustration through the case study. 
This chapter will trace the intellectual 
development of the literature on mediation, and explain 
it in terms of changes of level from the interpersonal 
to the international. In order effectively to do this, 
the literature will be categorised under certain 
headings. This classification is however not water-
tight, and certain writings will, with equal 
justification, fit into more than one category. In 
spite of this content overlap, this attempt at 
classification is a useful one for heuristic purposes, 
and as an aid for the analysis of the main literature on 
mediation, the burgeoning extent of which is evident 
from the survey done by Lakos.l 
Literature Development: From Interpersonal to 
International 
1 Lakos,A. International Negotiations: A Biblicqraphy 
(Boulder, co. : Westview Press, 1~l89). 
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Much of the earlier literature on mediation was 
largely devoted to interpersonal conflict. The 
approaches to mediation propounded in that literature 
reflected, and were largely informed by, that concern. 
Walton2 represents the essential concerns of this type 
of literature, while Burton and Dukes 3 have ably put the 
earlier preoccupation of the literature within the 
context of the management of such disputes. 
The concern of this literature with interpersonal 







management of such 
In that context as 
being intervention by an acceptable, impartial and 
neutral third party.4 Kaufman and Duncan look at the 
question of third party intervention in conflict from 
the point of Vlew of interpersonal disputes, but their 
attempts to extrapolate lessons from intervention In 
that type of conflict to the international level are 
laboured. 5 Other literature has recognised the pitfalls 
of such extrapolation. Thus, Thomas has made a powerful 
case for a shift from the earlier 'economic paradigm', 
and suggested that a new paradigm should be concerned 
less with the rationality of actors and instrumentality 
of lssues, and more with the normative influence by 
parties in conflict with each other. 6 Almost similarly, 
2 Walton,R.E. Interpersonal Peacemaking: Confrontation and Third 
Party Consultation (Reading,MA.: Addison-Wesley, 1969). 
3 Burton,J. & Dukes,F. Conflict: Practices in Management, 
Settlement and Resolution (London: Macmillan, 1990). 
4 Moore, C. W. The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for 
Resolving Conflict (San Fransisco: Jossey Bass, 1986) p.14. 
5 Kaufman,S. & Duncan,G.T. 'Third Party Intervention: A 
Theoretical Framework' in Rahim,M.A. (Ed) Managing Conflict: An 
InteLJisciplinaryApproach (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989) pp.273-
289. 
6 Thomas, K. W. 'Norms as an Integrative Theme in Conflict and 
Negotiation: Correcting our Sociopathic Assumptions' in Rahim,M.A. (Ed) 
Managing ConfliL~t: An InterJisciplinaty Approach op.cit., pp.265-
272:269. 
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Strauss has argued for a 'negotiation paradigm' that 
would take into account the negotiation context (i.e. 
the larger concerns affecting the negotiation and 
mediation), and the structural context within which 
negotiations take place. In his view this would help to 
locate negotiation firmly within the larger social 
structure. 7 The second edition of Kriesberg's Social 
Conflicts attempts this sort of growth of the canvass of 
mediation, and especially considers the expanding role 
of intermediaries and its effect on the development of 
the conflict. s 
This increasing concern with perceiving mediation 
In contexts larger than the purely personal represents 
a subtle change in emphasis in the literature. Thus, 
the literature expanded its operational base to take 
into account a larger canvas of conflicts, particularly 
labour and industrial ones. Although quite subtle in 
the beginning, this enlargement lS nevertheless 
important because it marked the first change in emphasis 
In the literature on negotiation and mediation. 
Methodologically, this development lS significant 
because it demonstrated the fact that to be useful and 
more broadly applicable, mediation methods and 
techniques developed at the interpersonal level must be 
imbued with a wider social character and concern. 
The second change in emphasis In the literature was 
from the organisational to the international level. 
Here, methods of mediation which had been tested and 
tried In organisations were applied to international 
conflict. This borrowing from the organisational to the 
international sphere is evident especially in the early 
vocabulary, and indeed methodology, of international 
mediation. This extrapolation is especially manifest in 
7 Strauss, A. Negotia tions: Varieties, Con texts, Processes and 
Social Order (San Fransisco: Jossey Bass, 1978) p.238. 
8 Kriesberg,L. social Conflicts (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1982-
2nd ed.) . 
45 
works such as those of Burton, 9 Raiffa,lO Druckmanll 
and Kriesberg, 12 who attempt to create frameworks for 
conflict analysis on the basis of extrapolation from the 
methodology of small group conflict to the international 
level. Others, like Bacharach and Lawler have 
propounded a theory intended to be applicable to all 
types of bargaining situations, from the industrial, 
organisational, to the international. 13 Cot takes 1ssue 
particularly with Burton's extrapolation of the 
methodology of small group to international conflict, on 
the basis that to do so 1S to underestimate the 
specificity of international conflict .14 Questions of 
methodology aside, the link between the interpersonal 
and the international is a very real and fundamental one 
since, as Kelman points out, II [m]uch of what happens in 
diplomacy takes place at an interpersonal 
level ... whether in meetings ... or in negotiating 
sessions, or at summit conferences. ,,15 Thus, Rubin 
emphasises that however complex, formal, or powerful the 
organisation undertaking intervention in international 
conflict, mediation is ultimately conducted by, and 
9 For example, Burton,J.W. 'Resolution of Conflict' 16 
International Studies Quarterly (1972) pp.5-29; also, Burton,J.W. 'Some 
Further Comments: In Reply to Criticism' 16 International Studies 
Quarterly (1972) pp.41-52. 
10 Raiffa,H. The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge,MA.: 
Harvard University Press,1982). 
11 Druckman,D. (Ed) Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives 
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977). 
12 Kriesberg,L. Social Conflicts op.cit. 
13 Bacharach,S.B. & Lawler,E.J. Bargaining: Power, Tactics and 
Outcomes (San Fransisco: Jossey Bass, 1981). 
14 Cot,J-P. 'Critical Remarks on John Burton's Paper on Resolution 
of Conflict with Special Reference to the Cyprus Conflict' 16 
International Studies Quarterly (1972) pp.31-39:35. 
15 Kelman,H.C. 'Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner' 
in Bercovitch,J. & Rubin,J.Z. (Eds) Mediation In International 
Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management (London: 
Macmillan, 1992) pp.64-96:68. 
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between, individual s . 16 Hence, the interaction of 
individuals represents the common denominator ln all 
types of mediation. 
This neat compartmentalisation of the literature 
into categories of changes in emphasis should however 
not mask the fact that ln many instances, a direct 
development can be discerned from the interpersonal to 
the international level. This trend has been noted by 
Burton and Dukes, 17 and Mitchell, 18 who warns that the 
application of methods used at the interpersonal level 
has been much less successful at the international 
level. Young noted this cross-conflict application of 
methodology in his seminal work,19 while Curle's book 
attempts an integrative approach that takes into account 
the interplay of interpersonal, institutional, and 
international conflict. 20 Deutsch's explanation for the 
various approaches adopted at different times is that 
they reflect the academic disciplines of those involved 
ln conflict research at particular periods: 
"Theoretical approaches often reflect the academic 
discipline of the theorists. Psychologists have 
focused on interpersonal conflict; social 
psychologists have concentrated on interpersonal 
and intergroup conflict; sociologists have stressed 
social, role status and class conflicts; economists 
have focused on game theory and decision making, 
economic competition, labour negotiations and trade 
disputes; political scientists and international 
16 Rubin,J.Z. 'Conclusions: International Mediation in Context' 
in Bercovitch,J. & Rubin, J.Z. (Eds) Mediation ~n International 
Relations op.cit., pp.249-272:249-50. 
17 Burton,J.W. & Dukes,F. Conflict: Practices in Management, 
Settlement and Resolution op.cit., pp.121-123. 
18 Mitchell,C.R. The Structure of International Conflict (London: 
Macmillan,1981) pp.xiv-xv. 
19 Young,O.R. The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International 
Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). 
20 curle,A. Making Peace (London: Tavistock Publications, 1971). 
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specialists have centred their work on political 
and international conflicts. ,,21 
This argument is persuasive because it supports the view 
that the changes in emphasis in the literature observed 
earlier reflect the rise of conflict research within the 
social sciences. 
General Literature 
There is an influential, albeit not very extensive, 
literature that does not take its place properly within 
the categorisation outlined above. This literature, 
mostly classical, examines negotiation and mediation 
within the framework of diplomatic activity. It lS 
rooted firmly In Realist thought, especially In its 
conviction that activities such as negotiation fall 
properly within the sole competence of states. 
Nicolson's Diplomacy is the leading one In this 
category. In it, he characterised negotiation as the 
main diplomatic activity. In defining it as the major 
concern of diplomacy, he raised negotiation to an 
exalted height in the diplomatic agenda. 22 Indeed, his 
other works also extol this function of diplomats. 23 
While Nicolson's book was the modern successor to De 
Calliere's earlier classic,24 Ikle's is the successor to 
Nicolson. 25 His treatise lS an advance on Nicolson's, 
because he locates negotiations within the framework of 
international politics, and examines its processes In 
21 Deutsch,M. 'Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: 
Psychological, Social and Cultural Influences' in Vayrynen,R. (Ed) New 
Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict 
Transformation (London: Sage Publications, 1991) pp.26-56:26. 
22 See Nicolson,H. Diplomacy (Washington: Institute for the Study 
of Diplomacy, 1988). 
23 For example, Nicolson,H. The Evolution of Diplomatic Method 
(London: Constable & Co., 1954). 
24 See Keens-Soper,H.M.A. & Schweizer,K. (Eds) Francois De 
Callieres: The Art of Diplomacy (Leicester: Leicester Uni versi ty Press, 
1983) . 
25 Ikle,F.C. HOI .. ; Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). 
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the broader context of the other interests of states. 26 
Lall's book on the other hand was an important 
contribution in that it considered multilateral 
negotiation and its processes as they take place within 
international organisations. 27 To Lall, as to these 
others, negotiation is essentially confrontational. 
Within this general literature is that which places 
mediation in the perspective of international law 
generally, and the peaceful settlement of disputes in 
particular. Bowett's2B survey is typically legalistic, 
and describes the various methods of peaceful settlement 
of disputes enshrined in the United Nations Charter. 




as does Waldock31 who, 





settlement in special fields such as labour, culture, 
and investments. Birnie32 examines the role of 
international law In solving environmental conflicts, 
through the enunciation of general principles and 
26 See Barston,R.P. Modern Diplomacy (London: Longman, 1988) 
pp.77-78. 
27 Lall,A. Modern International Negotiations (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1966). 
28 Bowett,D.W. The Search for Peace (London & Boston: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1972). 
29 Northedge,F.S. & Donelan,M. International Disputes: The 
Political Aspects (London: Europa Publications, 1971) Ch.14. 
30 Lachs,M. 'International Law, Mediation and Negotiation' in 
Lall,A. (Ed) Multilateral Negotiation and Mediation: Instruments and 
Methods (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985) pp.183-196. 
31 Waldock, H. (Ed) International Disputes: The Legal Aspects 
(London: Europa Publications, 1972). 
32 Birnie, P. 'The Role of International Law in Solving Certain 
Environmental Conflicts' in Caroll,J.E. (Ed) International Environmental 
Diplomacy: The Management and Resolution of Transfrontier 
Environmental Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
pp.95-121; also, Birnie,P.'International Environmental Law: Its 
Adequacy for Present and Future Needs' in Burrell,A. & 
Kingsbury,B. (Eds) International Politics of the Environment (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992) pp.51-84. 
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approaches. She notes that international law and its 
ability to handle environmental conflicts is a hostage 
to the political willingness of states to address 
environmental conflicts. Likewise, Bjorkbom argues that 
although there is an impressive legal and institutional 
framework for the regulation of environmental conflicts, 
it lS not a sufficient tool for the conduct of 
environmental diplomacy. He notes that international 
environmental problems have been addressed ln a 
multilateral diplomatic context, and examines some of 
the inherent problems such as coordination, ln the 
mul tilateral negotiation of environmental lssues and 
problems. 33 Falk34 and Kremenyuk35 give an overview of 
the role of international law ln its flexible and 
organlc, rather than in its traditional and more rigid 
setting, in the management of international conflict. 
Theoretical Approaches to Mediation 
The question of what lS, and what lS not 
theoretical is elusive because it often depends on the 
subjective definition of the researcher. Pruitt 
classifies it conveniently into speculative theory and 
experimental research. 36 To Roger Fisher, negotiation 
theory needs to be both descriptive and prescriptive, 
and in either case, generalisations drawn must be tested 
33 Bjorkbom,L. 'Resolution of Environmental Problems: The Use of 
Diplomacy' in Caroll, J. E. (Ed) International Environmental Diplomacy 
op.cit., pp.123-137. 
34 Falk, R. 'International Law in a Fragmented World: The Challenge 
of New Issues and New Actors' in Vayrynen,R. (Ed) New Directions in 
Conflict Theory op.cit., pp.79-107. 
35 Kremenyuk,V.A. 'Rules of Conduct in the Settlement of Regional 
Conflicts' in Zartman,I.W. (Ed) Resolving Regional Conflicts: 
Inte~-national Perspectives (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1991) 
pp.143-152. 
36 Prui t t, D. G. Negotia tion Behavior (New York: Academic 
Press,19B1) p.10. 







mediation in dissonant ways, 38 and both might not be 
aware when an important and critical paradigmatic 
threshold requiring new ideas has been reached. 39 The 
result would be eventually as Banks has warned 
forcefully: that empirically, things will happen in the 
real world that are not predicted by existing theory; 
and normatively, questions will be raised for which 
existing theory may have no answer. 40 Therefore, 
whatever conception of theory is chosen, there is a need 
for it to perform, if nothing else, the two tasks 
outlined by Banks. This section will review the 
mediation literature that approaches the subject from a 
game-theoretic and simulation perspective, and that 
which raises important ethical and philosophical issues 
about third party involvement in conflict generally, and 
mediation in particular. 
Ethical and Philosophical Issues 
The discourse on ethical issues 1S rooted firmly in 
the views taken on the nature of conflict, and on 
whether conflict is perceived as being subjective or 
objective. There is now wide agreement amongst conflict 
analysts that conflict can be both creative and 
37 Fisher,R. 'The Power of Theory' in Bendahmane,D.B. & 
McDonald,J.W. (Eds) International Negotiations: Art and Science 
(Washington: Foreign Service Institute, 1984) pp.57-68:59. 
38 See Winham,G.R. 'Practitioners' Views on International 
Negotiations' 32 World Politics (1979) pp.111-135:117. 
39 Sandole,D.J.D. 'Paradigms, Movements, and Shifts: Indicators 
of a Social Invention' in Mitchell,C.R. & Webb,K. (Eds) New Approaches 
to International Mediation (Westport,CT.: Greenwood Press, 1988) 
pp.219-229:219. 
40 Banks,M. 'The International Relations Discipline: Asset or 
Liability for Conflict Resolution?' in Burton,J.W. & Dukes,F. (Eds) 
Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution (London: Macmillan, 
1990) pp.51-70:65. This is indeed a more general phenomenon: on the 
application of this trend in sociology, see, Berger,P.L. 'Sociology: 
A Disinvitation?' 4 Dialogue No. 102, (1993) pp.38-42. 
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destructive. de Reuck sees it in that way, by observing 
that conflict 1S 
"both a source and a consequence of change. It has 
innumerable and diverse causes and effects 1n 
society, and is not a unitary phenomenon. It is a 
symptom which accompanies the birth of much that is 
new in society and frequently attends the demise of 
whatever is outworn. It also sometimes signals the 
presence of ills in the body politic. It has 
therefore both destructive and constructive 
aspects. It can be both a warning and a promise. 
It heralds progress and growth as well as death 
and decay." 41 
In this setting, conflict may be seen as being either 
subjective or objective. 42 If it is subjective, parties 
must perceive the conflict for conflictual relations to 
exist. If it is objective, parties need not perceive it 
for them to be considered to be in conflict.43 Conflict 
management relies for its tools on whether a 
subjectivist or an objectivist point of V1ew is adopted. 
If the former, management and eventual resolution will 
occur through altering the perceptions of the parties 
about the nature of their conflictual relationship. If 
the latter, management will take the form of altering 
the structures that are responsible for the conflict. 
Although somewhat simplified, this summary locates the 
source of some ethical and philosophical problems of 
conflict analysis, as evidenced in the literature. 
Curle postulates that one of the components of 
peacemaking 1S confrontation, which ranges from 
revolution to non-violent protest, and through which the 
weaker party in a conflict attempts to restructure the 
41 de Reuck,A. 'The Logic of Conflict: Its' Origin, Development 
and Resolution' in Banks,M. (Ed) Conflict in World Society: A New 
Perspective on International Relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf 
Books, 1984) pp.96-111:99. 
42 On which see, Mitchell,C.R. Peacemaking and the Consultant's 
Role (Westmead: Gower Publishing Co., 1981). 
43 A good critique of these two approaches lS given by Webb,K. 
'Structural Violence and the Definition of Conflict' in [~crld 
Enl')"cl"l)"edia ot Peace: Vol.2 (oxford: Pergamon Press, 1986) 431- 434. 
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conflictual relationship. 44 From a slightly different 
philosophical basis, Webb argues for a utilitarian 
perception of mediation. He contends that since all 
mediators have a value in mediation (l' e It' t . . an u lma e 
desire to end violence), they may, in pursuit of that 
moral aspiration foment conflict In order to create 
conditions that lead to the cessation of violence, since 
in that context, "physical violence is not in itself 
morally wrong". 45 Vayrynen observes that conflicts 
should not be seen as static since they change over time 
In response to the social, economic and 
dynamics of society. 46 Therefore, conflicts 
political 
cannot be 
resolved for good: the task of the conflict manager lS 
to eliminate the violence in current conflicts. Since 
future conflicts will be founded on new socio-economic 
transformations, their management must wait for those 
new transformations to reveal themselves. 47 
Whichever way the third party rationalises its 
functions, the ethical question whether the third party 
should foment violence In order to end it has not been 
satisfactorily answered. Instead, the fomenting of 
violence has been transformed in appearance but not In 
substance, by being labelled as empowerment. There, the 
third party might consider that the existing 
disequilibrium between the conflictants militates 
against their search for ways to end the conflict 
(because one of the parties is too strong and does not 
therefore see the need to negotiate, and the other is 
too weak to have any bargaining power). In that case, 
44 Curle,A. Making Peace op.cit., p.20. 
45 Webb,K. 'The Morality of Mediation' in Mitchell,C.R. & 
Webb,K. (Eds) New Approaches to International Mediation op.cit., pp.16-
28:18. 
46 Vayrynen,R. 'To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the 
Resolution of National and International Conflicts' in Vayrynen,R. (Ed) 
New Directions in Conflict Theory op.cit., pp.1-25. 
47 Ibid., p.23. 
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the third party may lncrease the resources of the 
weaker, or 
decreasing 






effect, empowerment reduces the relative strength of the 
originally stronger party in favour of the weaker one. 48 
Eventually, this means the same thing, and ralses 
equally pertinent ethical and philosophical problems of 
whether a third party is justified, under the guise of 
making peace, both to create and cause violence. 
The philosophical terrain that lS traversed by 
these issues, and the ethical grounds on which they are 
rooted, are bordered by the debate on whether conflict 
is subjective or objective. Thus, the argument lS 
whether the philosophical position that conflict can be 
both destructive and constructive is a sufficient 
warrant for fomenting violence. In ethical terms, the 
debate centres on the basis on which an outsider to the 
conflict can, for reason only that he rationalises his 
actions by reference to the objective and subjective 
dichotomy, exacerbate the conflict by fomenting 
violence; and particularly whether that should be so In 
the face of uncertainty as to the result of that 
violence. 49 
Game Theory and Simulation 
The literature on game 
they relate to mediation, 
theory and simulation as 
ralses questions of a 
different category and magnitude. The centre-piece of 
the lssues raised lS the problem whether purely 
theoretical findings serve to develop the field, and if 
so, to what extent. Thus, if such findings are not 
found to be useful for the analysis and practice of 
48 See Groom,A.J.R. & Webb,K. 'Injustice, Empowerment and 
Facilitation in Conflict' 13 International Interactions (1987) pp.263-
280: they see the problem as being one of making the parties 
symmetrical, through disempowerment. 
49 Webb argues that because of this uncertainty, "only very rarely 
would the peace worker be justified in advocating behavioural violence 
to end structural violence." See Webb, 'Structural Violence and the 
Definition of Conflict' op.cit., p.434. 
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mediation, then they should be rejected. One side of 
this 1ssue 1S stated by Zartman, who warns that 
theoretical approaches 








unless they relate to its true nature. ,,50 On the other 
side is the argument that whether or not such insights 
are useful for the practice of mediation, they are 
nonetheless valuable because they expand the range of 
inquiry. In so doing, they may illuminate perspectives 
which real conflict might not have revealed. 51 
Game theory operates on the triple assumptions that 
conflicts are conducted rationally, that there 1S no 
time limit on the players' ability to choose a course of 
action, and that the players can think through their 
opponents' moves throughout the game. 52 It takes a zero-
sum view of conflict, since it is based largely on a 
vision of the world wherein the pr1mary end 1S the 
struggle for power. 53 Although Schelling54 tried to 
reconstruct game theory by including in it a non-zero 
sum factor such as communication (which lacked 1n 
traditional games such as 'Chicken' and 'Prisoner's 
Dilemma' ), this psychological dimension did not help 
because 
"overwhelmingly ... strategic analysis postulates 
'actors' whose only psychological traits are those 
which the strategist finds convenient to endow them 
with, or those which the strategists, in their 
50 Zartman,I.W. 'Negotiation as a Joint Decision Making Process' 
21 Journal of Conflict Resolution (1977) pp.619-638:619. 
51 Rapoport,A. 'Conflict Resolution in the Light of Game Theory 
and Beyond' in Swingle, P. (Ed) The Structure of Conflict (New York: 
Academic Press, 1970) pp.I-43:39,42. 
52 Ibid., p. 2 . 
53 Rapoport, A. Stra teq}, and Con sci ence (New York: Schoken Books, 
1 c) 6 9 ) p. 11 0 . 
54 Schelling,T.C. The ~trategy of Conflict (Cambridge,MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 1960). 
55 
professional involvement, imagine themselves to 
have. ,,55 
But as Axelrod argues, In an anarchic international 
society, it is possible to use game theory (through the 
iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, which takes into account 
the possibility of mutual gain through cooperation, the 
possibility that one party will choose to exploit the 
other, and the possibility that neither party will 
choose to cooperate), to examine the potential structure 
of cooperation between actors in the system. In this 
regard, Axelrod postulates an 'evolutionary perspective' 
through which the process by which actors in the system 
select a strategy of cooperation 
can be identified and analysed. 56 
The literature on conflict 
(or non-cooperation) 
studies (especially 
negotiations) argues that game theory models are of 
limited use because of their a priori assumption that 
negotiations will end in agreement. 57 Game theory also 
assumes that every conflict is new whereas in real life, 
as Rangarajan points out, every conflict has a memory.58 
Supporters of game theory as an aid to negotiation point 
out that it has increased the precision of the language 
used In negotiation analysis, 59 and that despite its 
many problems, its modern developments cannot easily be 
ignored by policy makers. 60 Zagare has used game theory 
55 Rapoport, A. Strategy and Conscience op.cit., p.123. 
56 Axelrod,R. The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 
1984) . 
57 Rangarajan,L.N. The Limitation of Conflict: A Theory of 
Bargaining and Negotiation (London: Croom Helm, 1985) p.7. 
58 Ibid., p.45. This point is later illustrated with reference to 
the Uganda conflict: see Chapter 8. 
59 Malitza,M. 'Small States and the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes' in Lall,A.S. (Ed) Multilateral Negotiation and Mediation 
op.cit., pp.77-88:78. 
60 Binmore, K. G. 'Why Game Theory "Doesn't Work'" in Bennet t, P. G. 
Analysing l~L'Ilflict and Its Resolution: Some Mathematic-:oal Contributions 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) pp.23-42. 
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to analyse the Paris Peace Talks of 1968-1973; he tries 
to demonstrate how the study of international relations 
and diplomatic history can benefit from the insights of 
game theory, particularly "as an explanatory tool and as 
an instrument for retrodicting historical events. ,,61 
Others contend that In its modified form as hypergame 
analysis, it holds much promise for conflict management 
and resolution. 62 
Nicholson's analysis of game theory lS part of a 
broader defence of rationality as a framework for 
conflict analysis. While admitting some of the 
limitations of game theory, he nevertheless considers it 
an important aid to the study of conflict, because not 
only do games (non-zero, n-person), provide insight into 
the nature of complex conflict, but they also serve to 
clarify ideas about conflict generally. He submits that 
by analysing conflict in terms of different garnes, it lS 
possible to galn insight into the basic nature of 
conflict. 63 
The literature on simulation as an aid to enhancing 
understanding and knowledge about negotiations takes a 
trend similar to that on game theory. One of the most 
enduring criticisms of simulation lS well argued by 
Saunders, who asserts that it is necessary to analyse 
the pre-negotiation stages in order to establish "useful 
links between negotiation theory, the conduct of 
diplomacy, and foreign policy. ,,64 Simulations fail to do 
61 Zagare,F.C. 'A Game Theoretic Analysis 
Negotiations: Preferences and Strategies, 
Zartman,l.W. (Ed) The Negotiation Process: Theories 
(London: Sage Publications, 1978) pp.111-132:132. 
of the Vietnam 
1968-1973' in 
and Applications 
62 Bennet t , P . G. ' Hypergames as an Aid to Mediation' in 
Mitchell,C.R. & Webb,K. (Eds) New Approaches to International Mediation 
op.cit., pp.195-218. 
63 Nicholson,M. Rationality and the Analysis of International 
Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
64 Saunders,H.H. 'The Pre-Negotiation Phase' in Bendahmane,D.B. 
& McDonald,J.W. (Eds) International Negotiation: Art and Science 
op.cit., pp.47-56:48. This theme is taken up further in the critical 
57 
this because they concentrate on the last stage of 
negotiations, where the parties actually sit down to 
negotiate. Putnam underscores one of the fundamental 
failings of theoretical writings based on simulations, 
and one of their most misleading aspects: their 
assumption that actors J.n negotiations are unitary. 65 
This supposition is heavily censured because it tends to 
"obscure much of the richness and complexity of the 
bargaining process. ,,66 For example, Wittmer et al report 
on a simulated mediation in organisational conflict, and 
derive therefrom support for Touval's thesis on 
impartiality. Their abrupt extrapolation from the 
organisational to the international level, and the fact 
that they do not take into account the wider 
implications of mediation render their efforts 
unconvinc ing . 67 
Supporters of the simulation process like Smoker, 
predict that once social scientists develop computer 
literacy, they will be able to use simulation for the 
study of complex social processes, and "the symbiosis 
between complex conflict theory and the new computer 
technology may well provide a creative confluence for 
the simulation of international processes." 68 Perhaps 
the best summary of the shortcomings of game theory and 
simulations is that offered by Rapoport who, though he 
analysis in chapter 8. 
65 Putnam,R.D. 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two 
Level Games' 42 International Organization (1988) pp.427-460. 
66 Colosi,T. 'A Model for Negotiation and Mediation' in 
Bendahmane, D. B. & McDonald, J. W. (Eds) International Negotiation: Art and 
Science op.cit., pp.15-33:17. 
67 Wittmer,J.M., Carnevale,P. & Walker,M.E. 'General Alignment in 
Biased Mediation' 35 Journal of Conflict Resolution (1991) pp.594-610. 
68 Smoker, P. 'Simulations of International Conflicts' in 
Bennett, P. G. (Ed) Analysing Conflict and Its Resolution op. cit., pp .149-
176:150-151. What Smoker fails to note, however, is that in this use, 
data can be subjectively fed into computers, and hence be 
manipulated. 
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did much to develop game theory, did not lose sight of 
its limitations: 
"The strategist will not get the sort of knowledge 
~e wants b.eca.use he does nothing to inquire into 
lts underplnnlngs, namely, the deep commitments of 
people, their concepts of equity, their real 
hierarchies of values ... and their noble and ignoble 
impulses, which may invalidate the strategist's 
entire conceptual system. The strategist will not 
get the right answers in matters beyond his system 
of thought because he does not ask the right 
questions. He cannot ask the right questions 
because his libidinal commitment ... is to power over 
the other, not knowledge of the other." 69 
Historical Approaches 
There are two classes of historical literature on 
international mediation and negotiation. The first 
comprises mainly autobiographical writing, in the form 
of memOlrs of leading actors in various mediations. 
Al though some of these wri tings are sometimes almost 
pejoratively referred to as 'anecdotal' In the 
literature, a fair amount of them are a source of useful 
information for the student of conflict. They glve 
useful insights into the official, and sometimes non-
official, minds of decision makers at the centre of 
important mediations. Indeed, some writings, such as 
those of Kissinger70 have the additional merit of being 
both scholarly and analytical. While the further charge 
against this literature as a source of information -
that it tends to be self-serving - lS often true, 71 this 
lS tempered and counterpoised by the benefit of 
historical hindsight on the part of the reader. 
69 Rapoport,A. Strategy and Conscience op.cit., p.124. He might 
have added that this problem is compounded wi thin a mul tilateral 
setting. 
70 See Kissinger,H. The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1979); also,Kissinger,H. Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1982) . 
71 Such as Haig,A. Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1986); Garba,J. Diplomatic Soldiering: 
Nigerian Foreign Policy, 1975-1979 (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1987); 
Riad,M. The Srrll",lgle for Peace in the Middle East (London: Quart::et 
Books, 1981). 
This literature 
insights into the 





participants in past negotiations and mediations. It lS 
of great benefit to the conflict analyst attempting to 
understand why certain conflicts took the directions 
that they did. The memoirs of Carter, 72 Sadat, 73 and 
to a lesser extent those of Carrington74 are especially 
rich sources In this regard. Others, like Waldheim, 
illustrate the gulf that may exist between what 
practitioners do, and what theoreticians think 
practitioners do. Waldheim repeatedly points out the 
need for a mediator, at least one in the position of an 
international organisation, to be impartial. 75 
The second type of historical mediation literature 
consists of case studies which attempt an academic 
analysis of past mediations. There are two types of 
case studies: those where the data about the cases lS 
carried in data sets, and which because they contain 
multiple cases enable comparative analysis and study. 
The second type are those where the researcher collects 
the actual raw data from the field. While the former is 
useful because it enables comparative study, the latter 
has the merit that the researcher is able to ask the 
particular questions that interest him.76 
Historical case studies serve a useful function 
Slnce they enable the development of conceptual thinking 
about the process of mediation. By allowing a 
comparlson between completed mediations, they permit 
72 Carter,J. Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam Books, 1982). 
73 Sadat,A. In Search of Identity (Glasgow: Fontana, 1978). 
74 Carrington,P.A.R. Reflect on Things Past (Glasgow: Fontana, 
1989). See especially chapter 13 on the Rhodesian negotiations at 
Lancaster House. 
75 Waldheim,K. The Challenge of Peace (London: George Weidenfeld 
& Nicholson, 1980). 
76 See Chaf't er 1. 
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generalisations across cases, and thus mitigate one of 
the maj or pitfalls of idiographism. Some of this 
literature has on that basis challenged the validity of 
received wisdom about certain concepts of mediation, 
such as the requirement of impartiality and the role of 
power.77 Others have made useful contributions to 
mediation theory by highlighting such aspects as the 
right moment to undertake mediation, and the general 
management of conflict. 7B 
Other case study based literature has made 
important contributions to mediation theory by 
displaying the interaction between the conflict system 
and the third party entering into it. 79 Pioneering 
insights into the complexities of mediation by non-
official third parties in conditions of civil war have 
also emerged from this category of literature. BO 
Rothchild and Hartzel, in their study of the Angolan 
conflict, have shown that the same conflict can have a 
dual intra-state and inter-state existence, but that the 
processes of its resolution, while co-existing, may 
emphasise different requirements on the part of the 
intervening third party. B1 A similar point is made by 
77 For example, Touval,S. 'Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and 
Historical Considerations' 1 Jerusalem Journal of International 
Relations (1975) pp.51-70. This issue is one of the main concerns of 
this study, and is addressed in later chapters. 
78 For example, Bendahmane, D. B. & McDonald, J. W. (Eds) Perspectives 
on Negotia tion: Four Case Studies and In terpreta tions (Washington: 
Foreign Service Institute, 1986). The concept of 'ripe moments' is 
reinterpreted in the light of the Uganda mediation in Chapter 8. 
79 Jabri,V. Mediating Conflict: Decision-Making and Western 
Intervention in Namibia (Manchester & New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1990). 
80 Assefa,H. Mediation in civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -
The Sudan Conflict (Boulder,CO.: Westview Press, 1987); also, 
Assefa,H. 'World Council of Churches Mediation and the Sudan Civil War' 
in Mitchell,C.R. & Webb,K. (Eds) New Approaches to International 
Mediation op.cit., pp.147-167. 
81 Rothchild,D.G. & Hartzel,C. 'Great and Medium Power Mediations: 
Angola' in Zartman, I. W. (Ed) Resolving Regional Conflicts op. ci t. , 
pp.39-57; for a closer analysis of that conflict, see, Bender,G.J. 
'Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Luanda-Pretoria Tug of War' 11 
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Bercovitch, who states that mediation 1S a dynamic 
process which operates in different contexts of varying 
complexity, and should therefore be studied 
systematically.82 The role of individual personalities 
and its effect on the process of mediation comes out 
strongly 1n Chan's study of the role of the 
Commonwealth, particularly 1n the Zimbabwean 
mediation, 83 while the notion that a mediator should 
necessarily be an outsider to the conflict is challenged 
convincingly in a study of the Nicaraguan conflict.84 
Social, Cultural and Psychological Approaches 
As noted earlier, Deutsch made the observation that 
theoretical approaches to mediation reflect the academic 
discipline of the theorist. In mediation theory, this 
was especially true in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
when as a resul t of the growth of the behavioural 
revolution in international relations and in the social 
sciences generally, 'scientific' methods became popular 
across the social sciences. Whereas this did not mean 
that other approaches ceased to co-exist with these new 
ones, there was a proliferation of works based 
especially on 'scientific' rationalisations during that 
period. Although these approaches did not rema1n pre-
eminent for very long, they are still influential 1n 
some quarters. Indeed, they still provide some useful 
insights into the process of mediation. 
Third World Quarterly (1989) pp.1S-30. 
82 Bercovitch,J. 'The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in 
International Relations' in Bercovitch,J. & Rubin,J.Z. (Eds) Mediation 
in International Relations op.cit., pp.1-29. 
83 Chan, S . The Commonweal th 
International Action, 1965-1985 
Publishing, 1988). 
in World Politics: A Study of 
(London: Lester Crook Academic 
84 Wehr, P. & Lederach, J . P. 'Mediat ing Conf lict in Central America' 
28 Journal of Peace Research (1991) pp.8S-98. See further, chapter 8, 
where this idea is discussed further in the context of the (TJlnda 
mediation. 
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A pioneering text in this area is Druckman's edited 
volume. 8s He argues that personality is central to the 
study of negotiation behaviour. To him there is a 
complex relationship between personality and negotiating 
behaviour, since personality affects negotiation 
behaviour during the various stages of negotiation. 86 In 
this connection, Winham accepts that psychological 
factors are inputs in the negotiating process, but not 
significant ones. He advances the view that the greater 
the complexity of negotiations, the less personality 
inputs are likely to affect negotiation behaviour. 87 
Oppenheim decries the reduced input of psychological 
approaches in international relations generally, and 
pleads for its revived role, particularly in the area of 
decision making. 88 
An important cross-section of the literature on 
socio-cultural factors examines them against actual 
negotiations. The conceptual background to these 
studies is provided by Unterman. B9 He places discussions 
on cross-cultural influences on negotiation into two 
theoretical models. One model hypothesises that the 
volume and intensity of international negotiations has 
produced a group of people who operate within an 
'internationalised culture', and for whom cultural 
differences have no effect ln cross-cultural 
85 Druckman,D. (Ed) Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives 
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977). 
86 Druckman,D. 'Social-Psychological Approaches to the Study of 
Negotiation' in Druckman,D. (Ed) Negotiations: Social-Psychological 
Perspectives op.cit., pp.15-44:29-30. 
87 Winham,G.R. 'International Negotiation in an Age of Transition' 
35 International Journal (1979/80) pp.1-20. 
88 Oppenheim,A.N. 'Psychological Processes in World Society' in 
Banks, M.(Ed) Conflict in World Society op.cit., pp.112-127. 
Psychological factors were important in the Uganda mediation, and are 
discussed in that context in Chapter 7 and 8. 
89 Unterman,I. 'Negotiation and Cross-Cultural Communication' in 
Bendahmane,D.B. & McDonald,J.W. (Eds) International Negotiations: Art 
and Science op.cit., pp.69-75:71-72. 
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negotiations. The second model posits that although the 
outward manifestations of international negotiators may 
be similar, their internal motivations and methodologies 
may be greatly influenced by their cultures. 
Bozeman argues strongly that not only does culture 
determine the views taken of conflict, but also of the 
methods for its resolution. 90 This theme 1S proper 
adopted by Cohen . 1n his study of Egyptian-Israeli 
He submits that the process negotiations since 1948. 
has been hindered by various cross-cultural antinomies, 
particularly differing views on the role of bargaining, 







a sense of 
flexibility 1n 
Egyptians. 91 Similarly, Blaker traces Japanese 
approaches to negotiation to certain domestic ideals of 
conflict resolution, especially harmonious cooperation, 
and the warrior ethic. 92 HoI t, Chang and Steingard93 
suggest that some problems of modern mediation such as 
the mediator's dilemma (how to settle the dispute while 
at the same time remaining uninvolved with the parties) , 
are rooted deep in western culture, but might be solved 
by metaphoric analysis, which in this case would involve 
the application of the metaphors of Taoist philosophy, 
whose teachings require the mediator to be indifferent 
and non-directive. 
90 Bozeman,A.B. Conflicts in Africa: Concepts and Realities 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 
91 Cohen,R. 'Deadlock: Israel and Egypt Negotiate' in Korzenny,F. 
& Ting-Toomey,S. (Eds) Communicating for Peace: Diplomacy and 
Negotiations (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990) pp.136-153. 
92 Blaker,M. Japanese International Negotiating Style (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1977); some aspects of Japanese negotiating 
psychology are also briefly discussed by Kuroda, M. 'Talking Tough About 
Trade' 7 Journal of Japanese Trade and Industry (1988) pp.30-32. 
93 Holt,G.R., Chang,H-C & Steingard,D. 'Taoism and the Metaphoric 
Analysis of International Dispute Mediation' in Korzenny,F. & Ting-
Toomey,S. (Eds) Communicating for Peace op. cit., pp.118-135. 
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Malitza has tested some of the psychological 
theories against an actual case study, the Zimbabwean 
negotiations. He tests Cross's laboratory findings that 
negotiators choose their bargaining strategies to 
optimise their payoffs, and modify those strategies as 
expectations change;94 Bartos's theory that negotiators 
strive to attain the mid-point between their past 
expectations and present offers,95 and Spector's theory 
that negotiating strategies are determined by the 
interaction of bargainer personalities. 96 His findings 
indicate that each of these theories covers only 
partially the real process of negotiation, and at most 
a "fragment of the truth." 97 
Unofficial Intervention 
The literature on unofficial third party 
intervention in conflict is fairly diverse. This 
diversity is explicable partly by the fact that the 
term covers many activities, all linked together only 
because they are not formal, track one interventions. 
However, the general thrust of the literature is that 
this type of intervention plays an important role in the 
management of conflict, not least because unofficial 
diplomats sometimes have greater access, and "the 
potential to follow more effective novel approaches than 
those of the traditional ... mediator. ,,98 Berman and 
Johnson trace the development of unofficial diplomacy, 
and note that its growth and development reflects 
94 Cross,J.G. 'Negotiation as a Learning Process' 21 Journal of 
Conflict Resolution (1977) pp.581-606. 
95 Bartos, O. J. 'A Simple Model of Negotiation: A Sociological 
Point of View' 21 Journal of Conflict Resolution (1977) pp.565-579. 
96 Spector, B. I . 'Negotiation as a Psychological Process' 21 
Journal of Conflict Resolution (1977) pp.607-618. 
97 Malitza, 'Small States and the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes' 
in Lall,A. (Ed) Multilateral Negotiation and Mediation op. cit., pp.77-
88:80. 
98 Heraclides,A. The Self-Determination of Minorities in 
International Politics (London: Frank Cass, 1991) p.56. 
65 
changing perceptions about international relations. 
They note that since states are no longer the only 
actors in the international scene, a plurality of actors 
engaged in various aspects of diplomacy has emerged. 99 
McDonald argues that track two diplomacy is not a 
substitute for track one, but operates parallel or in 
support of it. 100 To him, phrases such as 'citizen 
diplomacy', 'unofficial diplomacy' and 'supplemental 
diplomacy' are synonymous with track two diplomacy. 
Burton disagrees with this formulation of track two 
diplomacy. He contends that such phrases are all-
inclusive, and concern themselves with both 
intercommunal and international affairs. Track two 
diplomacy, properly stated, deals with matters normally 
dealt with at a diplomatic level, but by people who are 
not constrained by official ties. 101 Burton argues 
further that in working towards building a theory of 
conflict resolution, the identification of track two was 
an important first step, but that the second and vital 
step is to move towards track two as the main one. 102 
Of all the writers on track two diplomacy in any of 
its aliases, Burton has made the most sustained effort 
at explicating its theoretical basis. Conceptually, 
track two is directly opposed to track one, since 
"[track two] is not just about unofficial methods 
within this allegedly political realistic world of 
power politics. Indeed, second track diplomacy has 
its official applications. It is not about 
improved negotiating skills so that 'leverage' and 
99 Berman,M.R. & Johnson,J.E. 'The Growing Role of Unofficial 
Diplomacy' in Berman, M. R. & Johnson, J. E. (Eds) Unofficial Diplomacy (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1977) pp.1-33. 
100 McDonald,J.W. & Bendahmane,D.B. (Eds) Conflict Resolution: 
Track Two Diplomacy (Washington: Foreign Service Institute, 1987) p.1. 
101 Burton,J.W. & Dukes,F. Conflict: Practices in Management, 
Settlement and Resolution op. cit., p. 139. 
102 Burton,J.W. 'Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy' 
in Sandole,D.J.D. & van der Merwe,H. (Eds) Conflict Resolution Theory 
a.nd Practice: Integration and Application (Manchester & New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1993) pp.55-64:58. 
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power can be employed more effectively ... It is 
about an altered set of hypotheses about world 
politics and human behaviour. ,,103 
The relationship between the two tracks of diplomacy lS 
that track two is exploratory, and eventually moves to 
an official level: it discovers options that 
subsequently can be negotiated. 104 Berman and Johnson 
take a similar view, with the difference that for them, 
one of the important characteristics of what they term 
unofficial diplomats is that they can be disowned at any 
time by those in track one, for whom they were carrying 
out exploratory functions. 105 Indeed, as Hare recounts 
from his experiences of unofficial mediation in Cyprus, 
some track one organisations such as the United Nations 
would, while supportive of track two efforts, prefer 
them to have no official affiliation, nor confer on them 
any official recognition. 106 
Montville has analysed the phases that track two 
should go through, particularly 
conflict. To him, there are 
phases: small problem-solving 
in the resolution of 
three interdependent 
workshops that bring 
together conflicting groups informally; influencing 
public opinion, In an attempt at "reducing the sense of 
victimhood of the parties and rehumanizing the lmage of 
the adversary" , and a third, (optional) phase, 
addressing cooperative economlC development. 107 The 
103 Burton,J.W. 'Track Two: An Alternative to Power Politics' in 
McDonald,J.W. & Bendahmane,D.B. (Eds) Conflict Resolution: Track Two 
Diplomacy op. cit., pp.65-72:67. 
104 Ibid., p. 72. See also Chapter 1. 
105 Berman,M.R. & Johnson,J.E. (Eds) Unofficial Diplomats (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1977) p.74. 
106 Hare,A.P. 'Informal Mediation by Private Individuals' in 
Bercovitch,J. & Rubin,J.Z. (Eds) Mediation in International Relations 
op . cit. , pp . 52 - 63 : 58 - 5 9 . 
107 Montville,J.V. 'The Arrow and the Olive Branch: A Case for 
Track Two Diplomacy' in McDonald,J.W.& Bendahmane,D.B. (Eds) Conflict 
Resolution: Track TI .. ·C Diplomacy op.cit., pp.5-20:7-8. The absence of 
the second of these phases was partly responsible for the outcome of 
67 
third of these phases is one way by which the paradox of 
track two (that it works best with non-official parties, 
but has less influence on the resolution of conflict 
because official representatives are not part of the 
process10B ) can be resolved. 
Problem-Solving Workshops 
Different writers have examined various aspects of 
problem- solving workshops. While acknowledging the 
merits of the problem-solving workshop, Kelman 
identifies some of its inherent problems, like the 
problem of transfer (maintaining changed attitudes upon 
return home), and re-entry. 109 But Kelman lS also at 
palns to explain the special character of problem-
solving, and to delineate its distinction from 
mediation. To him, not to appreciate the difference in 
their alms and processes leads to unduly harsh 
conclusions about their place In conflict management. 
Such conclusions are arrived at by Bercovitch, who views 
problem-solving workshops as a useful "social 
innovation, but ... too loose and undeveloped ... and hence 
of limited relevance to the study of international 
conflict. ,,110 
Kelman submits that participants in problem-solving 
workshops should ideally have some access to the 
leadership of their communities, and that informal 
approval for their participation should be obtained from 
the authorities. Thus, "participants should be 
individuals who are generally influential within their 
the Uganda mediation: see Chapter 8. 
108 Druckman, D. 'Four Cases of Conflict Management: Lessons 
Learned' in Bendahmane,D.B. & McDonald,J.W. (Eds) Perspectives on 
Negotiations op.cit., pp.263-288:277. 
109 Kelman,H.C. 'The Problem-Solving Workshop in Confli~t 
Resolution' in Berman,M.R. & Johnson,J.E. (Eds) Unofficial Diplomats op. 
cit., pp.168-200:193-198. 
110 Bercovitch, J. 'A Case Study of Mediation as a Method of 
International Conflict Resolution: The Camp David Experience' 12 Review 
of InterILltional Studies (1986) pp.43-65:45. 
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potential access to respective societies ... and who have 
political leaders. ,,111 In Kelman's Vlew, participants 




Hill considers some of the difficulties of the 
problem-solving workshop, and notes that while a good 
source of normative theory, it has serious limitations 
as a scientific theory, particularly because hypotheses 
generated cannot be falsified by means of the 
workshops .114 Burton has countered this suggestion by 
asserting that in the complex study of the behavioural 
relations of humans as persons in open systems, no 
controlled experiments are possible, or even desirable 
because such experiments are "too simplistic for such 
complex realities. ,,115 Foltz attempts a more general 
commentary on the philosophy behind problem-solving 
111 Kelman,H.C. & Cohen,S.P. 'The Problem-Solving Workshop: A 
Social-Psychological Contribution to the Resolution of International 
Conflicts' 13 Journal of Peace Research (1976) pp.79-90:84. 
112 This theme is also 
Problem-Solving: A Social-
articulated in Kelman,H.C. 'Interactive 
to Conflict Resolution' in Burton, J. W. 
Readings in Management and 
215:204-205. 
Psychological Approach 
& Dukes, F. (Eds) Conflict: 
Resolution op.cit., pp.199-
113 See Groom,A.J.R. 'Problem Solving in International Relations' 
in Azar,E.A. & Burton,J.W. (Eds) Conflict Resolution: Theory and 
Practice (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986) pp.85-91:91. 
114 Hill,B. 'An Analysis of Conflict Resolution Techniques: From 
Problem Solving Workshops to Theory' 26 Journal of conflict Resolution 
(1982) pp.109-138:111. This is however a wider problem, and applies 
albeit to a lesser extent to international mediation, where there is 
the "difficulty of studying [it] in its natural setting" (Bercovitch,J. 
'International Mediation' 28 Journal of Peace Research (1991) pp.3-
6:3), knowing "who said what to whom and with what effect" 
{Zartman,I.W. 'Conflict Reduction: Prevention, Management and 
Resolution' in Deng,F.M. & Zartman,I.W. (Eds) Conflict Resolution in 
Africa (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1991, pp.299-319:314) 
and hence of undertaking a textual analysis of mediation sessions which 
is difficult because data about them is rarely available {Webb,K. Third 
Party Intervention and the Ending of Wars: A Preliminary Approach (Kent 
Papers in Politics and International Relations, (1994) Series 3 No.7, 
p. 28) . 
115 Burton,J.W. 'The History of International Conflict Resolution' 
in Azar,E.A. & Burton,J.W. (Eds) International Conflict Resolution: 
Theory and Practice op.cit., pp.40-55:49. 
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workshops, 116 while Doob highlights some of the 
practical problems encountered in their organisation, 
and with less than convincing evidence, remains 
optimistic as to their efficacy. 117 Mitchell observes 
that, while the usefulness of problem-solving workshops 
in practical conflict resolution is widely acknowledged, 
their theory building potential is an equally important 
area for future, systematic research. 11s 
A different kind of problem-solving workshop 1S 
third party consultation, as developed amongst others, 
by Ronald Fisher. This approach attempts to 1mprove 
communication between the parties in conflict, and to 
analyse their relationship .119 In its more developed 
form, it is intended to play a complementary role to 
mediation, particularly during the pre-negotiation 
stages. 120 
Unofficial Intervention By Non-Governmental 
Organisations 
The role of non-governmental organisations in the 
unofficial management of conflict is little documented. 
In this regard, Toth offers a very general discussion of 
the role of the church in conflict resolution. 121 Austin 
gives a detailed analysis of the Church of England's 
116 Foltz, W. J. 'Two Forms of Unofficial Conflict Intervention: The 
Problem Solving and the Process Promoting Workshops' in Berman,M.R. & 
Johnson,J.E. (Eds) Unofficial Diplomats op.cit., pp.201-221. 
117 Doob, L. W. (Ed) Resolving Conflict in Africa: The Fermeda 
Workshop (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). 
118 Mitchell,C.R. 'Problem-Solving Exercises and Theories of 
Conflict Resolution' in Sandole,D.J.D. & van der Merwe,H. (Eds) 
Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice op.cit., pp.78-94:79. 
119 Fisher,R. 'Third Party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup 
Conflict Resolution' 27 Journal of Conflict Resolution (1983) pp.301-
334:302. 
120 Fisher,R. & Keashly,L. 'The Potential Complementality of 
Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party 
Intervention' 28 Journal of Peace Research (1991) pp.29-42:37. 
121 Toth, K. 'The Role of the Church in Conflict Resolution' in 
Thakur, R. (Ed) International Conflict Resolution (Boulder, CO. : Westview 
Press, 1988) pp.211-222. 
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foreign policy as it related to the conflicts In 
southern Africa,122 while Yarrow describes the Quaker 
approach to conflict management, which is said to be 
founded on the pillars of a humanistic approach, 
confidentiality, pacifism and consensus. 123 Assefa 
discusses the role of the World Council of Churches and 
the All Africa Conference of Churches in mediating the 
Sudan civil war. 124 He notes that this kind of 
unofficial intervention lS particularly suitable In 
civil wars, where track one participation may be witheld 
as a matter of policy, so as not to confer legitimacy 
and prestige on those parties in the civil war who are 
not the government in power. 125 
This literature on unofficial intervention reveals 
that this area lS still underdeveloped both In the 
theory and practice of conflict management. But, 
al though a robust area, modes and practices of its 
operationalisation are still developing, albeit rather 
slowly. But they are doing so In ways that will 
strengthen its contribution especially to the resolution 
of protracted conflicts. 126 
Mediation By International Organisations 
The complexity of the international environment has 
added unofficial involvement in mediation to that of 
states, and also led to, and indeed encouraged, 
122 Austin,G. 'The Church of England and Southern Africa During 
the 1970s' in Chan,S. & Jabri,V.(Eds) Mediation in Southern Africa 
(London: Macmillan, 1993) pp.3-26. 
123 Yarrow,C.H.M. Quaker Experiences in International Conciliation 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). 
124 Assefa,H. Mediation in Civil Wars op.cit. This mediation lS 
discussed in terms of OAU conflict management in Chapter 4. 
125 Assefa, 'World Council of Churches Mediat ion and the Sudan 
Civil War' in Mitchell,C.R. & Webb,K. (Eds) New Approaches to 
International Mediation op.cit., pp.156-157. 
126 Kelman, 'Informal Mediation by the Scholar/Practitioner' 
op. cit., p. 94. Possible future roles for track two diplomacy in 
conflict management in Africa are suggested in Chapter 9. 
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participation by international organisations in 
mediation or mediation-supporting activities .127 In this 
connection, the United Nations publication, The Blue 
Helmets128 is a rich documentary source of United Nations 
efforts in this endeavour. Although not about mediation 
per se, it explains the role of peacekeeping as being 
inter alia to create a climate in which peacemaking, 
which may involve mediation,129 can prosper, as for 
example in Cyprus .130 Writing on the role of the United 
Nations in the Middle East conflict, Jonah argues that 
international organisations have certain advantages when 
they act as third parties, since they have no vested 
interests in the parties or the dispute .131 They can 
also provide a face saving alternative Slnce a party 
making a compromise does so as a concession to the 
international community rather than to the adversary. 
He argues interestingly, that like unofficial diplomats, 
international organisations can, if necessary, be 
disavowed by either or both parties to a conflict more 
readily than an intermediary acting on behalf of a 
state. 132 Thornton examines the role of regional 
127 Bercovi tch, 'The Structure and Di versi ty of Mediation in 
International Relations' op.cit., pp.13-14. 
128 The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping (New 
York: United Nations, 1990). 
129 Boutros-Ghali,B. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations, 1992) pp.20-22. 
130 See The Blue Helmets op.cit., p.298. On the conflict and 
peacemaking efforts in Cyprus, including tho.se of the un~te~ Nations, 
see for example, Polyviou,P.G. Cyprus: Confl~ct and Negot~at~on, 1960-
1980 (London: Duckworth, 1980); Groom,A.J.R. 'Cyprus: Light at the End 
of the Tunnel' 9 Millennium (1984) pp.245-257; also, Groom,A.J.R. 
'Cyprus: Back in the Doldrums' The Round Table No.300, (1986) pp.362-
383. 
131 Jonah has in mind a specifically UN role: but as is argued in 
Chapter 4, his formulation in this respect is not true of organisations 
such as the OAU. 
132 Jonah,J.O.C. 'The United Nations and International Conflict: 
The Military Talks at Kilometer M';lrker 101'. in Berc:ovitch,J. & 
Rubin, J. Z. (Eds) Mediation in Internat~onal Relat~ons op. Cl.t., pp .176-
205:177. 
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organisations like the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) in regional conflict management, 
notes that their efficiency during the cold war 
and 
was 
hampered by super power involvement 1n those 
conflicts.133 
A fair number of the studies on the role of 
international organisations in mediation (and conflict 
management generally), have focused on the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU). The general tone of many of 
these studies is represented by Amoo and Zartman, who 
argue that mediation by regional organisations should 
not be seen as being undertaken by the organisations as 
composite actors, but by individual member states of 
those organisations. They contend that "in most of its 
mediatory activity, the regional organization is a locus 
and a flag, not a corporate actor." 134 The point being 
made here 1S that regional organisations do not 
themselves, qua organisations, act as mediators, and 
that therefore, "basic questions of interest and 
leverage ... have to be answered in terms of the member 
states and not 1n terms of the organization. ,,135 The 
eventual point being canvassed is thus one which Zartman 
has laboured elsewhere: that neither the sum nor the 
parts of the OAU can arrive at a successful mediation 
unassisted.136 A neatly evasive version of this thesis 
is postulated by Nye, who while concluding that regional 
organisations (including the OAU) "merely contribute 
133 Thornton,T.P. 'Regional Organizations in Conflict Management' 
in Zartman,I.W. (Ed) Resolving Regional Conflicts op.cit., pp.132-142. 
134 Amoo,S.G. & Zartman,I.W. 'Mediation by Regional Organizations: 
The Organization for African Unity (OAU) in Chad' in Bercovitch,J. & 
Rubin,J.Z. (Eds) Mediation in International Relations op.cit., pp.131-
148:131. 
135 Ibid. But see the discussion of OAU conflict manaa~ment in 
Chapter 4. 
136 See Zartman, I. W. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict anti 
Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989-updated 
ed. ) . 
73 
small but useful pleces to the puzzle of peace", 137 
finds 
down 
tha t regional 




conflict that he 
studied. 13B 
Fol tz' s analysis 
management of Africa's 
Having examined the 
of the role of the OAU In the 
conflicts lS more forthright. 
cornerstones of OAU conflict 
management (i.e. non-interference, respect for 
territorial integrity, and African solutions to African 
problems), he recognises a subtle but important 
component of OAU peacemaking: that "it is more important 
that a dispute be resolved within the framework of the 
organization than that it be formally resolved by the 
organization. ,,139 This distinction has been made 
elsewhere, 14°but Foltz goes beyond it and concludes that 
the OAU's system of conflict management lS not 
misguided, but will be more effective once it addresses 
the question of creating an economically enabling 
environment. Lancaster's views are not much different: 
she notes that some sub-regional organisations, even 
though created for economic purposes, have served as 
fora for intervention In conflicts between member 
states. Indeed, she notes that the success of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) In 
this respect, in the dispute between Ghana and Togo In 
1988, and Senegal and Mauritania in 1989, led to the 
137 Nye,J.S. Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional 
Organization (Lanham: University Press of America, 1987) p.199. 
138 Ibid., p.159. 
139 Foltz,W.J. 'The Organization of African Unity and the 
Resolution of Africa's Conflicts' in Deng,F.M. & Zartman,I.W.(Eds) 
Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 
1991) pp.347-366:357. 
140 In Meyers, B. D. 'Intraregional Conflict Management by the 
Organization of African Unity' 28 International Organization (1974) 
pp.345-374. 
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mooting of the creation of an ECOWAS Standing Mediation 
Commi t tee. 141 
Mediation In International Organisations 
The mediatory role of states and individuals within 
the multilateral negotiating context of international 
organisations is important, yet often ignored. In this 
role, bilateral negotiations, shading into mediation, 
take place within the overall multilateral context. 
Zartman sets out the context of mediation In 
international organisations, by observing that: 
"When parties do not feel equally constrained to 
negotiate, when power or aims are out of balance, 
or when trust is elusive, a mediator is especially 
useful. Mediators make communication possible when 
it breaks down; they think up new formulas for 
agreement when the parties run out of ideas; they 
can add side payments when it becomes otherwise 
hard to come up with a positive sum; they become 
the vehicle of trust when the parties do not trust 
each other; and they can provide some pressure to 
move the parties to agreement. In a large 
multilateral negotiation, mediation may come from 
an individual ... or from an international 
organization, such as the Commission for the 
European Communlties in the 
Lome ... negotiations. ,,142 
Williams's article points out the sort of role small 
states, particularly 'neutral' ones, can play In 
breaking a deadlock in multilateral negotiations. H3 
Although the body of that article deals with mediation 
in international organisations, the title confuses that 
role with the potential one that small states can play 
In mediating conflicts 
generally, such as the 
In international relations 
mediation by Algeria In the 
141 Lancaster,C. 'The Lagos Three: Economic Regionalism in sub-
Saharan Africa' in Harbeson,J.W. & Rothchild,D. (Eds) Africa in World 
Politics (Boulder,CO.: Westview Press, 1991) pp.249-267:256-257. 
142 Zartman, I. W. 'Conclusions: Importance of North-South 
Negotiations' in Zartman,I.W. (Ed) positive S~: Improving North-South 
Negoti3.tions (New Brunswick & London: Transactlon Books, 1987) pp.278-
301:294-295. 
143 Williams,A. 'Mediation by Small States: Some Lessons From 'he 
CSCE' 6 Para3igms (1992) pp.52-64. 
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Iranian hostage crisis, which is analysed in some detail 
by Slim.144 
In the multilateral context, Dell analyses the role 
that groups can play in enhancing the efficiency of 
multilateral negotiations by 'bilateralising' them. 
Although he notes that the conversion of multilateral 
negotiations 
difficulties 
into one between groups 
especially where there 
. 
1S fraught with 
are divergent 
opinions within the group, the role of the chairman can 
be crucial in mediating these types of differences, and 
thus facilitating agreement .145 
Slightly differently, Lang points to the role 
played by interest groups and dominating personalities 
in mediating differences in multilateral negotiations. 
They can perform an important role horizontally by 
facilitating communication between the members, and 
vertically by mediating dialogue between the conference 
leadership and individual delegations. 146 Antrim and 
Sebenius illustrate the point that a chairman who 
understands the mediation process and is willing to be 
creative, can be a pillar in the successful outcome of 
multilateral negotiations. 
Ambassador Koh's ability to 
widely acceptable formulae 
They conclude that 
foster the development of 
for trade-off between the 
negotiating parties, and to create linkages between 
different and contending issues by personal informal 
mediation, largely contributed to the successful 
outcome in the law of the sea negotiating group of which 
144 Slim,R.N. 'Small State Mediation in International Relations: 
The Algerian Mediation of the Iranian Hostage Crisis' in Bercovitch,J. 
& Rubin, J. Z. (Eds) Mediation in International Relations op. cit., 
pp.206-231. 
145 Dell,S. 'The United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations' in Kaufmann,J. (Ed) Effective Negotiation: Case Studies 
in Conference Diplomacy (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989) pp.53-74. 
146 Lang,W. 'The Second Review Conference of the 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention' in Kaufmann, J. Effective Negotiation op. cit., 
pp.191-203:198. It is argued later that a third party playing a 
similar mediatory role at the Moshi Conference might have changed the 
later pattern of conflict in Uganda: see Chapter 5 and 6. 
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he was chairman. 147 During the law of the sea conference 
also, a procedural innovation was put in place, whereby 
unofficial negotiating sessions, mediated by private 
initiative, but taking place outside official 
negotiating framework, helped to produce a draft texts 
that were generally acceptable, thereby facilitating 
agreement on many issues. 148 
Zartman's formulation of mediation in international 
organisations is pertinent. To him, mediators in that 
setting play a role similar to that of mediators In 
behavioural conflict, in as far as the technical aspects 
of mediation are concerned. However, he notes that in 
mediation in international organisations, mediators may 
be either partial or impartial. In international 
economic negotiations, secretariats are best placed to 
play the role of impartial mediators, 149 whereas In 
north-south negotiations, partial mediators such as the 
Commonwealth Secretariat or the Commission of the 
European Communities are the order of the day. But in 
spite of being partial, such mediators have a special 
role to play, in that they are "expected to 'deliver' 
the party to whom they are partial, as they bring 
together the two sides to make up an agreement. ,,150 Such 
mediators, although having few resources for side 
payments, and little other than moral leverage over 
147 Antrim,L.N. & Sebenius,J.K. 'Formal Individual Mediation and 
the Negotiator's Dilemma: Tommy Koh at the Law of the Sea Conference' 
in Bercovitch, J. & Rubin, J. Z. (Eds) Mediation in International Relations 
op.cit., pp.97-130. 
148 Evensen, J. 'Three Procedural Cornerstones of the Law of the 
Sea Conference: The Consensus Principle, the Package Deal and the 
Gentleman's Agreement' in Kaufman, J. (Ed) Effective Negotiation op. ci t . , 
pp.75-92:84. 
149 Although some secretariats, such as that of the CSCE are 
designed to playa purely technical, rather than any political role: 
see, Lipatti,V. 'The CSCE and Innovations in the Practice of 
Multilateral Diplomatic Negotiations' 44 International Social Science 
Journal (1992) pp.299-305:302. 
150 Zartman, 'Conclusion: Importance of North-South Negotiations' 
op . cit., p. 2 '15 . 
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states, can instead provide communication, formulae, and 
truSt. 151 
The Politics of Mediation 
The body of literature on the politics of mediation 
is significant, and is of great importance to the theory 
and practice of mediation. Endeavours that have been 
made to place conflict management in the larger context 
of international relations theory will be examined under 
this rubric. 
Apart from Groom's masterly treatment of this kind 
of integration,152 and Banks's much broader survey, 153 
much of the literature operates within the context of a 
particular paradigm. The effects of this on the 
discipline have been severe: statements made within the 
context of a particular paradigm, like Touval's 
generalisation about impartiality, 154 have come, ~pse 
dixit, to be taken as representing the high ground of 
mediation theory and practice. 
There are three main contending schools of thought 
in conflict management. These are the power (Realist) 
school of mediation,155 the Structuralist school, 156 
151 Ibid. The idea that a mediator who has no means of exercising 
leverage can nevertheless play an influential role in mediation is 
examined in the light of the Uganda mediation in Chapter 8. 
152 Groom, A. J. R. 'Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the 
Conflict Researcher, and the Peace Researcher' in Burton,J.W. & 
Dukes, F. (Eds) Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution cp.cit., 
pp.71-98. 
153 Banks, M. 'The International Relations Discipline: Asset or 
Liability for Conflict Resolution?' in Burton,J.W. & Dukes,F. (Eds) 
Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution op.cit., pp.51-70. 
154 Touval,S. 'Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical 
Considerations' op.cit. 
155 For example, Touval,s. The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1982) i Zartman, I.W. 'The Political Analysis of Negotiation: Who 
Gets What and When?' 26 World Politics (1973/4) pp.385-399. 
156 For example, Curle, A. Making Peace op.cit.i Galtung,J. 
'Violence, Peace, and Peace Research' 3Journal of Peace Research (1969) 
pp.167-191i also, Galtung,J. 'Cultural Violence' 27 Journal of Peace 
Research (1991) pp.291-305. 
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and the World Society approach. 157 Al though this 
paradigmatic plurality in the literature has delineated 
sufficiently wide and differing perceptions within which 
the schools have contended for mastery, mediation 
literature has been dominated by the power school, and 
neither the existence of both passionate15B and 
articulate,159 literature has been able to alter this 
perception. 
The literature justifying the notion that 
impartiality is not necessary for successful mediation 
is powerful, if not entirely convincing 1n its 
explanations. 16o In it, the beginning point is the 
unconditional rejection of Young's seminal The 
Intermediaries where he argued that impartiality 1S an 
important source of a mediator's persuasive power, and 
a necessary characteristic of successful mediation. 161 
This literature is based on the perception of mediation 
as "an integral part of bargaining and negotiation", 162 
in which the original dyadic negotiation relationship of 
the parties in conflict is transformed into a triadic 
one. 163 In that structure, the compelling motive is self 
157 For example, Burton, J. W. World Society (London: Cambridge 
Uni versi ty Press, 1972) i also, Burton, J. W. Conflict: Resolution and 
Provention (London: Macmillan, 1990) i and Banks,M. (Ed) Conflict in 
World Society op.cit. 
158 Burton, 'Track Two: An Alternative to Power Politics' op.cit. 
159 Banks, , The International Relations Discipline: Asset or 
Liability for Conflict Resolution?' op.cit. 
160 A different explanation for (im) partiality is offered in 
Chapter 8. 
161 See also Young,O.R. 'Intermediaries: Additional Thoughts on 
Third Parties' 16 Journal of Conflict Resolution (1972) pp.51-65. 
162 Bercovitch, J. ' A Case Study of Mediation as a Method of 
International Conflict Resolution: The Camp David Experience' 12 Review 
of International Studies (1986) pp.43-65:45. 
163 Bercovitch,J. Social Conflict and Third Parties: Strategies 
of Conflict Resolution (Boulder,CO.: Westview Press, 1984) p.112i a 
similar point is made by Touval, S. & Zartman, I. W. ' Introduction: 
Mediation in Theory' in Touval,S. & Zartman,I.W. (Eds) International 
Mediation in Theory and Practice (Boulder, CO. : Westview Press, 1985) 
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interest, and the motivating credo, power, its use and 
manipulation. 164 The Ii terature makes it clear that at 
that point, mediation as a process becomes absorbed into 
negotiation,165 where the parties in the triad engage in 
hard bargaining. To Zartman, the outcome of that 
bargaining is dependent on the maximisation of power, 
and hence the tautology inherent in the notion of power 
becomes evident: "power determines the ability to Wln, 
but the ability to Wln determines who has the most 
power. ,,166 As Bacharach and Lawler state more directly 
In formulating their power theory of bargaining, 
"bargaining power becomes the central element of 
bargaining, pervading all facets of the bargaining 
relationship. To understand bargaining, therefore, 
is to understand how bargainers perceive, use, and 
manipulate power." 167 
In these circumstances, it is thought that it lS 
unnecessary for the mediator (now an integral part of a 
negotia tion) , to be impartial, Slnce to be impartial 
would militate against the pursuit of his self interest. 
Zartman and Touval consider this logic to be acceptable 







provide an acceptable outcome. ,,168 
pp.7-17:10. 
question ... is 
but whether it 
not 
can 
164 Casmir,F.L. 'International Negotiations: A Power and Trust 
Relationship' in Korzenny,F. & Ting-Toomey,S. (Eds) Communicating for 
Peace op.cit., pp.40-55 gives a useful analysis of power in 
negotiations. 
165 See Chapter 1. 
166 Zartman, 'The Political Analysis of Negotiation: Who Gets What 
and When' op.cit., p.395. 
167 Bacharach,S.B. & Lawler,E.J. Bargaining," Power, Tactics and 
Outcomes (San Fransisco: Jossey Bass, 1981) p.ix. 
168 Zartman,I.W. & Touval,S. 'International r·lediat::ion: Conflict 
Resolution and Power Politics' 41 Journal of Social Issues (19'35) 
pp.27-45:37. This explanation is challenged in Chapter 8. 
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Urnbricht concurs that in certain types of mediation 
where great power political considerations playa major 
role, the absence of impartiality does not preclude 
agreement. In such cases what matters more lS the 
mediator's influence on the parties, the importance of 
their relations with one another, and the likely adverse 
consequences for the parties In case of failure. 
However, he qualifies this by noting that while this lS 
true where a (powerful) government is a mediator, it lS 
not true in cases of an individual mediator who does not 
represent a government. In such cases impartiality is 
an indispensable condition for effective mediation .169 
Technical Aspects of Mediation 
There lS a vast literature that examines the 
various technical aspects of the mediation process. It 
examines such matters as the stages of mediation, the 
ripe moment for undertaking mediation, its outcome, and 
structure. 
Much of the traditional thinking about mediation 
(and negotiation generally), conceptualised the process 
as beginning and ending at the negotiation table. 
Mediation was not seen as as a complex and protracted 
process whose life history often long pre-dated the 
conference table. Modern analyses of mediation reveal 
that the process of mediation lS larger than was 
realised earlier. Modern literature also shows that the 
complexity of issues and the diversity of parties and 
their interests are better understood through an 
examination of the various stages that a mediation or 
negotiation goes through. Saunders, who has written at 
length on this subject, notes that: 
"Crucial as it is, 
only a later part 
resolve conflicts 
around-the-table negotiation is 
of a larger process needed to 
by peaceful means. In many 
169 Umbricht bases his writing on his experiences as the media~or 
in the dispute between Kenya, Ugan~a and Tanzani~ over the ~~lla~sed 
East African Community. See Umbrlcht,V.H. Mult~lateral ~el~it~on: 
Practic3.1 Experiences and Lessens (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988) 
p.243. 
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cases, persuading parties to a conflict to a 
n~gotiated s~ttlement, is even more complicated, 
tlme consumlng, and difficult than reaching 
agreement once negotiations have began. Those who 
try to resolve conflict peacefully need to think in 
terms of a process that deals with the obstacles to 
negotiation as well as the hurdles in negotiation. 
Unless we enlarge our scope to understand why 
parties to a conflict will not talk, we are not 
constructing a theory of negotiation most likely to 
give negotiation a chance. ,,170 
Such an enlarged framework also has the merit that it 
enables the right tools to be used in managing the 
various stages of a conflict. 171 The three main stages 
of negotiation are the 
negotiation itself, (with 
deals, and which lS 
pre-negotiation stages, the 
which much of the literature 
the exclusive focus of the 
literature on simulations), and the post-negotiation (or 
implementation) stages, which have not received the 
attention they deserve, and whose importance lS 
demonstrated by Chan. 172 There can, however, exist many 
more stages. 
negotiation: 
Saunders develops five stages of 
defining the problem, producing a 
commitment to a negotiated settlement, arranglng a 
negotiation, the actual negotiation, and the 
implementation stage. 173 Zartman constructs three 
stages In the actual negotiations: diagnosis, 
formulating or defining the problem, and applying the 
principle so derived to the negotiation .174 Mitchell 
170 Saunders, H. H. 'We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The 
Importance of the Pre-Negotiation Phases' 1 Negotiation Journal (1985) 
pp.249-262:262. 
1 71 Saunders, 'The Pre-Negotiation Phase' in Bendahmane, D. B. & 
McDonald,J.W. (Eds) International Negotiation: Art and Science op.cit., 
pp.47-56:49. 
172 Chan,S. The Commonwealth in World Politics op.cit. 
173 Saunders, 'We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation' op.cit., 
pp.2SS-261. A modified form of this classification is used in the 
analysis of the Uganda mediation in Chapter 7. 
17-i Zartman,I.W. 'Negotiation: Theory and Reality' in 
Bendahmane,D.B. & Mcdonald,J.W. (Eds) International Negotiation: Art 3.Td 
Science op.cit., pp.1-8:2. 
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formulates four stages of conflict termination: the 
decision to compromise, communicating that decision, the 
negotiations themselves, and the implementation 
process . 175 Each of th t f . ese sages 0 negotlation while 
interlinked with the others, has uses and functions of 
its own. The uses of the negotiation stage itself are 
clear to discern: it may lead the parties to a peaceful 
outcome to their conflict. The uses of the pre-
negotiation stage are much less discernible, but no less 
important: a significant learning process may take place 
there, and the parties may derive benefits therefrom 
that are independent of the outcome of the dispute. 176 
The post-negotiation stage is the testing ground ln 
which the parties learn to live together under the new 
conditions created by the negotiation. But, although 
the varlOUS stages are analytically distinct, 177 they 
are symbiotic. 178 
The question of when mediation should be attempted, 
and when the suggestion to negotiate should be made, is 
one of the problematical aspects of mediation theory and 
practice. A mediation that is attempted at the 
inopportune moment is almost certainly doomed to fail, 
while a party which offers to negotiate before the other 
side is ready and willing to do so may be perceived as 
175 Mitchell,C.R. 'Ending Conflicts and Wars: Judgement, 
Rationality and Entrapment' 43 International Social Science Journal 
(1991) pp.35-55:35. 
176 Stein,J.G. 'Getting to the Table: Processes of International 
Pre-Negotiation' 44 International Journal (1989) pp.231-236:232. 
177 Ibid., p.233. 
178 A good illustration of this was the mediation between members 
of the defunct East African Community over its assets. In that 
mediation, progress on the various issues of negotiation was not 
simultaneous. While on some issues (such as the future of the East 
African Development Bank) the post -negotiation stage was reached early, 
other issues (such as the formula for the distribution of 
assets and liabilities) were still at the negotiation stage, while on 
yet others (such as responsibility for pensions), progress was still 
at a pre-negotiation stage. Eventually, all these aspects once 
negotiated, were reflected in the M~diation Agre~me~t between. the 
parties. See Urnbricht,V.H. Mult~lateral Med~at~on: Pract~cal 
Experiences and Lessons op.cit. 
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weak, and therefore compromise its ability to negotiate 
a satisfactory outcome. In an attempt to find a way out 
of this problem, Zartman has designed the concept of 
'ripe moments' 179 or 'plateaus and precipices', 180 
alias 'windows of opportunity'. In his Vlew, 
"Ripeness is associated with conditions where the 
parties realise that their attempts to solve the 
problem and pursue their goals alone are unlikely 
to succeed at an acceptable price. Therefore they 
are amenable to looking for jointly established 
al ternati ves ... A ripe moment may ... be characterized 
as a mutually hurting stalemate with a way out. ,,181 
Zartman's notion of . rlpe moments is based on the 
thinking that conflicts are part of a general process of 
ripening and unripening: once ripe, they burst, and the 
ripe moment is thus evident .182 Ripe moments can also be 
contrived, by lowering the parties' expectations in such 
a way that those expectations are "higher than what 
the ... party could get on the conflict track, minus the 
heightened cost of getting it,,183 Webb points out a flaw 
in the notion of ripe moments and the associated concept 
of a hurting stalemate: while it can be either 
179 These are also discussed in other literature. See for 
example, Haass,R.N. Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional 
Disputes (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1990) pp.27-29, 
138-150. 





and Informal Peacemaking' in Brown,S.J. & 
Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New 
United States Institute of Peace, 1992) pp.241-
181 Zartman, I. W. 'Alternative Attempts at Crisis Management: 
Concepts and Processes' in Winham,G.R. (Ed) New Issues in International 
Crisis Management (Boulder,CO.: Westview Press,1988) pp.199-223:213. 
182 Zartman, I. W. 'Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment, Formula and 
Mediation' in Bendahmane,D.B. & McDonald,J.W. (Eds) Perspectives on 
Negotiation op.cit., pp.205-227:205. 
183 Zartman, 'Negotiation: Theory and Reality' op.cit., p.5. 
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subjectively or externally defined, it lS rarely the 
external perception that is important. 184 
Zartman has developed another way of und~rstanding 
ripe moments, by seeing them as a process of regime 
change. In this sense, accepted patterns of conduct are 
challenged, and reach a point where they begin to break 
down and require to be changed. The notion here is that 
regimes 
"are continually under challenge and are re-
affirmed when they successfully overcome those 
challenges and reassert their structures and 
habits. But at times the challenges accumulate and 
begin to represent growing structural shifts, new 
issues, or an e x h a u s t ion 0 f old 
answers ... Negotiation is necessary to create the 
replacement regime and have it accepted ... " 185 
Thus, ripe moments will coincide with the stage at which 
the old regime is so burdened with challenges to it that 
it is willing to contemplate negotiations about change. 
The literature on the technical aspects of 
mediation suggests that it lS extremely difficult to 
tell precisely when the ripe moment lS recognisable. 
This difficulty exists partly because the ripe moment lS 
essentially a subjective matter within the knowledge of 
the parties to the conflict .186 This difficulty 
notwithstanding, Ott has suggested some objective 
indicators: these include a relatively even distribution 
of power among the protagonists, absence of vital 
national security interests, and absence of intense 
184 Webb,K. Third Party Intervention and the Ending of r<lars: A 
Preliminary Approach (Kent Papers in Politics and International 
Relations: (1994) Series 3, No.7.). 
185 Zartman,loW. 'Conflict and Resolution: Contest, Cost, and 
Change' in Zartman, loW. (Ed) Resolving Regional Conflicts op.cit., 
pp.11-22:19. 
186 This point is laboured by opponents of the notion of 'ripe 
moments'. Although this criticism is valid from the point of view of 
the conflict manager, it is argued in later chapters that the idea 
of 'ripe moments' is still a powerful tool for the analyst studying the 
conflict ex post facto. 
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personality conflicts. 187 But even he then falls back on 
the general statement that: 
"As a rule, conflicts do not remain completely 
static over any substantial length of time. While 
~ew are amenable to mediation at any given point, 
1t seems reasonable that at some time in their life 
history many protracted conflicts will be 
susceptible to intervention by a third party. The 
task of statesmanship will be to remain alert to 
such moments and exploit them. With proper timing, 
the mediator may provide the critical impetus to a 
settlement. ,,188 
The literature that analyses conflict and its 
management through an understanding of the structure of 
conflict 1S sparse, but powerful. Wall suggests a 
mediation paradigm, where the mediation environment 
includes not only the parties to the conflict, the 
mediator, and their constituents, but also third parties 
who affect, or are affected by, the process and outcome 
of the mediated negotiation. 189 Jabri illustrates how 
third parties come to be drawn into, and become part of, 
a complex conflict system. 190 Mitchell has fine tuned 
the paradigm formulated by Wall, and broadened the 
environment to include the sources of the benefits that 
the parties, and especially the mediator, derive from 
the process. This more encompass1ng V1ew of the 
negotiating environment identifies the sources of the 
benefits (and therefore the actors involved), as the 
conflict itself, the regional environment, other third 
parties, (i.e. the international audience), and the 
constituents of the parties to the conflict, including 
187 Ott,M. 'Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution: Two 
Cases' 26 International Organization (1972) pp.595-618:618. 
188 Ibid., p.618. Emphasis added. 
189 Wall,J.A. 'Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed 
Research' 25 Journal of Conflict Resolution (1981) pp.157-180:158. 
190 Jabri,V. Mediating Conflict op.cit. 
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those of the mediator. 191 Vayrynen I s contribution 
considers conflict from the perspective of its 
transformation. In his view, since conflicts are 
dynamic processes, their analysis must reflect that 
dynamism. This transformation is evidenced by actor, 
issue, rule, structure, and interest-structure 
transformation. To Vayrynen, solutions to conflicts can 
only be found by addressing the causes and structure of 
their transformation. 192 
A logical complement to the literature that 
addresses the broad process of mediation as examined 
above, is that on the outcomes of mediation. This 
literature focuses especially on the conditions that 
facilitate the successful outcome of mediation. 
Bercovitch has identified three basic conditions that 
affect the likelihood of the successful outcome of 
mediation. These are the identity of the parties, the 
nature of the dispute, and the characteristics of the 
mediator .193 Using what he terms the contingency 
approach (i. e . regarding outcomes as contingent upon 
certain variables), further but lesser conditions for 
successful outcomes are identified, such as the power 
disparity between the disputants, and the nature of the 
disputants I former relations. 194 The perception by a 
party that the other is paying a sufficiently high price 
for the settlement may also contribute to a successful 
191 Mitchell,C.R. 'The Motives for Mediation' in Mitchell,C.R. & 
Webb,K. (Eds) New Approaches to International Mediation op.cit., pp.29-
51:36-37. See chapter 6 and 8 for the application of this theorising 
to the Uganda mediation. 
192 Vayrynen,R. 'To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the 
Resolution of National and International Conflicts' in Vayrynen,R. (Ed) 
New Directions in Conflict Theory op.cit., pp.1-25. 
193 Bercovitch, J. 'International Mediation: A Study of the 
Incidence, Strategies, and Conditions of Successful Outcomes' 21 
Cooperation and Conflict (1986) pp.155-168:160-163. 
194 Bercovitch,J., Anagnoson,J.T. & Wille,D.L. 'Some Conceptual 
Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in 
International Relations' 28 Journal of Peace Research (1991)pp.7-17:7. 
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outcome, particularly In conflicts of long standing. 195 
The importance of thinking about the conditions 
necessary for successful outcomes is that the mediator 
may, at the outset of the mediation, know the types of 
conditions that may lead to a successful outcome in the 
type of conflict he is mediating. On a practical level, 
this may provide useful guidelines to the kind of 
action, such as empowerment, that may inch the mediation 
towards a successful outcome. 
Bercovitch et al have also formulated a 'success 
index' by which the outcome of mediation can be 
measured. In this formulation, mediation lS fully 
successful when it is given credit for making a great 
difference to, or settling the conflict; it is partially 
successful when its efforts initiate negotiations and 
some dialogue between the parties; it achieves limited 
success when it attains only a ceasefire or a break In 
hostility, and lS unsuccessful when it has no 
discernible impact on the conflict. 196 
Mediation as Role Playing 
The growlng literature on the role that the 
mediator plays is based on the judgment that although 
mediators may be informed by some element of altruism in 
deciding to mediate, the true reasons for the decision 
to mediate are located elsewhere, and outside the mere 
wish to create peace. Quite beyond the technical roles 
that the mediator plays once a mediation is underway, 
there are important issues to be investigated. In 
particular, why should a party undertake a role that 
calls for high expenditure in terms of resources, and 
which might injure the reputation of the mediator should 
he fail? 
195 S t T L & Alexander,J.M. Conflict Resolution: The Analytic aa y, .. 
Hierarchy Approach (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989) p.9. 
196 Bercovi tch, et al ' Some conceptual Issues and Empirical 
Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations' 
op.cit., pp. 'i-10. The analysis in Chapter 8 adopts this Success Index. 
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Wall's contribution to knowledge In this area lS 
founded on the point of view that the mediator should be 
looked at as a symbiotic part of the conflict, and that 
his invol vement begins long before the actual 
negotiation, In the pre-negotiation stages. 197 Young's 
more traditional treatment of this subject leads to a 
formulation of certain roles which the mediator plays: 
mediatory and conciliatory actions (such as persuasion, 
enunciation and interpretation); positive actions (such 
as facilitating communications, and interposition, l.e. 
providing peacekeeping services) ; and service 
activities, 
agreed upon 




regimes. 198 Similarly, Brouillet observes that the 
mediator may also offer his services once his mission is 
over, and maintain "a kind of continuous mediation". 199 
During the mediation itself, the mediator can also play 
the role of preventing disagreements arising between 
other parties participating in the negotiation. 200 In 
environmental negotiations, the mediator's roles include 
acting as a catalyst, educator, and translator. 
Significantly for this as for other types of mediation, 
he can act as a scapegoat, especially when the parties 
re-enter their domestic environments. 201 
Discussion on the role of the mediator however 
needs to be looked at in a context wider than just the 
197 Wall, 'Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed Research' 
op.cit. 
198 Young,O.R. The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International 
Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). 
199 Brouillet,A. 'Mediation as a Technique of Dispute Settlement: 
Appraisal and Prospects' in Thakur,R. International Conflict Resolution 
op.cit., pp.165-173:172. 
200 Stenelo,L-G. Mediation in International Negotiations (Malmo: 
Nordens boktryckeri, 1972) p.8. 
201 Bacow,L.S. & Wheeler,M. Environmental Dispute Resolution (New 
York: Plenum Press, 1984) p.188-189. These roles are not, however 
peculial' to mediation in environmental conflicts. 
89 
actual negotiations. Thus, 
mediator acts within the 
Carnevale argues that the 
realities of the wider 
international system. 202 In this context, the mediator's 
behaviour is associated with a status that the mediator 
sees himself as having, and to which he patterns his 
reactions. 203 Seen in this way, a mediator's behaviour 
is intended to enable him to achieve a sense of 
fulfilling certain roles which he sees as his destiny to 
play.204 Mitchell's position is succinct: third parties 
intervening 1n a conflict choose their strategy (alias 
their role) "on the basis of some evaluation of the 
relative costs and benefits of adopting one strategy 
rather than another. ,,205 The point Mitchell is making is 
that the choice of the type of role to play is one 
amongst a set of repertoires available for managing a 
conflict. Bercovitch refines this theorising further by 
envisioning motivation to mediate as being different for 
official and unofficial mediators. Unofficial mediators 
may be prompted inter alia by the desire to change the 
pattern of long standing conflict 1n order to ga1n 
access to political leaders, or 
personal standing and professional 
to enhance their 
status. Official 
mediators might intervene in order to protect their own 
political interests, preserve a structure of which they 
202 Carnevale,P.J. 'Mediation of International Conflict' in 
Oskamp, S. (Ed) International Conflict and National Public Policy Issues 
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1985) pp.87-105:92. This wider 
context of the mediator's role was evident in the Uganda conflict, and 
is discussed at length in Chapter 6. 
203 Laue,J.H. 'The Emergence and Institutionalization of Third 
Party Roles in Conflict' in Burton, J. W. & Dukes, F. (Eds) Conflict: 
Readings in Management and Resolution op.cit., pp.256-272:257. 
204 Rothchild and Hartzel's analysis of how the Angolan settlement 
satisfied the needs of the various parties to be seen as playing 
certain roles illustrates of this point. See, Rothchild & Harzel, 
'Great and Medium Power Mediations: Angola' in Zartman,I.W. (Ed) 
Resolving Regional Conflicts op.cit., pp.43-44. This point is 
demonstrated further in the mediator's perceived role in the Uganda 
mediation: see Chapter 6. 




a part, or enhance and extend their influence with 
parties 1n conflict. 206 
Quite evidently therefore, 
conflict requires a 
particular role that 
careful 
the proper analysis of 
consideration of the 
the mediator plays. Because 
mediators also have their own agenda to pursue, the role 
that they decide to play may affect significantly the 
direction that the mediation takes, and the very 
structure of the conflict. Traditional analyses missed 
this important point: modern analyses are slowly making 
amends. 
Mediation in Civil Wars 
Many of the current conflicts 1n the world are 
internal conflicts. Given their significant numbers, 
and the fact that internal wars seem set to remain an 
important feature of international life in the future, 
as is clearly evident in the pattern of post-Cold War 
conflicts, the study and analysis of their processes and 
management 1S an important aspect of the study of 
conflict. A significant set of the literature on 
mediation has developed knowledge on the question of the 
management of internal conflict. This section will 
delve into the most salient aspects of that literature. 
Although not specifically on mediation, Modelski's 
article on the international settlement of internal war 
has remained influential over the last thirty years. 207 
In it, he outlines a carefully crafted anatomy of 
internal war, and highlights possible outcomes of such 
wars. These are an outright win, a separation (i. e. 
avoidance), and settlement, which entails procedural 
resolution of the war, and which he sees as the best 
206 Bercovitch, 'The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in 
International Relations' op.cit., pp.8-9. That this is a pertinent 
observation is illustrated by reference to the Uganda conflict, in 
Chapter 5 (Nyt?rere) and Chapter 6 (Moi). 
207 Modelski,G. 'The International Settlement of Internal Wars' 
in Rosenau,J. (Ed) International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1964) pp.131-149. 
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outcome. Significantly, Modelski places internal war 
within its international context, and so justifies the 
taking of international action to end such wars: 
"every internal war occurs In the context of 
international society; it is a disturbance in the 
functioning of one member of that society and it 
cannot but affect other members of the society as 
a whole. ,,208 
In his reckoning, there are certain conditions necessary 
for the settlement of internal war: a well defined 
identity or personality of the contestants, a certain 
minimum duration of the conflict, the possibility of 
third party actors coming into play, and a certain 
amount of communication between the parties, which 
incl udes shared cuI tural values such as language and 
other symbol s . 209 
Although looking exclusively at international wars, 
Pillar's book nevertheless provides some useful insights 
into the termination of internal wars. His typology of 
war endings consists of absorption, where one party lS 
absorbed into a larger war; extermination or expulsion, 
where one of the sides is exterminated, or expelled from 
the theatre of war; and withdrawal, where the war ends 
by a decision of both parties, but without any specific 
agreement. 210 In an interesting argument, he sees a 
package deal as providing the best settlement agreement: 
both parties concede on certain 
The further merit of the package 
In this arrangement, 
issues simultaneously. 
deal lS that it may serve to avoid a continued 
stalemate,211 since issues are agreed on in clusters. 
208 Ibid., pp.126-127. 
209 Ibid., p.142. 
210 Pillar, P.R. Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining 
Process (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) pp.14-15. 
Withdrawal can be either unilateral (i. e. capitulation), or by 
negotiation between the parties. In the latter case, the parties may 
eventually resolve the conflict. 
211 Ibid. 
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Zartman has made one of the most important 
contributions in this area. 
different ways of looking at 
that each way of looking at 
He argues that there are 
(regional) conflict, but 
it suggests a particular 
method of reducing or managing the conflict. 212 Thus, if 
conflict is regarded as a clash of wills, its management 
entails finding a formula that turns a zero-sum into a 
positive-sum conflict. If the conflict is seen as a 
'confrontation' of cost-benefit calculations, then 
management requ1res the creation of a r1pe moment. 
Where the conflict 1S seen as an event 1n a reg1me 
change, management encompasses easing the transition in 
reg1mes. If the conflict takes the form of a mutual 
stand-off, management means the use of power to effect 
a favourable outcome. 213 Although rather Realist in its 
substantive orientation, Zartman's idea of linking 
perceptions of the conflict to possible ways for its 
elegant contribution to management 1S a valid and 
theorising about how to manage 
other) type of conflict. 214 
this (or indeed any 
Mitchell's theorising 1n this area involves a 
refinement of the model designed by Pruitt and Rubin. 
Their symmetry model postulated that the behaviour of 
parties to a conflict (ranging from inaction, contending 
and yielding, to problem solving), depends on the level 
of concern by each party for its own goals, and for the 
well-being of the other party. 215 This model 1S 
symmetric in that it explains the behaviour of only one 
212 Zartman, 'Conflict and Resolution: Contest, Cost, and Change' 
op.cit., p.9. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Zartman does not, however, address the problem of when the 
mediator's perception of the conflict is different from that of the 
conflictants. This complex dimension of his regime change theory 
renders it inadequate to explain the Uganda mediation, as 1S ar?ued 
more fully in Chapter 8. 
215 P 'tt D G & Rub1·n,J.Z. Social Conflict (New York: Random rU1 , . . 
House, 1986) p.29. 
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party to a conflict. But as Mitchell argues, conflicts 
are more complex than that: whereas one party may be 
concerned about the other, the second party may not have 
such concern, and the situation therefore becomes 
asymmetric. 216 In his view, therefore, the first step in 
contemplating the management of conflict, is to search 
for the areas of asymmetry, which are most likely to be 
legal, structural, moral, and behavioural. 217 
Mitchell's proposition of the search for asymmetry 
as the beginning point in attempts to manage conflict 
echoes Vayrynen's concept of conflict transformation. 
In the particular case of civil wars, Vayrynen argues 
that there is more to them than the typical assumption 
of competing claims for political power, and that 
" [t] he reality is often more complex than 
that ... The conflict issues are multidimensional and 
the political groups involved are internally 
divided. The government is, as a rule, more 
united than the opposition, which is not held 
together by the glue of power. The inter- el i te 
conflict may intensify, however, when the 
government starts losing power. In an internal 
conflict the assumption of unitary actors fighting 
or negotiating for power sharing in a well defined 
issue space is seldom justified. ,,218 
The point that Vayrynen makes, and in very unambiguous 
terms, is that "while tackling ... conflict, scholars and 
practitioners should not make unwarranted assumptions 
about the rationality of actors, their internal cohesion 
or the clarity of conflict situations. ,,219 This is very 
well said. 
216 Mitchell,C.R. 'Classifying Conflicts: Asymmetry and 
Resolution' in Zartman, I. W. (Ed) Resolving Regional Conflicts op. cit., 
pp.23-38:26. 
217 Ibid., p.30. This is one of the elements which it is argued 
later, make mediation a complex, rather than a simplistic undertaking. 
On its relevance to the Uganda conflict, see Chapter 8. 
218 Vayrynen, 'To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the 
Resolution of National and International Conflicts' op.cit., p.8. 
219 Ibid., p. 12 . 
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Assefa's case study of track two mediation of civil 
is a useful pioneering work in this area, and 
serves to fill a big void in the literature. 220 However, 
the hypotheses he tests are not particularly creative or 
reflective of the problems that manifest themselves 1n 
internal conflicts. But his study of the process of 
mediation by non-official third parties 1n internal 
wars, 1S a signal contribution to knowledge, and 
suggests how diplomatic tracks other than official ones, 
can collaborate in bringing about peaceful settlement in 
internal conflicts. 221 
Conclusions: A Comment on the Literature 
This chapter has made a broad ranging survey of the 
literature on mediation, and traced its conceptual 
genes1s 1n focus, from the interpersonal to the 
international. It reveals that whereas some of the 
areas 1n this field have been attended at length, others 
have not received the close and sustained attention that 
they deserve. In this respect, the paucity of 
literature on unofficial involvement 1n conflict, 
particularly case studies thereon, belies the increasing 
importance of this area of conflict management. The 
literature on this area of conflict management has not 
only highlighted its importance, but has pointed out 
flaws in its application, as it also has for official 
(track one) conflict management. None of the literature 
has however formulated a means by which the strengths of 
these two approaches can be brought together in the 
serV1ce of more effective conflict management. 
In addition, although what has been termed here as 
the 'politics of mediation' is a crucial area in seeking 
to understand the processes of mediation, its 
underdevelopment, especially in theory building, does 
220 Assefa,H. f\Je,liation in Civil Wars op.cit. 
221 Ibid. See also, Assefa,H. 'World Council of Churches Mediation 
and the Sudan Civil War' in Mitchell,C.R. & Webb,K. (Eds) New Approaches 
t,) International Mediation op.cit., pp.147-167. 
95 
not do justice to its centrality in conflict management. 
Further, although there is much in the literature by way 
of theories such as the ripe moment for mediation and 
impartiality, their explication in the literature is not 
always convincing, and offers at best only partial 
explanations. The paucity of commanding literature on 
the international management of internal wars does not 
reflect the growing importance of that area, and its 
increasingly central place In the international 
relations of various parts of the world, especially in 
the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the writings on that 
subj ect are still at a pre-theoretical level. This 
study is therefore aimed at making a small contribution 




African Perspectives on Ethnic and Territorial Conflict 
Introduction 
The last two chapters examined the broad 
theoretical perspectives that will inform this study. 
Chapter One suggested inter alia that a sound framework 
for the analysis of mediation should have as one of its 
pillars an appreciation of the regional context of the 
conflict(s) under investigation. Chapter Two surveyed 
the literature on mediation. While there are some 
useful studies that analyse conflicts in Africa, few 
have investigated them within the broad analytical 
framework formulated in Chapter One. Failure to do this 
has contributed to the void in the literature noted in 
Chapter Two. 
Analysts from other disciplines such as history, 
political science, sociology and anthropology, have 
studied the causes of the conflicts in Africa. Many 
have identified the ethnic factor, and the problem of 
the territorial borders inherited at independence, as 
contributors to the development and continued currency 
of these conflicts. These findings have not been 
satisfactorily integrated in an African perpective of 
the analysis of these conflicts. It has therefo 
re not been adequately demonstrated how these two 
factors interact in generating conflict in Africa. This 
chapter 
will argue that the interaction of ethnicity and 
boundaries provides a satisfactory framework from which 
the analyst of conflict on the continent can proceed 
with benefit. 
This chapter will establish the basis against which 
the conflict management practices of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) should be properly analysed. 1 It 
will identify the dominant type of conflict on the 
continent, and thus provide a useful 
unders tanding the reasons behind the 
background for 
OAU's conflict 
management approaches as discussed in detail in Chapter 
Four. It will also delineate part of the historical 
background for the conflict in Uganda carried in Chapter 
Five. These three chapters will, jointly and severally, 
inform the analysis of the diplomatic context of the 
Uganda mediation of 1985. 2 
This chapter will give an historical background of 
the ethnic and boundary conflicts In Africa. The 
problem of ethnicity generally, and its application to 
the development of conflict in Africa, will also be 
examined, as will the broad question of border and 
territorial conflicts, and their place on the conflict 
map of Africa. Lastly, the interaction of these two 
factors in the crucible of conflicts in Africa will be 
considered, and a symbiosis attempted. The limited 
purpose of this chapter is thus to outline the broad 
background against which the general flavour of this 
study will be brought out. It will suggest why, faced 
with the type of conflict outlined, the OAU has adopted 
conflict management policies that have precluded its 
involvement in many conflicts in Africa, and notably for 
the purposes of this study, the Uganda conflict. 
Some cavea ts are in order at the outset of this 
chapter. Firstly, it is a truism that ethnicity is at 
the heart of many conflicts in different parts of the 
world,3 as the current conflicts in former Yugoslavia4 
1 This is discussed ln detail in Chapter 4. 
2 See Chapter 6. 
3 See for example the case studies of various ethnic conflicts in 
McGarry,J. & O'Leary,B. (Eds) The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1993). 
and the former USSR clearly demonstrate. However, this 
chapter is concerned with the African perspective. 
Because this study has a general African flavour, 
analysis of the ethnic question will, without prejudice 
to its generality, concentrate on its manifestations in 
Africa. But as the literature cited in this chapter 
suggests, explanations for ethnicity and ethnic conflict 
el sewhere have a universal impact, 5 and are therefore 
relevant to the study, explanation and analysis of 
ethnic conflict in Africa. Indeed, it is true of 
conflict generally, that the "same problems [in Africa] 
and the same methods are relevant for much of the Third 
World, specifically the Middle East and Asia, and also 
for Latin America. ,,6 
Secondly, there is a prominent group of scholars in 
Africa who rej ect the centrality of ethnicity in the 
analysis of conflicts in Africa. Subscribers to this 
school of thought argue that the ethnic problem is no 
longer, (and in the stronger form, never was), central 
to an understanding of conflicts in modern Africa. 
Instead, this school of thought prefers and vigorously 
champions a class analysis of these conflicts. It 
contends that the competition between classes is the 
analytical centrepiece around which conflicts in Africa 
should be studied. This study does not share that 
outright rejection of ethnicity as a central explanatory 
factor of the conflicts in modern Africa. Indeed, 
4 On which see, 'The Future of the Balkans: An Interview with 
David Owen' 72 Foreign Affairs(1993) pp.1-9. 
5 See McGarry,J. & O'Leary,B. 'The Macro-Political Regulation of 
Ethnic Conflict' in McGarry,J. & O'Leary,B. (Eds) The Politics of Ethnic 
Conflict Regulation op.cit., pp.1-40, who note the ubiquity of ethnic 
conflict and the general problems of its regulation. 
6 Zartman,I.W. Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in 
Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) pp.255-256. Wiseman 
also draws some interesting comparisons between conflict resolution in 
Central America and in Africa, for example Angola, Mozambique and 
especially Zimbabwe; see, Wiseman,H. 'The Parameters of the Process of 
Conflict Resolution in Central America' in Child,J. (Ed) Conflict in 
Central America: Approaches to Peace and Security (London: C.Hurst & 
Co., 1986) pp.69-87; see also Basil Davidson'S excellent The Black 
Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State (London: James 
Currey, 1992). 
empirical evidence of the vast number of ethnic and 
border conflicts in Africa, 7 should not be dismissed on 
the basis only of preference for one theoretical 
framework over others. The point of view taken in this 
study is that although class analysis has some 
explanatory role to play . this it 1n respect, 1S a 
secondary and supportive role, rather than a primary 
one. 8 
Thirdly, although the analysis 1n this chapter 
begins with an examination of colonial history and 
process in Africa, it is not intended to suggest that 
colonial history is wholly to blame for the conflicts 
that have riven modern Africa. The argument that post-
colonial patterns of governance in Africa have played a 
big role in shaping the conflict map of Africa 1S 
meritorious. The point of view taken here however, 1S 
that these post - colonial pat terns served largely to 
exacerbate conditions and patterns received at 
independence, as indeed the historical basis of the 
conflict in Uganda as described in Chapter Five reveals. 
This chapter is therefore informed by the belief that, 
without prejudice to post-independence developments, the 
roots of post colonial patterns of conflict in Africa 
are properly traceable to the colonial process. 9 Thus, 
the analyst of conflicts in modern Africa must begin by 
establishing where ' the rain began to beat Africa.' 10 
7 See Asiwaju,A.I. (Ed) Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations 
Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884 -1984 (Lagos: Lagos 
University Press, 1984). 
8 Shaw notes that it is axiomatic that class and ethnicity co-
exist in Africa (as in the developed world), although the relationship 
and balance between them will change with time. See Shaw,T.M. 
'Ethnicity as the Resilient Paradigm for Africa: From the 1960s to the 
1980s' 17 Development and Change (1986) pp.587-605. 
9 A case for the colonial roots of the Uganda conflict has been 
made for example by Lwanga-Lunyiigo,S. 'The Colonial Roots of Internal 
Conflict' in Rupesinghe,K. (Ed) Conflict Resolution In Uganda (London 
& Athens,OH.: James Currey & Ohio University Press, 1989) pp.24-43. 
10 This graphic phrase is borrowed from Chinua Achebe. He argues 
that Africa must look back and try to find out where it went wrong, in 
an attempt to "regain belief in itself and put away the complexes of 
the years of denigratio~ and self-abasement." See Chi?ua Achebe, 'The 
Novelist as Teacher' l.n Achebe, C. Hopes and Imped~ments: Selected 
. 
The vlew taken In this study lS that while it did so 
before, during, and after colonialism, it did so most 
eminently during Africa's colonial history. 
Historical Origins of Conflict in Modern Africa 
The rendition of the histriography of nineteenth 
century Africa, and the role that colonialism played in 
shaping modern Africa, has been the bone of contention 
amongst historians for a long time. While some western 
historians have generally adopted a stance that lS 
Eurocentric and sympathetic towards the imperial powers, 
historians in emergent Africa have called for, and 
embraced, an Afrocentric interpretation of colonial 
history, one which takes into account the values and 
concerns of the African people. So deep has this divide 
been that it has ranged from disagreement on the advent 
of the scramble for Africa, to the actual impact of 
colonialism In Africa. At the heart of this 
disputation, and of immediate concern to the analyst of 
conflict In Africa, is the question of the root cause 
of, and part of the explanation for, the pattern of 
conflict in post-independence Africa. 
Although the disputation about the colonial factor 
In Africa has traversed the terrain of when precisely 
the scramble for Africa began,l1 the 
concerns the effect of partition 
communities of the nineteenth century, 
central question 
on the African 
and later. One 
school of thought posits that the pre-partition era was 
foreshadowed by a process of the partition of Africa by 
Africans, characterised by such epochal events like the 
consolidation of Shaka' s Zulu empire and the Mfecane 
migrations, the creation of the Trekker republics by the 
ESS3.),S 1965-1987 (Oxford: Heinemann, 1988) pp.27-31:29,30. 
11 See for example, Boahen,A.A. Af.rican Perspectives on 
Coll'llialism (London: James Currey, 1987), and Robinson,R. & 
Gallagher, J. Africa and the Victorians: The Official ;\J~nd of 
Imperialism (London: Macmillan, 1981) who offer a differen:: 
interpretation. 
South African boers, and the West African Jihads.!: The 
conclusion of this school of thought therefore, is that 
European partition was merely the continuation of a 
process that was already underway on the continent. 
Critics of this view have advanced the counter 
argument that al though these powerful, African based 
imperialisms took place, that process was already 
concluded by the time the European partition commenced: 
and to 19nore that fact would be to discount 
"significant elements of European purposiveness, 
premeditation and aggression. ,,13 In this perspective, 
what the Europeans did instead was to interrupt a series 
of far reaching economic, social, and intellectual 
revolutions that were at an advanced stage by 1880, with 
the effect, as Boahen has argued, that" [b]y the 1900's, 
in place of the numerous African independent states and 
polities, 
of some 
a completely new and numerically smaller set 
forty artificially created colonies had 
emerged. ,,14 
The Dynamics of Partition 
The dynamics of the partition itself reflected the 
imperial powers' preoccupation with the economlC and 
political realities of the day. The consolidation of 
the process of bringing Africa into the world capitalist 
political economy15 required that the European powers 
delimit, and take actual administrative charge of, 
terri tories they claimed in Africa. Maintaining the 
European balance of power called for the formalisation 
of their claims, and a strict delimitation and 
demarcation thereof. The Berlin Conference of 1884-5 
was an exerClse In effectuating these goals In a way 
that would stop the Europeans fighting each other over 
12 Wilson, H. S. The Imperial Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa Since 
1870 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977) pp.24-30. 
13 Ibid., p.SO. 
14 Boahen, A. A. African Perspectives on Colonialism op. ci t ., p. 27 . 
15 For an account of which see Munro, J. F. Africa and 
International Economy, 1800-19~0 (London: J.M.Dent ~ Sons, 1976). " 
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Africa, and induce as little conflict as possible 
between the various European powers.16 
The Process of Partition 
The process of partition as enshrined in the Berlin 
Act (1885), was inter alia that any of the powers was 
required to inform the others of an intended claim, ln 
order to facilitate any counterclaims. Successful 
claims had to be followed by annexation and occupation, 
in order to formalise their validity. And treaties 
signed with African rulers were to be accepted as 
legitimate title to the territory in question. 17 
Boahen has argued controversially that the fact 
that the European powers entered into such treaty 
relations in the first place, whatever the status of 
those treaties in international law, signifies an 
acceptance of the Africans as equal sovereigns, a fact 
normally ignored ln the ratiocinations of imperial 
historians. Thus, 
"the phase of actual conquest was preceded by years 
of negotiation and treaty-making between the 
imperial powers and African rulers. This phase of 
negotiation shows that the European powers 
originally accepted their African counterparts as 
their equals, and secondly that the former did 
recognise the sovereignty and independence of the 
African states and polities. ,,18 
However, Boahen rather overstates his case. The 
consequent history of Euro-African relations suggests 
that the acceptance of "their African counterparts as 
their equals" was merely a cloak put on by the Europeans 
for their convenience. 
16 Wilson, H. S. The Imperial Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa 
op.cit., p.100. 
17 Boahen,A.A. African Perspectives on Colonialism op.cit., p.33. 
18 Boahen,A.A. 'Africa and the Colonial Challenge' in 
Boahen,A.A. (Ed) UNESCO General History of Africa, Vol VII: Africa Under 
Colonial Domination, 1880-1935 (London & Paris: Heinemann & UNESCO, 
1985) pp.1-18:9. The equality Boahen is talking about is legal rather 
than political equality. The im~erial pow~rs in this view,. did not ~ave 
in mind to challenge the author1ty of Afr1can rulers to s1gn treat1es. 
Neither did they, for this reason, dispute that those rulers were the 
legitimate leaders of their various polities. 
The Pattern of Partition 
The pattern that the partition of Africa followed 
was threefold. It entailed the conclusion of treaties 
between the Europeans and the African rulers i 19 their 
confirmation through bilateral treaties between the 
European powers themselves i 20 and undertaking actual 
administration of the territories so annexed. The 
treaties between the Europeans and the African rulers 
were political treaties, by which "African rulers either 
purportedly surrendered sovereignty ln return for 
protection, or undertook not to enter into treaty 
obligations with other European nations. ,,21 The treaty 
and administration stage of this arrangement gave rise 
to serious jurisprudential problems. With regard to the 
treaties signed between the colonial powers and the 
African rulers, Morris has observed that 
"Such treaties were of very different kinds, and 
ranged from what were, in fact, simple undertakings 
entered into by often uncomprehending chiefs, 
whereby sovereignty was handed over, virtually 
unrestricted, to the protecting power, to elaborate 
documents such as the Uganda Agreement of 1900, 
whereby after a long process of bargaining, a 
careful division of spheres of authority was agreed 
upon. ,,22 
The actual validity of such treaties has been the 
subject of much debate. Some writers like Touval have 
maintained that the consensual nature of those treaties 
19 These were usually in standard form. For some texts, see 
Kiwanuka, S. From Colonialism to Independence: A Reappraisal of Colonial 
Policies and African Reactions, 1870-1960 (Nairobi: Kenya Literature 
Bureau, 1982) pp.132-146. 
20 For example, The Anglo-German Treaty of 1890. For the text, 
see, Kiwanuka,S. From Colonialism to Independence op.cit., pp.122-131. 
21 Uzoigwe,G.N. 'European Partition and the Conquest of Africa: 
An Overview' in Boahen, A. A. (Ed) UNESCO General History of Africa: 
Vol.VII op.cit., pp.19-44:31. 
22 Morris,H.H. 'Protection or Annexation? Some Constitutional 
Anomalies of Colonial Rule' in Morris,H.F. & Read,J.S. Indirect Rule 
and the Search for Justice: Essays in East African Legal History 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1972) pp.41-70:50. Indeed, as is 
argued in Chapter 5, the Uganda Agreement of 1900 convinced the Bagan~a 
of their separateness from the other ethnic groups of Uganda. Th1s 
feeling was later to be pivotal in the development of the Uganda 
conflict. 
cannot be doubted, and can be deciphered from the fact 
that the African rulers signing them also benefitted 
politically and militarily, since the treaties altered 
the local balance of power by holding local rivals at 
bay.23 The analytical basis of that argument lS 
predicated on a misunderstanding of the whole nature of 
colonial system and process, and the consultative nature 
(or lack thereof), of its decision-making. To argue for 
the consensual nature of colonial treaties is to ascribe 
a choice to colonial rulers which they did not enjoy, 
nor indeed in retrospect, 
That the treaties were 
imagined themselves to have. 
obtained fraudulently, lS 
admitted by no less an authority than Lord Lugard, the 
guru of colonial treaty-obtaining. To him, it was clear 
that confronted with such a document, 
"No man if he understood would sign it, and to say 
that a savage [sic] chief has been told that he 
cedes all rights to the company in exchange for 
nothing is an obvious untruth. If he has been told 
that the company will protect him against his 
enemies, and share in his wars as an ally, he has 
been told a lie, for the company have no idea of 
doing such a thing and no force to do it if they 
wished. ,,24 
Although the colonial occupiers had undertaken at Berlin 
to accept such treaties as evidence of legitimate title, 
whenever those treaties were inconsistent with the 
essence of the colonial status of their African 
possesslons, they were superceded and overruled by 
legislation promulgated in the metropoles. 25 The logic 
of that practice was that such 'treaties' did not enJoy 
a status such as would commend them to the attraction of 
23 Touval, S. The Boundary Poli tics of Independen t Africa 
(Cambridge,MA.: Harvard University Press, 1972) p.5. Bugandan pro-
imperial diplomacy was at the expense of the kingdom of Bunyoro,part 
of which was annexed to the kingdom of Buganda in return. Hence the 
problem of the 'lost counties' which was an important factor in the 
development of the Uganda conflict especially in the early years of 
independence: see Chapter 5. 
24 Perham,M. & Bull,M. (Eds) The Diaries of Lord Lugard, Vol.I 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963) p.31a. 
25 Morris, 'Protection or Annexation? Some Constitutional 
Anomalies of Colonial Rule' op.cit. 
the full force and protection of western customary 
international law of treaties. 26 
The Jurisprudence of Partition 
The jurisprudential problems that attended the 
administration stage of partition concerned generally 
the nature and function of colonial empire, and 
particularly for Britain, the requisites of 
protectorate. The first hurdle was gone over by 
reference to the social Darwinist theories then current 
in Europe, the overthrow of the natural law paradigm of 
international law by positivist legal theory, and by the 
exclusion from western dogma of colonial states and 
peoples from the category of those who had attained the 
requisite 'standard of civilisation', 27 and who would 
therefore merit recognition as full members of the 
family of nations. 
The second problem was peculiarly British, and 
arose because the rigours of English law as then stated, 
did not permit the issue to be swept under the carpet by 
resort to the paternalism that informed the 'standard of 
civilisation' doctrine. The legal nicety that exercised 
the minds of the Victorians was that as the Law Officers 
of the Crown had consistently ruled, English law did not 
contemplate the assertion of title over protectorates, 
confer any title to the soil thereof, or permit the 
granting of title over such lands to individuals. 28 
Because the Berlin Act required occupation and actual 
administration, this problem assumed great urgency. It 
was finally resolved through a happy confluence of 
26 This was a view the courts articulated: see for example the 
opinion of Judge Huber in the Islands of Palmas Case (The Netherlands 
vs. United States) Permanent Court of Arbitration (1928) especially 
pp.44-45; this case is reported and commented on in Harris,D.J. Cases 
and Materials on International Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1973) 
pp.176-186. 
27 See Jackson,R.H. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International 
Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990); see also, Gong,G.W. The Standard of 'Civilization' in 
International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984) 
passim. 
28 Sorrenson,M.P.K. Origins of European Settlement in Kenya 
(Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968) Ch.3. 
events. Firstly, there was a fundamental shift in the 
paradigmatic basis of international law, from natural 
law to posi ti vism, towards the end of the nineteenth 
century. 29 Secondly, because of that change, there was 
a doctrinal metamorphosis in the notion of sovereignty, 
permitting only those states that had attained the 
European-determined 'standard of civilisation' to claim 
sovereignty internationally. Thirdly, perhaps as a 
result of these developments, the Law Officers of the 
Crown rendered a ruling that although their earlier 
opinion was still good law, it did not apply to 'waste 
and unoccupied land', and that therefore, "exercise of 
protectorate in an unci vilised country imported the 
right to assume whatever jurisdiction ... may be needed 
for its effectual exercise. ,,30 With this ruling, which 
is a classic example of colonial legal and positivistic 
instrumentalism, the final hurdle to Britain's 
acquisition of 'legal' title to its African 
protectorates was removed. It 
concentrate on the practical 
exploi tation. 31 
Having solved these problems, 
proceeded to formalise their 
could henceforth 
problems of their 
the European powers 
claims to colonial 
possessions. They did so through the creation of 
boundaries demarcating their various areas of influence. 
In doing this, they were unduly preoccupied with 
completing the exercise with as little friction and 
conflict amongst themselves as possible. They therefore 
29 On the emergence of which see Oppenheim's seminal 'The Science 
of International Law: Its Task and Method' 2 American Journal of 
International Law(1908) pp.313-356; Boyle,A.F. World Politics and 
International Law (Duke University Press, 1985); and Kaplan,M. & 
Katzenbach, N. The Poli tical Foundations of International Law (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1961); Akehurst,M. A Modern Introduction to 
International Law (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1973 - 2nd Ed.) pp.26-
28; and Shaw,M.N. International Law (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 
1986 - 2nd Ed.) pp.44-56. 
30 W'l on H S The Imtperial Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa 1 s , . . 
op.cit., p.84. 
31 Okoth-Ogendo,H.W.O. Tenants of the Crown: Evolution of Agrarian 
Law and Institutions in Kenya (Nairobi: ACTS Press, 1991) pp.10-12. 
"put a premium on strict delimitation and demarcation,,32 
of those borders. Although they carefully obviated any 
possibility of conflict amongst themselves over these 
borders, the arbitrary approach that they adopted in the 
delimitation exercise ensured that following 
decolonisation, those borders would become the source of 
much conflict. As Boahen has written, 
"Had the boundaries of these states been laid down 
in accordance with any well-defined, rational 
criteria and in full cognisance of the ethno-
cultural, geographical and ecological realities of 
Africa, the outcome would have been wholesome. 
Unfortunately, many of these boundaries were 
arbitrarily drawn on African maps in the 
chancelleries of the imperial powers in Europe. 
The result has been that most of these states are 
artificial creations, and this very artificiality 
has created very serious problems, many of which 
have still not been solved. ,,33 
This view may attract the criticism that it assumes for 
Africa a great degree of homogeneity, which its very 
diversity belies. But, while it is true that a great 
deal of heterogeneity existed on the continent, and 
still does, it cannot be gainsaid that the operational 
philosophy of colonialism, and the rationale of the 
colonial state, was to submerge this innate 
heterogeneity. As Vail and others show, this was a 
carefully calculated process. 34 It will be pointed out 
later that at a subterranean level, colonial policy 
fuelled negative ethnic identity; and post-colonial 
states tried to reduce the negative effect of this by 
reference to the nationalist paradigm. 
The rest of this chapter will examine the way in 
which the arbitrary demarcation of Africa's colonial 
boundaries bequeathed independent African states with a 
legacy of ethnic and border conflicts: or why the 
3 2 W· 1 H S The Imperial Experi ence in Sub-Saharan Africa l son, .. 
op.cit., p.100. 
33 Boahen, A. A. African Perspectives on Colonialism op. ci t ., p. 96. 
34 Vail,L. (Ed) The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa 
(London: James Currey, 1989). 
"inevitability of instability,,35 resulted from the 
artificial frontiers and unresolved ethnic conflicts of 
Africa. 36 
Ethnic Conflict in Africa: The Intellectual Milieu 
The study of ethnicity is a complex undertaking. 
It cuts across disciplinary borders, embracing the 
disciplines of anthropology, sociology, political 
science and international relations. It is also double 
edged in that it is 'ethnicity' when it is approved of, 
and 'tribalism' when it is disapproved of. 37 In the 
African context, the study of ethnici ty lS of recent 
origin, and is an offshoot of the 'nationalist paradigm' 
of the 1950s and 1960s. It emphasised the totality of 
the transformation of sub-national units and loyalties 
into a wider polity.38 That paradigm, which was born of 
anti-colonial sentiments, appealed to all shades of 
opinion, but was rendered nugatory by the attainment of 
independence. With the vacuum so created, it became 
necessary to address the question of the ethnic problems 
which arose, in an effort to imbue post-independence 
states of Africa with a sense of 'nationalism'. 
Explanations of these problems have spanned all manner 
of intellectual colour: this section will consider the 
main ones. 39 
One explanation for ethnicity In Africa that lS 
offered consistently, lS the modernisation paradigm, 
35 O'Connell,J. 'The Inevitability of Instability' 5 Journal of 
Modern African Studies (1967) pp.181-191. 
36 Thompson observes that these still define the "venue of hostile 
conflict. " See, Thompson, W. S. 'Where History Continues: Conflict 
Resolution in the Third World' in Brown,S.J. & Schraub,K.M. (Eds) 
Resolving Third World Conflicts: Challenges for a New Era (Washington: 
United States Institute of Peace, 1992) pp.1-12:1. 
37 Vail,L. 'Introduction: Ethnicity in Southern African History' 
in Vail, The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa op.cit., pp.1-
19:1. 
38 Stavenhagen,R. 'Ethnic Conflicts and their Impact on 
International Society' 43 International Social Science Journal (1991) 
pp.117-131:117. 
39 Vail, 'Introduction: Ethnicity in Southern African Hist::;ry' 
op.cit. gives a summary of these. 
which views tribalism as a relic of the distant past, 
which should have disappeared wi th the social, 
political, and economic changes that independence should 
have brought with it.40 This view sees ethnicity (in its 
'tribalist' garb), as a species of collective 
irrationality. The shortcomings of this explanation are 
that it takes the wrong view of (African) man, as an 
irrational being. In terms of explaining ethnici ty, 
this explanation is wanting because it is tautological: 
it argues that Africans act tribalistically because they 
are tribal by nature. 
Other explanations of ethnicity have been offered 
by a range of social scientists spanning the disciplines 
of sociology, anthropology, and political SClence. 
These explanations are characterised by their 
ahistorical nature, and by their evolutionary view of 
human history. Being outgrowths of the nationalist 
paradigm, they assert that the future ought to be better 
than the past. In their judgment, 'better' means 
developments associated with nation-building and 
national unity. They therefore take a negative view of 
ethnicity, by seeing it as a disrupter of the process of 
nation building. 41 
Amongst these explanations lS one that sees 
ethnicity as primarily a result of the policies of the 
colonial state, especially the policy of divide-and-
rule. In the opinion of this school, "European 
anthropologists connived at such policies by specifying 
'tribes' culturally within the context of a uniquely 
colonial sociology, thereby giving the 'tribe' a real 
but specious identity. ,,42 But this explanation does not 
explain why even within the same colonial territory 
40 According to this view, "the process of societal change leads 
from the traditional to the modern, from the simple to the complex, 
from 'particularism' to 'universalism'." See Stavenhagen, 'Ethnic 
Conflicts and their Impact on International Society' op.cit., p.117. 
41 Vail, 'Ethnicity in Southern African History' op.cit., p.3. 
42 Ibid. 
where divide-and-rule tactics were used, ethnic 
consclousness was uneven in its spread. Neither does it 
explain why the ethnic problem has persisted for so long 
after the end of colonialism. 
The 'nationalist theory' explanation of ethnicity 
locates the genesis of the problem in the work place. 
It claims that as members of the various cultural groups 
left their rural homes and interacted with others in the 
industrial and urban areas, they developed stereotypes 
of themselves and others, and thus sharpened culturally 
defined distinctions between the different groups. This 
theory fails to acknowledge that such people's Vlews 
about their ethnic past, their culture and their 
language, did not wholly develop in the work place, or 
In purely urban and industrial settings. Particularly, 
it fails to take cognlsance of the intelligentsia's 
contribution towards defining the intellectual content 
of ethnici ty. 43 
The false consciousness theory traces the ethnic 
problem to the uneven development within African 
colonial territories. It postulates that certain groups 
of people benefitted comparatively from the education 
and employment opportunities of colonial capitalism. 
Therefore, at the end of the colonial era those groups 
of people mobilised support along ethnic lines, In an 
effort to continue enjoying that status after 
independence. To this school of thought, post-
independence conflicts In Africa are the result of 
ethnic groups competing for advantage. 44 In this 
instance, "Ethnici ty ... when ordinary people embrace it, 
lS the epitome of 'false consciousness'''. 45 Although 
this theory is useful because it underlines the 
manipulation of one class by another In post-
43 Ibid. 
44 This is often cited with reference to the Uganda conflict. But 
see Chapter 5 on the historical background of the i"~anda con: =- ict . 
~5 Vail, 'Ethnicity in Southern African History' 2p.cit., p.5. 
independence African politics, it assumes a certain 
credulity on the part of ordinary Africans, and hence 
fails to explain why the ethnic message persists among 
them so long after independence. 
The 'primordialist' school of thought, which lS 
advanced amongst others by Horowitz, 46 and 
Giddens,47seeks explanation for the ethnic problem in 
psychology. It lS based on Durkheim's idea of the 
importance of the role of the community (Gemeinschaft). 
It argues that because Africans were badly affected by 
the disruptive socio-economic and political changes of 
the late nineteenth century, and Slnce the capitalist 
relations introduced then undermined the pre-capitalist 
and pre-colonial hierarchies and order of social life, 
they were deprived of social and psychological security. 
Consequently, they have sought security through invoking 
the values of the past. In this conception, ethnicity, 
as Vail puts it, is a romantic rejection of the present. 
Although as Vail argues, this psychological explanation 
lS useful In that it captures the "unself -conscious 
inevitability of ethnic ascription", it fails to take 





it does not explain whether the 
lS because it . lS intrinsically 
primordial, or whether its discourse has been rendered 
primordial in order to give it more appeal and currency. 
Further, in its application to ethnicity in Africa, it 
errs In attributing to the African people a 
psychological stasis. Vail argues well that 
"It is simply impossible to accept that Africans, 
living through some of the most rapid changes that 
any people have lived through in all human history, 
have attached themselves blindly, like so many 
limpets, to a vision of the past that has little 
relevance to the present and the future just 
because it is 'comfortable'. As an interpretation, 
46 Horowitz, D.L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: Universi'::y 
of California Press, 1985). 
47 Giddens, A. The Na t ion -Sta te and Violence (CambridgoC>: Pol i ':: Y 
Press, 1'185) . 
the 'pri~ord~alist' exp~anation of ethnicity, on 
its own, lS slmply too ahlstorical and non-specific 
to convince." 49 
The historical perspective attempts to explain the 
development of ethnic consciousness as a historical 
creation that took place over time. It takes a broad 
sweep of developments, especially from the growth of 
nationalism in Europe in the nineteenth century, 49 and 
links this, through the colonial state, to the countries 
of Africa. By this approach, not only were the seeds of 
ethnicity deliberately planted by agents of colonialism 
such as missionaries, 50 but they were nurtured by the 
local intelligentsia after independence, hence the 
continuity of the ethnic issue after the demise of the 
colonial state. In historical terms (and in the African 
context), the development of ethnic ideology took place 
within the framework, and ln the face of colonial 
policies on land and labour, which encouraged the need 
to emphasise and maintain "the historical integrity of 
the tribe and its land, especially the sanctity of the 
family and its right to land. ,,51 Apart from this 
important emphasis on the centrality of land ln the 
development of ethnic ideology, the historical 
explanation underlines the continuity of the growth of 
the ethnic lssue. Nurtured by the administrative 
machinery of the colonial state, it later came to be 
justified by the policies of post-colonial African 
states. As Papstein shows, these policies, and the 
deprivation that they have wrought on many African 
48 Vail, 'Ethnicity in Southern African History' op.cit., p.6. 
49 On which see for example Hobsbawm,E.J. Nations and Nationalism 
Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990). 
50 See for example, Ranger,T.O. 'Missionaries, Migrants and the 
Manyika: The Invention of Ethnicity in Zimbabwe' in Vail,L. (Ed) The 
Creation of Triralism in Southern Africa op.cit., pp.118-1S0. 
51 Vail, 'Ethnicity in Southern African Histcry' op.cit., p.14. 
peoples, 52 have led many 
and sometimes 'reinvent' 
Ethnicity, Conflict, and 
ethnic groups to 'rediscover' 
their ethnic identities. 53 
International Relations 
, 
In terms of the international relations dimension 
of the ethnic problem, there 1S a dearth of 
significant, 54 analytical,55 or even general and broad 
ranging56 literature. This is also the case with 
respect to the treatment of the ethnic factor 1n the 
international relations of Africa. 57 The writings on the 
domestic and the international aspects of ethnici ty 
examine different sides of the same coin. There is thus 
a close relationship between the two, especially where 
ethnicity is considered 1n its conflict generating 
context. 58 Hence, the approach 
such as the definition of the 
responses of the authorities 






52 However, ethnic forces are also important elsewhere, and not 
just in Africa; see for example, Anderson,B. Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London & New York: 
Verso, 1991 - revd. ed.); also, Smith,A.D. National Identity (London: 
Penguin Books, 1991); and McGarry,J. & O'Leary,B. (Eds) The Politics of 
Ethnic Conflict Regulation op.cit. 
53 Papstein,R. 'From Ethnic Identity to Tribalism: The Upper 
Zambezi Region of Zambia, 1830-1981' in Vail, (Ed) The Creation of 
Tribalism in Southern Africa op. cit., pp. 372-394. For the African 
context see Ranger,T.O. 'The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa' 
in Hobsbawm,E. & Ranger,T.O. (Eds) The Invention of Tradition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992 ed.) pp.211-262; for the 
European context see Hobsbawm,E.J. 'Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 
1870-1914' in Hobsbawm,E. & Ranger,T. (Eds) The Invention of Tradition 
op.cit., pp.263-307. 
54 For example, Suhrke,A. & Noble,L.G. (Eds) Ethnic Conflict in 
International Relations (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977). 
55 Such as Ryan, S. Ethnic Conflict and International Relations 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1990). 
56 For instance, Moynihan,D.P. Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in 
International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
57 For example, Asiwaju,A.I. (Ed) Partitioned Africans: Ethnic 
Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984 (Lagos: 
Lagos University Press, 1984). 
58 See for example, Samarasinghe,S.W.R. & Coughlan,R. (Eds) 
Economic Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: International Perspectives 
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), especially Coughlan & Samarasinghe, 
'Introduction-Economic Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Theory and 
Evidence' in Samarasinghe, S. W. R. & Coughlan, R. (Eds) Economic Dimensions 
of Ethnic Conflict op.cit., pp.1-15. 
determines to a large extent the readiness with which 
the linkage (both conceptual and practical) between the 
domestic and the international can be identified. 
Relationship Between Ethnic Groups and the State 
The definition of ethnic group (or unit) is a major 
key to understanding the nature of ethnic conflict. 
Traditionally, when dealing with ethnicity, 'tribe' was 
habitually substituted for 'ethnic', especially when 
negative connotations were intended. Therefore, some 
modern theorists propose that the word 'tribe' should be 
"banned from social science vocabulary", 59 since it has 
pejorative connotations,60 displays the ideological bias 
of indigeneous elites, 61 and is congruent with 
ethnocentric usages. 62 
To van den Berghe an ethnic group, or ethny, is a 
group of people who claim common descent and share a 
common language and culture. 63 Where the ethny develops 
political consciousness and asserts statehood rights 
based on the common ethnicity, there are sufficient 
ingredients for the existence of a nation. The 
definition of ethnic group has been honed further in 
later theorising, to include the psychological 
requirement that members of the group believe that they 
share a common descent and cultural heritage, and are 
recognised as such by others. 64 Thus, ethnic conflict 
59 Berghe,P.L. 'Class, Race, and Ethnicity in Africa' 6 Ethnic and 
Racial Studies (1983) pp.221-236:222. 
60 Smith,A.D. State and Nation in the Third World: The Western 
State and African Nationalism (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983) p.68. 
61 Mafeje,A. 'The Ideology of "Tribalism'" 9 Journal of Modern 
African Studies (1971) pp.253-261:259. 
62 Berghe, 'Class, Race, and Ethnicity in Africa' op.cit. p.221. 
Minorities everywhere, such as in Northern Ireland, are described as 
'tribes', although this usage may not have the pejorative overtones of 
its reference to Africans by non-Africans, which Berghe has in mind. 
See Walzer,M. 'Modern Tribalism' 1 Dialogue No.99 (1993) pp.14-19. 
63 Berghe, 'Class, Race and Ethnicity in Africa' op.cit., p.222. 
64 Smith,M.G. 'Pluralism, Race and Ethnicity in Selected African 
Countries' in Rex,J. & Mason,D. (Eds) Theories of Race and Ethnic 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) pp.187-225. 
involves at its source this psychological divergence in 
identity. It manifests itself in primary loyalty to the 
nation rather than to the state, which is "a political 
entity wherein a group of people claim authority over 
others who are neither kin nor spouses, and over 
terri tory occupied by them." 65 The task, therefore, is 
one of attempting to transfer this loyalty from the 
nation to the state: making nations states (in Connor's 
term 'nation-destroying') 66 and vice versa. 67 
States' Responses to Ethnic Consciousness 
In plural societies, that is, states with two or 
more ethnies in their composition, the very bringing 
together of divergent groups within the borders of one 
state generates enhanced ethnic 
suggested, however, that the 
consciousness. 6B 
way in which 
It . 1S 
the 
authorities react to this enhanced ethnic consciousness 
within the state will determine not only its reputed 
threat to the state, but also the possibility of 
internationalising the ethnic problem, should it result 
in violent conflict. 69 Thus, early approaches to the 
65 Berghe, 'Class, Race and Ethnicity in Africa' op.cit., p.222. 
66 Connor,W. 'Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?' 24 World 
Politics (1972) pp.319-355; also in Stone,J. (Ed) Race, Ethnicity, and 
Social Change: Readings in the Sociology of Race and Ethnic Relations 
(North Scituate: Duxbury Press, 1977) pp.238-269. In this respect, 
Lan's account of how, having incorporated spirit mediums into the war 
of independence on the side of liberation movements, the Zimbabwean 
state had to subordinate the role of the mediums to that of the new 
state, is very illustrative. See Lan,D. Guns and Rain: Guerillas and 
Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe (London: James Currey, 1985). 
67 Zartman calls this a back-turning process: he notes that the 
stability of nations separated by boundaries "depends on the 
willingness with which a citizen accepts the order to turn his back on 
a particular neighbour, or the willingness with which a national leader 
accepts the fact that people in certain areas are turning their backs 
on him and his leadership." See Zartman,I.W. International Relations 
in the New Africa (Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 1987) 
p.106. 
68 Mazrui,A.A. 'Ethnic Stratification and the Military-Agrarian 
Complex: The Case of Uganda' in Glazer,N. & Moynihan,D.P. (Eds) 
Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge,MA.: Harvard University 
Press, 1975) pp.420-449:447. 
69 In the conflicts of Africa (but also elsewhere) this 
internationalisation often occurs through the refugee problem. For 
example, in the Somalia conflict, Somalis affected by the conflict have 
sought sanctuary with their kith and kin in Kenya; similarly, the Hutus 
in Burundi have done the same with their ethnic kin in Rwanda. The 
study of plural societies posited the assimilationist 
theory, which was based on the assumption that ethnic 
conflict would disappear with modernisation, through 
which minorities would be assimilated within the 
mainstream groups. 70 
The assimilationist theory was the product of the 
optimism of western liberalism. It was found wanting, 
and was replaced by incompatability theories, whose 
basis lS that multi-ethnic societies cannot be both 
stable and democratic ln the absence of active 
involvement by the authorities. Incompatability 
theories are effected ln either of three ways: by 
incorporation, where the dominant group imposes its will 
on the rest of the society; by consociational democracy, 
which lS an attempt at a grand coalition of the 
political leaders of all the significant communities; or 
by hegemonial exchange, where government is undertaken 
by the coalition of the centre with the various ethnic 
groups and regions.71 The difference between 
consociationalism and hegemonial exchange ln this 
context is that whereas consociationalism aims at the 
coali tion of the centre with the significant ethnic 
communities, hegemonic exchange alms at an exchange 
relationship of the centre with all the other groups. 
In this sense, hegemonial exchange lS a more 
encompassing form of consociationalism. 
How ethnic conflict is responded to by the 
authorities depends on their perception of conflict. 
Where they see conflict as arising by nature, they 
resort to suppresslon. If they perceive conflict as 
arising from nurture, the response is one of cooperation 
Rwandese in the current conflict have done the same with their kin in 
Burundi, Tanzania, and Zaire. 
70 Ryan,S. Ethnic Conflict anci International Relations op.cit., 
pp.xix-xxii. 
71 Ibid., pp.16-19. 
and accomodation. 72 Rothchild articulates this 
interpretation in different words: 
"~roadly speakin~ hegemonial state systems, which 
vJ.ew open conflJ.ct as threatening and possibly 
unmanageable, see~ to control conflict from the top 
downward; hegemonJ.al exchange systems which tend to 
perceive conflict as ubiquitous but manageable are 
~ased upon a mutual adjustment of confli~ting 
J.nterest on the part of ... authorities. The former 
regulates ~he various types of ethnic conflict by 
strengthenJ.ng the control which authoritative 
institutions at the centre exercise over sub-
regions; the latter manages conflict by means of 
reciprocal exchange obligations among state and 
ethnoregional leaders at the centre of the 
political system." 73 
It will be argued later that this distinction has 
considerable implications for conflict management: it is 
an important conceptual tool in the hands of the 
conflict analyst or manager who wishes to know at the 
outset, whether or not a particular conflict is amenable 
to a general, or any particular approach, to its 
management. 
Inter-State Dimension of Ethnic Conflict in Africa 
It is a truism of nineteenth century African 
history that when the partition of Africa was formalised 
in Berlin, the Africans, whose nations were the subject 
of the partition were neither invited to participate, 
nor consul ted. 74 It also cannot be gainsaid that the 
partition itself was arbitrary from the point of view of 
Africans, or that 
72 As is argued in Chapter 5, in the Uganda conflict the various 
governments took the former view, and hence partly, the protracted 
nature of the conflict. 
73 Rothchild, D. 'Interethnic Conflict and Policy Analysis in 
Africa' 9 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1986) pp.66-86:73. This is 
similar to the conflict theory debate on inherency and contingency, on 
which see Webb,K. 'Conflict: Inherent and Contingent Theories' World 
Encyclopaedia of Peace: Vol.1 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1986) pp.169-
174:171. 
74 Most books written from whatever conceptual perspective note 
this. But some still take the position that "all intere~ted par~ies" 
were represented at Berlin. They do not, therefore cons1d~r Afr1cans 
to have been interested part ies . See for example, Chamberla1n, M. E. The 
Scramble for Africa (London: Longman, 1974) pp.54-55. 
"when ~he,process of partition was complete, there 
w~re w1th~n each c~lony many diverse ethnic groups 
w1th the1r o~n d1stinct cultures and political 
systems, ran~1~g from groups who only knew loose 
extended fam1l1es as, a syste~ of administering 
themselves to groups w1th relat1vely sophisticated 
centralize,d kingdoms. : . Some of those grouped 
together 1n one colon1al entity were inveterate 
enemies in pre-colonial times. ,,75 
Indeed, not only were heterogeneous groups lumped 
together, but efforts to create amongst them a "shared 
sense of belonging, [or] the experience of a common 
destiny,,76 were generally absent. At decolonisation 
therefore, many of the newly independent states of 
Africa contained diverse ethnic communities, while the 
borders inherited cut across many of these groups. This 
planted the seeds 1n those divided communities of 
conflict between loyalty to the ethnic group or to the 
state, or loyalty to either part of a divided ethnic 
group, or loyalty to an ethnic group or a part thereof 
and one or more states. 77 This pattern of divided 
loyalty, and the resulting conflict, has coloured much 
of the international relations of post-independence 
Africa. 7B 
Because of the additionally complicating factor of 
official attitudes of respect for the territorial 
75 Ibingira,G.S. African Upheavals 
(Boulder, CO. : Westview Press, 1980) p.6. 
Since Independence 
76 Ibingira, G. S. ' The Impact of Ethnic Demands on British 
Decolonization in Africa: The Example of Uganda' in Gifford, P. & 
Louis,Wm. (Eds) The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940-
1960 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) pp.283-304:285. 
77 Hence the problem of 'post-colonial' self-determination, which 
is discussed in Chapter 4. 
78 For example, Papstein op.cit., notes that colonial 
administrative policies in Central Africa divided the Luvale and the 
Lozi administratively into what at independence became Angola, Congo, 
and Zambia: the seeds of later conflcit were thus sown. Similar 
patterns are observeable in other parts of Africa; For example in West 
Africa the colonial division of the Ewe people between what later 
became'Ghana and Togo: see, Brown,D. 'Borderline Politics in Ghana: The 
National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland' 18 Journal of Modern 
African Studies (1980) pp.575-609. The conflict genera~i~g aspe~t.of 
these colonial policies was however alse:' depende~t on off1c1al pol1c1es 
of post-independence governments, wh1ch cont1nued to accept those 
borders and to consider them sacrosanct. 
borders inherited at independence,79 ethnic conflict in 
Africa marks as elsewhere, an important interface 
between domestic and international relations. This can 
be discerned by identifying the parties involved in 
particular conflicts, and by considering the type of 
ethnic conflict (e.g. separatist, secessionist, or 
irredentist), and thus the motivating force behind it. 
Although it has been argued that "secession lies 
squarely at the juncture of internal and international 
politics, but for the most part separatism can be 
explained in terms of domestic ethnic politics", 80 the 
transboundary nature of many ethnic communities . ln 
Africa, and their sheer numbers, 81 suggest that since 











behind separatist, secessionist or irredentist conflict, 
although the former may be motivated purely from within 
the community, and the latter two as part of official 
policy as is the case in Somalia,83 the end result ln 
both will invariably be the acquisition of an 
international character. Furthermore, the international 
character of these conflicts may be introduced by 
raising the issue, as Young does, whether the policy of 
the OAU (which entails supressing secessionist, 
irredentist and separatist conflict) does not clash with 
79 See Chapter 4. 
80 Horowitz,D.L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1985) p.230. 
81 See Asiwaju,A.I. 'Partitioned Culture Areas: A Checklist' in 
Asiwaju,A.I. (Ed) Partitioned Africans op.cit., pp.252-255. 
82 This is a very specific form of internationalisation of 
internal conflict. Here, the reasons for internationalisation are 
created long before the conflict begins. See Chapter 1 for a more 
detailed exposition. 
83 Gurr, T. R. 'Tensions in the Horn of Africa' in Gross, F . World 
Politics and Tension Areas (New York: New York University Press, 1966) 
pp.316-334:333-334. 
the international legal right to self-determination, as 
enunciated by the United Nations General Assembly.84 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of ethnic 
conflicts is their festering quality: they are in turn 
latent, erupt, and subside again.8s During this cycle, 
possibilities for third party involvement are manifest. 
In Africa, ethnic conflict usually introduces border 
issues, thus enhancing the possibility of its eruption 
into armed conflict. Mandel's general findings on the 
roots of modern inter- state disputes are of useful 
explanatory value in this regard. He concludes that the 
frequency of international border disputes is highest 
between states that have roughly equal levels of power, 
and relatively low levels of technology, and severest 
when the level of technology is low and the contention 
is about ethnic rather than resource issues. 86 
This general argument has been noted elsewhere: 
that where identity or religious issues are involved, 
they are non-bargainable in a way that economic issues 
are not. Thus, where there is low technology (and 
therefore less wealth), the ability of the authorities 
to payoff dissident elites is accordingly lessened, and 
hence conflict may erupt. The explanation for these 
trends is found in the fact that especially in the third 
world, border territory can still play "an important 
functional and symbolic role in international 
relations. ,,87 Moreover, 
"In the cultural sphere, the rise in consciousness 
and outspokenness of sub-national ethnic groups has 
reopened many simmering disagreements over border 
terri tory. When geographical boundaries do not 
84 Young,C. 'Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity, and the 
African State System' in Deng, F. M. & Zar~man, I . W . (.Eds). Conflict 
Resolution in Africa (Washington: The Brookl.ngs Instl.tutl.on, 1991) 
pp.320-346. 
85 Suhrke & Noble, 'Introduction' in Suhrke,A. & Noble,L.G. (Eds) 
Ethnic Conflict in International Relations op.cit., pp.1-15:5. 
86 Mandel,R. 'Roots of the Modern Interstate Border Dispute' 24 
Journal of Conflict Resolution (1980) pp.427-454:429. 
87 Ibid., p. 429. 
co:respond to ethnic boundaries, tensions emerge 
WhlCh revolve directly around ... border demarcation 
issues. Finally, in many third world countries 
territ,?r~ still appears to play the traditional 
geopolltlcal roles that it did prior to the influx 
of modern technology." ss 
This kind of trend is a common feature of the conflicts 
in Africa, such as the frequent conflicts between Rwanda 
and Burundi, the Somalia-Kenya conflict between 1964 and 
1967, the Biafran war of secession, and the Western 
Sahara conflict. 
Unfortunately, much of the work done in this area 
has approached the problem from a state-centric 
perspective, rather than from the point of view of the 
"particular African cuI ture areas or ethnic groups which 
were most immediately affected by ... political surgery by 
being split into two or more colonies and, later, 
independent African successor states. "S9 Such an 
approach would have helped to explain the emotive and 
seemingly intractable nature of these conflicts. The 
conflict analyst would thereby have benefitted from 
insights as to their apparently zero- sum nature, 90 and 
hence their amenability, or lack of it, to effective 
management. 
Border and Territorial Conflict 
The General Analytical Context 
The problem of territorial control, international 
borders, and the conflicts to which they give rise, can 
be seen as one about the effect of environmental factors 
on international relations. Early exponents of the 
relationship between the environment (particularly 
geographical) and the actions of states, argued for 
88 Ibid., p.429. 
89 Asiwaju,A.I. 'The Conceptual Framework'. ir: A~iwaju~ A.I. (Ed) 
Partitioned Africans op.cit., pp. 1-18:2. AS1waJu 1S mak1ng a plea 
for an approach based on 'gras~roots history', or 'hi,,~tory from. bel~w: ' 
on which see Hobsbawm,E.J. 'H1story From Below - Some Reflect10ns 1n 
Krantz, F. (Ed) History From Below: Studies in Popular Protest and 
Popular IdeolL-"JY (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) pp.l?-27. 
90 Mandel, 'Roots of the Modern Interstate Border Di:c;pute' 
op.cit., pp.428-430. 
geographic determinism, that is, that a state's policies 
are determined inter alia by its location, resources, 
and climate. 91 This early rendition of the essence of 
geographic (and environmental) determinism was 
influenced by Darwinist theories, but was later rejected 
with the realisation that even though geographic factors 
did playa role, state and international behaviour was 
influenced by factors more complex than determinism 
suggested. Although Darwinian theories in this context 
were rejected later, it was not until the mid-twentieth 
century that pragmatism was glven an international 
dimension by the Sprouts' theory of environmental 
possibilism, whose main tenet was 
"that the initiative lies with the man, not with 
the milieu that encompasses him. Possibilism 
rejects the idea of controls, or influences, 
pressing man along a road set by nature or other 
environing condition. The milieu, in the 
possibilist doctrine, does not direct or compel man 
to do anything." 92 
In this sort of relationship, the environment "presents 
limitations as well as possibilities,,93 for state 
action. But, while the environment plays an important 
role in determining state action, other factors do too, 
Slnce "which possibilities will be realised, which 
deliberately foregone, and which unknowingly or 
accidentally foregone depends on non-geographic as well 
as geographic factors. ,,94 
Boulding postulated the loss-of-strength gradient, 
by which the further a state moves away from its home 
91 Goertz,G. & Diehl,P.F. Territorial Changes and International 
Conflict (London & New York: Routledge, 1992) p.3. 
92 Sprout,H. & Sprout,M. The Ecological Persp.ec.tive a.n Human 
Rela ti ons: Wi th Special Reference to In terna tional Pol~ t~ cs (Prlnceton: 
Princeton University Press, 1965) p.83. 
93 Ibid., p.86. 
94 Fox,W. 'Geopolitics and International Rela~ions' in Zoppo,C.E. 
& Zorgbibe,C. (Eds) On Geopolitics: Classical ani Nuclear (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1985) pp.15-";4 :31. 
base, the weaker it gets. 95 The milieu within which the 
loss-of-strength gradient is determined is complex, and 
involves organisational, psychological and geographical 
factors. 96 In terms of international conflict, war is 
likely to break out when the loss-of-strength gradient 
is at its most strained, at the point where one state's 
critical boundary (the furthest point of its sphere of 
influence) is breached. 97 In this sense, it may be said 
that "geography influences not only the possibility of 
conflict, but also the likelihood that it will be chosen 
as an option by the decision maker. ,,98 
Staar has extended this line of thinking by 
emphasising the concepts of opportunity and willingness 
as necessary, but not sufficient conditions, for the 
decision to go to war. To Staar, the recognition of 
opportunity and willingness depends on how the 
perception of the decision makers interacts with the 
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notion of lateral pressure. 
scale violence is shaped 
In their reasoning, large 
by human population, 
95 Boulding, K. E. Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1962) p.230. 
96 Ibid., p.245. 
97 Ibid., pp.264-266. 
98 Goertz,G. & Diehl,P.F. Territorial Changes and International 
Conflict op.cit., p.5. 
99 Staar,H. 'Opportunity and Willingness as Ordering Concepts in 
the Study of War' 4 International Interactions (1978) pp.363-387. 
100 Westing,A.H. 'Environmental Factors in Strategic Policy and 
Action: An Overview' in Westing,A.H. (Ed) Global Resources and 
International Conflict: Environmental Factors in Strategic Policy and 
Action (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) pp.3-20. 
technology, and access to resources. Thus, advances in 
technology, and increase in population cause the dilemma 
of rising demands against insufficient domestic 
resources. A society In that position will be greatly 
constrained unless it can find a way of acquiring enough 
resources to meet the demands. Therefore, in order to 
acquire such resources, that state reaches out beyond 
its borders. In doing so, it is constrained inter alia 











. pressure lS 
centrepiece 
that when 
of the concept 
resources are 
domestically, and there lS the capability to acquire 
them, then a disposition to do so is created. If that 
predisposition is acted upon, conflict may resul t. 102 
Territorial Borders and Inter-state Conflict 
The sum of the varlous approaches to the 
interaction of environmental factors and international 
relations, lS that the study of inter-state conflict 
would be considerably impoverished if the milieu within 
which the protagonists act was not taken into account. 
But that notwithstanding, a preclse appreciation of the 
link between borders and conflict enables inter-state 
conflict to be put against a sharper analytical relief. 
This section will briefly investigate that relationship. 
A maJor variable In the determination of the 
opportunity and willingness of states to engage In 
conflict lS geographical possibility, which can be 
determined inter alia by the number of shared borders103 
that a state has. While it has been argued that states 
experience more conflict with their neighbours than with 
101 Choucri,N. & North,R.C. Nations in Conflict: National Growth 
and International Violence (San Fransisco: W.H.Freeman & Co., 1975) 
pp.14-15. 
102 Ibid., p.1 7. 
103 Or frontiers: borders and frontiers are distinguished by the 
fact that whereas "a boundary is a definite line of separa+::ion, a 
frontier is a zone of contact." See Taylor,P.J. Poli~ical Geography: 
I\\'lld Economy, Naticn-5tate anJ Locality (Essex & New York: Longman & 
John Wiley ~ Sons, 1989) F·145. 
other states because borders . 1ncrease the number of 
interactions, and therefore the opportunity for serious 
conflict, 104 it 
conflict: thus 
is not the borders per se that cause 
"a border does not necessarily cause either 
conflicts or cooperative international interaction. 
The argument is ... that a border creates a certain 
structure of risks and opportunities in which 
various interactions appear more or less likely to 
occur. ,,105 
This approach is meritorious because while looking at 
territory as a facilitating agent for inter-state 
conflict, it also suggests that geography plays a role 
in the diffusion of conflict. In this regard, general 
empirical findings have shown that diffusion 1S more 
likely amongst highly interacting countries. 106 In 
Africa, it has been suggested that contagion is 
contingent on a recent history of domestic strife, 
polarisation among a few contending groups, 107 and most 
intriguingly, on colonial structures, which 
"created certain linguistic and communication 
patterns that have continued to link nations during 
the post colonial years ... [That] argument might 
suggest that former membership in a given colonial 
empire rather than shared borders could go 
further towards defining the sets of interacting 
nations within which conflict is most likely to 
diffuse. ,,108 
104 Goertz,G. & Diehl,P.F. Territorial Changes and International 
Conflict op.cit., p.7. 
105 Staar,H. & Most,B. 'The Substance and Study of Borders in 
International Relations Research' 20 International Studies Quarterly 
(1976) pp.581-620:588. The same point is emphasised in Siverson,R.M. 
& Staar, H. 'Opportunity, Willingness and the Diffusion of War' 84 
American Political Science Review (1990) pp.47-68:49-50. 
106 Staar,H. & Most,B. 'Contagion and Border Effects on 
Contemporary African Conflict' 16 Comparative Political Studies (1983) 
pp.92-117:97. 
107 This is true for example of the (conflict) relations between 
Uganda and the Sudan. See Chapters 5 and 6. 
108 Hill,S. & Rothchild,D. 'The Contagion of Political Conflict 
in Africa and the World' 30 Journal of Conflict Resolution (1986) 
pp.716-735:733. 
However, territory can be perceived of as a source 
of conflict. Where territory is a source of conflict, 
the conflict potential revolves around either the 
intrinsic importance (i.e. availability and control of 
minerals, and the land itself), or the relational 
importance (i.e. geographic location, historical 
importance, or ethnic composition of the population), of 
the terri tory. 109 As will be argued later, the 
relational importance of territory 1S an important 
feature of the conflicts in Africa. 
A slightly different approach but which concludes 
that territory is the source of conflict most likely to 
end in war, has been advanced by Vasquez. He argues 
that the relationship between territory and war is best 
seen not in terms of the Realist paradigm, with its 
preoccupation with power, but in terms of 'issue 
poli tics'. Hence, he contends that al though all wars 
begin with 1ssues, not all issues are resolved by war. 
He notes further that those issues relating to territory 
(rather than power) have been the underlying and 
fundamental source of conflict that ends in war. Thus, 
"it 1S territoriality ... rather than the struggle for 
power, that is the key to understanding interstate 
war.,,110 Therefore, although territorial issues are not 
a sufficient condition for war, they are underlying 
causes of inter-state warfare. ll1 
A Critical Analysis of Border Conflicts 1n Africa 
It is part of post-colonial received wisdom that 
the exercise of demarcating Africa during partition was 
done arbitrarily by officials with limited expertise, 
since at that time "European knowledge of the physical, 
109 Goertz,G. & Diehl,P.F. Territorial Changes and International 
Conflict op.cit., pp.14-20. For example, the Biafran conflict. In the 
Ugandan conflict, the NRM established an interim administration in 
western Uganda during the mediation. Had that succeeded, it would ha~e 
been explicable in similar terms: see Chapter 7 for an account of thlS 
interim administration. 
110 Vasquez,J.A. The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge Universi:y 
Press, 1993) p.124. 
111 Ibid.,p.124,133,146. 
let alone the human geography of Africa was still 
rudimentary. ,,112 Thl· scI d . th h , oup e Wl t e mood of popular 
colonialism which was abroad in Europe during the period 
of partition, ensured that complaints by Africans about 
the defects of colonial boundaries, if they were 
listened to, were not given much or any, weight. In 
Hargreaves's graphic phraseology, in the colonial period 
and after, "the inhabitants of the grass had to learn to 
endure the trampling of contending elephants - and to 
cope wi th other predators as well." 113 The effect of 
this arbitrary demarcation especially after 
decolonisation, was to enshrine structural violence 
based on ethnic and regional competition, encourage 
secession, irredentism, and border conflicts. Eventually 
this stimulated political and economic policies 
favouring some ethnic communities over others.114 Hence, 
the endemic nature, and festering quality of, conflicts 
ln modern Africa. 
The reactions of African governments to this state 
of affairs, through the articulation of the three 
pillars of OAU conflict management (non-interference in 
internal affairs of states, respect for the borders 
inheri ted at independence, and African solutions to 
African problems), are analysed ln detail ln Chapter 
Four. Part of the philosophy behind OAU policy was the 
belief that conflict would be most likely to arise in 
those states which were heterogeneous, and some of whose 
ethnic communi ties were divided by colonial borders. 
But as experience was later to show, even those states 
which were supposedly homogeneous such as Somalia, were 
affected by ethnically inspired conflict because their 
apparently homogeneous communi ty was divided between 
112 Hargreaves,J.D. 'The Making of the Boundaries: Focus on West 
Africa' in Asiwaju,A.I. (Ed) Partitioned Africans op.cit., pp.19-27:22. 
On the borders of East Africa, see McEwen, A. C. In terna tional Boundari es 
of East Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
113 Ibid., p. 25. 
114 Sommerville,K. Foreign Military Inte~-\'e:]tion ~n .~frica 
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1990) pp.2-4. 
neighbouring states, such as Kenya and Ethiopia. 115 In 
any case, even so-called ethnically homogeneous states 
do generate conflict between clans belonging to the same 
ethnic group. 116 As the current internal conflict In 
Somalia is bringing to light, given the ethnic map of 
the region such heterodox tensions invariably diffuse 
into neighbouring states. Therefore the conclusion is 
manifestly justified that the territorial boundaries 
inheri ted at independence, whether they are between 
heterogenous 
bequea thed an 
instability.117 
or homogenous African states, have 
inescapable legacy of shared political 
Some wri ters have however tried to minimise the 
role of borders as conflict generating agents in Africa. 
Thus, Kapil has argued that the conflict potential of 
African boundaries is dependent on the discontinuities 
in interaction caused by superimposed borders, and on 
the efficiency of administrative controls of those 
borders. In terms reminiscent of Deutsch,llB he 
concludes that 
"Over a period of time, wi th increas ing economi c 
modernisation and social mobilisation around new 
territorial institutions and symbols, the inherited 
boundaries will come to designate and to coincide 
with new regions of movement, circulation, 
interaction, and identification. The potential for 
conflict over their location should decline even 
further. ,,119 
Mathews, adopting Prescott's classification of the 
causes of border disputes (that they arlse over 
115 See Woodward, P. 'Relations Between Neighbouring States in 
North-East Africa' 22 Journal of Modern African Studies (1984) pp.285-
275. 
116 Lewis,I.M. 'The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary 
Nationalism' 88 African Affairs (1989) pp.573-579. 
11 7 Woodward, 'Relations Between Neighbouring States in North-East 
Africa' op.cit., p.278. 
118 Deutsch,K.W. Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry 
into the Foun~ia.tions of Nationality (Cambridge,MA.: MIT Press, 1966). 
119 Kapil,R.L. 'On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries 
in Africa' 18 lv,'rld Politics (1966) pp.656-673 :673. 
territory, position, function, or resource 
development) ,120 posits the Vlew that where rlvers and 
lakes represent borders between African states, or are 
shared, conflicts over the resource development of these 
will become more common with the increasing need of 
their exploitation and use .121 He advances further the 
Vlew that 
"most African states are characterised by a 
heterogeneous population and by the absence of any 
'national history'. Lacking a guide for 
territorial revision, they have insisted on 
preserving the present boundary system and opposed 
any attempt to alter it. Further disputes of an 
ethnic and historical nature are not, therefore, 
1 ikely to develop." 122 
It lS difficult to know whether Touval has 
undergone a transformation or not: the writings of the 
later Touval appear to have modified the doctrinaire 
iconoclasm of the earlier one. Yet, these later 
writings are peppered with references to the earlier, by 
way of authoritative clarification. In The Boundary 
Poli tics of Independent Africa, he argued that the 
expectation at independence that Africa's borders would 
prove to be the cause of bitter conflict had been proved 
wrong, (and that it could not be otherwise) since "some 
of the disputes that did erupt underwent rapid and 
extreme fluctuation from phases of mild disagreement to 
phases of violent conflict and reconciliation. ,,123 He 
observed further that the maj ori ty of divided ethnic 
communities "have accepted the fact of their division 
and have not to irredentism or 
separatism. ,,124 Later, he was to concede that 
120 Prescott, J. R. V. The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries 
(London: Hutchinson, 1965). 
121 Mathews,R.O. 'Interstate Conflicts in Africa: A Review' 24 
International Organization (1970) pp.335-360:344. 
122 Ibid., p.359. 
123 Touval, S. The Boundary Poli tics of Independent Africa 
(Cambridge,MA.: Harvard University Press, 1972) p.vii. 
124 Ibid., p.271. 
"The ubiquity of partitioned groups astride African 
int~r~ational bo~ndaries therefore greatly 
fac1l1tates the sp1llover of domestic conflict by 
the addi tion of an international dimension. It 
also contributes to the readiness of people to flee 
from their homes and become refugees 1n 
neighbouring states. ,,125 
He recognises that the potential for inter-state 
conflict is high in Africa, but proceeds to embellish 
that concession with a rider that amounts to the same 
thing: 
"it is not the partition of groups which 1S the 
direct cause of conflict, but rather the union of 
disparate groups the enclosure of partitioned 
groups within a single state with others with whom 
their interests conflict. ,,126 
Although the conceptual scalpel that the later Touval 
wields has become somewhat sharper, the hands that hold 
it have not changed at all. Not surprisingly, his 
remedy for the state of affairs in Africa is to propose 
a form of consociational democracy, where, by virtue of 
skillful management of alliances with others, 
disadvantaged groups can increase their share of power 
within their state. 127 
In arguing that conflicts in Africa will not arlse 
as a result of disputes about borders, Kapil, Mathews, 
Touval, et al miss the point completely, and fail to see 
the wood for the trees. Where internal factors such as 
ethnic composition generate conflict, and where the 
ethnic group 1n question 
borders, such conflict 
is divided by international 
will necessarily become 
internationalised: and part of the reason for that 
internationalisation will be the arbitrary nature of the 
colonial borders. For example, the various internal 
conflicts in Somalia (including the current one) have 
been generated internally; but Somalia's international 
125 Touval,S. 'Partitioned Groups and Inter State Relations' in 
Asiwaju,A.I. (Ed) Partitioned Africans op.cit., pp.223-232:231. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid., pp.223-224. 
borders divide an ethnic group which has loyalties and 
family ties across those borders. Once these find 
expression, the question of the rationality of those 
borders, and their place in the international relations 
of the region will, ~pso facto, arise. Kapil et al are 
right to the extent that the borders per se may not be 
the primary spark of conflict. But, because they fail 
to appreciate the close conceptual link between borders 
and internal (especially ethnic) conflict, their 
interpretation is flawed, and they miss the essential 
key to understanding this important aspect of conflicts 
In Africa. 
Touval's thesis on the pattern of conflicts In 
Africa - that they go through fluctuating phases from 
mild disagreement to violent conflict, and eventually to 
reconciliation - falls loose at the seams, because it lS 
predicated on a lack of appreciation of the true nature 
of conflict. He puts too high a premium on behavioural 
conflict at the expense of structural conflict. To the 
extent that it refers to ethnic minorities along 
territorial borders, his panacea of consociational 
democracy for ethnic minorities misapprehends the whole 
basis of ethnic related border problems. Where an 
ethnic community is divided by a territorial border, the 




will be visited 
movement towards 
with suspicion,12B 
which may be translated into violent conflict. 
The conflict in Burundi is an interesting case In 
point. There, the minority Tutsi are in power, and 
since the early sixties, there has been violence 
directed against the majority Hutus. In 1987, a new 
government tried to improve relations between the two 
128 As Rupesinghe notes, "Over the years, suspicion and 
intolerance have increased to a point where minori ty grievances are met 
wi th increased police and mili tary repression. Ethnic claims are often 
interpreted as ... threats to the very security of the state itself." 
See Rupesinghe,K. 'Internal Conflict~ and their. Res?lution: The ~ase 
of Uganda' in Rupesinghe,K. (Ed) Confl~ct Resolut~on ~n Uganda Op.Clt., 
pp.1-23:4. 
ethnic groups. Although on the surface it looked like 
the conflict was abating, the source of the problem was 
structural, and this being the case, the mutual hatred 
persisted. In 1988, the Hutu in the north killed several 
thousand Tutsis, and in turn about twenty thousand Hutus 
were massacred by the (Tutsi) army, with the result that 
about a hundred thousand Hutus ran away to the 
neighbouring countries, mostly to Rwanda, where the 
Hutus are in the majority. Nevertheless, in an exercise 
in consociationalism, the position of Prime Minister was 
created in Burundi, and given to a Hutu, and the number 
of Hutu cabinet ministers increased to eleven. Security 
was restored, and many of the refugees returned home. 129 
But the structure of relations, and the underlying 
potential for conflict did not change. In 1991 and 
again in 1993, the ethnic killings resumed. l3O 
What analysts of the African scene such as Kapil, 
Mathews, and Touval fail to appreciate, is that in this 
type of conflict, ethnic and border issues are so 
closely intertwined that source, cause and effect lose 
their distinction as separate categories. These 
analysts perhaps rely too heavily, and embrace too 
uncritically, notions which without modification, are 
alien to African realities. Trapped in the prison of 
their analytical approach, their predictions, 
extrapolated wholly from a different (and unmodified) 
experience, are proved to be false. Consequently, they 
now contemplate balefully the different realities of 
conflict on the African continent. 
Border and Ethnic Conflict: A Symbiosis 
The very close relationship between the problem of 
borders and the ethnic question In Africa, can be 
discerned from the undertaking of the OAU member states 
129 These facts are summarised from Brogan, P. World Conflicts: Why 
,nhl Where They are Happening (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1989) 
pp.14-18. 
130 A good analysis of the Burundi conflict is made by 
Lemarchand,R. 'Burundi in Comparative Perspective: Dimensions of Ethnic 
Strife' in McGarry,J. & O'Leary,B. (Eds) The Politics of Ethnic Conflict 
Regulation op.cit., pp.1Sl-171. 
to respect the territorial borders inherited at 
independence. The rationale behind the adoption of that 
policy has been suggested by Brownlie, who observes that 
"If the colonial alignments were discarded 
alternative alignments would have to be agreed 
upon. Such a process of redefinition would create 
confusion and threats to the peace. Even if the 
principles on which revision was to be based were 
agreed upon, there would be considerable difficulty 
in applying the principles to the ethnic and tribal 
complexities of African states."l31 
The relationship between 









elsewhere .132 The rationale behind an ethnic conflict 
that assumes an international character is that such 
internationalisation would not have arisen had the 
border in question not been arbitrary, and thus divided 
ethnic communities between two or more states. When an 
ethnically oriented conflict lS complicated by a 
dividing border, it tends to be severe, since "ethnic In 
general seems to be the most intractable, most 
emotional, and most violence-prone of all lssues 
relating to international conflict. ,,133 Contemporary 
conflicts such as that leading to the independence of 
Eritrea, the Sudanese conflict, and historical ones like 
the Biafran war, are ready illustrations of this point. 
Connor notes that loyalty to the ethnic group and 
to the state are not harmonious. He reports that ethnic 
consciousness as a political force lS on the rlse 
globally, and that this trend has the effect of 
challenging the validity of the existing state 
borders. 134 In specific types of ethnic conflict such as 
131 Brownlie, I. African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic 
Encyclopaedia (London: Christopher Hurst, 1979) p.ll. Emphasis added. 
132 Staar & Most, 'Contagion and Border Effects on Contemporary 
African Conflict' op.cit., p.104. 
133 Mandel, 'Roots of the Modern Interstate Border Dispute' 
op.cit., p.--l35. 
134 Connor, 'Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?' op.cit., 
pp.243-2--l4. He is right, as demonstrated by the realities of Eastern 
Eur0Fe and the former USSR in 1993. 
secesslon, ethnic anxiety plays a particularly 
significant role al though many other factors such as 
economlC ones are also important. 135 
With respect to Africa, Boyd has noted the close 
affinity In terms of conflict potential between the 
superimposed boundaries, and what he terms 'ethnic 
population overhang'. This arises from a situation where 
ethnic groups are bisected by state boundaries, wi th 
parts of the same group being placed on either side of 
a state border.136 The conflicts in the Horn of Africa, 
and historically, conflicts such as that between Ghana 
and Togo, where the division of the Ewe people between 
Togo and Ghana led to the efforts of liberation groups 
to reunify the Ewe people137 are illustrations of this 
affinity. 
Shorn of the unhappy phraseology of 'population 
overhang' which imports the connotation of excess 
populations, Boyd's concept lS very pertinent. He 
explains cogently the dynamics between ethnic conflict 
and the resul tant generation of boundary conflict by 
referring to the relative strength of particular ethnic 
groups in the domestic political scene, which may lead 
to official policy which generates border conflict: 
"If an ethnic group has a particularly significant 
or pivotal role in the political environment, the 
likelihood is that its demands for some form of 
alteration in the boundary status quo will result 
in the formulation of government policy is greater. 
It may well be that politically unimportant ethnic 
groups, or ethnic groups which operate in a 
political environment where ethnicity is not an 
important factor, have their demands ignored while 
those with greater political clout will be more 
successful in their claims. In this case, the 
presence of population overhang may be of initial 
importance, but the factor which is crucial in the 
135 Horowitz, D.L. Ethnic Groups in Conflict op.cit., p.359. 
136 Boyd,J.B. 'The Origins of Boundary Conflict in Africa' in 
DeLancey, M. W. (Ed) Aspects of International Relations in .~.:crica 
(Bloomington: University of Indiana, 1979) pp.159-189:164. 
137 See Brown, D. ' Borderline Politics in Ghana: The Uational 
Liberation Movement of Western Togoland' 18 Journal of Modern African 
Studies (1980) pp.575-609. 
generation of boundary conflict is the salience of 
ethnicity in internal politics."l3S 
This feature should however be seen alongside the notion 
of fomenting boundary conflict as a 'safety valve' for 
general domestic turmoil. Thus, governments facing 
significant opposition at home may provoke conflict 
whose apparent cause 1S the artificial boundaries: hence 
Zartman's statement that any "African state can have 
boundary problems if it wants. ,,139 But even 1n such 
cases, it is the fact that those boundaries divide an 
ethnic group(s) between two countries demarcated by the 
artificial border that leads to the success of the 
'safety valve' policy. This was the case in the Uganda-
Tanzania conflict of 1978/79. In order to obtain some 
relief from opposition - especially from some sections 
of the military - Amin invaded the Kagera Salient 1n 
Tanzania, on the basis that the pre-colonial border 
between Uganda and Tanzania was originally situated 
there. 
Therefore, cross-border involvement in an internal 
conflict 1S more likely to happen when the internal 
conflict 1S ethnic. The other aspect of this argument 
1S the idea that if internal borders are interfered 
with, this will also affect the external borders of the 
state, if only because the area of that state's 
sovereignty will be accordingly reduced, thus calling 
for a general re-alignment of the international 
relations of the region. This was almost the case 
during the Uganda conflict. When Museveni's NRM 
declared an interim administration 1n western Uganda 
during the mediation,140 Tito Okello's government 
138 Boyd, 'The Origins of Boundary Conflict ln Africa' op.cit., 
p.167. Emphasis added. 
139 Zartman,I.W. 'The Foreign and Military Politics of African 
Boundary Problems' in Widstrand, C. G. (Ed) .2<.frican Boundary Problems 
(Upsalla: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1969) p. 79 -
quoted in Boyd, 'The Origins of Boundary Conflict in Africa' op.cit., 
p.160. 
140 See Chapter 7. 
rejected it inter alia on the basis that such 
declaration would impugn the integrity of Uganda, by 
interfering with its international boundaries, as well 
as polarising Uganda into ethnic factions. It 1S 
therefore pertinent to argue that perhaps one reason why 
border and ethnic related conflict 1n Africa and 
elsewhere has appeared to be intractable is that ethnic 
and cultural ties are far stronger than political ties. 
Writing about Africa, Asiwaju suggests that authorities 
there will need to get this perspective right in order 
to formulate policies that will positively address this 
type of conflict in the future. 141 How the OAU has gone 
about manag1ng the conflicts of Africa Slnce its 
inception is the concern of the following chapter. 
141 Asiwaju, A.I. 'The Global Perspective and Border Management 
P 1 · 0 t· 'l·n AS1·waJ·u, A.I.(Ed) Partitioned Africans op.cit., o lCY p lons 
pp . 2.3 3 - ~~ 45 . 
Chapter Four 
OAU Conflict Management 
Introduction 
Chapter One formulated an analytical framework for 
mediation, and suggested that such a framework should 
inter alia take into account the regional approach to 
management. It was argued that track one and track two 
conflict management are not always separately able to 
cater for the various levels of conflict. Hence it was 
suggested that a dual diplomatic track ought to be 
considered. 
Chapter Two examined the literature, and concluded 
that there are certain important areas of conflict 
management that have not been addressed sufficiently. 
It was argued that internal conflicts are increasingly 
becoming the dominant type of conflict in the post-Cold 
War era, and that an analytical approach that takes into 
account their complex and multi-level dimension should 
be adopted. 
Chapter Three delineated the general background 
against which the conflicts In Africa should be 
analysed. It observed that these conflicts display a 
dual ethnic and territorial character which 
internationalises them, and a symbiosis between the two 
was attempted. It was conceded that these traits are 
common to conflicts elsewhere. However, it was pointed 
out that since the general flavour of this study is 
African, examining these factors from an African 
perspective would lay a useful general background for 
the discussion of OAD conflict management in this 
chapter. 
Although it 1S true that the exercise carried out 
in Chapter Three 
meaningful to the 
should be examined 
. 
1S useful in itself, to be more 
conflict analyst, those conflicts 
in terms of the efforts that have 
been made to manage them. The efforts of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in managing Africa's 
conflicts has received mixed notices. 1 However, many of 
the writings on this subject have been guided by general 
parameters of analysis, considering mainly the evolution 
of the OAU in its politica12 and internationa13 setting, 
but without taking into account the operational 
philosophy within which the OAU has attempted to manage 
these conflicts, as Fol tz has done so articulately. 4 
Very few studies have attempted to analyse OAU conflict 
management within an analytical framework geared to the 
improvement of OAU conflict management. Some of the 
writings of Zartman have attempted to do this.5 But as 
even he has been constrained to observe, little "is 
known about the internal dynamics of 
African ... mediation; there are few records of 'who said 
1 See El-Ayouty,Y. & Zartman,I.W. (Eds) The OAU After Twenty Years 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984). 
2 See for example, Amate,C.O.C. Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in 
Practice (London: Macmillan, 1986). 
3 See for example, Mathews,K. 'The Organisation of African Unity 
in World Politics' in Onwuka,R.I. & Shaw,T.M. (Eds) Africa in World 
Politics: Into the 1990s (London: Macmillan, 1989) pp.32-63. 
4 Foltz,W.J. 'The Organization of African Unity and the Resolution 
of Africa's Conflicts' in Deng, F. M. & Zartman, I. W. (Eds) Conflict 
Resolution in Africa (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1991) 
pp.347-366. 
5 See for example, Zartman,I.W. 'Ripening Conflict, Ripe Moment, 
Formula and Mediation' in Bendahmane,D.B. & McDonald,J.W. (Eds) 
Perspectives on Negotiation: Four Case Studies and Interpretations 
(Washington: Foreign Service Institute,1986) pp.20S-227j 
Zartman,I.W.Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa 
(New York: Oxford Uni versi ty Press, 1989 -updated ed. ) j and, Zartman, I . W. 
'Conflict Reduction: Prevention, Management, and Resolution' in 
Deng,F.M. & Zartman,l.W. (Eds) Conflict Resolution in Africa op.cit., 
pp.299-319. 
what to whom with what effect.,,,6 I n consequence, 
whereas there 
"are many studies about the nature of current 
conflicts ln Africa ... they tend to be either 
historical or polemical. The first give a thorough 
analysis of the causes and evolution of the 
conflict, the second of the rightness of one side. 
But there is little study of the conflict as a 
problem, requiring imaginative ideas and propi tious 
conditions for a solution. Solutions are at best 
added as an afterthought to studies, and are not 
considered academic since they are unfootnotable. ,,7 




It will examlne 
OAU conflict management 
the OAU's attitude to its 
invol vement ln internal and inter- state conflicts ln 
Africa. It will be argued that the dichotomy of 
internal and inter-state conflicts, while logical within 
the provisions of the OAU Charter, is rendered nugatory 
in practical conflict management. Track one and track 
two conflict management within the spirit of the Charter 
will be examined, as will the reasons for the paucity of 
non-OAU individual African mediations. It will be 
suggested that since OAU practice has developed along an 
internal and inter-state dichotomy which is no longer 
practically feasible, an alternative (dual) trackS that 
is not inspired by that dichotomy should point towards 
a new direction in African conflict management. 
The Legal Background: The OAU Charter 
The OAU Charter was born toward the end of the 
colonial era. It was inspired by different visions of 
the place, role, and function of independent Africa. In 
the end, it was a merger and a compromise between these 
6 Zartman,l.W. 'Conflict Reduction: Prevention, Management, and 
Resolution' op.cit., pp.299-319.:313-3~4;althoug~, as was not.ed ~n 
Chapter Two, some of the histor1cal llteratur~ 1S very reveal1ng 1n 
this regard, and therefore ought not to be reJected out of hand as 
merely anecdotal. 
7 Zartman, 'Conflict Reduction: Prevention, Management and 
Resolution' op.cit., p.319. 
8 See Chapter 1. 
different views. 9 The Casablanca groupl0 demanded the 
immediate unification of African states, while the 
Monrovia groupll advocated a more functional approach to 
African unity. Against this divergence of approach to 
African unity were the fears of some states that the 
idea of self-determination would encourage irredentism. 
There was also anxiety in some small states that the 
bigger and more nationalistic ones would interfere with 
their internal affairs on pan-Africanist or irredentist 
grounds. 12 Thus, article 3 of the Charter enshrined 
principles which exemplified the bridging of the 
philosophical gap between the Casablanca and the 
Monrovia groups, and catered for the apprehension of 
some states about their future security. 
Principles of OAU Conflict Management 
Of the seven principles articulated In the Charter, 
the first three, namely the sovereign equality of all 
member states, non-interference in the internal affairs 
of states, and respect for the territorial integrity of 
each state, are central to OAU conflict management. 13 
So is the principle of 'African solutions to African 
problems', which though not enshrined in the Charter, 
has evolved from OAU conflict management practice. 
The Principle of the Sovereign Equality of States 
The debates preceding the formation of the OAU 
demonstrate that the founding fathers contemplated an 
organisation in which none of the members would lay a 
9 The story of this evolution is given in Djaksam, T. Conflict 
Resolution in the OAU: A Case Study of Chad (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Kent at Canterbury, 1990) Ch.1. 
10 Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Egypt, and the Algerian 
Provisional Government in Exile. 
11 Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, 
Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Upper Volta, Liberia, Nigeria and 
the Sudan. 
12 Umozurike, U. O. 'The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the OAU 
Charter' 78 African Affairs (1979) pp.197-209:198. 
13 This has recently been reaffirmed by the OAU. See Interim 
Report ot the Secretary-General. on the Nec-:;3.:1isms f~r Conflict 





over the others, or 
inter pares. This 
In any way 
concern was 
reflected In the Charter, article 3(1) of which 
reaffirms the undertaking to adhere to the principle of 
the sovereign equality of all member states. Indeed, 
the adherence to this principle differentiates the OAU 
from other regional organisations such as the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) , in that it was 
intended to include no dominant state and was instead to 
be "a partnership of almost equally weak equals. ,,14 
All member states formally profess adherence to 
this principle. But the varied pace of development, and 
the uneven availability of resources In different 
countries, has predisposed certain countries to want to 
play a hegemonial role in pan-African, and regional 
affairs. The role of Nigeria in the Economic Community 
of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG, which 
lS the peacekeeping force in Liberia) illustrates this. 
In conflict management terms however, this perceived 
role of some states has not been clearly discernible. 
Thus, although intending to play a leadership role In 
the Liberian conflict, Nigeria has professed to do so 
under the cover of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West 
African States). On the other hand, although Kenya's 
attempt to mediate in the Uganda conflict was partly 
inspired by its perceived status as a leader in the 
region,15 that perception was not shared by all parties 
In the conflict. Indeed, if anything, it played a 
complicating role in the mediation. 16 
The Principle of Non-Interference 
14 Northedge,F.S. & Donelan,M. International Disputes: The 
Poli tical Aspects (London: Europa Publications, 1971) p. 270. 
Developments since 1963 have however rendered this observation void. 
Currently, some members such as South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt are 
certainly not 'equally weak' with other less developed and less well 
endowed members. 
15 See Chapter 6. 
16 See Chapter 7. 
The principle of non-interference In the internal 
affairs of states , lS best seen as exemplifying II the 
desire to be left alone, to be allowed to choose one's 
particular political, economic and social systems and to 
order the life of one's community in one's own way. liP 
Ideally, African governments require by this principle, 
that they be left alone to deal wi th any internal 
problems and conflicts, and only invite outside 
involvement as an exercise of sovereign choice. ls 
As will be seen later from examples such as the 
Chad conflict, the OAU's definition of what lS and is 
not internal has not been consistent, or realistic. 
Three approaches to interpretation explain this. 
Firstly, the OAU has adopted a very strict and limited 
interpretation of the principle of non-interference. It 
considers any involvement, including involvement by way 
of management, to constitute interference in internal 
affairs. Accordingly , individual member states have 
adopted that strict interpretation. Secondly, although 
article 3 (2) of the Charter refers to the internal 
affairs of states, it has been restrictively interpreted 
to mean non-interference in the internal affairs of OAU 
member states. In truth, the provision was intended to 
encapsulate a broad philosophical position, and was 
addressed to the world at large. Its consequent limited 
interpretation does not accord with the intentions of 
its drafters, or the spirit of the Charter,19 
The third problem refers to whether the provision 
against non-interference was addressed to member states 
exclusively, or to the organisation as well. The OAU's 
17 Elias,T.O. 'The Charter of the Organization of African Unity' 
59 American Journal of International Law (1965) pp.243-267:248; also, 
Elias,T.O. Africa and the Development of International Law (New York: 
Dobbs Ferry,1972) p.127. 
18 Foltz, 'The Organization of African Unity and the Resolution 
of Africa's Conflicts' op.cit., p.359. 
19 A textual (admittedly positivistic) analysis of article ? 
supports this view. The other rele,:ant sub-articles make. direc~ 
reference to member states where they lntend to refer excluslvely to 
them: for example, article 3(1) refers to "all member states"; article 
3(3) to "each state", and article 3(5) to "neighbouring s'::.ates". 
interpretation . 1S that it also applies to the 
organisation. However, the argument that this provision 
is not coterminously addressed to the organisation has 
been canvassed persuasively by TiewuI. He argues that 
the injunction to adhere to the principles of article 3 
are addressed to member states, unlike a similar 
provision in the United Nations Charter, which is 
addressed to both member states and the organisation 
itself. Since the drafters of the OAU Charter modelled 
it on the UN Charter, (and indeed had it before them) ,20 
the omission to extend the provisions of article 3(2) to 
the organisation could not have been fortuituous. 
Tiewul therefore concludes that "[far] from prohibiting 
the involvement of the OAU in the domestic affairs of 
member states, the Charter charges it with functions the 
performance of which presupposes such involvement. ,,21 
The Principle of Territorial Integrity 
This principle enjoins OAU member states to respect 
the territorial borders inheri ted at independence. 22 
More even than the principle of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of states, (although in many instances 
in state practice they operate together) it is the 
principle most cherished by the OAU, and indeed, has 
been "elevated to an absolute principle. ,,23 This 
explains a contradiction in OAU conflict management: 
20 Elias, 'The Charter of the Organization of African Unity' 
op.cit. 
21 Tiewul,S.A. 'Relations between the United Nations Organization 
and the Organization of African Unity in the Settlement of Secessionist 
Conflicts' 16 Harvard International Law Journal (1975) pp.259-302:294. 
22 See AHG/Res .16 (1). This is known as the doctrine of uti 
possidetis juris, on which see Zartman,I.W. Ripe for Resolution: 
Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Oxford & New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989-2nd ed) p.15. 
23 Kamanu,O.S. 'Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: An 
OAU Dilemma' 12 Journal of Modern African Studies (1974) pp.355-
376:360. Shivji agrees,. but a:gues t~at of t?e three, self-
determination is the prlmary rlght, wlth non-lnterference and 
territorial integrity being secondary. In his view the OAU Charter has 
raised the two secondary elements to the level of princip~e e~ements. 
See, Shivji,I.G. 'The Right of Peoples to Self-Determlnatl~:m: .An 
African Perspective' in Twining,W. (Ed) Issues of Self-Determ~nat~on 
(Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1991) pp.33-48:40. 
that al though as for example In Western Sahara the 
conflict would have precluded involvement on the basis 
of non-interference in internal affairs, it nevertheless 
became engaged there on the basis that the conflict 
affects territorial borders, and is hence international. 
An intense debate on the question of territorial 
borders and the meaning of African unity (and 
tangentially therefore, the view taken on secession) 
prefigured the drafting of the Charter. The Casablanca 
group adopted a 'Uni ted States of Africa' Vlew, and 
envisaged the political union of all African states to 
form one government. The Monrovia group championed a 
'United Nations of Africa' perspective, and did not 
contemplate any devolution of sovereignty from 
individual states. 24 The OAU adopted the Monrovia 
approach and since then, the view that secessions are 
inherently incompatible with the goal of African unity 
has been taken as a truism by African leadership.25 The 
reaction of the OAU to the Biafran and Eritrean 
secessionist conflicts bears this out. 
The Principle of 'African Solutions to African Problems' 
This principle is one which the OAU has long 
laboured to affirm.26 Also known as the ' try OAU first' 
approach, 27 it is based on the belief that any dispute 
between member states "should be dealt with as a family 
quarrel, that should not be taken to any outside 
body ... to settle. ,,28 It also forms part of the larger 
debate about regionalism, and the Vlew that regional 
organisations are more effective conflict managers in 
24 Kamanu, 'Secession and the Right of Self-Determination' 
op.cit., pp.362-363. 
25 Ibid., p.362. 
26 See the preamble to AHG/Res.16 (1) which was passed 
at the Cairo summit. 
27 See Andemicael, B. & Nicol, D. 'The OAU: Primacy in Seekir:? 
African Solutions Within the UN Charter' In El-Ayouty, y. & 
Zartman,I.W. (Eds) The OAU ~fter Twenty Years op.cit., pp.l01-119. 
28 Amate, C.O.C. Inside the OAU op.cit., p.166. 
their geographical region. In this view, because such 
organisations are geographically proximate, they are 
more likely to understand the factual background of a 
conflict, and the norms relevant to its management. 29 
The later policies of the United Nations and the United 
States towards the conflict in Somalia30 lend support 
for this view. 
Although during the Cold War this principle was not 
always recognised elsewhere, especially by those with 
strategic and other interests in Africa, it has recently 
been affirmed 1n the aftermath of United States 
involvement 1n the Somalia conflict. Thus, United 
States Secretary of State Christopher explained changing 
United States policy in Somalia by observing that 
henceforth, "we're gOlng to try and use the African 
leaders' assistance to provide an African solution to 
what is really an African conflict. ,,31 
OAU Principles and the Problem of Self-Determination 
The principles of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states and respect for the territorial 
borders inheri ted at independence, are the two main 
pillars on which OAU conflict management 1S founded. 32 
This is not surprising given the political milieu within 
which they were formulated. But when they are 
considered alongside the commitment of the OAU to the 
29 See Nye,J.S. Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in 
Regional Organization (New York: University Press of America, 1987) 
p.17. But, consistent with the argument adopted in this study, such 
organisations are heterogenous managers, and hence may not be able to 
manage conflict effectively: see Chapters 1 and 8. 
30 Some viewed United States policy as being essentially United 
Nations policy: see Kirkpatrick,J. 'Clinton Does Have a Clear Foreign 
Policy: Just ask Boutros-Ghali' International Herald Tribune, 8 August 
1993, p. 6 i others saw United Nations policy as reflecting United States 
Policy: see 'For UN Read US' The Guardian (Editorial), 15 October 1993, 
p.3. Others saw a collaboration of policy: see Rosenfeld,S.S. 'A 
Broader U.S. Vision, or a Setting of Limits?' International Herald 
Tribune, 25-26 September, 1993. The provenance of the policy does not 
affect the argument here. 
31 Reported in International Herald Tribune, 11 October 1993, p .1. 
Emphasis added. 
32 And as is argued in Chapter 6, the strict adherence of the OAU 
to these principles led it to ignore the Uganda conflict. 
principle of self-determination, (a major purpose of the 
OAU, under the rubric of the eradication of all forms of 
colonialism 1n Africa)33 then severe contradictions 
manifest themselves. Some of the conflicts that the OAU 
has dealt with, such as the civil wars in Nigeria and 
Ethiopia, have been secessionist: both the Biafrans and 
the Eritreans sought self-determination. In both cases, 
the governments in power pleaded that those conflicts 
were internal affairs, and the OAD concurred with that 
v1ew. In both, success of the secessionist movements 
would have necessarily entailed alterations of the 
borders of a member state,34 an eventuality that the OAU 
considers anathema. Thus, in both, the OAU's support 
was for the existing territorial borders and states. 
There is an inherent contradiction in this OAD policy, 
because while professing to hold the principle of self-
determination dear, in practice it seems to value it 
less than it does these other two principles. 35 In OAU 
doctrine, self-determination is supportable only when it 
is from foreign rule, and not from African rule,36 or as 
Shivji puts it, when it 1S external rather than 
internal. 37 This OAD position has hardened so much that 
it has impaired the ability of the organisation 
effectively to manage conflicts such as that 1n the 
Ogaden. It also affects the OAD's ability to manage 
33 Article 3 (6) of the OAU charter. 
34 In the case of Eritrea, this did eventually happen. Eritrean 
independence meant a reduction in the territory of ~thiopia. ~t ~ook 
the frontiers of the Italian colony, thus preservlng the prlnclple 
violated by Ethiopia. 
35 See Young, C. 'Sel f - Determinat ion, Territorial Integri ty, and 
the African State System' in Deng,F.M. & Zartman,I.W. (Eds) Conflict 
Resolution in Africa op.cit., pp.320-346. 
36 Mayall,J. 'Self-Determination and the OAU' in Lewis,I.M. (Ed) 
Nationalism and Self-Determination in the Horn of Africa (London: 
Ithaca Press, 1983) pp.77-92:82. 
37 Shivji, 'The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination: An African 
Perspective' op.cit., p.40. 
conflicts related to "post-colonial self-
determination" .38 
In the course of the Ogaden conflict, Somali policy 
changed from accepting OAU mediation in the hope that 
its resistance to Somali irredentism could be thus 
contained (1964-69); containing popular irredentist 
demands by concentrating on alternative social and 
political goals (1969-77); and, pertinently, from 1977, 
arguing that the principle of the inviolability of 
borders applied to sovereign, but not colonial states. 
Since in the Somali view Ethiopia was a colonial state, 
the Ogaden Somali had the right to fight for self-
determination and to receive support In that 
endeavour. 39 Ethiopia and the OAU rej ected this Vlew. 
The OAU upheld the principle of the inviolability of 
borders, and expressed opposition to any 'subversion' 
against the government of a member state. Clearly, "the 
OAU [was] not ... prepared to jeopardise its existence by 
re-classifying one of its member states as a colonial 
power. ,,40 
This OAU policy of supporting the right to external 
self -determination (i. e. liberation from another, 
external state), while hardening its attitude to 
internal self-determination (the right to act against 
totalitarian and oppressive local regimes) 41 and to 
post-colonial self- determination (the demand for ethnic 
communities divided by borders to merge) is hard to 
justify. In conflicts such as in the Ogaden, persuasive 
38 In this type of conflict, the demands for self-determination 
represent "a conflict between those who l~ve within a ter~it~ry and 
those who are part of a wider ethnic group wlth members both lnslde ~nd 
outside the territory". See International Alert's Report, Preve~t~ve 
Diplomacy: A UN/NGO Partnership in the 1990s (London: Internatlonal 
Alert, 1993) p.10. See also Chapter 3. 
39 Mayall, 'Self Determination and the OAU' op.cit., p.86. 
40 Ibid., p.87. 
41 On external and internal self-determination, see Michalska,A. 
'Rights of Peoples to Self-Determin,atio,n in In.ternational Law' in 
Twining,W. (Ed) Issues of Self-Determ~nat~on Op.Clt., pp.71-90:83-87. 
op1n1on V1ews it as a factually colonial situation. 4 : As 
such, it would attract the test laid down by the 
International Court of Justice . 1n the Wes tern Sahara 
Case: 43 that self -determination is a fundamental right 
in contemporary international law, is available to all 
peoples who are subjugated and functionally subjected to 
colonialism, and can be inferred from such obj ecti ve 
factors as geographical, ethnic or cultural 
distinctiveness. In this case as in others, the OAU has 
been out of touch with changing realities. 
OAU Approaches to Managing African Conflicts 
The preceding section identified the legal and 
philosophical milieu within which the OAU has defined 
its conflict management capability. Given the confines 
of that delimitation, the OAU has developed certain 
distinct, and peculiarly OAU conflict management 
policies and methodology. The main conflict management 
policies are firstly, that the organisation eschews 
invol vement in internal conflicts. Secondly, the OAU 
has historically preferred the less formal conflict 
management device of ad hoc mediations, to the more 
formal arrangements contemplated 1n the Charter's 
provision for a Commission on Mediation, Conciliation 
and Arbitration. 
The main methodology of OAU conflict management 1S 
that mediations are carried out collectively, by a 
commission appointed whenever a conflict is brought to 
the attention of the organisation. Three factors render 
these mediations quintessentially OAU. Firstly, the 
mediators are composed exclusively of OAU heads of 
state. Secondly, al though collective, the anatomy of 
these mediations reveals that there runs through them 
some strands of individual mediation. Thirdly, these 
individual mediations only take place within the 
42 Reisman,W.M. 'Somali Self-Determination in the Horn: Legal 
Perspectives and the Implications for Social and.Pol~tica.l Engineering' 
in Lewis, I .M. (Ed) Nationalism an,l Self-Determ~nat~on ~n the Horn of 
Africa op.cit., pp.151-173:164. 
43 ICJ Reports (1975). 
framework and authorisation of the ad hoc commissions. 
There are thus very few instances of non-OAD individual 
mediations on record. 44 
These approaches to OAD management of African 
conflicts have had a twin effect on the structure of 
conflict management in Africa. Because of the OAD's 
preoccupation with institutional (track one) conflict 
management, individual, non-OAD African mediation 
efforts are barely discernible on the OAD conflict 
management map. Secondly, track two conflict management 
efforts on the continent have not been nurtured, if not 
expressly discouraged. The OAD's response to track two 
initiatives has been the classic track one response to 
track two of not formally recognising such efforts, 
presumably so as not to share any blame should they fail 
(and to share 1n their success where that 1S the 
outcome) . 
The following sections will look beneath the veil 
of these OAD approaches, and seek therein the reasons 
why the growth and development of individual non-~AD 
African mediation and track two management has been 
stultified. The OAD is a conservative organisation, and 
this makes it difficult for its Charter to be amended. 
Yet, its approach to conflict management is rigid, and 
is increasingly becoming less able to provide sufficient 
direction in the face of the realities of a changing 
world. It will be suggested that an alternative dual 
diplomatic approach may point to the direction that 
conflict management on the continent should aim towards 
in the future. 
The Conflict Management Policies of the OAU 
i) Preference for Ad Hoc Mediations 
The kind of conflict management preferred 
historically by the OAD is one of "mediation shading 
44 The Uganda mediation which is examined in detail in Chapter 7 
1S one of the few, and most prominent examples. 
into conciliation. ,,45 The emphasis has been on informal 
approaches which are considered to be better suited to 
the realities of the African context. 46 There has 
therefore been an almost obsessive championing of the 
principle of the maintenance of borders inheri ted at 
independence. 47 In practice this has meant that disputes 
have been managed more within the organisation, than by 
the organisation. 48 Indeed, the formal institutional 
machinery contemplated in article XIX of the Charter, 
which set up the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation 
and Arbitration49 was abandoned in practice, in favour 
of ad hoc mediations which are procedurally more 
informal. 50 
Dj aksam gl ves some reasons why that Commission 
became moribund. These include the slow speed of its 
formation which allowed the institutionalisation of ad 
hoc committees, and the bureaucratic politics of 
competition between the Commission and the Secretariat 
of the OAU. He also cites the potential clash between 
the four main organs of the organisation as to which of 
them were to deal with conflicts, and the unsuitability 
of the procedure of judicial settlement or arbitration 
which did not conform to the needs of the continent. 
Finally, he mentions the lack of African specialists in 
45 Wolfers,M. 'The Organization of African Unity as Mediator' in 
Touval,S. & Zartman,I.W. (Eds) International Mediation in Theory and 
Practice (Boulder,CO.: Westview Press, 1985) pp.175-196:175. 
46 Meyers, B. D. ' lntraregional Conflict Management by the 
Organization of African Unity' 28 International Organization (1974) 
pp.345-373:369. 
47 See Chapter 3 on how these borders were effected. 
48 Meyers, 'lntraregional Conflict Management by the Organization 
of African Unity' op.cit., p.369. 
49 On the creation of which see Elias,T.O. ' The Commission of 
Mediation Conciliation and Arbitration of the Organization of African 
Unity' 40'British Yearbook of International Law (1964) pp.336-359. 
50 Wolfers, 'The Organization of African Unity as Mediator' 
op.cit. p.177. 
international law, and the fact that judicial settlement 
is slow and expensive. 51 
These reasons however tell only part of the story. 
Although it 1S true that the Commission underwent 
certain problems in getting off the ground, when the 
Secretary General reported on the need to get the 
Commission started, the Assembly of Heads of State 
nevertheless still preferred to set up a special ad hoc 
commi ttee rather than to resuscitate the Commission. 52 
The argument that there was a lack of African 
specialists on international law 1S only partly 
pertinent. While it is true that there was a dearth of 
African specialists on general international law, it 1S 
also true that specialists on the type of law 1n 
question i.e., African regional customary international 
law based on peculiarly African state practice, did not 
exist anywhere else Slnce it was still developing. 
Hence expertise thereon would have to develop wi th 
evolving practice and on the job, as indeed it later 
did. Thus it was not bureaucratic politics, much less 
a suspicion of western international law that 
predisposed African leaders 1n the OAU to 19nore the 
Commission. It was more that, perhaps because of the 
1ssues involved 1n the conflicts in contemplation 
(especially the matter of borders and non-interference) , 
the leaders did not want any institutionalised and 
binding forum for their settlement. It was also thought 
that the Commission, 1n its present form, 1S 
inappropriate. It was envisaged that the Commission 
would have jurisdiction over states only. In the view 
of OAU members however, it would be impractical to 
suggest that this provision be amended to apply to 
intra-state conflicts, since 
"no sovereign government would readily allow its 
opponents from within the same country to be 
51 Djaksam,T. Conflict Resolution in the OAU: . .:l, Case Study of Cluj 
op.cit., p.98-100. 
52 See Amate, C.O.C. Inside the OAU op.cit. 
ac70rded parity of status in any proceedings of a 
trJ.bunal. Indeed ... [there] ... is the need for an 
approach that ... [engages] the parties in a non-
accusatory discussion. ,,53 
In other words they preferred settlement out of court 
rather than in court. 54 
It remains to be answered why, if this was the 
case, the provision for a Commission was enshrined in 
the Charter in the first place. The answer is not far 
to find. The Charter was drafted by officials, who used 
the precedent of the United Nations Charter in doing so. 
Their concession to Africa was to make the Commission an 
African one, rather than providing for disputes to be 
taken to the International Court of Justice, as is the 
case with the UN Charter. 
In practice, whenever a conflict J.S reported, a 
commitee of heads of state is appointed to look into the 
dispute. The Assembly lays down the philosophical 
guidelines within which the committee should operate, 
usually that the dispute should be settled within the 
spiri t of the Charter. 55 The resort to using heads of 
state in these committees is a peculiarly OAU practice, 
and is particularly significant because it has become 
institutionalised. Its rationale has been suggested by 
Foltz, who observes that 
"The men at the top have greater flexibility in 
reaching decisions and cutting deals than do their 
juniors, as well as the prestige to make their 
decisions stick. This procedural principle has 
consequences for the way the OAU goes about trying 
53 Report of the Secretary-General on Conflicts in Africa: 
Proposals for an GAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution 
(CM/1710 (LVI)) p.7. See also Chapter 1, where the fears governments 
have of legitimising insurgents is discussed. 
54 The suspicion with which courts are seen by African leaders was 
evident later when the African Charter on Human and People's Rights , . 
was being drafted. The suggestion that there be a hum~n rlghts court 
in Africa in the style of the European court was reJected, largely 
because the idea of governments being taken to court was seen as alien 
to tradition. In truth, they were probably scared that judicial 
procedures would reveal much that they preferred to hide. 
55 See for example, AHG/Res. 81 (XII) and AHG/Res. 92 (XV) on 
Western Sahara; AHG/Res.94 (XV) on the Libya/Chad dispute; AHG/Res.199 
(XXVI) on the Mauritania/Senegal dispute; and AHG/Res.121 (XX) on 
Chad. 
to re~ol~e disputes, for it virtually requires that 
negot1at1ons be conducted under the auspices of 
someone who is formally on an equal footing with 
the spokesmen for the two sides, which is to say 
that he too is a chief of state. ,,56 
It will be suggested later that this preoccupation with 
a quintessentially track one approach 1S one of the 
areas of OAU conflict management that could beneficially 
be modified in the future. 57 
ii) OAU Policy of Non-Involvement 1n Internal Conflicts 
That the OAU in practice professes to involve 
itself only in inter-state conflicts was a result of the 
modification 1n the thinking of 
African leaders at the formation 
the first crop of 
of the OAD. Just 
before independence, African nationalists argued that 
Africa was being balkanised, and that the colonial 
borders then existent being artificial, would have to be 
re-drawn after independence. However, because of the 
suspicion that many leaders had for the notion of 
Nkrumaist pan-Africanism, the idea of re-drawing the 
borders was abandoned in favour of territorial integrity 
within the inherited borders. This was partly due to 
the leaders' realisation (which they still hold), that 
changing borders would create as many problems as not 
changing them, 58 and that the status quo provided the 
better way out of that dilemma. 59 As a result, the 
principles of sovereignty, terri torial integri ty and 
non-interference were glven a prominent place in article 
3 of the Charter. This change 1n approach after 
independence was informed by the conviction that 
56 Foltz, 'The Organization of African Unity and the Resolution 
of Africa's Conflicts' op cit p.357. 
57 See Chapter 9. 
58 This position is being questioned increasingly elsewhere, and 
the view is emerging that "Africans must redraw their boundaries not 
in blood and chaos, but through tough negotiations with each other and 
a vision of Africa's role in the world." See Hoagland,J. 'Cast off 
Myths and Redraw the Boundaries of Africa' International Herald 
Tribune, 18-19 June 1994, p.6. 
59 See Chapter 3. Also, Brownlie,I. African Boundaries: A Legal 
ancl Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (London: Christopher Hurst, 1979) p .11. 
"since most African frontiers divided ethnic 
communities, it was feared that to concede the 
demands of one dissatisfied group would open a 
Pandora's box of similar demands elsewhere In 
these circumstances, pressures for external 
intervention would prove irresistible. ,,60 
In many ways, OAD involvement in African conflicts has 
been at its core a defence of these principles. Thus, 
ln post-colonial African thought on secession, the 
'domino theory of secessions' has held sway, especially 
ln the official circles of the OAD. 
Although the articulation of these principles has 
great theoretical coherence, it has led to the OAD being 
unable and unwilling to involve itself in the face of 
several serious conflicts. It has especially declined 
involvement in conflicts which though on the face of it 
internal, had serious international repercussions. The 
cases of strife in Dganda during the Amin years, the 
current crisis in Somalia, and the repeated conflicts ln 
Rwanda and Burundi 61 are pertinent cases in point. In 
the 1972-3 conflict in Burundi for example, when 
Tanzania appealed to the international community and the 
OAD to intervene in order to prevent genocide, the OAD 
Secretary General gave it as the opinion of the OAD that 
the events ln Burundi were its internal affairs, and 
that the OAD could not therefore get involved. 62 The 
sending of a Group of Neutral Military Observers (GNMO) 
60 Mayall,J. 'The Hopes and Fears of Independence: Africa and the 
World,1960-1990' in Rimmer,D. (Ed) Africa 30 Years On (London: Royal 
African Society, James Currey & Heinemann, 1991) pp.22-38:25. One 
explanation offered is that this new policy was as a courtesy to Haile 
Selassie, who still claimed Eritrea as part of Ethiopia. But Haile 
Selassie's influence belongs to a quite different issue, namely the 
observation that the OAU never discusses those conflicts affecting the 
state of which the current chairman is head of state. In this, Haile 
Selassie, who was the first chairman of the OAU, may have set a 
precedent. 
61 Although the OAU eventually put in place a "Group of Neutral 
Military Observers" (GNMO) in northern Rwanda: see Africa News Report 
8 April, 1993, p.5. This was howe:rer more in response. . to the 






Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the OAU 
to northern Rwanda 63 in 1993 suggested a change in this 
policy. But the OAU Secretary General's later (after 




responsibility for sending a peace-
to Rwanda, indicates otherwise. 64 OAU 
be involved In the Rwanda conflict 
probably stems from its perception of that conflict as 
an internal rather than an inter-state one. 
The doctrine against involvement In internal 
conflicts went through a metamorphosis from cautious 
invol vement In the early years of the OAU, to the 
absolutist policy of non-involvement in later years. In 
1963, when an internal revolt In Togo led to the 
assassination of President Olympio, the new government 
was refused representation at the founding Assembly of 
the OAU. It was not until elections confirmed the new 
government that Togo was allowed to join the OAU. In 
that instance the OAU saw itself as having a legitimate 
interest in involving itself in the internal affairs of 
a (member) state. This was in defence of the principle 
of "unreserved condemnation, In all its forms, of 
political assassination as well as of subversive 
activities on the part of neighbouring states or any 
other states ,,65 which the OAU saw as fundamental to its 
existence. 66 
The involvement In Togo showed an early willingness 
of the OAU to involve itself In internal African 
conflicts in defence of cherished principles. But its 
experlences in the Congo and Nigeria showed that such 
involvement could also threaten the internal 
cohesiveness of the organisation. In the Congo 
63 See Cohen,H. 'Conflict Resolution: An Urgent Challenge' ~frica 
News Report 8 April,1993 pp.4-6:5. 
64 See Secretary General Salim's statement ln Sunday Nation 
(Nairobi) 3 May 1994, p.13. 
65 Article 3 (5) of the OAU Charter. 
66 Meyers, 'Intraregional Conflict Management by the Organization 
of African Unity' op.cit., p.362. 
fl . 67 con 1ct, Tshombe was not allowed to attend the 1964 
OAU Council meeting in Cairo as leader of the Congolese 
delegation or in any other capacity. 68 Unlike on Togo, 
the OAU was greatly divided on the issue. Some members 
argued that Tshombe deserved condemnation, while others 
considered the matter to be purely internal. This sort 
of division marked future trends whenever the OAU was 
confronted wi th internal conflict in a member state. 
Indeed its failure to involve itself successfully in the 
Congo was "a bitter blow to the prestige and authority 
of the OAU,,69 from which it never quite recovered its 
self confidence, as the Biafran conflict later 
demonstrated. 
The OAU responded to the Biafran conflict70 by 
appointing an ad hoc commission to visit Lagos "in quest 
for terri torial integri ty and peace." 71 The Nigerian 
government insisted that its actions were a purely 
police action to quell a mutiny, and that this was an 
entirely internal affair. The OAU embraced this 
argument, and reaffirmed the Assembly's "adherence to 
the principle of respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of member states", "condemnation 
of secession in any member states", and its recognition 
of the Nigerian conflict "as an internal affair, the 
solution of which is the primary responsibility of 
67 A detailed, almost day by day account of this conflict is given 
by Gerard-Libois, J. Katanga Secession (Madison, Milwaukee & London: The 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1966: Tr. Rebecca 
Young) . 
68 Amate,C.O.C. Inside the GAU op.cit., pp.432-433. It was 
argued by some that this decision was a peccadillo of the Egyptian 
foreign minister, rather than an official OAU Co~ncil one. The 
point is moot, as in the event, the Tshombe delegatlon did not attend. 
69 Wiseman,H. 'The OAU: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution' in 
El-Ayouty,Y. & Zartman,I.W. (Eds) The GAU After Twenty Years op.cit., 
pp.123-153:129. 
70 On which see Oyinbo,J. Nigeria: Crisis and Conflict (London: 
Charles Knight & Co., 1971). 
71 Nye,J.S. Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional 
Organization op.cit., p.158. 
Nigerians 
. seceSSlon 
themselves. ,,72 The Biafran 





states ln the OAU Commission on Nigeria was however 
illustrative: they were states whose governments were 
apprehensive 
countries. 73 
of ethnic secession . ln their own 
In the Nigerian civil war, the Nigerian government 
was not averse to OAU involvement, provided that it took 
place against the background of the OAU's acceptance of 
the indivisibility of Nigeria. 74 Although the OAU was 
divided on the lssue, with four states (Gabon, Ivory 
Coast, Tanzania and Zambia) recognising Biafra, its 
attitude to the conflict marked a turning point in its 
thinking and approach to involvement ln internal 
conflicts. In later internal conflicts like those in 
Ethiopia, Somalia75 and the Sudan, the OAU studiously 
observed the policy that was crystallised during the 
Nigerian civil war, that is 
"to reinforce the orthodox interpretation of the 
national self-determination principle, namely that 
it is tied to decolonisation, and cannot be invoked 
to challenge the legitimacy of an established 
state. ,,76 
Problems of the Internal/Inter-state Dichotomy 
The notion that the OAU will not involve itself ln 
internal conflicts, but will activate its conflict 
management mechanisms ln respect of inter-state 
conflicts, is one of the problematic areas of the study 
of OAU conflict management. An examination of many of 
the continent's conflicts reveals that in practice, it 
72 Amate,C.O.C. Inside the OAU op.cit., p.441. 
73 Wolfers,M 'The Organization of African Unity as Mediator' in 
Touval, S. & Zartman, I. W. (Eds) International Mediation in Theory and 
Practice op.cit., pp.175-196:183. The ~tat~s repre~ented were 
Cameroun, Congo Kinshasa, Ethiopia, Ghana, Llberla and Nlger. 
74 Mayall, 'The Hopes and Fears of Independence: Africa and the 
World, 1960-1990' op.cit., p.27. 
75 See for example CM!Res.1340 (LIV) Rev.l, which reaffirms the 
"indivisibility and the territorial integrity of the Somali Republic. 
76 Ibid., p. 27. 
is difficult to maintain the internal/inter-state 
dichotomy In any systematic way. This leads to the 
conclusion that to the QAU, a conflict is internal if 
the organisation decides that it lS, regardless of 
whether objective facts reveal otherwise. The conflict 
in Chad, and the Tanzania/Uganda war of 1978-9 are good 
illustrations of this dilemma. 
a) The Conflict in Chad 
Two developments informed the unfolding of the 
modern conflict In Chad. 77 After the withdrawal of 
French troops from Chad in 1965, a civil war ensued, and 
with it the disintegration and collapse of Chad such 
that" [f]rom the early seventies, Chad became more of a 
geographical expression than a state." 7B The resul ting 
inter-ethnic animosities permeate this part of the 
development of the Chad conflict,79 as do the religious 
differences between the christians and the animists in 
the south, and the muslims in the north, which have led 
to a de facto division of the country.BO 
Libyan designs have been an integral part of the 
development of this conflict. Since he took power, 
Libya's Gaddaffi has had revolutionary ambitions, and 
the resources to pursue them. Libyan interests in Chad 
have been inspired by Gaddaffi's pan-Islamic vision of 
consolidating power in the Islamic Sahel Belt, galnlng 
access to the uranium deposits in Northern Chad, and by 
the ambition to turn Libya into a regional power In 
Africa. Libyan occupation of the Aouzou Strip In 
77 Case studies of this conflict have been done amongst others by, 
Djaksam,T. Conflict Resolution in the OAU op.cit.; and Amoo,S.G. & 
Zartman, I. W. 'Mediation by Regional Organizations: The Organization for 
African Unity (OAU) in Chad' in Bercovitch,J. & Rubin,J.Z. (Eds) 
Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict 
Management (London: Macmillan,1992) pp.131-148. 
78 Amoo & Zartman, 'Mediation by Regional Organizations' op.cit., 
p .137. 
79 Decalo,S. 'Regionalism, Political Decay, and Civil Strife in 
Chad' 18 Journal of f-k,3.erI1 African Studies (1980) pp.23-56. 
80 Pittman,D. 'The OAU and Chad' in El-Ayouty,Y & 
Zartman,l.W. (Eds) The L' .. iU After Twenty l"ears op.ci'::., pp.:'::97-325. 
Northern Chad ln 1973, and its support for one or the 
other of the various factions during the different 
stages of the conflict, further underline the dual 
internal and inter-state character of this conflict. 
The OAU first got involved in the Chad conflict 
during the Libreville Summit ln 1977,B1 when then 
President Malloum formally complained against Libya's 
support for the rival faction led by Oueddei. The 
Chad/Libya conflict was on the OAU's agenda again in 
1978, when it appointed an ad hoc committee to mediate 
in the conflict. B2 On 6 January 1981, Libya and Chad 
announced a decision to merge the two countries. This 
gal vanised the OAU: twelve heads of state meeting in 
Togo, issued a communique calling on Libya to withdraw 
all its forces from Chad. 
At the Nairobi summit ln June 1981, the OAU 
Assembly decided to expedite a 1979 decision to send 
peacekeeping forces to Chad. B3 The conditions given by 
the Nairobi summit for the OAU to effect that decision 
were that there be a formal request by the Chad 
government, and that Libyan troops be withdrawn from 
Chad. Under pressure from the OAU, (whose chairmanship 
Gaddaffi was looking forward to assuming in 1982) Libyan 
forces withdrew abruptly from Chadian territory. The 
OAU force was put in place by mid-January 1982, but was 
withdrawn in June that year amidst logistic and 
financial problems. B4 The OAU ad hoc committee was 
reactivated later, after Hussein Habre took power and 
complained about Libya's occupation of the Aouzou Strip. 
This brief sketch of the Chad conflict demonstrates 
the difficulties in labelling the conflict as either 
81 See AHG/Dec. 108 (XIV). 
82 See AHG/Res. 94 (XV). 
83 See CM/Res. 769 (XXXV) and AHG/Res .101 (XVII). 
84 See Sesay,A. 'The DAU's Responses to European Military 
Interventions in Africa' in Sesay,A. (Ed) Africa and Europe: From 
Partiticm to Independence or Dependence? (London: Croom Helm,1986) 
pp.153-182:166. 
purely internal or inter-state. In that conflict, both 
these dimensions are so closely interwoven that their 











convincingly argue that it was doing so 1n a purely 
inter-state conflict, because both dimensions of the 
conflict were intertwined. Although to its credit the 
OAU peacekeeping force declined to get involved in the 
factional fighting in Chad, that has been attributed 
more to its lack of instructions and direction than to 
any conscious policy of the OAU. Interestingly, the OAU 
cited the intended merger of Chad and Libya to justify 
its proactive involvement 1n Chad. That merger would 
have flown in the face of the OAU principle enjoining 
states to respect the borders inherited at independence. 
At the same time, OAU involvement can be seen as being 
contrary to its principle of non- interference in the 
internal affairs of a (member) state. The major problem 
with this policy however, 1S that it has been applied 
inconsistently 1n different cases, as the conflict 
between Tanzania and Uganda in 1978/9 demonstrates. 
b) The Tanzania-Uganda War, 1978-79 
Following the invasion by Ugandan troops into the 
Tanzanian Kagera Salient 1n 1978, Tanzanian forces 
pushed them out, and drove them back to Kampala, 
ensur1ng Amin' s downfall 1n the process. 85 Upon the 
Ugandan invasion, Tanzania complained to the OAU, and 
demanded that the Ugandan invasion be condemned as a 
serious breach of the OAU principle of respect for the 
territorial integrity of member states. The OAU sent an 
envoy, who reported that Ugandan forces had already 
withdrawn from Tanzanian territory. However, Tanzanian 
85 See Chapter 5. Nyerere called the Moshi Conference to ensure 
that there would be a democratic government in Uganda after Amin, and 
one sympathetic to Tanzania,n int,er,ests, Thi,s ,info:rmatio~ was ~uppl~ed 
by a senior Tanzanian forelgn mlnlstry offlclal ln an lntervlew wlth 
the author, Paris,23 December, 1993, 
forces had already commenced operations to expel the 
Ugandan forces from Tanzania. 
In that conflict, the lssues were joined in a very 
novel way. The Tanzanian invasion of Uganda "was of 
great significance for the precedent it set on a 
continent whose geographical and ethnic divisions had 
hitherto rendered such a violation totally 
unacceptable. ,,86 However, Nyerere maintained that the 
issue was no longer whether or not the Ugandan forces 
had pulled out of Tanzania, but that the OAU had not 
condemned the Ugandan 
Nyerere contended that 
invasion In the first place. 
Slnce the OAU had failed to 
censure Uganda's earlier invasion, it had forgone any 
right to condemn punitive action by Tanzania against 
Amin's forces. In that way, the lssues were firmly 
joined, in a way that put an unrelenting spotlight on 
the whole basis of OAU non-interventionist policy. 
At the Monrovia summit In 1979, most OAU member 
states remained silent on the lssue, save for Sudan 
(whose President Numeiry had been chairman of the OAU 
during the conflict) and Nigeria, which condemned the 
action by Tanzanian forces as a gross violation of the 
OAU Charter. In a brilliant riposte to these two, 
Nyerere argued that the OAU had put the victim rather 
than the aggressor in the dock, and that 
"We are unfair in the proposition that when one 
country has committed an act of aggression against 
another, has clearly violated the Charter of the 
OAU, has blatantly attempted the annexation of a 
piece of land of another country, that to appeal to 
the OAU to condemn that act ... is in itself a 
violation of the Charter. ,,87 
c) The Chad Conflict, the Tanzania-Uganda War and OAU 
Policy 
OAU involvement In Chad was founded on the Vlew 
that the territorial integrity of a member state was 
86 Thomas,C. New States, Sovereignty and Intervention (Aldershot: 
Gower Publishing Co.,1985) p.109. 
87 Speech reported in New African, September 1979, p.12. 
threatened. The OAU's attitude to the Tanzania-Uganda 
war was based on the argument that Tanzania had 
interfered in the internal affairs of a (member) state. 
This sort of distinction does not display any 
consistency in OAU policy. The OAU's attempt to 
rationalise its contradictory policies In these two 
conflicts is not convincing, and indeed flies In the 
face of the facts. 
The Chad conflict has always been an internal 
conflict internationalised inter alia by outside (e.g. 
Libyan) involvement. The Tanzania-Uganda conflict was 
an internal Ugandan one, which was internationalised by 
anti-Amin groups in Tanzania, and most eminently an 
international conflict when Ugandan forces invaded the 
Kagera Salient. ss In both, the distinction between 
internal and international is hard to maintain, Slnce 
one dimension feeds into the other. The OAU's failure 
to affect the outcome of either was due to its attempt 
to maintain a distinction that could not, on the ground, 
be properly founded. The result lS the engendering of 
the feeling that the OAU's policy on non-intervention lS 
not based on any rational justifications. It appears to 
be based on the ad hoc calculation of the potential 
precedent-setting effect of an intervention. 
The Methodology of OAU Conflict Management 
As noted earlier, one of the most clearly 
discernible elements of OAU conflict management lS the 
eschewing of the formal approaches enshrined In the 
Charter provision for a Commission of Mediation, 
Conciliation and Arbitration, In favour of ad hoc 
committees of heads of state. The broad methodology of 
OAU conflict management has therefore been correctly 
identified as collective. s9 Within this broad framework 
two strands of methodology are discernible: actual 
88 See Chapter 1 on the process of internationalisation of 
conflict. 
89 Wolfers, 'The Organization of African Unity as Mediator' 
op.cit., p.190. 
collective mediation, where the committee conducts the 
mediation as a group, and individual mediations, where 
the committee authorises one of its members to conduct 
the mediation on its behalf, and to report back on 
progress. To this type of individual mediation should 
be added those where individual heads of state of the 
OAU conduct mediations, not on the authority of a 
committee, but on the direct authority of the OAU. 
These are sometimes, but not always undertaken by the 
chairman of the organisation, and represent an exception 
to the rule, rather than a firm and well established 
thread of practice. 
Collective Conflict Management of the OAU 
The first test of the functioning of OAU conflict 
management machinery was the border conflict between 
Algeria and Morocco. In that conflict, Algeria based 
its claims on the OAU policy of respect for the borders 
inherited at independence, while Morocco founded its 
claim primarily on the non-existence of such borders. 90 
Following the war that broke out between them, several 
attempts at mediation took place. 
Among these was the joint effort of Haile Selassie 
and President Modibo Keita of Mali. 91 They persuaded 
King Hassan and Ben Bella to meet at Bamako in Mali 
under their j oint mediation. The Bamako Agreement 
resulted from that meeting. It called inter alia for an 
extraordinary meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers to 
create a committee of arbitration to seek for a 
definitive solution to the conflict. The OAU Counc i 1 
was convened later, and passed a resolution reaffirming 
the determination of the OAU to operate within the 
framework, principles and institutions of the 
organisation. It also created a committee as called for 
90 Wild,P.B. 'The Organization of African Unity and the Algerian-
Moroccan Border Conflict: A Study of New Machinary for Peacekeeping and 
for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Among Africans' in Th~rp, 
P. A. (Ed) Regional Interna tional Organizations: Structure and Funct~ons 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971) pp.182-199. 
9 1 See E CM / Res. 1 ( 1) . 
by the Bamako Agreement. 92 The Bamako Agreement broke 
down before the OAU committee could implement it, 
because eventually Algeria and Morocco settled the 
conflict bilaterally. 
In the Chad conflict, collective mediation by the 
OAU took place simultaneously with individual mediation. 
The original OAU involvement was at the Libreville 
summit, where, following a complaint by Chad against 
Libya, an ad hoc committee was appointed, with a brief 
to mediate the conflict.93 This committee met in August 
1977, and counselled moderation on the two parties. A 
second committee was appointed by the OAU in 1978, with 
instructions to continue in the efforts of the earlier 
commi t tee. 94 In 1980 , the OAU commi t tee organi sed a 
conference attended by Oueddei and Libya's foreign 
minister, but this did not achieve any concrete results. 
The OAU's next involvement was through the sending of an 
OAU peacekeeping force to Chad in 1982. 
Individual Conflict Management Under the OAU 
Although the OAU prefers to mediate in conflicts 
through ad hoc committees, In practice expresslon lS 
glven to individual members of such committees to 
attempt mediation on their behalf. Some of these 
individual OAU mediations have yielded positive results. 
Examples of this are the mediation by Kaunda in the 
conflict between Somalia and Kenya, where a joint 
declaration expressing both countries' desire to resolve 
outstanding disputes in the spirit of the OAU Charter, 
was signed. 95 In the aftermath of the Nigerian civil 
war, Haile Selassie mediated successfully between 
92 See ECMjRes. 1 (I). The committee comprised Ethiopia, Ivory 
Coast, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Tanzania. 
93 This committee was made up of Algeria, Cameroun, Gabon, 
Mozambique, Nigeria and Senegal. 
94 See AHGjRes.94 (XV). This one was made up of Cameroun, Niger, 
Nigeria, and the Sudan. 
95 See AHGjSt.l (IV). This is discussed in Amate, C.O.C.Inside 
the OAU op.cit., p.·n4. 
Nigeria and the four states which had recognised Biafra, 
thus enabling them to resume diplomatic relations. 
Other individual mediations ended in failure. At 
the beginning of the Nigerian civil war, General Ankrah 
of Ghana attempted but failed, to mediate between the 
parties. Although an agreement was reached on the 
reorganisation, administration and control of the army, 
and on senior appointments In the army and civil 
serVlce, it was never implemented. 96 In the Algeria-
Morocco conflict, President Nasser attempted mediation 
by calling a summit meeting with the two parties. 
However, Slnce he had earlier condemned Moroccan 
'aggression committed against Algeria', and had given 
Algeria military assistance, his mediatory endeavours 
were unsuccessful. 97 An effort by President Bourguiba of 
Tunisia to offer his good offices met with similar 
failure because although Morocco had expressed 
willingness to attend a meeting called by him, relations 
between Tunisia and Algeria were strained, following 
earlier accusations by Bourguiba that Algeria was 
harbouring Tunisian dissidents plotting to assassinate 
him.98 
Nigerian mediation in the Chad conflict lS also 
illustrative. In the Kano conference on Chad, a Peace 
Accord was reached, which called inter alia for the 
development of a national coalition, a general 
ceasefire, an independent monitoring commission under 
the chairmanship of Nigeria, the demilitarisation of 
N'Djamena for a radius of one hundred kilometres, and a 
general amnesty for prisoners and hostages. Apart from 
the fact that many of the armed groups in Chad did not 
pullout of N'Djamena, Amoo and Zartman ascribe the 
failure of this Peace Accord to the fact that 
96 Oyinbo,J. Nigeria: Crisis and Beyond op.cit., pp.76-77. 
97 Wild, , The Organization of African Unity and the Algerian-
Moroccan Border Conflict' op.cit., p.185. 
98 Ibid., p.188. 
"[c]ompounding the problem, Nigerian troops 
conducte~ themselves as an occupying army 
e~genderlng so much local hostility that they were 
flnally asked to leave by the Provisional 
Council. ,,99 
Individual mediations within the OAU do not 
therefore reflect an overwhelming, or even discernible 
pattern of success. The reasons for this are evident 
from the examples given above. In the case of the 
Egyptian and Tunisian efforts in the Algeria-Morocco 
conflict, the perception by Morocco that Egypt 
sympathised with and supported Algeria led to Moroccan 
rej ection of the Egyptian offer. Strained relations 
between Algeria and Tunisia induced Algerian fears that 
the Tunisian offer to mediate was not al truistic. 100 In 
the Chad conflict, Nigerian self-interest (Nigeria was 
backing one of the factions in Chad) led it to play too 
heavy a hand during the sojourn of its forces In Chad. 
These examples support the conclusion that In such 
conflicts, mediation based too heavily on the self-
interest of individual states lS unlikely to be 
successful. As the case study will reveal later, 101 
this is true also of non-OAU individual mediations. 
Cooperation between the OAU and the United Nations 
At the centre of the study of OAU conflict 
management practices is the question of the relationship 
between the OAU and the United Nations. As was noted 
earlier, OAU policy lS inspired by the belief that 
African conflicts should be resolved by Africans. The 
United Nations takes the Vlew that although primacy in 
conflict management should be given to regional 
99 Amoo & Zartman, 'Mediation by Regional Organizations' op.cit., 
p.30S. 
100 Consistent wi th the literature surveyed in Chapter 2, 
mediation is rarely undertaken for altruistic motives. See fer 
example, Mitchell,C.R. 'The Motives for, Mediati<;m' ,in Mitchell,C.R. 
& Webb, K. (Eds) New Approaches to Internat~onal Med~at~on (Westport, CT. : 
Greenwood Press, 1988) pp.29-S1. 
101 See Chapters 6-8. 
organisations, it retains a general mandate to oversee 
progress in such management .102 
This apparent conflict of approach has not affected 
the cooperation between the two organisations. The 
United Nations has supported the OAU's primacy in the 
management of conflicts on the continent. This is based 
on the United Nation's Charter, which encourages 
regional organisations to take regional conflict 
management initiatives .103 Indeed, whenever some states 








and take their 
Nations Security 
Council, they have been referred back to the OAU .104 The 
cases also reveal that the United Nations has supported 
OAU primacy in managing African conflicts. The current 
conflict in Somalia illustrates how the OAU and UN 
approaches have come to merge. In that conflict, 
although the UN through its peacekeeping force (UNOSOM) 
at first appeared to insist on UN primacy,105 it later 
came to accept a primary role for the OAU on the basis 
that management of the conflict should take a regional 
approach .106 Hence the UN's support for the Addis Ababa 
negotiations. 107 
102 See Boutros-Ghali, B. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive 
Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations, 
1992) pp.35-38. 
103 Articles 52 and 53 (Ch.8.) of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
104 Cases of this are for example, the conflicts between Somalia 
and Ethiopia, Burkina Faso and Mali, and Burundi and Rwanda. 
105 See Boutros-Ghali,B. 'UN Multilateralism: A Cure for Ugly New 
Nationalisms' International Herald Tribune, August 21-22, 1993. 
106 This was owed largely to changing USA policy on Somalia. See 
the statement of Warren Christopher, the US Secretary of State, that 
"we're going to ... use the African leaders' assistance to provide an 
African solution to what is really an African problem." International 
Herald Tribune, 11 October 1993, p.1; earlier, Defense Secretary Aspin 
had stated that "the United Nations and the Organization of African 
Uni ty should now act to bring the parties together on the peace 
track. "Maoni Ya Amerika (Nairobi), No. 70, September 1993, P .14. 
107 The original December 1993 talks in Addis Ababa did not 
materialise because of the failure of General Aideed to attend. See The 
Kenya Times (Nairobi), 3 December 1993, p.8; also, The Independent 
(London), 30 November 1993. 
The Western Sahara conflict is the locus classicus 
of cooperation between the OAU and the United Nations, 
and the compatability of their views on conflicts In 
Africa. 10B OAU and United Nations attempts at managing 
the Western Sahara conflict have gone hand in hand. But 
In its early 
by shifting 
other. 109 The 
stages, Morocco was able to delay progress 
the lssue from one organisation to the 
OAU's original involvement was In 1976, 
when the lssue was whether to recognise the POLISARIO 
Front as the legitimate liberation movement of the 
Western Sahara. However, Spain's withdrawal from 
Western Sahara removed the rationale for the recognition 
of the POLISARIO as a liberation movement. The lssue 
thus became one of recogni t ion of a new s ta te , whi ch 
would have entailed membership of the organisation. The 
OAU ruled that recognition was a matter for individual 
members to decide, but called an extraordinary summit on 
Western Sahara. 110 That summit formed a 'Committee of 
Wise Men' .111 In 1979 this committee recommended that a 
peacekeeping force be created to monitor a ceasefire in 
preparation for a referendum, and that Morocco withdraw 
from the area which was formerly occupied by Mauritania. 
By the 1980 summit, twenty three African states had 
recognised the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) , 
and therefore inevitably the question of SADR's 
membership arose. Morocco argued that the SADR was 
neither independent nor sovereign, the two attributes 
required by the Charterl12 for membership. The issue of 
108 See Zoubir, Y.H. 'The Western Sahara Conflict: Regional and 
International Dimensions' 28 Journal of Modern African Studies (1990) 
pp.225-226. 
109 Damis,J. 'The OAU and Western Sahara' in EI-Ayouty,Y. & 
Zartman,I.W. (Eds) The OAU After Twenty Years op cit., pp.273-296:278. 
110 By AHG/Res. 92 (XV). 
111 This committee comprised Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Ivory 
coast, Tanzania and the Sudan. 
112 In article 4 which provides that "Each independent sovereign 
African State shall be entitled to become a member of the 
Organization." 
membership was postponed, but the life of the committee 
of Wlse men was extended further. The committee 
proposed, and the OAU adopted, a two part peace plan for 
the Western Sahara: a ceasefire to be enforced by United 
Nations forces, and a referendum to be organised with 
United Nations assistance. At the OAU summit in 1981, 
the OAU set up a seven nation ad hoc implementation 
committee to make the necessary arrangements for a 
'general and regular referendum of self determination' . 
It also requested a UN peacekeeping force to maintain 
peace and security during the referendum and subsequent 
elections. 
These OAU efforts complemented those of the United 
Nations, including the personal efforts of the Secretary 
General. In August 1988 the Secretary General proposed 
a peace plan whose maln elements included a cease fire, 
and a referendum on self-determination. Although 
Morocco and the POLISARIO accepted this plan, Moroccan 
acceptance was seen as part of a larger policy to rejoin 
the OAU, and to restore credibility and regain lost 
prestige at the United Nations .113 At the 1988 United 
Nations General Assembly, pressure was put on Morocco by 
the Fourth Committee, which underlined the linkage 
between joint OAU and UN efforts by overwhelmingly 
calling for direct negotiations between POLISARIO and 
Morocco. This was seen as the best way to create the 
requisite conditions for a peaceful and fair referendum 
under the auspices of the OAU and the United Nations. 
Although until then King Hassan had consistently 
declined to hold talks with the representatives of the 
POLISARIO, such talks were held in Marrakesh in 1989. 
King Hassan maintained that these were merely 
'discussions' rather than negotiations. Nevertheless, 
those talks marked a turning point in the conflict in 
Western Sahara, because their real effect was to confer 
de facto recognition by Morocco on the POLISARIO. 
Indeed, 
113 Zoubir, 'The Western Sahara Conflict' op.cit., p.2:?l. 
"Despite Morocco's insistence that the King 'only 
talked' with the ... Polisario representatives in 
January 1989, the substance of their discussions 
c~uld well be described as quasi-negotiations, 
sl~ce not only were the details of the referendum 
ralsed, but also arrangements for a truce and an 
exchange of prisoners." 114 
Although only gradually, Morocco had moved towards 
fulfilling the requirements set by the OAD and the 
Dnited Nations. Thus, when the Dnited Nations Secretary 
General visited Algeria and Morocco in March 1990, his 
discussions centered on proposals for a ceasefire ln 
Western Sahara to be followed by substantial, gradual 
and appropriate reductions of Moroccan forces. Indeed, 
Moroccan concerns now centred not on whether a 
referendum should be held, but on definitional squabbles 
on the nature of the referendum. 
Effect on the Structure of OAU Conflict Management 
Al though OAD conflict management has registered 
mixed results,l15 it has had some deleterious effects on 
the structure of conflict management in Africa. These 
effects are all linked somehow to the insistence by the 
OAD that it be at the centre of conflict management on 
the continent. They also reflect areas which require to 
be addressed in future. 
The most notable of these effects are: several 
serious conflicts which have remained unattended and 
unmanaged by the OADi the paucity, and probably lack of 
support for, collective and individual, non-OAD African 
mediations; the existence of fewer bilateral conflict 
management efforts than when the OAD was formed; and the 
underdevelopment of track two conflict management ln 
Africa. This section will analyse each of these trends. 
Conflicts Where the OAD Declined Involvement 
114 Ibid., p.236. 
115 Out of thirty OAU efforts (1963-1983) recorded by El-Ayouty 
and Zartman, twelve failed, ten succeeded, and eight ended either in 
victory for one side, or in management whose resul ts are not 
included in the period. See El-Ayouty,Y. & Zartman,I.W. (Eds) The OAU 
After Twenty Years op.cit., pp.379-383. 
The sum of OAU conflict management policy is that 
it has been selective in the conflicts in which it has 
involved itself, and been markedly inactive in some of 
the most festering conflicts in the continent. This 
attitude of selective neglect is explicable by the role 
of personal influence in OAU decision making, especially 
in deciding which conflicts it should be involved in. 
For example, the OAU rarely discusses those conflicts in 
the countries from which the chairman in a particular 
year comes. 116 The OAU also prefers not to be involved 
in those conflicts in countries where a particularly 
revered figure, such as Haile Selassie was, is head of 
state. This has often paved the way for outside powers 
to intervene, usually by supporting one or the other 
side in the conflict. The Eritrean conflict117 was a 
prlme example of this policy of selective neglect. 
Several reasons have been advanced for OAU neglect 
of the Eritrean conflict. The first was the OAD policy 
that borders inherited at independence are sacrosanct. 
In the Eri trean case, Haile Selassie manipulated the 
fear of secession in Africa, and thus managed to keep 
the Eritrean question off the OAU agenda. 118 By 
maintaining consistently that the Eritrean conflict was 
an act of banditry, and therefore an Ethiopian internal 
affair, he managed to keep the Eritreans from getting a 
hearing both at the OAD and at the United Nations. 119 
Secondly, during the Haile Selassie reglme, the first 
Eritrean liberation movement, the Eritrean Liberation 
116 Amate, C.O.C. Inside the OAU op.cit., p.445. 
117 For useful analyses of the Eritrean conflict see, Araya,M. 
'The Eritrean Question: An Alternative Explanation' 28 Journal of 
Modern African Studies (1990) pp.79-100; also, Pateman,R. 'Liberte, 
Egalite, Fraternite: Aspects of the Eritrean Revolution' 28 Journal of 
Modern African Studies (1990) pp.457-472. 
118 But in contrast, the OAU discussed the inter-state conflict 
between Ethiopia and Sudan: see for example AHG/Dec. 107 (XIV) and 
AHG/Res.93 (XV). 
119 Markakis,J. 'No Longer a Hidden War: Recent Writings on the 
Eritrean Nationalist Struggle' 19 Journal of Modern African Studies 
(1981) pp.362-366:362-363. 
Front (ELF), did not pUblicise its cause sufficiently. 
Indeed, it was not until the fall of the ancien regime 
that paradoxically, a split in the ELF produced a second 
movement, the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) 
which realised the need to raise international awareness 
of the Eri trean cause. 120 The task of the EPLF was made 
easier by the competition between the USSR and the 
United States for control of the Horn of Africa, which 
significantly internationalised the conflicts In the 
Horn.121 Thirdly, the personal standing of Haile 
Selassie In the eyes of his contemporaries in the OAU 
disinclined them to discuss the Eritrean conflict. From 
the very first OAU summit in Addis Ababa in 1963, "the 
African Heads of 
Emperor ... declined to 
nationalists. ,,122 Thus 






"the mythical image of Ethiopia, and the resultant 
preponderant posi tion enj oyed by Haile Selassie, 
helps to explain why most African leaders [did] not 
recognise the right of Eri treans to self-
determination ... In addition, sub-Saharan 
governments [were] assiduously reminded of the 
disruptive impact that Eritrean independence would 
have on the multi-ethnic nature of their own 
societies, with Katanga and Biafra still fresh in 
the memories of all concerned." 123 
The Paucity of Non-OAU African Mediations 
What is very striking on examlnlng conflict 
management in Africa is that there are surprisingly few 
African non-OAU mediations, either collective or 
individual. Because of this paucity which makes 
comparative study difficult, the erroneous conclusion 
could be reached that these are not a successful method 
of conflict management in Africa. But as the Kenyan 
120 Ibid., p.363. 
121 Laidi,Z. The Superpowers and Africa: The Constraints of a 
Rivalry, 1960-1990 (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 
1990) pp.123-131. 
122 Yohannes,O. 'The Eritrean Question: A Colonial Case?' 25 
Journal of Modern .:-"frican Studies (1978) pp. 643-669: 662. 
123 Ibid., p.662. 
mediation of the Uganda conflict suggests, this mode of 
conflict management has great untapped potential In 
Africa. 
The reason for this paucity of either individual or 
collective non-OAU conflict management in Africa is best 
found in the OAU Charter, and as noted earlier, in its 
strict interpretation by the OAU. Given the conditions 
In 1963, the OAU was right to enshrine its Charter 
principles. However, conditions have since changed, and 
the OAU's interpretation of the Charter should reflect 
this. Unfortunately, the OAU's interpretation of the 
Charter has been adopted by member states, not least 
those facing a variety of conflicts, as the Eritrean 
conflict demonstrated. This has greatly inhibited 
creative conflict management. Thus, states have 
preferred to hide their views on conflicts behind the 
cloak of the official approach of the OAU. 
The Paucity of Bilateral Conflict Management 
Inexplicably, even states experiencing non-violent 
conflict have not shown the same keenness for bilateral 
conflict management that some states did just before the 
OAU was officially founded. In those pre-OAU years, 
several boundary conflicts were managed bilaterally in 
a way that, had the trend continued, would have greatly 
altered the conflict map of Africa after the formation 
of the OAU. 
This pre-OAU pattern of border conflict management 
was particularly evident In North West Africa. Thus, 
the border conflict between Mali and Mauritania was 
settled diplomatically through a meeting between 
Presidents Keita of Mali, and Ould Daddah of Mauritania. 
The conflict between Liberia and Guinea was settled In 
the same way, when during an official visit to Guinea In 
November 1958, President Tubman renounced all Liberian 
claims to the Nimba reglon of Guinea. The border 
dispute between Liberia and the Ivory Coast was 
similarly settled In a bilateral meeting between 
Presidents Tubman and Houphouet-Boigny, where both 
presidents agreed to accept current borders, thus ending 
Liberia I s claims to Ivorian terri tory. 124 
There have not been such examples of bilateral 
(i.e. unmediated) conflict management between OAU member 
states to date. The closest example is the General 
Treaty of Solidarity and Cooperation and on Boundary 
Demarcation, signed between Morocco and Algeria in May 
1970. 125 But even that was partly mediated by Haile 
Selassie. Several reasons for this paucity can be 
hazarded. Neither of two conflicting states is willing 
to initiate such bilateral discussions, lest that be 
interpreted by the other side as a concession, or a sign 
of weakness. Also, as Zang argues, Joint Commissions 
play an important role in the bilateral diplomacy of 
African states, and although conflicts (including border 
ones) may not be resolved, they appear in the agenda of 
such Joint Commissions. 126 It is possible that in this 
way, tensions ensuing therefrom have been reduced. 
While persuasive, this argument does not explain the 
continued existence of so many border tensions between 
several African countries. 127 However, it does suggest 
that j oint commissions might prove a useful, though 
limited12B tool for the bilateral management of border 
related conflicts in Africa. 
124 Zartman, I. W. 'The Politics of Boundaries in North and West 
Africa' 3 Journal of Modern African Studies (1965) pp.155-173; also 
Zartman, I. W. International Relations in the New Africa (Lanham, MD. : 
University Press of America, 1987) ch.3. 
125 See Day,A.J. (Ed) Border and Territorial Disputes (London: 
Longman, 1982) - section on the Algerian/Moroccan conflict. 
126 Zang, L. 'Joint Commissions as a Privileged Tool of African 
Bilateral Diplomacy' (Paper presented at the Inst~ tute of Diplomacy and 
International Studies (Nairobi) & Geneva Instltute of 
International Relations Seminar on Thirty Years of African Diplomacy, 
Mombasa, Kenya, December,1991). 
127 See Asiwaju,A.I. 'Partitioned Culture Areas: A Checklist' in 
Asiwaju,A.I. (Ed) Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations. Acr~ss 
Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984 (Lagos: Lagos Unlverslty 
Press, 1984) pp.252-259 who counts one hundred and thirty such. 
128 There is no evidence that such a commission has helped towards 
resolving the Cameroon/Nigeria border conflict, which was subsequently 
put on the agenda of the June,1994 OA? He~ds of State and Government 
Summit in Tunis. See Kenya T~mes (Nalrobl), 15 June 1994, p.8. 
The Underdevelopment of Track Two Conflict Management 
It is surprising that given the number of conflicts 
there have been in Africa, and the involvement of non-
governmental organisations in diverse activities on the 
continent, there has been so little track two conflict 
management activity (or little of it that has been 
documented) . This may be partly because some 
organisations do not consider themselves to be conflict 
managers.129 But the real reason probably lies more in 
the official environment, which may not have been 
supportive of track two conflict management efforts. 
The documented instances of track two conflict 
management in Africa all involved different aspects of 
management, and thus their comparative analysis is not 
easy. Some, like the Quaker involvement in the Biafran 
conflict contented themselves with offering good 
offices. Others, like the World Council of Churches in 
the Sudan conflict undertook full scale mediation. Yet 
agaln, the Carter Centre's involvement In the Eritrean 
conflict, although aimed at full mediation, did not make 
much headway. The involvement of others, such as the 
Catholic Church In the Mozambique conflict, while 
contributing significantly to the success of the 
mediation, did so amid heavy and diverse track one 
involvement. 13o All of them revealed certain problems 
and possibilities for track two conflict management in 
Africa, which could serve as a base on which such future 
efforts could build. 
In the Eritrean conflict, discussions between 
representatives of the Ethiopian government and the 
129 For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC). See Freymond,J. 'The International Committee of the Red Cross 
as a Neutral Intermediary' in Berman,M.R. & Johnson,J.E. (Eds) 
Unofficial Diploma ts (New York: Columbia Uni versi ty Press, 1977) 
pp.142-151:142; see also a good discussion on this subject by 
Umbricht,V.H. Multilateral Mediation: Practical Experiences and 
Lessons (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989) pp.235-238. 
130 Kenya's heavy pre-negotiation involvement there, which was in 
support of RENAMO is an example. Information on this aspect was 
supplied to the author in a.n interv:iew with B.A.Kiplagat, (P~rma~en~ 
Secretary, Ministry of Forelgn Affalrs, Kenya, 1983-1991), Nairobi, ~ 
June, 1 C)93. 
Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) were organised 
by the Carter Centre, but these hardly made any advance 
in terms of managing the conflict. Ottaway argues that 
this failure was because the conflict was transitional 
at the time .131 But it is also true that the parties 
insisted on there being an African co-mediator, the 
absence of whom led to only preliminary and procedural 
matters being discussed.132 
In the Biafran conflict, although the Quakers were 
not very ambitious in their intentions, they enjoyed a 
remarkably high level of access to the leadership of 
both Nigeria and Biafra .133 Their impact was limited In 
the end because both parties to the conflict thought for 
a long time that they had sufficient outside support and 
advantages they could pursue using that support. They 
were consequently reluctant to hold any talks with each 
other. Each side therefore insisted on preconditions 
which the other could not accept without giving up its 
maln platform of argument. Moreover, because the 
Quakers did not appear to have an agenda beyond offering 
their good offices and trying to facilitate 
communication between the two parties, they slowly 
(albei t unwi t tingly) became hostage to the Nigerian 
government's strategy of wanting to end the conflict 
militarily, while at the same time being seen to be open 
to the possibility of negotiations. 
In the Mozambique conflict, the Catholic Church was 
able to play an influential role despite earlier uneasy 
relations with the parties - especially the government -
131 Ottaway,M. 'Mediation in a Transitional Conflict: Eritrea' in 
Zartman,l.W. (Ed) Resolving Regional Conflicts: International 
Perspectives (Newbury Park: Sage ~ublicat~ons, 1991) pp.6?-81.. The 
notion of transitional conflicts In relatlon to the confllct In Uganda 
is discussed in Chapter 8. 
132 Harbeson,J.W. 'The International Politics of Identity in the 
Horn of Africa' in Harbeson,J.W. & Rothchild,D. (Eds) Africa in World 
Politics (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1991) pp.119-143:137. 
133 See Yarrow,C.H.M. Quaker Experie:1ces in International 
l'('ncilia tion (New Haven & London: Yale Uni versi ty Press, 1978). 
which went back to the colonial period. 134 But the role 
of the Church there was rather reduced because of its 
late acceptance as a viable third party, and due to the 
very heavy involvement of track one players, and other 
track two involvements, such as that of Lonrho. 
World Council of Churches Mediation in Sudan 
The World Council of Churches (WCe) mediation in 
the Sudan conflict135 remains the only fully developed 
track two mediation on record. That mediation went 
through a series of problems. Their early efforts were 
frustrated by Joseph Garang, the Minister for Southern 
Affairs in the Sudan. After the short lived 1971 coup 
however, he was executed and Abel Alier, the new 
minister, was more receptive to wce involvement. As a 
result, the WCC was able to offer the Sudanese 
government their services "as a politically 
disinterested humanitarian organisation. ,,136 
Once preliminary negotiations between the wee and 
the Sudanese government began, some fundamental problems 
arose. The first of these was similar to the one 
earlier faced by the Quakers in the Nigerian civil war. 
While the Sudanese government was receptive to the idea 
of holding talks with the Southern Sudan Liberation 
Movement (SSLM), it insisted on doing so only within the 
framework of a united Sudan. The SSLM, on the other 
134 See Venancio,M. 'Mediation by the Roman Catholic Church in 
Mozambique,1988-1991' in Chan,S. & Jabri,V. (Eds) Mediation in Southern 
Africa (London: Macmillan, 1993) pp.142-1S8; see also Birmingham,D. 
Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique (London: James Currey, 
1992) who gives some insights,en passant, on the role of the Catholic 
Church in Mozambiquan history. 
135 For a background to this conflict see: Aguda,O. 'Arabism and 
Pan-Arabism in Sudanese Politics' 11 Journal of Modern African Studies 
(1973) pp177-200; Beshir,M.O. The Southern Sudan: Background to 
Conflict (London: C.Hurst & Co., 1968); Wai,D.M. (Ed) The Southern 
Sudan: The Problem of National Integration (London: Frank Cass, 1973); 
Wai,D.M. 'Revolution, Rhetoric and Reality in the Sudan' 17 Journal of 
Modern African Studies (1979) pp.71-93; Woodward,P. Sudan, 1898-1989: 
The Unstable State (London: Lester Crook Academic Publishing, 1990); 
Raghavan,N. 'The Southern Sudanese Secessionist Movement' in Premdas 
et al, Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective (London: 
Pinter Publishers, 1990). 
136 Assefa,H. Mediation in Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies-
The Sudan Conflict (Boulder,CO.: Westview Press, 1987) p.11S. 
hand insisted that "the negotiations take place only in 
an independent non-Arab African state under an agreed 
African or OAD chairman. ,,137 This latter posed two 
problems. It turned out that Haile Selassie had only 
agreed for the talks to be held in Ethiopia, but not his 
participation in them. He was advised against chairing 
them, since doing so would have encouraged Eritrean 
secessionists to demand a status similar to that of the 
SSLM, which 
government. 13B 
was unacceptable to 
OAD policy also 
the Ethiopian 
precluded its 
involvement: the OAD maintained that the southern Sudan 
problem was an internal affair, and therefore, 
"OAD officials ... would help unofficially in 
whatever way they could, even though they would 
formally stay out of the negotiations because the 
issue of the conflict was considered to be an 
internal affair according to OAD policies. ,,139 
The first problem was solved through some neat 
diplomacy, where both parties agreed that the leader of 
the wee group would act as the 'moderator' of the 
negotiations. That also took care of the second concern 
of the SSLM regarding an agreed African chairman. As it 
turned out, when the negotiations reached an impasse on 
the question of the integration of the armed forces, the 
personal intervention of Haile Selassie proved crucial 
in helping the parties to agree on mutually acceptable 
percentages for integrated armed forces, consisting of 
the southern Anya Nya soldiers and those of the Khartoum 
government. 140 
The role of the wee in the Sudanese conflict was 
important in bringing the two parties together. Since 
OAD policy precluded its involvement, and because 
individual states such as Ethiopia did not wish to get 
involved lest they compounded their own internal 
137 Ibid., p.lll. 
138 Ibid., p.132. 
139 Ibid., p.13? 
140 Ibid., pp.139-141. 
conflicts, the emergence of a third party which was 
acceptable to both the Sudanese government and the SSLM 
was crucial. Unlike the Quaker experience in Nigeria, 
the wee offer of its services coincided with a change of 
policy by the Sudanese government from neglect of the 
southern Sudan problem to one of actively searching for 
a solution. Besides, the fact that the wee, unlike the 
Quakers in Nigeria, was willing to undertake actual 
mediation, beyond just providing good offices, neatly 
coincided with the new mood of the Sudanese government, 
which the wee was able to exploit. Since in both 
conflicts the OAU did not wish to get involved because 
of the policy on non-interference in internal affairs, 
the willingness actually to mediate contributed to the 
ability of the wee to get the parties to negotiate, 
conclude and sign an Agreement. 
A Critique of OAU Conflict Management 
A clear pat tern emerges from these examples of 
conflict management in Africa. Firstly, the utility of 
the OAU doctrines of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states and the respect for the borders 
inherited at independence as the centre-pieces of its 
conflict management is called into question. The great 
preoccupation with these doctrines has considerably 
limited the ability of the OAU to manage conflicts in 
Africa, where many of the conflicts are internal, but 
are internationalised inter alia by the interaction of 
ethnicity and territory. 141 The OAU's policy of 
dichotomising internal and inter-state conflicts has led 
to its failure to get involved in some of the 
continent's most acute conflicts, which display equal 
measures of internal and inter-state identity. 
Secondly, this institutional preoccupation with 
these doctrines has been reflected In the attitudes of 
individual members who similarly, have not been keen to 
step in where the OAU has feared to tread. Thus, there 
have been very few cases of non-OAU collective or 










conflict management. It 1S 
that the OAU has discouraged the 
type of conflict management by its 
uncritical, adherence to these 
Thirdly, mostly for the same reasons, OAU members 
have not resorted to bilateral conflict management as 
several countries did in the pre-OAU era. The effect of 
this on the conflict management map of Africa has been 
to concentrate most conflict management initiatives 
unduly on the OAU. But because of the doctrinal 
problems already mentioned, the OAU has been unable to 
provide sufficiently creative conflict management 
leadership. 
Fourthly, OAU approaches to conflict management 
have served to discourage track two conflict management 
in Africa. In OAU official thinking, any involvement 1S 
interference, and this has been extended not only to 
member states, but to non- state conflict managers as 
well. This very discouragement (or non-recognition of) 
track two approaches has however served to underl ine 
their potential 1n managing Africa's conflicts. The 
relative success of the limited instances of track two 
efforts 1n Africa demonstrates that these approaches 
requ1re to rece1ve more attention than they have been 
accorded so far. 
Tracks of Diplomacy and OAU Conflict Management 
In terms of conflict management diplomatic tracks, 
a pattern has emerged whereby track one initiatives have 
been restricted to the inter-state dimension of 
conflicts (e.g. in Chad), whereas track two initiatives 
have been restricted to the internal dimension of 
conflicts (e.g. in Sudan). This is explicable partly by 
the fact that the OAU has bound itself to the doctrine 
of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. 
Regarding track two diplomacy, its involvement largely 
in internal conflicts has resulted mainly because, as 
with the Quakers in Nigeria and the WCC in the Sudan, 
conflict management has followed pastoral duties In the 
countries concerned. 
The effect of these developments has been to 
maintain the internal/inter-state dichotomy which, as 
was argued earlier, is a false one. This approach has 
resulted in track one and track two approaches ignoring 
the potential contributions to effective conflict 
management developed separately by each of them. This 
compartmentalisation has very severe limitations, 
because it leads only to the part management of 
conflicts. It is quite clear at least in conceptual 
terms how this state of affairs has resulted. Track one 
players, being too closely linked to the doctrine of 
non-interference, have been unable to break from its 
chains. Conversely, track two players, not being linked 
to the doctrine, have felt free to address the internal 
dimension of conflicts. But because of the mistrust 
that track one reserves for track two, they have not 
been encouraged to venture into the inter-state 
dimension of the conflicts. Because neither track one 
nor track two have operated in cooperation, the benefits 
and findings of either track have not enhanced the 
conflict management efforts of the other. 
This was clear for example in the WCC mediation In 
Sudan, where although the question of the composition of 
the armed forces in a post-mediation Sudan was discussed 
(indeed with the help of Haile Selassie) an important 
issue such as neighbouring states (like Uganda) giving 
aid and comfort to the southern soldiers was not 
addressed. On the other hand, OAU involvement in Chad 
presumably dealt only with its inter-state dimension. 
Therefore, while it addressed the issue of Libyan troops 
in Chad, it did not consider the question of where the 
various factions received their sustenance from (e.g. 
Libya and Nigeria) since to do so would have presumably 
constituted interference In the internal affairs of 
Chad. And yet in both cases, the conflict could not be 
managed effectively until both their internal and inter-
state dimensions were taken into account. It is on this 
footing that this study proposes a dual diplomatic 
approach to conflict management. 142 
A Proposal for Dual Diplomacy 
Methodologically, dual management 
approaches its task on the basis that both the internal 
conflict 
and inter- state character of a conflict ought to be 
addressed if a lasting solution is to be envisaged. In 
this sense, it would borrow from the formal methodology 
of track one such as around-the-table bargaining, in 
addressing the negotiable elements of the conflict. It 
would borrow from the methodology of track two in its 
concerns with the non-negotiable (e.g. attitudinal and 
psychological) elements of conflict which track one 
diplomacy tends to eschew. In this approach, the inter-
state dimension of conflict would be managed through 
track one approaches, while the internal aspects of the 
same conflict would be managed within the principles of 
track two conflict management, such as (but not 
exclusively) problem-solving workshops. 
It is suggested later that had a dual diplomatic 
approach been used in the Uganda mediation, it would 
have encouraged (indeed enabled) the mediator to 
approach the process as more than a traditional 
(simple?) exercise in Realist politics. Thus, while 
pursuing track one concerns In around-the-table 
negotiations, track two efforts geared towards reducing 
the psychological distance and mistrust between the 
conflictants should have taken place at least 
simul taneously. 143 In this way, the mul ti -dimensional 
character of the conflict would have been brought out, 
and rendered more salient in the search for a more 
lasting structure of peace in Uganda. 
142 See Chapter 1. 
143 See Chapters 7 and 8. 
Chapter Five 
An Historical Overview of the Uganda Conflict 
Introduction 
Chapter One argued the point of V1ew that 1n 
analysing conflict, regard must be had for general 
principles, the historiography of the particular 
conflict, and its internal content and motivations. 
That proposition 1S rooted 1n the belief that any 
attempt to manage conflict without taking into account 
these contexts 1S likely to founder against the false 
attractions of one of the perspectives devoid of the 
other. In this approach, the analyst and manager of 
conflict must necessarily resort to a general framework 
of analysis, while bearing in mind the contents of the 
'closed circle' of the conflict being analysed or 
managed. 
Chapter Three suggested that it is possible to 
focus the operational locale of conflicts in modern 
Africa around the issues of ethnicity and the borders 
inherited at independence. It noted that although 
ethnicity and territorial borders are also responsible 
for conflicts elsewhere, their historical explanations 
differ. In Africa, colonial policies created the 
division of ethnic groups between and within 
territories, and this consequently generated the climate 
in which many of the conflicts in modern Africa have 
operated. It was emphasised that locating the 
foundations of the conflicts in modern Africa in the 
colonial period does not mean that the full explanation 
for these conflicts resides entirely in African colonial 
history. post-independence political and administrative 
practices have played a role albeit a catalytic rather 
than a causative one. It was noted that the responses 
of post-independence African governments to conflicts 
within their territories has affected the direction that 
those conflicts have taken. Rothchild's distinction 
between hegemonial interactions (which are coercive), 
and hegemonial exchange systems (which are 
accomodative),l was thus found to be a useful analytical 
tool in deciding how the reactions of governments to 
conflict affect the trend that it takes. It is also a 
useful conceptual tool for the conflict analyst or 
manager who wishes to design a methodology for its 
analysis or management. 
Chapter Four examined OAU approaches to continental 
conflict management. It was observed that OAU conflict 
management has been track one, and concerned with the 
inter-state component of conflict. 
has been restricted to the 
Track two management 
internal element of 
conflicts.2 It was emphasised that the OAU's dichotomous 
approach to categorising conflict and hence its 
management - has not acknowledged the multi-level nature 
of conflict, nor appreciated the complexity of its 
management. Further, it was argued that the 
internal/inter-state dichotomy is rendered false by the 
process of the internationalisation of conflict. 
This chapter is informed by the belief that only 
through appreciating the history of a conflict can its 
varlOUS levels, and its complexity, be discerned. It 
will glve an historical overview of the conflict In 
Uganda, and the developments that led to the mediation 
of 1985. It will outline the colonial foundations of 
that conflict, and examine the constitutional bargain 
1 Rothchild, D. 'Interethnic Conflict and Policy Analysis in 
Africa' 9 Ethnic and Racial Studies (1986) pp.66-86:67. 
2 Except where there is a conflict of principl~s, ~s f~r exa~ple 
between the principle of non-interferenc~ and terrItorIal IntegrIty, 
for example in Eritrea, or between non-Interference and 
self-determination, for example in Western Sahara. In such cases, the 
OAU determines on a case-to-case basis which principle it considers 
more fundamental in the circumstances. This approach is not 
'scientific', and hence remains one of the problem areas of OAU 
conflict management. See Chapter 4. 
that was crafted to enable Uganda to gain its 
independence when it did. This chapter will further 
consider how the colonial policies, as reflected in the 
Independence Constitution, laid the ground for the 
series of conflicts that eventually culminated in the 
mediation under study. The historical foundations of 
that conflict, and the catalysts that exacerbated it 
after independence are diverse and complex. They are, 
in essence, a series of complex 'conversations' between 
the various actors, and often in a language of discourse 
which, while understood between some of the actors, was 
not understood or appreciated inter se. This chapter 
will therefore attempt to eavesdrop on these 
'conversations' .3 In doing so, it will endeavour to 
glve an idea of the complexity of the conflict patterns 
that faced the parties to the mediation of 1985, and 
with which future managers of conflict in Uganda would 
have to contend. 
Colonial Foundations of the Conflict in Uganda 
Colonial Administrative Policies 
Once the British colonised Uganda, they established 
a distinction between the kingdoms of the south and west 
(Ankole, Buganda, Bunyoro and Toro) , and the acephalous 
nilotic peoples of the east and north. The kingdoms 
were preserved intact and ruled under 'indirect rule', 
while the rest of Uganda was brought under direct 
British administration. 4 Although this differentiation 
In approach was also determined by climatological 
factors (the southern region of Buganda was suitable for 
tea growing, while the eastern grasslands were mainly 
pastoralist), the different ways In which Uganda was 
incorporated into the market economy nevertheless had 
3 See Stanford,M. The Nature of Historical Knowledge (Oxford & New 
York: Basil Blackwell, 1986) p.119. 
4 Anyang-Nyong'o, P. 'The Implications of Crises and Conflicts .in 
the Upper Nile Valley' in. Deng,F.M. & Zar~man,I.W.~Eds). Confl~ct 
Resolution in /Urica (Washlngton: The Brooklngs Instltutl0n, 1991) 
pp.95-114:108. 




Buganda, which became the 
colonial rule. It has 
In Uganda was centred In 
pre-eminent kingdom under 
been suggested that the 
subsequent history of Uganda has therefore been informed 
by the attempts of other parts of Uganda to emulate 
Buganda, and limit its political ambitions, which 
colonial administrative policies nurtured and 
encouraged. 6 The decision to make the development of the 
Uganda protectorate coterminous with that of Buganda 
encouraged Bugandan sub-imperialism which although the 
British later tried to rein in,7 was one of the early 
turning points of the conflict in Uganda. B 
The colonial administrative system in Uganda 
comprised the central government from which Africans 
were generally 
through which the 
excluded, and the local government, 




their country. Central 
In the 
government 
operated through the legislative and executive branches, 
and was the centre of colonial administration. The 
Legislative Council comprised the Governor, some 
officials, and some non-officials representing European 
(and later Asian) commercial interests In the 
protectorate. It was not until 1946 that the first 
three Africans were nominated to the Legislative 
Council. While this was increased to fourteen in 1954, 
it was not until 1958 that the first African members 
5 Ibid., p.109. 
6 Walker,R. 'Uganda: Recent History' in Africa South of the Sahara 
(London: Europa Publications, 1989) pp.1059-1066:1059. 
7 In Uganda, the colonial government saw its role as "that of 
arbiter in inter and intra-ethnic disputes. It only intervened 
whenever its power appeared to be undermined by local power centres." 
Mudoola,D. 'Post-Colonial Politics in Uganda: An 
Interpretation' 6 Jl1.~wazo (1985) pp.19-29:21. 
8 Wrigley, C. 'Four Steps Towards Disaster' in Hansen, H. B. & 
Twaddle,M. (Eds) [T~randa Now: Between Decay and Development (London: 
James currey, 1991) pp.~7-35:29. 
were actually elected to the Council. The executive 
branch operated through an Executive Council appointed 
by the Governor. It was not until 1955 when, after 
introducing a ministerial system of government to 
replace the Executive Council, three Africans were 
appointed as part of the five ministers selected from 
public life. 
Colonial local government policy constituted each 
ethnic group into 
unit (or district) 
an administrative local government 
Where the ethnic groups were not 
sufficiently large or viable, contiguous groups were 
aggregated into a single district. African leadership 
in the districts consisted of carrying out the orders of 
the colonial district administrators. However, Buganda 
kingdom was given more latitude in Buganda through the 
1900 Agreement, whose effect was to create a 'state 
wi thin a s tate' . 9 The other kingdoms of Ankol e , Toro, 
and later Bunyoro, were accorded similar, but lesser 
latitude in managing their affairs. The effect of these 
policies was to ensure that the dealings between ethnic 
groups in various districts were kept to a mlnlmum, 
through this policy of divide and rule. 10 It has been 
suggested that this colonial administrative system which 
operated on the basis of ethnic divisions, denied the 
Africans the opportunity to meet and formulate policies 
affecting their common destiny. It has been claimed 
further that the effect of this policy was later 
reflected in their inability to respond to the conflicts 
in Uganda from the standpoint of a common, non-ethnic 
front. 11 
Ethnic Implications of Colonial Policy 
9 Ogot, B. A. 'The Development of African Politics in the ~lur~l 
Societies of East Africa' in Anene,J.C. & Brown,G.N. (Eds) Afr~ca ~n 
the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Ibadan & Surrey: Ibadan 
University Press & Thomas Nelson, 1966) pp.487-503:489. 
10 Ibingira, G. S. African Upheavals Since Independence (Boulder, 
CO.: Westview Press, 1980) pp.18-19. 
11 Ibid., p. 14 . 
The philosophy of colonialism was rationalised as 
one of a 'dual mandate': to exploit the wealth of the 
colonies, and to promote the moral and educational 
progress of the colonised peoples. 12 The manner in which 
that mandate was effected in Uganda led to the creation 
of ethnic tensions within the protectorate. These 
lasted long after independence, and coloured much of the 
patterns of conflict that ensued. 
At the heart of British colonial aspirations 
towards fulfilling the dual mandate was the uneven 
treatment of Buganda. 
and most powerful 
strategically close 
British made Buganda 
Because it was the most developed 
kingdom . Uganda, situated ln 
to the source of the Nile, the 
the base of their administration. 13 
This policy, the administrative device of dividing 
Uganda into districts along ethnic lines, and the use of 
Bagandans as administrative hirelings in the northern 
and eastern parts of the country, 14 had two maln 
effects. It encouraged the Baganda to view themselves 
as a separate state from the rest of Uganda. It also 
imbued in other Ugandan groups a sense of relative 
deprivation, and hence fears as to the security of their 
ethnic entities after the transfer of power. Indeed, 
once it was decided that Uganda should become 
independent, the overriding concern was "who would 
inherit the mantle of power from the departing 
colonialists, and what security there would be for each 
12 Lugard, F. J.D. The Dual Mandate in Bri tish Tropical Africa 
(London: William Blackwood, 1929) p.18. As Brett notes, "The tra~it~on 
was ... one of paternalism ... assuming as it did the moral super1or1ty 
of the governors, the cultural immaturity of the governed, a~d ~he 
organic uni ty wi thin which they interacted." See Brett, E. A. colon~al~sm 
and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Econom~cs of 
Political Change, 1919-39 (London: Heinemann, 1973) p.42. 
13 Ibingira,G.S. 'The Impact of Ethnic D:ma~ds .on British 
Decolonization in Africa: The exampl.e of ,uganda 1n. G1f~ord, P. & 
Louis Wm.R. (Eds) The Transfer of Power ~n Afr~ca: Decolon~zat~on, 1940-
1960 (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1982) pp.283-304:288. 
14 Anyang-Nyong'o, 'The Implications of Crises and Conflicts in 
the Upper Nile Valley' op.cit., p.108. 
of the diverse ethnic groups . ln the new state." 15 
Although other groups feared for their future, the 
Baganda - whom colonial policies had favoured -had the 
most to lose from the departure of the British, and were 
especially fearful. 
Ethnicity in the Uganda Conflict 
The intellectual milieu of the debate on ethnicity 
in the African context was discussed in an earlier 
chapter,16 as was its relationship to international 
relations, and the responses of states to ethnic 
consciousness. 17 Whether or not the ethnic question 
explains fully the conflict in Uganda is a contentious 
point amongst scholars and observers of the Ugandan, and 
African scene. 
Broadly, one approach perceives the ethnic factor 
as absolute, and ignores its class element. The other 
concentrates analysis on class and downplays 
ethnici ty .18 Wi th respect to Uganda, scholars of the 
'progressive' view postulate that "the real issue at the 
heart of internal conflict in Uganda is not the question 
of ethnic balance or imbalance ... The issue rather is 
that of the failure to democratise Ugandan society in a 
comprehensive way. ,,19 The thrust of this approach is 
that since independence, Ugandan politics have been 
about excluding "ever larger numbers of people ... whether 
defined ethnically or otherwise, from the process of 
15 Ibingira,G.S. African Upheavals Since Independence op.cit., 
p.24. 
16 See Chapter 3. 
17 Ibid. 
18 See Nnoli,O. Ethnic Politics in Africa (Ibadan: Vantage 
Publishers, 1989) pp.11-13. 
19 Mamdani,M. 'How Not to Intervene in Internal Conflicts' 20 
Bulletin of Peace Proposals (1989) pp.437-440:439: This pO.int is also 
made, but less forcefully, by Barongo,Y. 'Eth~1~ Plural1sm. , a~d 
Political Centralization: The Basis of Pol1t1cal Confl1ct 1n 
Rupesinghe,K. (Ed) Conflict Resolution in Uganda (London & Athens,OH.: 
James Currey & Ohio University Press, 1989) pp.~5-90i an~ also 
Komacek L. ' Pseudo-Resolution of the Uganda Confl1cts: A ReV1ew of 
Kumar R~pesinghe's Conflict Resolution in Uganda' (Kampala: Centre for 
Basic Research, 1990, Mimeo). 
making public decisions. ,,20 This lS beyond dispute. 
However, there lS strong evidence that this post-
independence exclusion is explicable more fundamentally 
by analyses other than class and economic ones. Thus, 
the 'liberal' view argues that although conflict In 
Uganda lS not a simplistic one of 'north' 
'south', the ethnic factor is still salient. 
versus 
In this 
vlew, the structural imbalances created by colonial 
policy by which some areas of the country became more 
privileged than others, were compounded by post-colonial 
regimes like those of Obote and Amin, which made matters 
worse by the policy of military recruitment from their 
ethnic homelands. 21 
These two approaches are not mutually exclusive. 
It cannot be gainsaid that ethnicity In its crudest 
form, has contributed to the intensity of much of the 
conflict in Uganda. However, the continuation of that 
conflict has largely been because post-independence 
regimes have been unable, or unwilling, to transcend the 
ethnic factor in bringing Ugandans into the process of 
public decision making. 22 
The Territorial Effect of Partition on Uganda 
The approach of the imperial powers to the 
partition of Africa at Berlln was discussed in Chapter 
Three. The effects of that demarcation on Uganda is 
fairly representative of the consequences of partition 
for the other states of Africa. 
Internally, British policy centred around dividing 
the country administratively along ethnic lines. In 
terms of the borders that were inherited by Uganda at 
independence, these, as elsewhere, divided certain 
20 Mamdani, 'How Not to Intervene in Internal Conflicts' op.cit., 
p. 439. 
21 Gingyera-Pinycwa, A.G.G. 'Is There a "Northe.rn Question"?' in 
Rupesinghe, K. (Ed) Conflict Resolutionin Uganda Op.Clt., pp.~~-G~: ~ee 
also, Gingyera-Pinycwa, Northern Uganda in National Pol~t~cB 
(Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1992). 
22 Shaw notes correctly that the two approaches co-exist. See 
Shaw,T.M. 'Ethnicity as the Resilient Paradigm tor Africa: From ~he 
l'lC;Os to the 1980s' 17 Development and Change (1986) n:·587-605. 
ethnic communities between Uganda and neighbouring East 
f . 23 A rlcan states, as well as Rwanda, Sudan, and Zaire. 
The division of some ethnic groups by the Uganda-Sudan 
border has for example played an important role in the 
conflicts of both countries. As Woodward observes, it 
is the existence of the border itself that lS the 
oddity, and 
"Indeed from an ethnic standpoint the existence of 
cross-border links and a certain capacity for 
fluidity in identity between the two countries is 
understandable, bearing in mind that people on 
either side of the border often have closer links 
with each other than with other peoples with whom 
they share 'nationhood'. It is not only that the 
Acholi in northern Uganda have more obvious ties 
with Acholi in southern Sudan than with Baganda in 
Buganda, but that many of the peoples of Equatoria 
have closer links with northern Uganda than even 
their fellow southern Sudanese, especially the 
Nilotics of Upper Nile. ,,24 
The importance of this division of ethnic groups 
by the Uganda-Sudan border will become clear in the 
following sections. But it is worth noting meanwhile 
that both colonial and post-colonial policies in Uganda 
and in the Sudan rendered the ethnic groups of northern 
Uganda, and those of southern Sudan peripheral to their 
respective centres. In the colonial period the northern 
and eastern parts of Uganda received different treatment 
from the other parts of the country. In the Sudan, the 
British 'southern policy,25 had a similar effect for the 
southern Sudan. In both, post-colonial reglmes 
perpetuated the colonial policies. And in both, the 
activities of these divided communities have had an 
important bearing on the conflicts within. 
23 Oyugi, w.o. 'The State in Post-C~l~nial .Eas~ Africa: .An 
Overview' in Oyugi,W.O. (Ed) Politics and Adnnn~strat~on ~n East Afr~ca 
(Nairobi: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1992) pp.3-29:3. 
24 Woodward, P. 'Uganda and Southern Sudan: Peripheral Politics and 
Neighbour Relations' in Hansen,H.B. & Twaddle,M. (Eds) Uganda Nc\\' 
op.cit., pp.224-238:226. 
2 5 S Woodward P. Condomini um and SUd3.!leSe X.1 t ionalism (London: ee, . . f h' l' 
Rex Collings, 1979) especially pp. 9-12 for a d1Scusslon o~ t lS po lCy. 
The Military Factor in the Uganda Conflict 
The military has been the Achilles' heel of post-
independence Ugandan pOlitics. It has also been an 
important factor in the development of, and reactions 
to, the conflicts that have riven Uganda in the last 
thirty years. So pervasive and influential has the role 
of the military been in the various stages of the 
conflict in Uganda, that some observers have concluded 
that the role of the military is key to understanding 
post-independence patterns of the conflict in Uganda. 26 
The military's role In the various phases of the 
conflict In Uganda will be commented upon In the 
following sections. But it is important to note that 
the policy of structuring the military along ethnic 
lines was inherited at independence. The preoccupation 
of post-colonial governments with the ethnic composition 
of the military enabled, and perhaps encouraged, the 
army to take centre stage in the conflicts that ensued. 
This position obtains whether as Mazrui argues, the army 
in Uganda is a social class because of its distinctive 
institutional interest,27 or whether as Mamdani 
postulates, soldiers do not form a social class, but 
serve social classes. 29 
There were three stages In the formation of a 
standing army in pre-independence Uganda. The first was 
the recruitment of soldiers by the Imperial British East 
Africa Company (IBEAC) to help it achieve its commercial 
alms in Uganda. The second was during the interim 







26 Such as Prof. Nicholas Nyangira, Department of Government, 
University of Nairobi, in an interview with the author, Nairobi, April 
1992. 
27 Mazrui,A.A. 'Ethnic Stratification and the Military-Ag~a~ian 
Complex: The Uganda Case' in Glazer, N. & Moyniha~, D. P .. (Eds) Ethn~c~ ty: 
Theory and Experience (Cambridge,MA.: Harvard Unlverslty Press, 1975) 
pp .420 - 449 . 
28 Mamdani,M. Politics and Class Formatic'1 in Uqanda (New York & 
London: Monthly Review Press, 1976) r· 287 . 
Buganda, to augment Lugard' s Sudanese troops In the 
military campaigns against the kabarega of Bunyoro. The 
third stage came after the declaration of protectorate, 
when a standing army was established to effect the 
'pacification' of the rest of Uganda. 29 
During colonial rule In Uganda, the British 
colonial administration manned the security apparatus of 
the colonial state by recruiting soldiers and policemen 
from the northern and eastern parts of the country, 
because the ethnic groups there were thought to be 
"naturally warlike". 30 They laid little emphasis on 
education, and put a premium on military prowess, height 
and physical fitness, characteristics with which the 
northerners and easterners were reputed to be well 
endowed. Because the British encouraged the 
southerners, especially the Baganda to be administrators 
In the colonial regime, many southerners held the army 
In contempt, and few condescended to J Oln it. In 
addition, the nucleus of the early colonial army In 
Uganda was made up of Nubis, who had served in the army 
of Emin Pasha in the Mahdi's jihad in the Sudan, and who 
had consequently been driven out of there. These 
remnants of Emin Pasha's army were picked up by Lugard 
and his successors to form the core of the Ugandan army. 
For the duration of colonial rule, these Nubis became "a 
narrowly favoured but broadly underprivileged, 
hereditary military caste, never fully Ugandan, 
sometimes treated, and even regarding themselves, as 
Sudanese foreigners. ,,31 
This narrow ethnic composition of the 
colonial rule was the precursor of 
army during 
the ethnic 
29 This history is given in great detail by Omara-Otunnu,A. 
Politics and the Military in Uganda 1890-1985 (London: Macmillan, 
1987) Ch. 2 . 
30 Anyang-Nyong'o, 'The Implications of Crises and Conflicts in 
the Upper Nile Valley' op.cit., pp.l08-109. 
31 Southall,A. 'Social Disorganization in Uganda: Before, Duri::1, 
and After Amin' 18 Journal of Modern AfriL~an StuJies (1980) pp.627-
656:639-40. 
arrangements ln the Ugandan army after independence. 
Attempts by post - independence regimes to redress the 
ethnic imbalance of the army in order to ensure their 
own security, only ended up creating new imbalances in 
favour of different ethnic groups; hence the continuing 
insecuri ty on the part of groups which did not feel 
adequately represented in the new 'balance'. 
In addition, 
characterised by 
the years after independence were 
the erosion of civilian conflict 
management mechanisms, and the promotion of the military 
as the arbiter of political conflicts in Uganda. Thus, 
having succumbed to the demands of the military in the 
1964 mutiny, Obote increasingly came to rely on the army 
to maintain his party and regime in power. His use of 
the military to displace the kabaka ln 1966, and his 
later dependence on the military as "partners ln 
governance" amply demonstrated this reliance. 32 This, 
and his continued pampering of the army through rapid 
promotions and high salaries, inevitably generated 
within the military "a sense of politico-functional 
indispensability, relegating to the background the 
crucial importance of civil political institutions as 
legitimising instruments. ,,33 The eight year rule of Idi 
Amin was marked by the final destruction of civilian 
institutions in favour of the military as an instrument 
of domestic policy. In the post-Amin years, the 
military, having played a crucial role in the defeat of 
Amin, was pushed further into prominence in the Ugandan 
political and social landscape. Not surprisingly, it 
32 Gingyera-Pinycwa,A.G.G. 'The Militariz~tion of Politi~s. in the 
African State: The Case of Uganda' in Oyugl, W.O. (Ed) Pol~ t~cs and 
Administration in East Africa op.cit., pp.215-244:223-224. 
33 Mudoola,D. 'Communal Conflict in the Military and Its Political 




role of kingmaker In the 
The Transfer of Power in Uganda 
Pre-Independence Politics 
succeeding 
The decision that Uganda should become independent 
lS seen by some analysts as one of the important turning 
points in the development of the conflict in Uganda. 35 
Once that decision was made, the colonial administration 
responded by introducing representation by Africans In 
the executive, and permitting the direct election of 
Africans to the Legislative Council. In terms of 
internal developments that were to have a direct bearing 
on the later conflicts in Uganda, two contemporaneous 
developments were especially crucial. These were the 
emergence of various political parties, and the pushing 
of the 'Buganda problem' to the fore. 
In the early and mid-1950s, three maln political 
parties were formed in Uganda, and propagated various 
views on the form independence in Uganda should take. 
They were the Democratic Party (DP), which favoured a 
unitary Ugandan state after independence, and which was 
opposed to the traditional Bugandan parliament, the 
Lukiiko. The DP was predominantly professional In 
leadership, and derived its mass support from the Roman 
Catholic peasantry in Buganda, and the Roman Catholic 
immigrants from the south, the Banyarwanda. The Uganda 
National Congress (UNC) , was nationally based and 
supported a political platform based on universal 
suffrage and greater African control of the economy In 
an independent federal state. It was a coalition of 
mainly farmers' organisations, and its central committee 
was predominantly professional. The Progressive Party 
(PP) was deeply conservative, and favoured Bugandan 
34 Ibid. The involved question of the role of the military in 
politics in Africa is examined in Odetola,T.O. Military Regimes ani 
Development: A Comparative Analysis in African Societies 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982). 
35 Wrigley, 'Four Steps Towards Disaster' op.cit., pp.32-33. 
autonomy within a federal framework. 
largely by professionals outside 
Bugandan aristocracy. 
It was supported 
the traditional 
Because these parties were formed during the exile 
of Kabaka Mutesa II, they favoured his restoration, and 
saw him as a convenient symbol of Ugandan nationalism. 36 
Paradoxically, the return of the Kabaka from exile 
fragmented this unity between the political parties, and 
split them on the basis of their different Vlews on the 
place of Buganda in the future Uganda. Thus, the UNC 
was split into different factions, two of which merged 
to form the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) , led by 
Milton Obote. By 1960 the main political forces In 
Uganda were the DP, the UPC, and the Buganda Lukiiko. 37 
These developments acted as catalysts for the 
generation of fears amongst some ethnic groups. These 
groups began to feel insecure and uncertain about their 
identity in a future independent Ugandan state. These 
fears were greatest in the kingdom of Buganda, which was 
not only the largest group, but also the most developed 
region of the protectorate. 38 Thus there developed the 
'Buganda problem'. In trying to address it, the 
colonial administration shaped the national institutions 
that were inherited by independent Uganda. It also 
bequeathed it with the immediate causes of the series of 
conflicts that were to characterise Ugandan politics 
thereafter. 
The 'Buganda problem', which encompassed later 
demands by the kingdom for separatism, was the result of 
the early decision of the colonial administration to 
base its operations in Buganda. For reasons noted 
earlier, it was perhaps only logical to make an ally of 
36 Walker, 'Uganda: Recent History' op. ci t., P .1059. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibingira I 'The Impact of Ethnic Demands on Bri t ish 
Decolonization in Africa: The Example of Uganda' op.cit., p.288. 
Buganda.
39 
In pursuit of this policy, the British 
concluded the 1900 Agreement with Buganda, which 
specified inter alia how the kingdom would be ruled. 
The 1900 Agreement gave the Buganda wide latitude in the 
governance of Buganda, and ln effect established a 
, state wi thin a state' .40 As Decalo has pointed out, 
"The prlmary long-run outcome of the [1900] 
Agreement was that it appeared to reaffirm the 
contention of Buganda elites as to their kingdom's 
uniqueness and pre-eminence in the colony. The 
fact that Buganda had accepted colonial rule as a 
result not of military defeat or conquest but of 
negotiations ... had immense consequences for the 
future of all Uganda. Thus tensions and 
contradictions between concepts of Bugandan and 
Ugandan nationalism, or, put differently, Ugandan 
unity and Ganda separatism were at the root of much 
of the unrest since the early 1950s ,,41 
However, this special treatment of Buganda only 
increased Bugandan tendencies to . Vlew themselves as 
different from other parts of Uganda. They caused a 
constitutional crisis in 1953 by demanding separation 
from the rest of the protectorate. The colonial 
administration rejected these demands for Bugandan 
separatism, exiled the Kabaka, and declared a state of 
emergency in Buganda. Under an Agreement reached ln 
1955, the Governor induced the Buganda Lukiiko to accept 
the demotion of the Kabaka to a constitutional monarch. 
Under that Agreement, "Uganda was to develop as a 
unitary state in which Buganda would form one of the 
component parts, albeit in an almost primus inter pares 
relationship with the rest. ,,42 
This arrangement did not solve the Buganda problem, 
and was opposed by other Ugandan groups. The emerglng 
39 Indeed, the name of the protectorate was derived from 
'Buganda'. See Ibingira, Ibid., p.288. 
40 Uzoigwe,G.N. 'Uganda and Parliamentary Government' 21 Journal 
of Modern African Stu~ies (1983) pp.2S3-271:256. 
41 Decalo,S. Coups and Military Rule in Africa (New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 1990) p.142. 
42 Uzoigwe, 'Uganda and Parliamentary Government' op.cit., p.=S6. 
nationalist parties did not all share the 1955 Agreement 
view of the place of Buganda in an independent Uganda. 
The smaller ethnic groups feared perpetual domination by 
the larger, majority ethnic groups, and therefore 
agitated for their own local administrations. The 
smaller western kingdoms complicated the equation by 
emulating Bugandan demands, since in that way they could 
ensure the safety and integrity of their cultural 
institutions after independence. They therefore 
supported a federal arrangement. But they were 
unequivocally opposed to unilateral Bugandan 
independence, and consequently allied themselves with 
the nationalist political parties in demanding a unitary 
Uganda. 43 
These factors made the Baganda even more determined 
to secede, and on December 31 1960, the Buganda Lukiiko 
declared that Buganda would be independent from 1 
January 1961. The secession was not acceptable to the 
colonial administration, and never materialised. 
However, it led the administration to devise a 
constitutional formula for Uganda that was intended to 
ensure a unitary Uganda after independence, and to allay 
Bugandan fears as to their security thereafter. The 
rest of this section will examlne the anomalous 
constitutional bargain that was struck thereby. 
The Uganda Constitutional Bargain 
The colonial government responded to the Bugandan 
secessionist demand by calling for the first national 
elections to be held in Uganda, In March 1961. In an 
exerclse In brinkmanship calculated to strengthen 
Bugandan demands, the Lukiiko boycotted these elections. 
As a result, the DP won the majority of seats, and its 
leader was appointed Chief Minister. A Constitutional 
Conference was to follow this election, in September 
1961. Three pre-negotiation developments preceded this 
first Constitutional Conference. Firstly, because the 
43 Ibingira,G.S. African Upheavals Since In3e~Dendence op.ci~., 
p.26. 
new Chief Minister was a catholic, he was unacceptable 
to the Buganda Lukiiko. The Baganda therefore formed 
the Kabaka Yekka (Kabaka Alone) party, whose aims were 
to uphold the institutions and traditions of the Buganda 
kingdom. 44 Secondly, the Munster Commission was 
appointed, with a brief to make proposals that would 
form the basis of the Constitutional Conference. 
Thirdly, ln preparation for the Constitutional 
Conference, the Kabaka Yekka (KY) and the UPC entered 
into an alliance. Its terms were inter alia agreement 
by the UPC to support several Bugandan positions, 
including their federalist demands, a system of indirect 
elections for Bugandan representatives to parliament, 
and the postponement of any referendum on the lost 
counties of Bunyoro.45 In return, the KY was to support 
the UPC in its efforts to remove the DP from power. 
The Munster Commission reported ln June 1961. The 
Report's recommendations formed the basis of two 
Constitutional Conferences held in London. The first, 
in September 1961, was to negotiate a constitution, and 
the second ln June 1962 to reVlew and amend it as 
necessary, and to agree on a date for the transfer of 
power.46 It was agreed at the first conference that 
Uganda would be granted self-government, but that fresh 
elections would be held prior to the grant of full 
independence. In the elections preceding independence, 
none of the participating parties (DP, UPC, and KY) had 
a majority of seats. Therefore, in keeping with their 
earlier agreement, the UPC and KY formed an alliance, 
44 Ibid., pp. 29 - 3 O. 
45 Walker, 'Uganda: Recent History' op.cit., p.1059. During the 
process of the colonisation of Uganda, Britain, with allies from the 
south Sudan and Buganda, defeated the Bunyoro in a series of 
military campaigns. In reward for this alliance, parts of Bunyoro 
kingdom were annexed to Buganda. Bunyoro's bid to recover ;:hese 
terri tories later, came to be known as the problem of the lost 
count ies' . 
46 For a detailed account of these conferences, see Ibingira,G.S. 
The Forging of an African Na tion: The Poli tical and Consti t~tional 
Evolution of Ugan3,~ from Colonial Rule to Independence, L~94-1?t'2 (New 







alliance, Kabaka Mutesa II , 
that led Uganda to full 
1962. Under the UPC-KY 
the King of Buganda, became 
the President of Uganda, and Obote, the leader of the 
UPC, became Prime Minister. 47 The alliance between the 
UPC and KY was based on tactical calculations, and as 
later events were to prove, it was inherently 
unstable. 4B 
The 1962 Independence Constitution 
The independence constitution was 
between various interests and groups. 
a compromise 
Essentially it 
had to meet two major requirements. It had to ensure 
that power was shared between the centre and the 
reglons. Although the centre was to be made strong 
enough to govern, the constitution had to entrench 
provisions that restricted any misuse of power.49 In the 
end, it was "a great compromise ... a triumph of hope over 
experlence, whereby the harsh historical realities of 
conflicts and disintegration were adroitly papered over 
so that Uganda would achieve its independence. ,,50 
Under the independence constitution, Uganda became 
a unitary state on paper, but with strong federalist and 
monarchical overtones. The Kingdom of Buganda was given 
exclusive powers to legislate on matters it considered 
to be peculiarly Bugandan, such as the kabakaship. It 
also had power to legislate for its own public service, 
and on its traditional and customary institutions. The 
constitution further gave the Buganda Lukiiko the power 
to elect its members to the Ugandan parliament through 
47 As Nwabueze has demonstrated, this typically Westminster 
constitutional arrangement of separating the head of state and the head 
of government, while it works well in the peculiar circumstances 
of British constitutional history, does not work well, or at all, when 
transplanted elsewhere. See, Nwabueze,B.O. Constitutionalism in the 
Emergent States (London: C.Hurst & Co., 1973) pp.56-58. 
48 Mazrui,A.A. & Tidy,M. Nationalism and New States in Africa: 
From About 1935 to the Present (London: Heinemann, 1986) p.211. 
49 Ibingira, G. S. African Upheavals Since Independence op. ci t . , 
pp.30-31. 
50 Uzoigwe, 'Uganda and Parliamentary Government' op.cit., p.254. 
an electoral college rather than directly. It also 
created the constitutional fiction of a Buganda High 
Court . 51 The other th k· d ree lng oms were given exclusive 
power, similar to that given to Buganda, to control all 
matters relating to their traditional rulers. In other 
matters such as the administration of local services, 
these other kingdoms were for practical purposes treated 
in the same way as the other districts of Uganda. 
Regarding the centre, the independence constitution 
established a Uganda parliament, but imposed severe 
limitations on its ability to amend the constitution. 
Particularly, parliament could only alter or amend the 
constitutional provisions on the kingdoms by a two 
thirds majority vote. Although ln the circumstances the 
independence constitution was the best compromise that 
could have beeen achieved at that stage,52 it preserved 
certain potentially conflict-generating structures, such 
as the anomaly of a state within a state. But in its 
efforts to please everybody, it did not satisfy fully 
all the interests involved. Thus, 
"As Uganda joined the international community in 
1962 as a sovereign, independent state, few of its 
inhabitants were really satisfied with their 
status. The 'first class citizens' of Buganda were 
resentful because they had lost their fight for a 
separate sovereignty; the 'second class citizens' 
of the ' federal states' were upset because the 
privileges conferred on Buganda were denied to 
them; and the 'third class citizens' of the non-
kingdoms were unhappy they had been granted no 
concessions. ,,53 
51 Fictional because although the court was known as the High 
Court of Buganda, the appointment of its judges and their tenure was 
the responsibility of the central government. I~ al~o had no .. 
jurisdiction in important matters, such as constltutlonal provlslons 
on fundamental human rights, membership of the national assembly, and 
interpretation of the Uganda constitution. See, Ibingira, G. S. The 
Forging of an African Nation op.cit., pp.223-226. 
52 It attempted "to accomodate as many views, desires, 
expectations and demands as possible": th~s mediating. betwe~n different 
interests. See Kiapi,A. 'The Constltutlon as Medlator In Inte:-nal 
Conflict' in Rupesinghe,K. (Ed) Conflict Resolution in Uganda Op.Clt., 
pp.91-115: Q2. 
53 Uzoigwe, 'Uganda and Parliamentary Government' op.cit., p.258. 
The First Obote Regime and Constitutional Breakdown 
As noted earlier, an unhappy alliance between the 
UPC and the KY rode on the back of Ugandan independence. 
The unease of this alliance was compounded by the 
personal distaste between Obote and Mutesa II,54 and the 
absence of any solid common ground that would have held 
the alliance together. The alliance was therefore 
destined to be short lived. Certain actions by Obote 
who, as Prime Minister was bent on consolidating his 
power, hastened its demise. 
The concurrent position of the kabaka as President 
of Uganda and King of Buganda would have been a 
difficult one ln any circumstances. But ln the 
conditions of Uganda it never took root. As King of 
Buganda, Mutesa was the leader of a community whose 
centrifugal tendencies were historical, and which were 
undimmed by the compromlse at independence. As 
President of Uganda, he was sworn by the constitution 
inter alia to discourage Bugandan primordial separatist 
aspirations. This split ln loyalty was evident when as 
President, he declined to ratify the results of a 
referendum that would have returned the lost counties to 
the Kingdom of Bunyoro. His position was not helped by 
the fact that the early years of the coalition were 
characterised by a test of wills between President and 
Prime Minister, in which Obote consolidated his position 
by runnlng Uganda "as if the Presidency did not 
exist.,,55 
Obote's rush to consolidate his power led him to 
allow the UPC to contest seats in Buganda during the 
1964 local government elections. This was in breach of 
a central pillar of the UPC-KY alliance: that the UPC 
would not conduct political activities in Buganda. This, 
together with permitting the referendum on the lost 
counties (as the constitution required but which Mutesa 
54 Ibid., p.260. 
55 Ibid. 
objected to), and a series of defections from the DP and 
KY to the UPC which soon gave the UPC a parliamentary 
majority, removed the rationale for the coalition with 
KY, and rendered the alliance effectively dead. 
Obote's treatment of the army was of particular 
relevance to the trend the conflict in Uganda took 
later. He expanded it greatly along ethnic lines, In 
search for its personal loyalty to him.56 This trend was 
particularly evident in the 1964 army mutiny, one of a 
series that affected all three East African states. 
Unlike in Tanzania and Kenya where the mutineers were 
imprisoned or dismissed from the army, Obote acceded to 
their demands for higher pay and promotions. 57 He failed 
to consult the President in that course of action. In 
the interests of personal survival, he also 
'reorganised' the army, weighting it heavily with his 
fellow northerners. In so ethnicising the army, he 
helped nurture its pOlitical ambitions, and set the 
scene for future mili tary involvement in the Uganda 
conflict. 
The 1966 Constitutional Revolution 
All these developments were leading to an eventual 
attack on the independence constitution. Obote was 
uncomfortable with that constitution since it denied the 
UPC, and him personally, the political pre-eminence and 
power that he sought. The immediate cause of the 1966 
revolution was a motion introduced In parliament 
charging the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, 
and the Deputy Commander of the Army (one Idi Amin) , 
with using the army to support the insurgents in the 
Congolese civil war, and of complicity In smuggling 
gold, ivory and coffee from there. Parliament called 
for an inquiry, and for the suspension of Amin. 
Obote's reaction to these developments was to 
suspend the 1962 constitution, give Amin the effective 
56 Ibingira, G. S. African Upheavals Since Independence op. ci t . , 
pp.76-90. 
57 Wrigley, 'Four Steps Towards Disaster' op.cit., p.34. 
command of the army, dismiss the President and Vice 
President, and assume emergency powers as President. 
The 1962 constitution was formally abrogated a month 
later, and a revolutionary one adopted. This 
constitution departed fundamentally from the 
independence one. It abolished the 'federal' status of 
the monarchies, and made Uganda a unitary state. It also 
rescinded the special privileges that had been accorded 
to the monarchies by the independence constitution. In 
order to obviate the need to seek a mandate from the 
people for these fundamental changes, the revolutionary 
constitution postponed elections by prolonging the life 
of parliament for another five years.58 
The Baganda were unhappy with these developments 
which they considered unconstitutional, and which 
removed any basis for 
independence constitution 










government notice to remove its headquarters from 
'Bugandan territory'. 59 This ultimatum gave Obote an 
opportunity to deal with the Buganda problem. He did so 
by dispatching the army to Buganda where, in the Battle 
of the Palace on 24 May 1966, the Buganda were defeated, 
the kabaka escaped into exile, and a state of emergency 
was declared in Buganda. 
The sum of these developments was that although the 
anomalous position of 'states within a state' was ended, 
the supremacy of the executive over parliament was 
thereby signalled,60 and was formally recognised later 
in the 1967 constitution. More ominously for Uganda and 
the developing conflict, by using the army to help him 
deal with the constitutional crisis of Buganda, Obote 
58 Kanyeihamba,G. Constitutional Law and Government in Uganda 
(Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1975) pp.94-96. 
59 As a result of 
administration in Buganda, 
located in Buganda. 
the colonial policy of centering its 
the central government's headquarters was 
60 Uzoigwe, 'Uganda and Parliamentary Government' op.cit., p.265. 
formalised the position of the military as a central 
player in future developments in the conflict relations 
of Uganda. He also thereby cemented the 'military-
intellectual coalition' that had been formed after the 
1964 mutiny. 61 As Low observes, "having turned to the 
army to cut his Gordian knot, he was now more at its 
mercy than he would have cared to admit. For Uganda, 
the bell s began to toll." 62 
The 1967 Republican Constitution 
The 1966 revolutionary constitution was very much 
an interim document. It provided that it would remain 
in force until a new constitution was duly enacted by 
parliament. In September 1967, a new constitution was 
passed. The shadow of that constitution was to dog 
attempts at forming stable governments twelve years 
later, after the fall of Amin. Some of the provisions 
of that constitution centralised power in the hands of 
the President, and made the later trend of the Uganda 
conflict almost inevitable. 
The ostensible reason for a new constitution was 
gl ven as the need to abolish the monarchies, thereby 
making Uganda 'one nation' and 'one people'. The actual 
reason, as is evident from the provisions of the 1967 
constitution, was to confer absolute power on Obote. 
The 1967 constitution abolished the monarchies, with 
Buganda being divided in such a way that it no longer 
administratively existed as a kingdom. 63 It also 
enshrined what Ibingira calls a 'winner take all' 
philosophy. It gave the central government wide powers 
to appoint and dismiss principal officers of elected 
local governments, and the police wide powers of arrest 
61 Mazrui,A.A. & Tidy,M. Nationalism and New States ~n Africa 
op.cit., p.250. 
62 Low,D.A. 'The Dislocated Polity' in Hansen,H.B. & Twaddle,M. 
(Eds) Uganda Now op.cit., pp.36-53:43. 
63 Ibingira,G.S. African Upheavals Since Independence op.cit., 
p.161. 
and detention in the maintenance of public order. 64 It 
conferred on the President wide powers to make binding 
laws when parliament was not sitting, or was dissolved, 
and gave him powers of detention under the Public Order 
and Securi ty Act. 65 
The 1967 constitution was enacted when the 
opposition in parliament was weak and compliant. This 
was partly the result of defections, detention and exile 
of opposition leaders, and partly because no bye-
elections had been held to fill the vacant seats. Like 
the revolutionary constitution, it declared that all 
members of parliament were deemed to be elected for a 
further five years. What was put in place in 1967 was 
not only a constitution designed to keep Obote in power, 
but one which in all but name institutionalised a one 
party and authoritarian rule. This reglme was sustained 
by the military, which eventually ended its tenure in 
1971. 
The 1971 Coup and its Causes 
Because it relied on force to maintain the reglme 
it created, the effect of the 1967 Constitution was 
greatly to sharpen ethnic cleavages in the country, and 
especially In the army. Obote's recruitment policies 
created considerable anxiety both in the country and in 
the army. They al so made Amin, the army commander, 
lnsecure since he suspected that these developments were 
aimed at getting rid of him. Because of this fear, Amin 
counter-recruited heavily, this time from the Nubi, 
Kakwa and southern Sudanese groups.66 Thus, both Obote 
64 Some of these powers as they affected the freedom of the press 
and association are discussed in Zie,G. 'Media and Politics in Uganda: 
The Struggle for Democracy' (Kampala, Centre for Basic Research, ~ 
, May,1993) pp.28-33. 
65 Indeed, five ministers were detained under this law. In 
Ibingira vs Attorney General (1966) E.A.306, they successfully applied 
for a wri t of habeas corpus and were released. But they were re-
arrested immediately and detained under these regulations. The Court 
of Appeal for East Africa rejected their content~on that t~e government 
had acted in bad faith, and upheld the detentlons. ThlS was legal 
instrumentalism truly at work. 
66 Southall, 'Social Disorganization in Uganda' op.cit., p.640. 
and Amin had a substantial following in the army, each 
conditioned for reprisal against the other. 
Whereas Obote had been able previously to hold his 
'group' in the army together by posing the Buganda (and 
Bantu) threat, the exile of the kabaka in 1966, and the 
lack of effective opposition in parliament removed that 
excuse. And while a unifying ideology might have been 
a replacement, Obote and his government had none. 67 In 
an effort to create such an ideology, Obote formulated 
his 'Move to the Left' policy in 1969. But this was 
rather late in the day, and its implementation was 
halted by the coup d'etat In 1971. Two general 
explanations can be given for this coup. After the 1967 
constitution was promulgated, public support was eroded 
by the lack of elections, and by the harsh realities of 
Obote's zero- sum perception of his new found power. 
Additionally, the army had been introduced to the 
possibilities of power, and was divided along ethnic 
lines. In these circumstances, Obote's first reglme was 
not destined to last long. It was overthrown in January 
1971 by the army, led by Idi Amin. 
The Amin Years: Exile and Consolidation 
Amin's rule, which lasted until 1979 when he was 
overthrown, was one of the darkest periods of Uganda's 
post-independence history. It entrenched the worst 
aspects of Obote's first reglme, such as sharpening the 
ethnic cleavages in the armed forces and in the body 
politic. Worse, it destroyed virtually all the 
institutions which, although misused and almost 
strangulated by Obote, were still extant, and could have 
been salvaged by a more caring regime. 6B For the 
conflict analyst however, the duration of the Amin 
regime is important for the development of significant 
opposi tion to it by various groups In exile, which 
67 Ibingira,G.S. AfLican Upheavals Since Independence op.cit., 
pp.177-178. 
68 See Mudoola, 'Communal Conflict ln the Military a:::J its 
Political Consequences' op.cit., p.131. 
The way , In eventually participated In its overthrow. 
which that opposition was consolidated is especially 
important, because it determined the manner in which the 
Uganda conflict developed post-Amin, and thus of its 
mediation In 1985. In many ways, the road to the 
Nairobi mediation can be seen as having its earliest 
beginnings in the development of opposition during this 
period. The following sections will consider the 
consolidation of that opposition. 
Consolidation of the Opposition 
One of the notable features of the Amin regime was 
the absence of significant organised internal civilian 
opposition to it. There was, however, some intermittent 
opposition from the army, including some attempted coups 
d'etat. 69 This failure to 
"organise an internal struggle against the Amin 
regime was at the root cause of the failure to gell 
together in the post-Amin period a coalition of 
forces around a programme that could inspire and 
sustain popular support. ,,70 
Several reasons can be given for the failure of the 
development of effective internal opposition to Amin's 
By the time it was overthrown, Obote's regime 
had become widely unpopular, and Amin's coup was 
therefore greated wi th much goodwill from the 
population. After the euphoria of the first year or so, 
the regime became increasingly brutal, and Amin 
reorganised the security and administrative apparatus, 
putting loyal army officers, Nubian and Muslim civilians 
In charge. Internally therefore, 
"This change ... naturally hurt those displaced by 
Amin's policies - the Acholis and Langis, who had 
always seen the army as their preserve. For the 
southern Bantu speaking people, it was no more than 
a changing of the guard. For them, ,the army 
remained what it had always been - domlnated by 
northerners, and used by a leader from the 
north ... to subj ugate the people of Uganda, 
69 See Mutibwa, P. Uganda Since Independence: A Story 
Unfulfilled Hopes (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1992) Ch.8. 
of 
70 Mamdani,M. NRA NRN: T\\"o Years in Power (Kampala: Progressive 
Publishing House, 1988) p.4. 
particula7ly those of the south and west who did 
not contrlbute large contingents to the army. The 
fate of the southerners remained unchanged: 
hara~s~ent, torture and wanton killing at the hands 
of mllltary thugs from the north. lin 
In these difficult circumstances, it was extremely 
difficult for significant internal opposition to be 
marshalled. Finally, a lot of the people who could have 
organised opposition internally fled into exile, from 
where they organised external opposition which was not 
very effective. Indeed, it was not until 1979 when, 
wi th Tanzanian prompting, external exile groups 
effectively got together and joined in the removal of 
Amin. 
Opposition Groups in Exile 
From the beginning, there was always some form of 
opposition to Amin from groups in exile. Among the 
early notable activity of such groups was the 1972 
invasion of Uganda. This was carried out by members of 
the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) led by 
Museveni, and troops loyal to Obote72 who had fled to 
the southern Sudan, where the Sudanese army had helped 
them prepare for the invasion. 73 The invasion was 
unsuccessful, and the troops were expelled from the 
Sudan, and relocated in Tanzania. This expulsion was 
the result of an Agreement between Amin and President 
Numeiry of Sudan. The Agreement was prompted by 
southern Sudanese Anyanya guerillas operating from 
northern Uganda against Numeiry's government, and anti-
Amin forces campaigning from the southern Sudan. The 
two leaders calculated that their survival called for 
the mutual expulsion of the hostile forces from their 
respective territories. Amin also agreed to expel the 
71 Mutibwa, P. Uganda Since Independence op.cit., pp.108-109. 
72 See an interview with Yoweri Museveni, The Kenya Times, ~. 
November 1985, p.4. 
73 Woodward, 'Uganda and Southern Sudan: Peripheral Politics and 
Neighbour Relations' op.cit., p.231. 
Israeli mission which had been advising the southern 
Sudanese in Uganda. 74 
The pro-Obote force that was expelled from Sudan 
later regrouped in Tanzania under the command of Tito 
Okello and Oyite-Ojok. Apart from this, there were in 
the early days amongst others, the Front for National 
Salvation (FRONASA), led by Yoweri Museveni, which 
consisted of young exiles, especially from western 
Uganda. There was also the Save Uganda Movement (SUM) 
which included several young academicians, and which was 
responsible for several acts of sabotage in the late 
seventies. These groups were however not uni ted and 
differed on important matters, such as the best strategy 
to remove Amin, who future leaders should be, and 
ideology. It was not until 1977, and later, 1979, that 
efforts were made to consolidate the various opposition 
groups. 
Consolidation of Opposition Groups in Exile 
The Lusaka Conference, August 1977 
The first serious attempt to merge all the existing 
opposition groups took place in Lusaka in August 1977, 
where the Uganda National Movement (UNM) was formed. 
However, not all the movements joined the UNM. Indeed, 
some individuals like Obote tried unsuccessfully to 
persuade the Zambian government to cancel the meeting. 
From the beginning, the UNM was torn apart by ethnic, 
ideological and organisational differences. For 
example, the chairman, John Barigye, who as the son of 
the Omugabe of Ankole was of royal birth, was soon 
accused of being too monarchist, lacking ln dynamism, 
and of using the movement for his own ends. Differences 
within the UNM membership eventually caused some members 
including the chairman to reslgn, leading to the 
eventual collapse of the organisation. 75 
74 Ibid. 
75 New Afril~3.JJ, March 1979, p.50. 
The Pre-Moshi Conference, January 1979 
By the beginning of 1979, the leaders of the 
various opposition groups were under pressure, 
especially from Tanzania, to drop their differences and 
come together to design plans to oust Amin, and agree on 
the governance of post-Amin Uganda. 76 One development 
that particularly enabled the various groups to come 
together was the change in emphasis and approach of the 
Tanzanian government. Unlike ln the past, the Tanzanian 
authorities claimed that they no longer considered Obote 
to be the only leader capable of restoring peace ln 
Uganda. To emphasise this new approach, a daily 
broadcast ln Luganda was transmitted over Radio 
Tanzania, ln which the Tanzanian authorities denied 
repeatedly that the government wanted to lmpose any 
leader on the Ugandan people, and that Obote was no 
exception to that policy. 77 
In this changing climate, several groups including 
the Organisation for Free Uganda (OFU), the Uganda 
Freedom Union (UFU), the Uganda Human Rights Group 
(UHRG), the Uganda Action Group (UAG), the Democratic 
Party (DP), and the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), met 
in Tanzania to agree on and develop a concerted campaign 
against Amin. These groups all had different 
ideologies, and cut across ethnic lines. Perhaps ln 
order to emphasise Tanzania's newly stated pol icy on 
Ugandan opposition groups, Obote did not attend this 
meeting, although representatives of his party did. It 
was agreed that a committee be appointed to implement 
the resolutions passed during the conference. The most 
important of these resolutions called for a National 
Convention to be attended by two representatives from 
each group. That Convention would then appoint a 
76 Nyerere is said to have exerted this pressure in order that 
after defeating Amin militarily in the Tanzania-U~anda ",,:ar,. he was not 
faced with the problem of being see~ to be emp~re bUlld~ng by 
imposing a new regime in Uganda. Thls per~pectl~e wa~ glven ~o the 
author by a former senior aide to Nyerere, In an lntervlew, Parls, 23 
December 1993. 
77 New African, March 1979, p.SO. 
Commission which would act 
transitional government in exile. 78 
The Moshi Conference, March 1979 
The Moshi Conference (or 
collectively as a 
the Uganda Unity 
Conference) was a follow-up to the January conference, 
and brought together various Ugandan groups that had 
been engaged in all aspects of the struggle against 
Amin: the military, political, and humanitarian fronts. 
There were ln all twenty SlX groups of varying 
prominence represented. These included FRONASA, SUM, 
UHRG, UPC, the Uganda Nationalist Organization (UNO), 
the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) , the Uganda Liberation 
Group (ULG) , the Uganda Discussion Study Group (UDSG) , 
the Uganda Reconstruction and Reconciliation Union 
(URRU), and some individuals, including soldiers from 
within Uganda, who provided valuable military 
intelligence. 79 
Two developments at the outset established the tone 
for the conference, and probably avoided wrangles that 
might otherwise have wrecked it at that stage. Firstly, 
the Tanzanian Foreign Minister restated Tanzania's 
position at the beginning of the conference. This was 
that the Tanzanian attitude was informed by three 
principles: that Tanzanian concern was with the 
sanctity and security of its borders; that although the 
Tanzanian government had always detested the Amin 
regime, its replacement was the responsibility of the 
Ugandan people; and that whereas ln the process of 
fighting against Amin's aggression Tanzania had of 
necessity, asked for assistance from Ugandans exiled ln 
Tanzania, 
"[iJ t is bad for those individuals, and for the 
reputation of Tanzania for there to be even an 
appearance that Tanzania is favouring one group of 
the opponents of Amin rather than others. This ~s 
also contrary to the wishes of the Tanzanla 
government and people. Only Ugandans can decide on 
78 Ibid. 
79 New African, No.141, May 1979, pp.14-15. 
their future government 
fall. ,,80 
should Amin's regime 
The second development was that al though he was 
physically present, Obote was there ln spirit, 
not 
as a 
letter from him to the participants, read at the 
beginning of the conference indicated. 81 He said ln that 
letter that he was "willing but unable" to attend the 
conference, declared his solidarity with it, and assured 
the participants that he would play his part "in the 
implementation of positive conference decisions. ,,82 
Decisions of the Moshi Conference 
The different groups and organisations represented 
at the Moshi Conference merged to form a single 
organisation, the Uganda National Liberation Front 
(UNLF). They also established the military arm of the 
UNLF, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) , which 
was to be an organ of the UNLF, operating under its 
command and direction. By the Moshi Declaration, the 
basic structure of constitutional authority in post-Amin 
Uganda was set out. An eleven member National Executive 
Council (NEC) under the chairmanship of Yusuf Lule was 




one member from each of the organisations 
represented. Three commissions were also 
Political and Diplomatic, Finance and 
Administration, and Military. 83 
As the Moshi Conference was proceeding, the war 
between Uganda and Tanzania was well underway, and there 
was pressure for the UNLA to organlse itself and 
80 Ibid., p.16. 
81 But this did not dispel fully the belief amongst some 
participants that abote had refrained from attending on the advise of 
Nyerere, who thought that his attendance would frustrate the 
format ion of the UNLF. See, Nabudere, D. W . 'External and Internal 
Factors in Uganda's Continuing Crisis' in Hansen, H. B. & Twaddle, M. 
(Eds) Uganda Now op.cit., pp.299-312:301. 
82 Letter dated Dar-es-Salaam, 22 March, 1979. See full text in 
New African, May 1979, p.15. 
83 Tindigarukayo,J.K. 'Uganda, 1979-85: Leadership in Transition' 
26 Journal of MCciern African StuJies (1988) pp.607-622:608. 
spearhead (or at least appear to), the final march to 
Kampala that would culminate in unlodging Amin from 
power.84 This, plus the diversity of the groups 
represented, and the absence of a third party to mediate 
between their diverse 
important issues were not 
stage. 85 Particularly, 
interests, meant that 
discussed sufficiently at 




constitutional relationship and division of authority 
between the chairman of the NEe, who would replace Amin 
as President, and the NCC, which was to assume 
legislative powers, was not finalised. 86 Equally 
important, the crucial decision as to which, between the 
Moshi Declaration and arrangements thereunder, and the 
1967 Republican Constitution would take precedence was 
not made. As will be evident later, these crucial 
omissions were to undermine the attempts of the 
immediate post-Amin regimes to set up stable governments 
and find an enduring solution to the conflict in Uganda. 
Lifting the Veil: Groups in Conflict 
The excitement in the popular cause of removlng 
Amin, and the propinquity of a military victory against 
him, contributed to the papering over of the differences 
between the participants at Moshi, and in suggesting the 
common cause of the Moshi Declaration. The absence of 
a third party to help the participants keep the crucial 
distance between emotions and the diversity of the 
interests and issues behind the common cause, drew a 
veil over the cracks and faults beneath it. Either the 
participants thought that the 'Spirit of Moshi' would 
keep the veil permanently over their differences, or 
they hoped that those disparities would be sorted out, 
or at least minimised, after the task of removing Amin 
from power was accomplished. If the latter was the 
84 This pressure was exerted by Tanzania: this insight is owed to 
an interview with a senior Tanzania Foreign Office official, op.cit. 
85 See Chapters 6 and 8. 
86 Ibid. 
case, it was ill-advised. With the swearing ln of Lule 
as the interim President under the Moshi arrangements, 
the veil of unity was abruptly lifted. Beneath it were 
exposed all the ideological, regional, and ethnic 
differences that had kept the various groups from unity 
ln the long years of exile. And thus 
"The main problem facing the country after Amin's 
overthrow was that there were too many liberation 
movements or groups, with varying and often 
contradictory ideologies and aspirations. What had 
united the different groups ... completely 
disappeared once Amin was out of the way. [The] 
groups had convened in Moshi ... and emerged wi th 
what came to be known as the 'Moshi Spirit'. It 
was well named because the 'spirit' was left behind 
in Moshi. No sooner did the liberators arrive in 
Kampala, faced with the real problems of a Uganda 
without Amin, than the Uganda National Liberation 
Front (UNLF) started to disintegrate. "a7 
Once all the groups returned home after the 
liberation, rifts in the social fabric which the Moshi 
spirit had overlooked became manifest. Particularly, 
there was great bitterness between those who went into 
exile during the Amin years and those who did not; those 
who "had with great hardship stuck at their desks ... and 
the exiles, who after often holding well-paid 
prestigeful [sic] jobs abroad, came back to be treated 
as liberation heroes and given all the top jobs."aa The 
inability (or unwillingness) of post-Amin governments to 
address this problem satisfactorily affected their 
efforts to form governments of truly national consensus. 
For the animosity here was not just philosophical, but 
also emotional. Those who had stayed behind especially 
resented the assumption which even the governments 
seemed to take, that they were, ipso facto, Amin 
syrnpathisers. They made the eloquent argument that 
"men ... flee or resign themselves to tyranny for 
various reasons. Those who had stayed may have 
felt a revulsion against and fear of Amin's regime, 
yet put family loyal ty first: there could be an 
87 Mutibwa, P. Uganda Since Independence op.cit., pp.125-126. 
88 Southall, 'Social Disorganization in Uganda' op.cit., p.645. 
element of opportunism in the motives of both those 
who stayed and those who fled. ,,89 
The years between the liberation and the Nairobi 
mediation were largely preoccupied with finding a 
solution to these deep seated feelings. Indeed, it can 
be argued that the unveiling of these differences 
immediately after the liberation and in the subsequent 
years, and the inability of the several governments to 
find an acceptable accomodation between the varlOUS 
parties, laid the groundwork for the mediation of 1985. 
After the Liberation: Coups and Counter Coups 
The Role of the Tanzanian Forces 
The events that led to the war between Tanzania and 
Uganda, and the responses of the Organisation of African 
Unity to it, were examined in Chapter Four. 90 What has 
not always received sufficient attention or analysis lS 
first, how the UNLA was integrated in the final drive to 
remove Amin, and secondly, the role of the Tanzania 
People's Defence Forces (TPDF) In Uganda once the 
liberation of Uganda was effected. 
The final military drive to remove Amin was the 
combined effort of the TPDF and the UNLA. Initially, 
after the TPDF had driven Amin's army from the Kagera 
Salient, Tanzania was keen to stress that it had no 
intention to overthrow Amin itself.91 It therefore 
emphasised the partnership with the UNLA in the battles 
leading to the fall of Kampala. But the seniority in 
the partnership between the TPDF and the UNLA was 
evident from the strategies that Tanzania and the TPDF 
adopted in this leg of the campaign. Firstly, in order 
to capture Kampala, the forces had to go through 
Buganda: and to gain the support of the Buganda, one of 
89 New African, No.144, August 1979, p.57. 
90 See also Chapter 6. 
91 Because Nyerere did not want his war with Amin to be seen as 
motivated by empire building:interview with a former senior aide to 
Nyerere, op.cit. 
their number (Lule) was chosen as Chairman of the NEC, 
and would replace Amin as President once the campaign 
succeeded. Had Obote, a northerner, or a UPC person 
been appointed instead, the passage through Buganda 
would have been extremely difficult. Thus 
"[i]t made sense for Nyerere, and even for Obote 
and his UPC, for Obote to stand aside and let 
everyone believe that the man about to take power 
was Lule ... a member of the Baganda tribe, the now 
traditional enemies of Obote. ,,92 
Secondly, at Moshi Museveni was given command of the 
western wing, to fight the battle from the west. His 
intention however, was to reach Kampala before the TPDF 
forces did, and hence take power himself. 93 Thirdly, 
rather than the expected march on Kampala, the decisive 
battle was fought at Entebbe on April 7 1979, when with 
the help of the Tanzanian Air Force, Entebbe was taken. 
This not only effectively crushed any resistance by 
Amin, but also pre-empted Museveni's triumphant entry 
into Kampala, which would have rendered the Moshi 
arrangements void. 
After the fall of Kampala, a security threat was 
posed by the retreating Amin forces. Thus, the point of 
Vlew emerged in official circles in Kampala and 
Tanzania, that the TPDF would need to remaln in Uganda 
for much longer, until the UNLA was 'properly 
constituted'. Consequently, In his inaugral address 
President Lule officially invited the TPDF to remain in 
Uganda. Nyerere reiterated later that those forces 
would remain in Uganda only for as long as the Ugandan 
government required them. 94 The decision to invite the 
TPDF to remain in Uganda was one that Lule was to regret 
two months later, when he was overthrown in what smacked 
of a Tanzanian instigated 'palace coup'. Nyerere' s 
92 Mutibwa, P. Uganda Since Independence op.cit., pp.127-l28. 
93 This is the analysis of Dr.A. Mukwaya, Department of Political 
Science, Makerere Univesity, in an interview with the author, Kampala, 
June, 1993. 
9--1 Africa No.93, May 1979, p.1S. 
assurance came to be seen as being based on the belief , 
contrary to Tanzanian official pronouncements, that the 
immediate post-liberation governments in Uganda were 
only holding brief for Obote. 95 
The role that the TPDF played in Uganda after the 
liberation underlined the deep divisions within the 
DNLF. Lule's complaints about the TPDF will be 
considered in the next section. Meanwhile, it is worth 
noting that the composition of the leadership in Uganda 
(in the UNLA, the NEe and NCC) , suggested a longer term 
plan for the return of Obote to power. Thus, while the 
command of the UNLA and its membership included Tito 
Okello and Oyite-Ojok, leadership of the NCC included 
people like Paolo Muwanga. All these were staunch Obote 
supporters. They later played crucial roles jointly and 
severally, in Obote's return to power, maintaining his 
second regime, and in the events leading to the Uganda 
mediation after his second overthrow in 1985. 
The Lule Presidency, April-June 1979 
Although Lule came to power with a mandate from the 
Moshi Conference of a maximum of two years within which 
elections were to be held, his incumbency lasted barely 
two months. Many reasons have been advanced for the 
brevity of this tenure. These were both internal and 
external. The internal explanations revolved around the 
difficulty of balancing the diverse interests that the 
Moshi Spirit had veiled, and which led to the 
constitutional debate about the source of presidential 
power. The external reasons concerned Tanzanian 
attitudes regarding their status ln post-liberation 
Uganda. 
Internally, one of the most intractable problems 
that Lule faced was the reorganisation of the army. He 
realised that the problem was created originally by the 
colonial policy of recruiting predominantly from the 
north, and made worse by post-colonial policies of 
95 See Mutibwa, P. Ugancia Since Independence op.cit., p.128. 
recruitment along ethnic lines. 96 Lule therefore tried 
to create a new army, and a new police force. 
Accordingly, he set out to recruit from all regions of 
Uganda, . proportion the ln to Slze of each region's 
population, so that no single ethnic group would any 
longer have ascendancy in the armed forces. 97 It was 
thought that the new army should be loyal to the people, 
and should for that reason be a 'political army', one 
that understood the policies and programmes of the UNLA. 
In these two policies, Lule had the support of ministers 
in Kampala. They argued that a widely based army was 
less likely to be manipulated by a civilian or military 
dictator than a narrowly based one. 98 There was also an 
educational qualification requiring that men of the new 
army have at least seven years of education, and at 
least '0' level education for officer cadets, who were 
both to be trained by Tanzania. The UNLA was to be 
disbanded once the recrui tment of the new army was 
complete, although its members would be given priority 
ln filling the regional quotas in the new army.99 
These policies created two problems for Lule. The 
educational requirement caused insecurity amongst the 
ranks of the UNLA, many of whom saw it as a plan to 
dispense with their serVlces in a country where 
unemployment was rife. The quota system led to 
accusations that Lule was designing a way to ensure 
Bagandan supremacy in Uganda since being the largest 
ethnic group in Uganda, the Baganda would have had a 
numerical superiority in the new army. 
The second internal problem that Lule faced 
concerned the allocation of public offices. Although 
Lule at first appointed ministers from all significant 
96 Lule interviewed: New African, No.141, May 1979, pp.18-20:19. 
97 Tindigarukayo, ' Uganda, 1979- 85: Leadership in Transi t ion' 
op . cit., p. 610 . 
98 See Nel\: African July 1979, p.49. 
99 New.:-..trican, June 1979, p.30. 
parts of the country, 100 only a few of these were people 
who had not gone into exile. A constitutional problem 
also arose when, without consulting the NCC, Lule 
reshuffled his cabinet, demoting three non-Baganda 
ministers and appointing Baganda ones in their place. It 
had been agreed at Moshi that In an emergency, the 
chairman of the NEC could co-opt and fill vacancies in 
the executive, subject to later ratification by the NCe. 
In all other cases, the Nee had power to fill such 
vacanCles. The question therefore was which between the 
NEC and Nee was constitutionally subordinate to the 
other. 
Two schools of thought emerged on this issue. The 
first, supported by the maj ority in the UNLF, argued 
that the NCC alone could fill vacancies In the 
executive. The second, to which Lule and some of his 
supporters subscribed, contended that the chairman of 
the NEC alone was empowered to make appointmnts to 
public office. In support of this claim, Lule put 
forward the legal case that, since he and his cabinet 
derived their authority from the 1967 Republican 
Constitution under which they had been sworn into 
office, "on the strength of this national 
constitution ... I have made and will continue to make all 
the appointments to public office. ,,101 Most members of 
the UNLF saw this argument as a renunciation of the 
consensus that had been reached at Moshi, under which 
consensual and consultative arrangements leading to 
conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair 
elections would be created. 102 Hence, the first school 
of thought held sway, and a vote of no confidence, based 
100 Low, 'The Dislocated Polity' op.cit., p.49. 
101 New African, No.14S, September 1979, p.1S. 
102 Ibid. 
on the fear of Lule assuming dictatorial powers, 103 was 
eventually passed against him. 
The developments leading to Lule's ouster should be 
seen against the background of external influences, 
which were taking place contemporaneously. After he was 
overthrown, Lule revealed in an interview that there had 
been a strong Tanzanian influence ln that process .104 
Not only did Tanzania appoint a Resident Minister 
stationed in Kampala after the liberation, but it also 
opposed some of Lule's appointments, especially those 
to the crucial ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, 
Home Affairs, Communications, and the Chief of Staff. 
The basis of this opposition was that they were too 
'rightist' .105 Al ternati ve appointments to these were 
suggested, and when Lule resisted them on the basis that 
Tanzanian obj ections amounted to interference ln the 
internal affairs of Uganda, he was summoned to Moshi, 
where as he revealed later, Nyerere asked him to invite 
Obote to join his cabinet in the capacity either of Vice 
President, or Minister for Foreign Affairs. 106 Lule' s 
refusal to do this was closely linked to, and followed 
by, later developments where the NeC, a substantial 
number of whose membership was under the influence of 
Tanzania,107 voted him out of office, and elec 
ted Godfrey Binaisa to the Presidency. 
103 And, in the Tanzanian view, that he was acting as though he 
had been popularly elected, which was not the case since there had not 
yet been elections in Uganda. This perspective was given to the 
author by a senior Tanzanian foreign office official in an interview 
in Paris, December 1993. 
104 Lule interviewed: New African, No.145, September 1979, pp.12-
13. 
105 Ibid., p.13. 
106 Ibid. Lule however offered Obote the post of Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations in New York, provided Obote went 
there directly, without first visiting Uganda. See Ingham,K. abote: 
A Political Biograph}' (London & New York: Routledge, 1994) p.157. 
107 As is argued in Chapter 6, Tanzanian inf luence later 
complicated the issue of who should mediate in the Uganda ccnflict, and 
the venue of the mediation. 
The Binaisa Presidency, June 1979-May 1980 
Binaisa's presidency was a difficult one. He 
inherited some of the intractable problems that Lule had 
attempted unsuccessfully to grapple with. He eventually 
also had to confront the constitutional problem of the 
source of his authority. This question again revealed 
the deep divisions within the UNLF, and led to Binaisa's 
consequent overthrow. 
Regarding the military, Binaisa faced the problem 
whether the policy of regional representation did not 
conflict with the larger alm of creating a truly 
national army. His stated policy was that regionalism 
was gone forever from army recruitment, and that people 
would be recruited not because they belonged to a 
particular ethnic group, but because thay subscribed to 
the aims and policies of the UNLF. lOB This policy was 
reminiscent of Lule' s, but rang hollow. As he was 
making it, the UNLA was being enlarged, mainly by 
untrained recruits and ethnically based militias in the 
northern provlnces. It was also being divided between 
factions loyal to Oyite-Oj ok, Museveni, and others. 109 
This, plus the deteriorating relations between the TPDF, 
the UNLA and the civilian population, made it difficult 
to implement a coherent and generally acceptable 
military policy. 
Like Lule, Binaisa had to address the problem of 
the allocation and distribution of assets abandoned by 
Amin's fleeing supporters. Unlike Lule whose approach 
to this problem led to accusations that he was favouring 
his close political allies, and especially the Baganda, 
Binaisa's allocation policies offended "those who had 
stayed and suffered under Amin's rule, [who] 
increasingly resented the allocation procedures, argulng 
108 Binaisa interviewed: New .:'J.frican, No.14S, September 1979, 
p.1S. 
109 Walker, , Uganda: Rec~nt History' op. ci t ., p. 1063. 
that returning exiles were taking the lion's share."::: 
Under Binaisa, not only did the unity and cohesion 
between the UNLF and UNLA begin to disintegrate, but 
cleavages of bitterness within the civilian population 
became evident. His announcement that elections would 
be held in December 1980, but that candidates would only 
be permitted to participate under the umbrella of the 
UNLF (the so-called 'politics of the umbrella') only 
served to alienate further sources of potential support, 
such as political parties like the DP and the UPC. 111 
Binaisa also attempted to neutralise the still 
powerful NCC by expanding its membership to include 
representatives elected by district electoral colleges. 
This move was calculated to reduce tensions within the 
country. These had developed because the NCC was 
composed largely of exiles, and led to the sprouting of 
clandestine political groups opposed to their monopoly 




arguments similar to those Lule 
earlier, he dismissed Paolo Muwanga 








Defence to the Ministry of Regional 
And when in May 1980 he tried to dismiss 
Chief of Staff, UNLA soldiers put him 
under house arrest. On 12 May 1980, the UNLF Military 
Commission assumed power, under the chairmanship of 
Muwanga, with Museveni as Deputy Chairman, and Oyite-
Ojok and Tito Okello as members. 
The Military Commission, May-December 1980 
The Military Commission took power in Uganda just 
a year after the military dictatorship of Amin had been 
overthrown. This demonstrated two things that were to 
110 Tindigarukayo, 'Uganda, 1979-85: Leadership in Transition' 
op.cit., p.611. 
111 Walker, 'Uganda: Recent History' op.cit., p.1063. 
112 See New African, No.98, October 1979, p.33. 
become even more evident later during 
mediation: that the efforts to domesticate 
in Uganda had failed at a crucial moment , 
military still retained the "veto power 
which political rulers it preferred. ,,113 
the Nairobi 
the military 
and that the 
to determine 
The membership of the Military Commission was 
largely pro-Obote, and was later seen as having taken 
over power in order to pave the way for his return to 
office .114 Its tenure was mainly preoccupied with 
organlslng elections. It announced that these would be 
held ln 1980, (originally ln September, later ln 
December), and that all interested political parties 
were at liberty to participate, thus reversing Binaisa's 
earlier policy. The main political parties that took 
part ln the elections were the Obote-Ied UPC, which 
based its campaign on political reconciliation and the 
rehabilitation of the economy; the DP, led by 
Ssemogerere, which was Baganda dominated, and whose maln 
platform was the need to defeat Obote' s party; the 
Conservative Party (CP) led by Mayanj a-Nkangi, which 
wanted to restore the former kingdoms, and the Uganda 
Patriotic Movement (UPM) , led by Museveni, which 
emphasised the restoration of the rule of law. 115 
The UPC was announced as the winner of the 1980 
election, and Obote was sworn in as President of Uganda 
for the second time in his career. But it was a Pyrric 
victory, which some of the other parties like the UPM 
did not accept, on the basis that the elections were 
rigged. The election result marked the end of the Moshi 
Spirit of consolidation and reconciliation. Uganda was 
once again plunged into civil war, and the next attempt 
113 Mudoola,D. 'Political Transitions Since Amin: A Study in 
Political Pathology' in Hansen,H.B. & Twaddle,M. (Eds) Uganda Now 
op.cit., pp.280-298:294. 
114 Low, 'The Dislocated Polity' op.cit., p.50. 
115 Tindigarukayo, 'Uganda, 1979-85: Leadership ln Transition' 
op.cit., p.613. 
to restore peace was the Nairobi mediation, five years 
later. 
The Second Obote Regime and Internal War 
The results of the 1980 election were bitterly 
disputed by the other contestants,116 and the manner of 
its announcement did not encourage them to believe . ln 
its fairness. The announcement of the resul ts was 
halted by Muwanga, who was the returning officer, just 
when it appeared that the returns were signalling a DP 
victory.117 In the event, the resul t was later 
announced as a slight victory by the UPC over the DP: 
Museveni's UPM won only one seat. 118 
The dissatisfaction with the general conduct and 
outcome of the elections led several groups to begin a 
guerilla war against the second Obote regime. The 
earliest and most prominent of these was the Popular 
Resistance Army (PRA) commanded by Museveni. 119 This was 
later joined by the Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF) under 
Yusuf Lule. The National Resistance Movement (NRM) was 
formed by the merger of these two, with Lule as the 
Chairman, and Museveni as the Vice Chairman. The armed 
wing of the NRM was the the National Resistance Army 
(NRA) and Museveni was the Chairman of its High Command. 
On Lule's death, Museveni became Chairman of the NRM as 
116 The Commonwealth sent an Observer Group which reported that 
the elections were free and fair: see Commonwealth Observer Group, 
Uganda Elections December 1980: The Report of the Commonweal th 
Observer Group (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1981). This was not 
a view that many subscribed to, as Chan notes in a brief but pungent 
critique, in Chan,S. The Commonwealth in World Politics (London: 
Lester Crook Academic Publishing, 1988) pp.51-52. The problem, as Chan 
notes elsewhere, is that the Commonwealth Observer Group confirmed 
convenient results, rather than truthful ones: see Chan,S. Twelve 
Years of Commonwealth Diplomatic History (Lewiston, Queenston & 
Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992) p.129. 
117 See Africa No.113, January 1981, p.10. 
118 Twaddle,M. 'Museveni's Uganda: Notes Towards an Analysis' in 
Hansen,H.B. & Twaddle,M. (Eds) Uganda Now op.cit., pp.313-335:316. 
119 It has been argued that given the 'abysmal performance' of 
Museveni's party in the elections, the flaw in those elections was not 
the only reason Museveni waged a civil war against Obote's second 
regime: see Ingham,K. Obote: A Political Biography (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1994) pp.177-178. This is true, but Ingham's book is very 
sympathetic of Obote, and it is unlikely he would admit to any merits 
in an alternative explanation. 
well.
120 
The NRA waged a five year ' protracted people's 
war' ,121 culminating in its assumption of power In 
January 1986. 
Apart from the NRM/NRA, there was also the Uganda 
National Rescue Front (UNRF) led by Moses Ali, a former 
minister in the Amin regime. There was also the Former 
Uganda National Army (FUNA) composed of Amin supporters 
active in the West Nile district. There were further 
the Uganda Freedom Army (UFM) and the Federal Democratic 
Movement of Uganda (FEDEMU), which like the NRM/NRA, 
derived substantial support from the Buganda area. 122 As 
the civil war later gained ground, the support base of 
the NRA expanded. It drew support from people In 
several parts of Uganda. These included disaffected 
southern Ugandans, people from the Luwero Triangle which 
Obote's government later de-populated In order to 
deprive the NRA of civil ian support, 123 and defectors 
from the UNLA. 
Obote's second reglme was characterised by several 
internal conflicts. Apart from the military groups 
mentioned above, his rule was also opposed by certain 
sections of the civilian population. These included the 
Baganda, his traditional enemies, in whose 
constituencies Obote's UPC was denied even a single seat 
in the 1980 election. There were also supporters of the 
former political leaders, who alleged that Obote had 
rigged his way into power, and the southerners, who 
bitterly hated the still northern dominated army. Thus, 
"all this opposition made it difficult for Obote to 
120 See Kisekka,S.B.M. 'Forward' to Museveni,Y. Selected Articles 
on the Uganda Resistance War (Kampala: NRM Publications, 1986-2nd ed) 
p.7. 
121 See Museveni,Y. 'Why We Fought a Protracted People's War' in 
Museveni, Y.What is Africa's Problem? Speeches and Writings on .:'..~rica 
(Kampala: NRM Publications, 1992) pp.129-141. 
122 Omara-Otunnu,A. Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890-1985 
op.cit., p.1S7. 
123 Walker, 'Uganda: Recent History' op.cit., p.1064. 
acquire his needed legitimacy. ,,124 The dynamics of these 
various conflicts and Obote's "almost paranoid fear of 
a southern resurgence", led his second regime to be 
characterised by "policies verging on genocide. ,,125 
The response of Obote's government to this 
disaffection of large sections of the population was, in 
Rothchild's term, one of hegemonial interaction .126 The 
coercive element of this response was evidenced inter 
alia by the formation of the National Security Agency 
(NASA), whose members were ill-trained, indisciplined 
and brutal. Together with the UNLA, they unleashed a 
brutality on the civilian population which, by many 
accounts was as brutal, if not worse, than the earlier, 
unlamented one of Idi Amin. 127 
There also existed conflicts within the ruling 
group. Particularly, differences developed between 
Obote and some members of his cabinet who opposed some 
of his appointments, and who would have preferred to 
negotiate with the guerillas. Their views conflicted 
with Obote's, since he preferred continued confrontation 
with the guerillas in search of a military victory. 128 
Secondly, the old Ugandan problem of the military and 
its ethnic composition began to cause unrest within the 
UNLA, where some feared that Obote was appointing and 
promoting his fellow Langi tribesmen at the expense of 
124 Tindigarukayo, 'Uganda, 1979-85: Leadership in Transition' 
op.cit., p.616. 
125 Decalo, S. Coups and Mili tary Rule in Africa op. cit., pp .182-
183. 
126 Rothchild, 'Interethnic Conflict and Policy Analysis in 
Africa' op.cit. See also Chapter 3. 
127 See Furley, O. 'Britain and Uganda from Amin to Museveni: Blind 
Eye Diplomacy' in Rupesinghe, K. (Ed) Conflict Resolution in Uganda 
op.cit., pp.275-294:287-291. Some sympathisers of Obote argue th~t 
Obote was not to blame, since these acts were committed by 'rebels' ln 
UNLA uniforms: See Ingham, K. abote: A Poli tical Biography op. cit. There 
is little evidence for this view; and even if true, Obote was still the 
commander-in-chief and president, and the buck must properly stop with 
his government. 
128 Tindigarukayo, 'Uganda, 1979-85: Leadership in Transition' 
. 617 Ch pter 6 and 7 on similar conflicts in the op. c 1. t ., p. ; see a 
Military government during the mediation. 
the Acholi part of the alliance. These intra-UNLA 
tensions between the Langi and the Acholi led to the 
disintegration of the ethno-military alliance that kept 
Obote In power, and consequently to his second 
overthrow. 
Obote's second downfall began In December 1983, 
when on the death of Oyite-Ojok, a fellow Langi who was 
his Chief of Staff, 129 he appointed another Langi, Opon-
Ocak, as his replacement, bypassing more senior Acholi 
officers such as Basilio Okello. Although Obote 
promoted a large number of Acholi officers In 
compensation, the appointment of Opon-Acak meant that 
after the impending retirement of the ageing General 
Tito Okello there would be no Acholis in key military 
positions in the army. Opon-Acak was also a poor leader 
of men, and was accused of favouring the Langis in the 
army, and of ordering only Acholi soldiers to the front 
line in the fight against the guerillas. 130 This led to 
Acholi soldiers refusing to obey orders, and to Acholi-
Langi ethnic fights within the ranks of the army. In 
these circumstances, Brigadier Basilio Okello mobilised 
a substantial portion of the army from his Gulu 
headquarters, and marched into Kampala. 
Obote fled into exile. 
Once again, 
The Military Government, July 1985-January 1986 
General Tito Okello announced the formation of a 
Military Council on 27 July, 1985. The Military Council 
faced two problems from the outset, which were to render 
its tenure of office a brief one. Firstly, although the 
official reason for removing Obote from office was given 
as being "to stop the bloodshed in the country, and to 
create conditions for viable peace, unity and 
129 According to Ingham, Oyite-Ojok was totally loyal to Obote, 
,md had been running the army almost single-handedly, and was 
, impossible' to replace. His death there.fore "l~ft Obote ~i th a 
great feeling of loneliness and some of hls own flre and drlve ~e~med 
to die with his chief of staff." See Ingham,K. Llbote: A Pol~t~cal 
Biography op.cit., pp.198-199. 
130 Omara-Otunnu,A. Politics and the Military in Uganda op.ci'::.., 
pp.160-163. 
development, and the observance and promotion of human 
rights",131 the real reason was the Acholi-Langi rivalry 
in the army. 132 In spite of this, the Military Council 
that was announced after the coup was composed entirely 
of Acholis. Secondly, while the inter-ethnic struggle 
had been gOlng on in the UNLA during Obote's regime, the 
NRA had been gaining ground, and its campaign had 
reached a decisive stage when Obote was overthrown. 133 
Although the Military Council reacted to this by 
enlisting the aid of UNRF troops from the west Nile 
district, the Acholi-West Nile alliance was inherently 
unstable, and evidently so under military pressure. 
Because the UNRF troops were neither controllable nor 
efficient in the field, fighting broke out between them 
and the UNLA troops they had been drafted to assist. 
Also, apart from the NRA's control of the main towns in 
the west and south of Uganda, its control of the 
southern parts which produced most of the cash crops, 
placed an economic stranglehold on the impoverished 
military government of Tito Okello. 134 
Clearly therefore, the Military Council was ln an 
untenable position. It had to make either of two 
decisions: to stage a last military stand against an NRA 
force that was gaining ln support and confidence, or to 
negotiate with them. As Low observes on the state of 
forces at that time, 
"For a while, the principal ethnic groupings in 
northern and southern Uganda now became quite 
explicitly represented by two a~med forces, 
Okello's essentially northern, Acholl-Ied army on 
the one side and Museveni's essentially southern , . 
supported NRA on the other. They could elther now 
fight, or Okello could provide the southern 
elements, not only with a major place ln a 
131 Ibid., p.165. 
132 See Museveni, 'After Obote: What?' in Museveni, Y. Selected 
Articles on the Uganda Resistance War op.cit., pp.76-83:79. 
133 See Museveni I 'Who I s Winning the War?' in Museveni, Y. Wha t 
Is Africa I s Problem? op. cit., pp .143-147. 
134 Walker, 'Uganda: Recent History' op. ci ~ ., p. 1064 . 
political settlement, but in a new Uganda army as 
well. ,,135 
As will be seen in the following chapter, faced with 
this dilemma, the Military Council chose reluctantly to 
negotiate. 
135 Low, 'The Dislocated Polity' op.cit., p.51. 
Chapter Six 
The Diplomatic Context of the Uganda Mediation 
Introduction 
Chapter One argued that the Uganda (or any) 
mediation is best analysed inter alia in terms of the 
diplomatic and the mediation contexts, which are two 
sides of the same COln. The diplomatic one lS an 
important context because it reinforces the truism that 
no mediation takes place in a vacuum. It also supports 
the proposition that the motivations, actions, and 
strategies adopted during mediation are part of the 
larger background of the relationships between the 
parties. 1 In the case of the Uganda mediation, they are 
part of a wider pattern of the international relations 
of the East African region. As was pointed out ln 
Chapter Three, the broad diplomatic context of this 
study is the African one. It will be evident later in 
this chapter however, that this does not preclude the 
influence of non-African players. 
Apart from this broad diplomatic canvass, several 
other factors influenced the diplomatic context of the 
Uganda mediation. The first was the broad African 
perspective on the conflicts in Africa as discussed 
generally ln Chapter Three, and the historical 
background of the Uganda conflict narrated in Chapter 
Five. The second factor was OAU conflict management as 
set out in Chapter Four, especially as it is related to 
the Uganda conflict. The third factor was the diplomacy 
of the region as it broadly informed the mediation. The 
fourth factor relates the diplomatic concerns that 
1 See Chapter 5 on the historical basis of these. 
permeated the developments immediately leading to the 
mediation itself. 
This chapter will examine firstly the effects of 
DAU conflict management policies and practices on the 
development of the Uganda conflict. Secondly, aspects 
of the diplomacy of the East African region, 
particularly as seen through the bilateral diplomatic 
relations between Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania will be 
surveyed, and an explanation offered as to how the 
choice of mediator evolved within that background. The 
politics surrounding the decision on the venue of the 
mediation will also be discussed ln this context. 
Finally, the diplomacy of the 1985 mediation itself will 
be considered. In this regard, a strategic map of the 
actors involved, and of those with broader interests in 
the outcome of the mediation will be drawn, and an 
analysis made of the factors influencing the decision of 
each of the parties to agree to the mediation. 
The Uganda Conflict in the OAU 
The four pillars of DAU conflict management were 
discussed ln an earlier chapter. 2 These are the 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
states, the principle of the soverelgn equality of 
member states, the principle of respect for the 
territorial borders inherited at independence,3 and the 
principle of African solutions to African problems. 4 The 
2 See Chapter Four. 
3 See Young,C. 'Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity, and the 
African State System' in Deng,F.M. & Zartman,I.W. (Eds) Conflict 
Resolution in Africa (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1991) 
pp.320-346:327-328. OAU involvement in such conflicts as in Western 
Sahara and Eritrea may not seem to accord with this principle because 
it was precisely the borders inherited at independence which were under 
challenge. Those conflicts underline the fact that where borders are 
involved the OAU will become involved regardless of the 'internal' 
nature of the conflict, and hence that between the principles of non-
interference and sanctity of borders, it holds the latter more dear. 
Those conflicts are also an exemplar of the continuing validity of the 
notion of internal self -determination (Western Sahara) and 'post-
colonial' self-determination (Eritrea). See Chapter 4. 
4 See Foltz,W.J. 'The Organization of African Unity and the 
Resolution of Africa's Conflicts' in Deng,F.M. & Zartman,I.W.(Eds} 
Conflict Resolution in Africa op.cit., pp.347-366:354-361. 
OAU's strict interpretation of these principles, 
especially of non-interference in internal affairs of 
states, has led to various problems in practice. The 
most difficult is the creation of an internal/inter-
state dichotomy, by which the OAU decides which 
conflicts it will manage, and ones in which it will not 
be involved. In this practice, as was illustrated in 
Chapter Four, OAU conflict management has concentrated 
on inter-state conflict, and eschewed involvement 
those conflicts it considered to be internal. 
. 
ln 
With respect to the conflict in Uganda, except for 
two brief periods - during the skirmishes of 1972, and 
the Uganda-Tanzania war of 1978/9 - the OAU considered 
consistently the conflict to be an internal affair of 
Uganda. Thus, apart from the occasion when Nyerere 
complained about Uganda's bombing of Bukoba, and when 
Idi Amin complained to the OAU about Tanzania's invasion 
in response to Uganda's earlier one of the Kagera 
Salient in Tanzania, the OAU considered the conflict in 
Uganda to be purely internal. In keeping wi th the 
policy of involvement only in inter-state conflict, it 
never attempted to manage this conflict, nor indeed 
officially to involve itself in it. Apart from its non-
involvement on conflict management terms, the OAU could 
have justified involvement on the bases of human rights 
violations and the existence of violent conflict, but 
declined to do so. 
The OAU and Human Rights Violations in Uganda 
During the long years of the Uganda conflict there 
were massive violations of human rights. 5 However, the 
OAU did not at any time condemn these violations,6 and 
5 See the three reports by Amnesty International: Uganda: Evidence 
of Torture (AI Doc.AFR.59/06/85); Uganda: The Human Rights Record 
(London: Amnesty International, 1989); and, Death in the Countryside: 
Killings of Civilians By the Army in 1990 (AI Doc.AFR.59/15/90) . 
6 It is noteworthy that during the height of Idi Amin' shuman 
rights excesses in 1976, the OAU condemned "Israe~i aggressi<;,n ~gainst 
the territorial integrity of Uganda" and "the dellberate kl11lng ~nd 
injury of people and wanton destruction of property". by. the Is~aells, 
but said nothing against the Ugandan government's kl1llng of lts own 
citizens or the destruction of their property. See AHG/Res.83 (XII). 
indeed was taken to task for not doing so, first by 
President Binaisa . In 1979, and later by President 
Museveni who, when he assumed power in 1986, observed 
the contradiction in OAU policy: 
"The reason for not condemning such massive crimes 
has, supposedly, been the desire not to interfere 
in the internal affairs of a member state in 
accordance wi th the Charters of the OAU and' the 
United N~tions. We do not accept this reasoning 
because In the same charters, there are explicit 
laws that enunciate the sanctity and inviolability 
of human life."7 
In the case of Uganda as elsewhere, the OAU adopted a 
strict interpretation of the Charter provision on non-
interference in the internal affairs of states. This 
justification for non-involvement operated much to the 
detriment of human rights principles and their 
observance. B 
It has been argued that OAU ineffectiveness in this 
respect derives from the lack of legal power to deal 
with human rights violations, and that therefore, 
"for legal reasons alone, the opportunities for the 
OAU to become involved in questions of human rights 
are exceptionally slight: it has no legal power to 
deal officially with problems of human rights 
concerning specific incidents In individual 
states. ,,9 
However, this absence of legal power lS insufficient to 
explain OAU ineffectiveness, because the same situation 
prevailed even after the normative framework established 
by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights was 
established to deal with the protection of human rights 
7 Museveni, Y. 'Most of Africa Kept Quiet ... ' Address at the OAU 
Summit, Addis Ababa, July 29, 1986: in Museveni,Y. What is Africa's 
Problem? : Speeches and Writings on Africa (Kampala: NRM Publications, 
1992) pp.168-171:168; Museveni's statement about silence was directed 
specifically at the OAU. Other organisations su~h as th~ UN ~nd t~e 
Commonwealth did speak out against human rlghts vlolatlons ln 
Uganda. 
8 Oloka-Onyango,J. Armed Conflict, Political Violence and the 
Human Rights Moni toring of Uganda: 1971-1990 (Kampala: CBR Working 
Paper No.12, 1992) p.14. 
9 Kunnig,P. 'The Protection of Human Rights by International Law 
in Africa' 25 German Yearbook of International Law (1982) pp.138-
168:143. 
in Africa. 10 The reason for OAU non- invol vement ln 
Uganda and elsewhere in Africa was not so much legal, as 
doctrinal. By elevating the principle of non-
interference to an 'absolute norm', 11 and insisting on 
the dichotomy between internal and inter-state conflict , 
the OAU effectively tied its own hands. In so doing it 
missed an opportunity to justify its involvement in, and 
management of, the Uganda conflict. It could have 
asserted with merit that human rights violations, and 
the genocide these engendered in Uganda, were a matter 
of international concern, and thus justified involvement 
regardless of the strict letter of the Charter. Had the 
OAU argued that way, it would have concluded that the 
human rights violations had sufficiently 
internationalised the conflict ln Uganda. 12 This would 
have glven it international rather than internal 
characteristics, and thus rendered it one which, even in 
its own terms, the OAU could have involved itself in. 
The OAU and Armed Conflict in Uganda 
In terms of armed conflict, the OAU has generally 
"been a much more prominent actor on the scene ... in 
Africa than it has ln the question of political 
violence. ,,13 This was eminently the case wi th the 
Uganda conflict. It was not until the skirmishes of 
1972, when the OAU designated Somalia as a mediator, and 
later when the Uganda-Tanzania war of 1978-79 was 
underway and Amin complained that Tanzania had invaded 
10 Oloka-Onyango, J.Armed Conflict, Political Violence and the 
Human Rights Moni toring of Uganda op. cit. , P .16; for useful 
commentaries on the African Human Rights Charter and its mechanisms, 
see, Umozurike,O. 'The African Charter of Human and People's Rights' 
77 American Journal of International Law (1983) pp.902-912; Welch,C.E. 
'The African Commission on Human and People's Rights: A Five Year 
Report and Assessment' 14 Human Rights Quarterly (1992) pp.43-61. 
11 Kamanu,O.S. 'Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: An 
OAU Dilemma' 12 Journal of Modern African Studies (1974) pp.355-
376:360. 
12 The issue of human rights as a factor that can internationalise 
a conflict is discussed in Chapter 1. 
13 Oloka-Onyango, J. ,:'ll.-mecl Conflict, Poli tical Violence and the 
Human Rights Monitoring of Uganda op.cit., p.17. 
Ugandan territory, that the OAU invoked its conflict 
management mechanisms. In the 
designated Ethiopia and Kenya 





conflict.14 However, Amin was overthrown before the 
mediators could commence their task. 
During Museveni's protracted war against the second 
Obote regime, and later against Tito Okello's regime, 
the OAU considered the conflict to be purely internal, 
and did not involve it sel f in it. As was argued 
earlier, the OAU could have construed this and earlier 
stages of the conflict to be sufficiently 
internationalised to justify involvement on human rights 
grounds alone. This apart, the diplomatic efforts of 
the Obote and Okello regimes and of the NRM - to 
solicit financial support and arms from abroad should 
have been sufficient evidence for a keen OAU, that the 
conflict had become internationalised, and hence no 
longer purely internal. But being wedded to the 
principle of non-interference, and to its own version of 
the internal/inter-state dichotomy, the OAU did not 
contemplate any action that would have seemed to put its 
fidelity to those principles at risk. Indeed, because 
individual states have come to espouse the OAU's strict 
interpretation of non- interference, 15 and Slnce many 
African leaders have much to hide internally, there is 
unlikely to have been any consensus or maj ority for 
intervention in any OAU Assembly. Hence the continued 
decision to pursue the policy of non-involvement. 
Diplomacy and Conflict in East Africa 
Relations between the three East African countries 
of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, have historically blown 
hot and cold. Mul tilaterally, these relations were 
characterised by the high point of the East African 
Community years, and the low point of the disagreements 
14 Ibid., p.17. 
15 See Chapter 4. 
following the collapse of the Community. 16 Indeed, ln 
the early years of independence, so optimistic were 
these relations that the idea of federation was for a 
while pursued actively by the three countries .17 
Bilaterally, the common purpose of East African 
multilateral diplomacy has never been achieved, and 
indeed strained bilateral relations partly caused the 
collapse of the Community. A detailed exposition of that 
diplomacy is beyond the concerns of this study. This 
section will examine the broad bilateral relations 
between the three East African countries, and will 
especially explain how that pattern of relationships was 
related to, and affected the conflict in Uganda. 
Particularly, an elucidation will be given as to how the 
choice of mediator in the 1985 mediation evolved from 
that diplomatic environment. 
An Overview of Uganda-Kenya Relations up to 1985 
Relations between Kenya and 
generally friendly, have been 
intermittent tensions. 18 The changes 
friendship have largely mirrored the 
conflict ln Uganda. The shifts 
Uganda, although 
characterised by 
from hostility to 
development of the 
ln policy in both 
countries have therefore reflected uncertainties in the 
face of changing patterns of the conflict. Uganda-Kenya 
relations have also reflected the wider politics of East 
Africa, especially the competition for leadership in the 
region between Kenya and Tanzania. In this wider 
struggle, Uganda served to balance the power in the 
region. The policies Kenya and Tanzania adopted on the 
conflict there were directed, in essence, at winning the 
16 This was the subject of a mediation on the distribution of the 
Community's assets. See Umbricht,V.H. Multi.later~~ Mediation: 
Practical Experiences and Lessons (Dordrecht: Martlnus N1Jhoff, 1988). 
17 See Rothchild,D. (Ed) Politics of Integration: An East African 
Documentary (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968). 
18 See Okoth, P. G. 'Intermittent Tensions in Uganda-Kenya 
Relations: Historical Perspectives' (Staff Seminar No.6 of 1989/90: 
Dept. of History, University of Nairobi) i see als~, Okoth,P.G. 'Th; 
Foreign Policy of Uganda Toward Kenya and Tanzania Slnce ~ndepen~enc~ 
in Oyugi, W.O. (Ed) Poli tics and Administration in East Afr~ca (Nalrobl: 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 1992) pp.359-394. 
support of the various regimes that came and went during 
the Uganda conflict. 19 
Some commentators have considered the relations 
between Uganda and Kenya to be based almost wholly on 
economics, with the Kenyan economy playing a mediating 
role between the Ugandan economy and the world 
capi talist market. 20 In this reckoning, and especially 
during the Amin regime when the Ugandan economy was in 
poor condition, imports of producer goods declined 
sharply, while imports from Kenya increased 
correspondingly, thus "rendering the Kenyan connection 
more and more important to Uganda. ,,21 Further, it 1S 
argued that since the Kenyan economy is not independent, 
Kenya only fronted for foreign, and especially British 
interests in Uganda, such that deteriorating Uganda-
Kenya relations were "often but a reflection of the 
deterioration 1n relations between UK and Uganda. ,,22 
This is partially so, but as the rest of this section 
shows, relations between Uganda and Kenya have also been 
significantly informed by extra-economic considerations. 
During the period under reV1ew, two important 
factors informed the foreign policy relations between 
Kenya and Uganda, and both had an important bearing on 
the development of the conflict in Uganda. The first 
was strategic, and the second concerned regional 
leadership. Strategically, especially since the early 
1970s during the period of uncertainty and assessment in 
19 Kenya saw the mediation as an opportunity to "draw Uganda 
closer to Kenya". This insight is owed to B. A. Kiplagat (Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya, 1983-1991) in an 
interview with the author, Nairobi, 4 June 1993. 
20 Mamdani, M. Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda (London: 
Heinemann, 1983) p.95. 
21 Ibid., p. 97. 
22 Ibid., p.99. An interesting analysis of the relations betwe~n 
Uganda and Bri tain is made by Furley, O. 'Bri tain from Amin to f\luc>o·,en.l : 
Blind Eye Diplomacy' in Rupesinghe, K. (Ed) confli~t Resoluuon 
in Ugancl,C) (London & Athens, OH.: James Currey & Ohl0 Uni versi ty Press, 
1989) pp.275-294. 
Kenyan diplomacy,23 Kenya was concerned about its 
'socialist encirclement' In the region. Fears of this 
mounted in 1969, when a coup in Somalia brought the 
military dictatorship of Siad Barre to power. Apart 
from espousing a Greater Somalia policy, 
forged a close alliance with the USSR. 
that regime 
In the same 
year, a coup in Sudan brought to power a regime that 
temporarily espoused a socialist philosophy. Later, the 
1974 coup in Ethiopia overthrew Haile Selassie who was 
an ally of Kenya, and the new regime declared Ethiopia 
to be a socialist state, thus creating serious prospects 
for Soviet dominance in the Horn of Africa. 24 In Uganda, 
Obote had expelled Kenyan workers from Uganda In 1966 
and 1969, and In his 'move to the left', had 
nationalised several companies, some of them Kenyan 
based. 25 Obote' s overthrow by Amin did not give reI ief 
for long, Slnce Amin soon began to rely heavily on the 
Soviet Union and Libya, especially for arms. Thus by 
1974, the regional equilibrium which had existed in the 
reglon, and which Kenya had hoped to maintain, had 
disintegrated. 
In terms of regional leadership, the collapse of 
that regional equilibrium challenged the leadership 
status which Kenya had exerted. It also exacerbated the 
ideological differences and the struggle for regional 
domination with Tanzania. Thus, in the narrow East 
African context, the inter-state system which was 
hitherto characterised by the policy of co-existence 
also broke down. Part of the reason for this collapse 
was the hostility between Amin and Nyerere: this 
antagonism had a wider fallout because Tanzania expected 
23 See Makinda, s. 'From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War Politics: 
Kenya's Foreign Policy' 5 Third World Quarterly (1983) pp.300-319:307-
308. 
24 Orwa,K. 'Foreign Policy, 
Modern History of Kenya, 1895-1980 
pp.219-244:234. 
1963-1986' in Ochieng,W.R. (Ed) A 
(Nairobi: Evans Brothers, 1989) 
25 Okoth, 'Intermittent Tensions in Uganda-Kenya Rela::ions: 
Historical Perspectives' op.cit., p.8. 
Kenya too to denounce the mil i tary regime ln Uganda. 
When Kenya failed to do so, and indeed continued normal 
diplomatic relations with Uganda, relations with 
Tanzania deteriorated, causing the heightening of the 
ideological war between them, the outcome of which was 
a mutual suspicion of intent. 26 Therefore, Uganda-Kenya 
relations after Amin came to power were based not only 
on economic concerns, but also on considerations of 
strategy and hegemony. Orwa observes correctly that: 
"Kenya's policy towards Uganda may have been 
influenced by a number of considerations. First, 
economic self-interest. Under Amin, Uganda's 
economy increasingly became a hostage of Kenya. 
Second, realism cautioned against interference in 
the internal affairs of other countries as long as 
the equilibrium remained undisturbed. Thus to 
Kenya, the military coup and all the accompanying 
atrocities were matters better left to the Ugandans 
themselves. Finally, ideological considerations 
may have also played a part. Obote had been more 
pro-Nyerere and he had leaned towards socialism. 
Amin ended this trend and acted as a check against 
the spread of Tanzania-type socialism in the 
region. ,,27 
Although there were several tensions between Kenya 
and Uganda during the Amin years, relations were on the 
balance, normal. 2B This contrasts sharply with Tanzanian 
policy, which supported anti-Amin groups in Tanzania, 
and later spearheaded his removal. Kenya was generally 
silent on the conflict in Uganda during this period, and 
indeed professed neutrality during the 1978-79 Uganda-
Tanzania war. 29 By 1979 when Amin was overthrown, 
26 Orwa, 'Foreign Policy, 1963-1980' op.cit., p.234. 
27 Ibid., p.235. 
28 Commercial transactions between Kenya and Uganda continued 
during the Amin years: only when the security of Ken~a and its cit~zens 
(for instance in 1976) were involved did the relatIons ~xperIe~ce 
a strain. See Orwa,D.K. 'Continuity and Change: Kenya's ~o~eIgn ~OII~y 
from Kenyatta to Moi' in Oyugi,W.O. (Ed) Politics and Adm~n~strat~on ~n 
East Africa op.cit. pp.297-330:312. 
29 But, for example, Tanzania requested Kenya to limit oil 
supplies to Uganda: Kenya's reply was that Uganda would be able t~ get 
all the oil they wanted, provided they paid for it: see, Kees~ng's 
Contemporary Archives, July 17-22, 1979 p. 29670. ?koth .argues that 
Kenyan policy was misguided, in that it supported Amin d~r~ng the wa:, 
and that in doing so, Kenya lost chance to play a POSItIve role In 
Tanzania seemed set to play an influential role In the 
conflict, and Kenya appeared to be relegated permanently 
to the backyard. Kenya's relations with Uganda in the 
post-Amin years were inspired by attempts to regain the 
lost momentum, and these efforts culminated in what 
Kenya considered to be a singular foreign policy 
triumph, its mediation of the Uganda conflict in 1985. 
After the fall of Amin, Kenya worried about 
Tanzanian influence in Uganda, and therefore assiduously 
cultivated the Ugandan leadership. Indeed, during 
Lule's presidency Kenya not only gave Uganda generous 
economlC assistance, but also agreed to extradite 
several Ugandan fugitives from Kenya. During Binaisa's 
tenure, several summits between Presidents Moi and 
Binaisa took place. In the belief that misunderstandings 
between the two countries were caused by inadequate 
diplomatic representation, High Commissions were opened 
between the two countries for the first time. 30 
Relations between Uganda and Kenya during the Military 
Commission's tenure In 1980 were however tense, 
especially because Kenya protested against the continued 
presence of Tanzanian troops in Uganda. The return of 
Obote to power In Uganda surprisingly heralded 
cooperative relations between Uganda and Kenya, with 
Presidents Moi and Obote meeting several times. At 
these meetings they agreed on economic cooperation, and 
appointed a joint inter-ministerial commlSSlon to 
streamline local movements, and facilitate prevention 
and quick investigation of customs offences. Uganda 
also pledged to improve internal security, and to stop 
the harassment of Kenyan truck convoys en route to 
Uganda's future affairs. See, Okoth, 'Intermittent Tensions in 
Uganda-Kenya Relations' op.cit., p.13. 
30 See Okoth, 'Intermittent Tensions in Uganda-Kenya Relations' 
op.cit., p.14. Hitherto, i~ had.been argued th~t the existence o~ the 
East African community, wlth lts common leglslature and cabl.net, 
rendered separate bilateral diplomatic missions unnecessary. 
Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi. 31 During Obote' s second 
reglme, Uganda's policy towards Kenya consisted of 
trying to get the Kenya government to curb Ugandan 
exiles' activities ln Kenya, and doing nothing that 
might provoke Kenya into closing the border. Kenya's 
policy was reciprocal, in that it avoided doing anything 
that might excite Uganda, and thereby ruin the emerging 
equilibrium. 32 In these circumstances therefore , 
"Surprisingly, after Obote's second overthrow, 
Kenya announced that it would playa direct role in 
political developments in Uganda by hosting the 
peace talks between the new military government and 
Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA). The 
explanation from Nairobi was that this demonstrated 
friendly neighbourliness, although the real reason 
was more self - interest. After years of fence-
straddling, the Kenyans had eventually realised the 
importance of having a direct stake in Ugandan 
affairs. ,,33 
An Overview of Uganda-Tanzania Relations up to 1985 
There are three broad phases of the relationship 
between Uganda and Tanzania between their independence 
and 1985. The first phase lasted until Amin's coup in 
1971, and was characterised by close bilateral 
relations, and increasingly, close ideological affinity. 
The second phase spanned Amin's rule, and was informed 
by extremely chilly relations, based partly on the 
personal antipathy between Nyerere and Amin. During 
this phase, Tanzania played an important role in the 
Uganda conflict, especially by giving comfort to anti-
Amin groups which had taken refuge in Tanzania, and 
eventually launching Amin's removal. This period also 
witnessed the Uganda-Tanzania war of 1978-79. The third 
31 The situation in Uganda affected adversely these Kenyan trade 
routes and trade wi th those countries fell significantly. Kenyan 
busine~ses such as Kenya Breweries and East African Ind~stries were 
also affected. Hence, Kenya viewed these developments wlth conce~n. 
This analysis is owed to Mr. Stephen Loyat~m, (form~rly Head of Afrlca 
and OAU Division, Ministry of Forelgn Affalrs, Kenya) in an 
interview with the author, 30 September 1993. 
32 Okoth, 'Intermittent Tensions in Kenya-Uganda Rela:ions' 
op.cit., p.16. 
33 Ibid., p.16. 
phase spanned the years between the Lule administration , 
and the beginning of the brief rule of the Military 
Commision after Obote was overthrown in July 1985. This 
stage witnessed the waning of the great influence that 
Tanzania had wielded in Ugandan affairs after the 
overthrow of Amin, and its apparent rej ection as the 
broker in the Ugandan conflict, in favour of Kenya. 
During the first phase, Uganda and Tanzania were 
very close, particularly as they saw themselves as the 
less advantaged compared to Kenya under the East African 
Community arrangements. Nyerere and Obote were also 
close personally and ideologically, and their domestic 
and foreign policies converged on many points, as 
witnessed by Tanzania's Arusha Declaration (1967), and 
Uganda's Common Man's Charter (1968), which were seen as 
attempts to build socialism in the two countries. 34 
After Amin took power ln 1971, Uganda-Tanzania 
relations went through their most tense period. 
Tanzania refused to recognise the Amin reglme, or to 
have normal diplomatic relations with Uganda. This also 
affected trilateral Community relations, because Nyerere 
also refused to acknowledge Amin's nominees to posts in 
the Community. Although this latter problem was solved 
through Kenyatta's mediation, relations between Uganda 
and Tanzania did not improve since Tanzania continued to 
recognise Obote as the legal head of state of Uganda. 35 
These tense relations resulted in armed action on 
three occasions during this period. In August and 
September 1971, there was a series of border clashes; 
although the Commonwealth Secretary-General offered to 
mediate, the offer was not taken up, and the clashes 
continued until October 1971. In September 1972, there 
was an armed conflict between Uganda and Tanzania, when 
Obote's supporters invaded Uganda. Although these were 
easily defeated by Ugandan forces, Uganda retaliated by 
34 Mathews,K. & Omari,A.H. 'Uganda-Tanzania Relations, 1971-1980' 
3 Journal of International Relations (1980) pp.41-68:42. 
35 Ibid., pp.44-5. 
bombing the Tanzanian town of Bukoba. Perhaps because 
Tanzania did not deny sponsoring the invasion into 
Uganda, its appeals to the OAU for condemnation of 
Uganda as the aggressor did not get much support. 
However, Tanzania's later calls for mediation were taken 
up, and Somalia acted as the mediator. 36 This mediation 
resulted in the Mogadishu Agreement of 5 October 1972. 
By that Agreement, Uganda and Tanzania undertook to 
withdraw their forces to at least six miles from their 
common border, cease all military activity against each 
other, refrain from harbouring or allowing subversive 
forces to operate in the territory of either state, and 
to return all nationals and property captured from each 
other. 37 The high point of these strained relations was 
the Uganda-Tanzania war of 1978-79, through which Amin 
was removed from power with the aid of Tanzanian forces. 
This marked the beginning of the third phase in Uganda-
Tanzania relations. 
The role of Tanzania and its forces after the 
liberation of Uganda was examined in Chapter Five. What 
needs to be considered here is the effect of that role 
on Uganda-Tanzania relations, and especially how 
Tanzania attempted to use its pre-eminent place in that 
relationship to secure a role for itself as the broker 
ln the Uganda conflict. On assumlng power Lule 
confirmed that Tanzanian soldiers were ln Uganda 
pursuant to a formal invitation by the soverelgn 
government of Uganda. 38 The Ugandan government also 
reiterated that the TPDF (Tanzanian Peoples Defence 
Forces) and the UNLA (Ugandan National Liberation Army) 
were allies in a common cause. However, it soon became 
clear that in the new pattern of Uganda-Tanzania 
relations, Tanzania considered itself to be very much 
the senior partner. Thus, although the new relationship 
36 See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol.18 (1972) pp.25543-45. 
37 Ibid., p.25545. 
38 See Chapter 5. 
was based on 'cooperation and collaboration', this was 
to be on vastly different terms than was the case 
earlier. 
After the liberation of Uganda, Tanzania was intent 
on playing a central role in Ugandan affairs. As a 
result, the TPDF became an important feature of Ugandan 
political life. 39 In maintaining its troops in Uganda 
for what some states like Kenya considered to be an 
unconscionably long time, Tanzania was not just 
continuing its role of the good Samaritan, but was 
pursuing wider policy interests of its own. The long 
sojourn of the TPDF in Uganda was calculated to ensure 
certain things. These were that Amin did not stage a 
comeback in Uganda, to assist in Obote's return to 
power, and ascertain that the leader and party that took 
power in Uganda after elections was friendly to 
Tanzania. As there was also great fear that the 
Democratic Party (DP) which was viewed as pro-Kenya 
would come into power, Tanzania wished to stay longer in 
Uganda in order to determine the course of events there. 
More importantly, Tanzania had suffered great economic 
hardship as a resul t of heavy expendi ture in the war 
with Uganda. It therefore wanted the large number of 
troops which it could no longer maintain to remaln in 
Uganda, thus lessening its financial burden on the 
treasury.40 Indeed, the question of war debts was part 
of the later reasons for the souring of personal 
relations between Nyerere and Obote. 41 
39 Nevertheless Tanzania did not want to be seen internationally 
as an occupation force. Interview with a senior Tanzanian Foreign 
Ministry official, Paris, 23 December, 1993. 
40 Bwengye, F .A. W. The Agony of Uganda: From Idi Amin to abote 
(London: Regency Press, 1986) p.166. 
41 Interview with Mr. Ralph Ocan, Kampala, 27 May,1993. Ocan was 
at the time Obote's Chief of Protocol at State House, Entebbe. But 
also, the perception that Obote was" singularly inadequate fO.r the task 
of providing political leadership in Uganda" was prevalent 1n Western 
donor circles and by Nyerere, who by 1985 had lost confidence in Obote. 
See, Sathyamurthy,T.V. 'Uganda's Political System: 1962-.1990: The 
Balance Between External and Internal Influences' 1n Oyug1,W.O.{Ed) 
Politics and Administration in East Africa op.cit., pp. 503-536: 520-521. 
Thus, the high point of Tanzania's involvement and 
influence in the conflict in Uganda was in the immediate 
post-liberation period. This influence was especially 
pervaslve during the Lule and Binaisa regimes. As Lule 
disclosed after his ouster, it included trying to 
determine the composition of the Ugandan cabinet. After 
Binaisa came to power, his attempt to dismiss Oyite-Ojok 
as Chief of Staff of the UNLA ran counter to the wishes 
of Obote, who wanted to come back to power wi th the 
support of the army. It was also counter to the wishes 
of Nyerere who, together with Obote had arranged to have 
Oyite-Oj ok made Chief of Staff, ln order to control 
Ugandan pOlitics with the gun if the need arose. 42 
But at the same time, Kenya was trying to place 
itself ln a position of influence ln Uganda, and to 
dislodge Tanzania from its pre-eminent position. The 
gradual sourlng of relations between Obote and Nyerere, 
and the policy of cooperation between Obote' s second 
regime and Kenya, ensured that although relations after 
the 1985 coup were at first chilly, Kenya was ln a 
position to play an increasingly influential role in the 
Uganda conflict. In this way, Kenya hoped to dislodge 
the edifice of influence that Tanzania had so carefully 
constructed ln Uganda over the years. 





was due to 
Relations up to 1985 
and Tanzania were never 
fundamental ideological 
differences between them and their conviction that each 
was best suited to exercise leadership in the region.~3 
Both Kenya and Tanzania tried at various times to 
solicit the support of Uganda. Their differing policies 
during the various phases of the conflict in Uganda 
illustrates this struggle for hegemony. 
42 Bwengye,F.A.W. The Agony of Uganda: From .:c...Tllin to Obote op.cit., 
p.48. 
43 This factor is emphasised by Dr.Philip Mwanzia (Kenyan 
ambassador to Sudan, and formerly Head of the E~onomic an~ ~l.c.'d.· 
Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya), 1n a commun1cat1on 
with the author dated 10 October 1994. 
Ideologically, Kenya and Tanzania chose widely 
differing paths to national development, with Tanzania 
embracing socialist policies, and Kenya more capitalist 
oriented ones. This espousal of different ideologies 
made Kenya wary of the commitment to socialism which 
Tanzania moved to implement in the 1970s. Tanzania in 
turn was suspicious of Kenya's capitalism and its 
increasing integration into the international capitalist 
economy. 44 Tanzania also articulated the view in the 
early 1960s when talk of federation was rife, that Kenya 
had developed at the expense of the other East African 
regions during the colonial period. Tanzania therefore 
saw one of the benefits of federation as being to 
rectify this uneven pattern of development of the East 
African countries. 45 Kenya, on its part, was always 
concerned with directing its foreign policy towards 
maintaining the highly favourable level of inter-
regional trade and the regional infrastructure inherited 
at independence. 46 By 1968, Tanzania had found an 
ideological ally in Obote, who shortly before his first 
overthrow propounded his 'move to the left', as 
articulated in the Common Man's Charter. 
This move towards socialism by Uganda increased 
Kenya's fears that it was being encircled by a 
'socialist circuit'. Thus, the overthrow of Obote by 
Amin, who professed an aversion to socialism, was 
greated with relief 1n Kenya, and negatively by 
Tanzania, who saw it as a weakening of its position in 
the ideological map of East Africa. Consequently, while 
44 Johns,D. 'Tanzania' in Shaw,T.M. & Aluko,O. (Eds) The Political 
Economy of African Foreign Policy: Comparative Analysis (Aldershot: 
Gower Publishing Co., 1984) pp.263-282:269. 
45 See Rothchild, D. Politics of Integration op.cit., p.78; later, 
Tanzania increasingly came to question the raison d'etre of ~nt~a-East 
African Community trade, which she saw as basically benef1tt1ng the 
foreign investors operating in Kenya, at the expense of Ugan~a a~d 
Tanzania. See, Adar,K.G. & Ngunyi,M. 'The Politics of Inte~r~t10n 1n 
East Africa Since Independence' in Oyugi,W.O. (Ed) Pol~t~cs and 
Administration in East Africa op.cit., pp.395-425:411. 
46 Howell, J. 'An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy' 6 Journal of 
Modern African Studies (1968) pp.29-48:42. 
Tanzania supported anti-Amin forces, Kenya continued to 
have normal relations with the Amin regime. 47 Indeed, 
while Tanzania repeatedly condemned the Amin regime in 
African diplomatic fora, Kenya insisted that the 
conflict in Uganda was an internal affair, thus echoing 
official OAU pOlicy. 
In terms of regional leadership, Tanzania had for 
long cultivated an image of the champion of liberation 
in Africa,48 and indeed the OAU Liberation Committee was 
headquartered in Tanzania. Tanzania and Uganda were also 
members of the OAU Liberation Committee, which monitored 
the problems and progress of liberation in southern 
Africa,49 and the Mulungushi Club. 50 With regard to the 
Uganda conflict, Tanzania's policy was that Uganda under 
Amin was In a position similar to areas still under 
colonial rule, like Angola and Mozambique; hence during 
this period, Uganda became part of Tanzania's liberation 
agenda. 51 This view was articulated to the outside 
world, especially in the OAU, where Nyerere often noted 
the contradiction between the OAU's condemnation of 
human rights abuses in places like South Africa, but 
remained silent about similar (or worse) abuses In 
member states like Uganda. For example In a memorandum 
circulated at the OAU Assembly in 1975, he warned that 
the OAU 
"will deserve the condemnation of 
the people of Africa as an 
hypocrites, if it acquiesces, 
the world and of 
organisation of 
or appears to 
47 There were occassional hiccups, such as In 1976 when Amin 
claimed much of western Kenya as Ugandan terri tory: however, he quickly 
retracted that claim. 
48 This is discussed at length by Kiondo,A.S. 'Tanzania's Foreign 
Policy: The Socio-Economic Context' in Oyugi,W.O. (Ed) Politics and 
Administration in East Africa op.cit., pp.331-358. 
49 Mathews & Omari, 'Uganda-Tanzania Relations, 1971-1980' 
op.cit., p.42. 
50 Under the Mulungushi Club Agreement between Tanzania, Uganda 
and Zambia, the three countries were to cooperate closely, especially 
at the ruling party level. 
51 Mathews & Omari, 'Uganda-Tanzania Relations, 1971-1980' 
op.cit., p.44. 
acquiesce, in the murders and massacres which have 
been perpetrated [in Uganda] . ,,52 
After Amin was ousted, Tanzania was placed In a position 
where it could influence developments in Uganda, and 
indeed tried to do so. 
However, Kenya realised that having until then 
played a passive role in the Uganda conflict it had lost 
some influence in Uganda. Therefore Kenya attempted to 
cultivate closer relations with post-Amin regimes in an 
effort to dislodge Tanzania from its influential 
position in Uganda. In this spirit, Kenya protested the 
continued presence of Tanzanian troops in Uganda after 
the overthrow of Binaisa in 1980, and President Moi 
declined to attend an East African summit in protest 
against the continued presence of Tanzanian troops in 
Uganda. 53 
Because the personal closeness and ideological 
affinity between Obote and Nyerere would have ensured a 
friendly regime in Uganda, once Obote was installed back 
in office Tanzania seemed to have considered its task in 
Uganda to be completed. 54 Therefore, not only was Kenya 
able to cultivate close relations with Obote, but could 
thus place itself centrally by offering to mediate the 








involvement In the 
southern African conflicts of Namibia, Angola and 
Mozambique, this balance had tilted in Tanzania's favour 
in the years preceding 1985. 55 Ironically Kenya was 
aided in this policy by Tanzania: Nyerere's antipathy to 
52 Text quoted in New African, September 1979, p .11. 
53 Okoth, 'Intermittent Tensions in Uganda-Kenya Relations' 
op . cit., p. 15 . 
54 That Tanzania also withdrew its troops from Uganda in the first 
part of 1981 lends further authority for this proposition. See The 
Weekly Review (Nairobi) 28 August 1981, p.4. 
55 Interview with B.A.Kiplagat, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Kenya, 1983-1991: Nairobi, 4 June,1993. 
military regimes did not predispose him to play a 
mediating role in that phase of the Uganda conflict, 
despite Tito Okello's efforts to persuade Tanzania to do 
so. Indeed, as will be contended later, Tanzania's 
military support for the NRA during the mediation partly 
explained its eventual outcome. The closure of the 
Kenya-Tanzania border also meant that an alternative 
route for Kenya's central African trade was closed. As 
this affected Kenya's businesses, it regarded mediating 
in the Uganda conflict as a way of alleviating these 
hardships. 56 
Diplomacy and Conflict in Uganda 
The two rna] or diplomatic highlights during the 
Uganda conflict were the Moshi Conference of 1979, and 
the mediation by Kenya in 1985. Both should be seen as 
part of the wider struggle between Tanzania and Kenya to 
play an influential role in the conflict. In Moshi, the 
motivating role was Tanzanian, while Kenya played a 
central role in the mediation. The Moshi Conference was 
considered in some detail in Chapter Five. This section 
will examine the wider diplomatic implications of the 
Conference especially in terms of Tanzania's involvement 
in the Uganda conflict. It will also comment on the 
background to Kenya's involvement ln the conflict, 
through its mediation in 1985. 
The Diplomacy of the Moshi Conference 
In Tanzania's view, the non-condemnation by the OAU 
of the atrocities endemic during Idi Amin's tenure, 57 
and its later refusal to condemn Uganda's invasion of 
the Kagera Salient, denied the OAU any moral right to 
condemn any actions that Tanzania took in self defence 
against Uganda. 5B On the other hand, having decided to 
punish Amin's invasion of the Kagera Salient by deposing 
him Tanzania did not wish to take sole responsibility , 
56 Loyatum, op. cit. 
57 See Nyerere's statement in New African September 1979, p.1l. 
58 This is discussed in Chapter 4. 
for that action. Instead it wanted to be seen as 
supporting Ugandan Liberation Forces in their bid to 
remove Amin, rather than spearheading such an action.59 
It was against this background that at the height of the 
Uganda-Tanzania war, Tanzania prevailed upon anti-Amin 
groups ln Tanzania and elsewhere, to convene a 
conference at Moshi, to unite ln drawing up the 
modalities of removing Amin, and to work out and agree 
on the governance of post-Amin Uganda. 
The time was rlpe for such action. By 1978, 
although some trade continued with the west, the Amin 
regime was under heavy criticism for its human rights 
abuses. 6o In July 1978, the United States Senate voted 
to end all trade with Uganda, and that embargo became 
law in October 1978. Its effect was to present Amin 
with a serious dilemma because 
"A super-power had signalled to its allies that it 
was ready to sponsor a suitable replacement to 
Amin's regime, while, internally, the unity of the 
regime was crumbling fast; coup attempts were now 
combined with open, large scale mutinies ln the 
ranks. ,,61 
Amin's invasion of the Kagera Salient was designed to 
alleviate his internal problems by occupylng the 
mutinous troops with the invasion. 62 But there was no 
guarantee that this would alleviate the problems of his 
regime, which were by then very acute. 
Al though it had summoned the Moshi Conference, 
Tanzania had to tread a careful diplomatic line. On the 
one hand, it did not want to be seen to be dictating 
future developments in Ugandan affairs. On the other, 
59 Information supplied to the author by a senior Tanzanian 
Foreign Ministry official, op.cit. 
60 See Furley, 'Britain from Amin to Museveni: Blind Eye 
Diplomacy' op.cit., who however notes that trade between Uganda and 
Britain continued, especially the notorious 'whisky run' . 
61 Mamdani, M. Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda op.ci'::., p.106. 
62 This illustrates the policy of fomenting boundary conflict as 
a 'safety valve' for general domestic turmoil: this is discussed in 
,'ILipter 3. 
Tanzania was keen to ensure that the regime that took 
over power from Amin was sympathetic to Tanzanian 
interests. On this latter view, it has been argued that 
Tanzania's interest (and policy) was to ensure that 
Obote 
Thus, 
returned to power 
the centrepiece of 
. 
In post-liberation Uganda. 63 
the diplomatic edifice that 
Tanzania tried to fashion at Moshi was to create the 
impression that its action against Amin was purely part 
of the war between the two countries, aimed at 
reaffirming the sanctity of Tanzanian borders and its 
sovereignty. Nevertheless it argued that the action to 
remove Amin from power was primarily an action of 
Ugandans themselves, in which Tanzania lent some help.64 
This stage of the Ugandan conflict was significant 
because it marked an important turning point: for the 
first time, diverse Ugandan groups carne together 
determined to play a central role In ending the 
conflict. It was also important because for the first 
time Tanzania used both diplomatic and military means to 
ensure the downfall of the Amin reglme which it 
abhorred. However, the haste with which very diverse 
groups were called upon to reconcile their differences 
ensured that the unified spirit of Moshi collapsed as 
soon as the liberators arrived In Kampala, and were 
faced with the problem of governing Uganda. 65 The 
collapse of the 'Moshi Spirit' also signalled cracks in 
the diplomatic arm of Tanzanian involvement In the 
Uganda conflict. It will be contended later that had the 
Moshi Conference been mediated, its results would have 
proved to be an important turning point in the Uganda 
63 In an interview with the Kenya Times, Museveni was categoric 
that Tanzania backed Obote' s return to power. He said of Obote: 
" ... definately the Tanzanian army in Uganda backe~ him ... I don't ~no: 
whether some commanders were bribed but the Tanzanlan army backed hlm. 
See an interview with Museveni, The Kenya Times, 3 November 1985, p.4. 
64 See the speech by the Tanzanian Foreign Minister a~ the opening 
of the Conference, where he reaffirmed this view: NewAtr~can, No.141, 
May 1~79, pp.14-15. 
65 Mutibwa, P. Uganda .since Independence: A Story ot Untultillei 
Hopes (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1992) pp.125-126i See also Chapter 
5. 
conflict, and indeed might have created conditions that 
could have obviated the 1985 mediation. 
Background to Kenya's Mediation 
There 
mediation 
were several factors that prompted Kenyan 
ln the Uganda conflict, and they were 
connected to three broad considerations on the part of 
the Kenyan establishment. Firstly, as was argued above, 
Kenya was losing the competition for regional leadership 
with Tanzania, and wanted to restore the lost balance. 
Secondly, the Kenyan foreign policy establishment felt 
a need to realign Kenya's image internationally. 66 
Thirdly, President Moi was keen to consolidate the image 
of peacemaker, which in his view was established during 
his two term tenure as Chairman of the Organisation of 
African Unity. The first two of these considerations 
will be examined in this section: the third will be the 
subject of the following section. 
In the years preceding 1985, the rivalry between 
Kenya and Tanzania for pre-eminence in the region had 
tilted sharply in Tanzania's favour. This higher 
Tanzanian profile was especially buttressed by Tanzanian 
invol vement ln the conflicts ln southern Africa: ln 
South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, and indeed, 
ln Uganda itself. In undertaking to mediate ln the 
Ugandan conflict, Kenya's intention was to redress that 
imbalance,67 and if possible, to undercut Tanzania's 
growing international image. 
was being sidelined ln the 
Kenya also felt that it 
reglon, and the Kenyan 
establishment saw the increasingly close ties between 
Tanzania and Uganda as evidence of this. Kenya saw as 
further evidence of this the close personal ties between 
Nyerere and Obote, and the fact that Museveni, who had 
66 See Chapter 2 for the literature on roles and motives for 
mediation, especially Mitchell,C.R. 'The Motives for Me~iation' in 
Mitchell,C.R. & Webb,K. (Eds) New Approaches to Internat~onal 
Meciiation (Westport,CT.: Greenwood Press, 1988) pp.2:-5~; a~i 
Bercovitch,J. 'The Structure and Diversity of Medlatlon ,ln 
International Relations' in Bercovitch,J. & Rubin,J.Z. (Eds) Med~3t~on 
in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management 
(London: Macmillan, 1992) Fr· 1 - 29 . 
6 7 Kip 1 a ~1 at, ,-' r ' cit . 
been educated in Tanzania, was ideologically close to 
Tanzania's brand of socialism. Consequently, Kenya 
judged that mediating in the Ugandan conflict would help 
to draw Uganda away from Tanzania, and correspondingly 
closer to Kenya. 68 
The Kenya government had other interests In 
undertaking the mediation. These were related to the 
internal stability of the Moi regime. Kenya had earlier 
experienced an attempted coup in 1982, and Moi's 
position, although consolidated in the 1983 elections, 
was still not very secure. 69 In Moi's perception prior 
to the mediation, Museveni was a person who had waged a 
war against an 'established' government. 70 In 
undertaking the mediation, Moi hoped to understand 
Museveni's intentions, and thereby learn how best 




In undertaking to mediate in the Uganda conflict, 
Kenya also had an international audience in mind. For 
some time, Kenya's stand on sensitive international 
issues, such as on South African had been at best 
inconsistent. While supporting freedom fighters . In 
South Africa verbally, they were not for a long time 
allowed to open offices In Kenya. Also, while 
supporting international sanctions against South Africa, 
Kenya nevertheless permitted planes destined for South 
Africa to refuel in Nairobi and Mombasa, contrary to OAU 
68 Ibid. 
69 This is suggested by his appointment of a judicial commission 
of inquiry by Legal Notice No.2749 of 29 July 1983 (Kenya Gaz~t~e 29 
July 1983), to inquire into the (political) conduct of former mlnlster 
Charles Njonjo. Among the allegations in that inquiry was that he had 
planned to overthrow President Moi. See various issues of The Weekly 
Review, for example of March 16 and March 30, 1983. 
70 In his view, coups and the guerilla wars which follow them "rob 
the OAU of the continuity of experienced and senior advice and the 
service of devoted governments and statesmen." See Moi, D. T . Kenya 
African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles (London: 
Macmillan, 1986) p.159. 
71 This interesting analysis was articulated by Dr. A. Mukwaya, 
Dept. of Political Science, Makerere University, in an interview with 
the author, Kampala, 24 May,1993. 
resolutions. 72 Kenya was therefore viewed as being 
reactionary by those in the international community who 
supported a more ' progressive' Vlew on such issues. 73 
There was thus an awareness ln the Kenyan diplomatic 
establishment that Kenya's international lmage was 
sufficiently dented to warrant corrective measures. 
Kenya was keen to correct that image, and to enhance its 
credibility internationally (and regionally) by playing 
the role of regional peacemaker. Mediating ln the 
Uganda conflict was seen as an opportune moment to begin 
that process. 74 
The philosophical rationale for this policy was the 
argument that there was a need to make the statement 
internationally that Africans were capable of managing 
their own conflicts: that, not only had Africa come of 
age, but that Africans understood the conflicts in the 
continent better, and were thus best placed to manage 
them.7s This latter rationalisation was aimed primarily 
at the OAU, where Kenya's image had suffered especially 
on the South African question. In restating OAU policy 
against foreign intervention and 'African management of 
African problems' ,76 Kenya had an eye on its detractors 
ln the OAU, who were becoming increasingly vocal. 
Kenya's decision to mediate in Uganda was, in essence, 
an exercise in diplomatic 'damage control' . 
There were other reasons which, although not stated 
explicitly, informed (and perhaps encouraged), Kenya's 
72 Khapoya,V.B. 'Kenya' in Shaw,T.M. & Aluko,O. (Eds) The Political 
Economy of African Foreign Policy op.cit., pp.145-164:153. 
73 Kenya wanted to correct the image it had acquired over 
South African issue, of being "too rightist": this view 
communicated to the author by Kiplagat, op.cit. 
74 Kiplagat, op.cit. 
the 
was 
75 See Chapter 4 on the OAU's policy of African solutions for 
African problems; see also Chapter 8, where the role of an exogenous 
mediator in internal conflict is considered. 
76 This was official OAU policy then, as it is now: see statem~nt 
by OAU Secretary General on this issue, that 'Africa must assume lts 
responsibility of playing a central role in resolving its own 
conflicts. 'The KeIJ}'a Times, 8 August, 1993, p. 8. 
decision to mediate in the conflict. The first of these 
was economic: trade between Uganda and Kenya had always 
been in Kenya's favour.77 Kenya therefore preferred to 
have a regime in Uganda which would maintain this strong 
balance of trade ln favour of Kenya. 7B Undertaking 
mediation of the conflict . ln Uganda was intended to 
ensure this eventuality. In this view, because Kenya's 
economic and commercial activities are central to her 
relations with the other East African states, and since 
this regional commerce is a maJor variable in Kenya's 
economlC development, 79 Kenya has pursued a 
'conservative' and 'legitimist' foreign policy with 
regard to her relations wi th the other East African 
states. BO The furtherance of Kenya's economic interests 
therefore relies on stability in the region. Hence, 
Kenya's mediation of the Uganda conflict was a foreign 
policy response to the need to ensure (and contribute) 
to such stability. 
This concern with regional stability did not 
concern Uganda alone. During the reconstruction of 




hostilities . ln 
f or Kenyans. 
Sudan ln 1983 
But the 
adversely 
affected Kenya's economy since it could no longer reap 
the economic benefits it had enjoyed hitherto. Hence 
Kenya's mediatory efforts ln Uganda were a way by which 
it tried to ameliorate these adverse economic effects. B! 
77 See figures in Mamdani, M. Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda 
op.cit., p.97 & 98; also, Orwa, 'Foreign Policy, 1963-1986' op.cit., 
p.231 & 240. 
78 This is an argument beloved in Ugandan officialdom, for example 
Prof. Tarsis Kabwegyere, Director of External Affairs, NRM Secretariat, 
Kampala, in an interview with the author, Kampala, 25 May, 1993. 
79 Orwa,K. 'Diplomacy and International Relations' in 
Ochieng,W.R. (Ed) Themes in Kenyan History Nairobi: Heinemann, 1990) 
pp.218-229:225. 
80 Howell, 'An Analysis of Kenyan Foreign Policy' op.cit., p.37. 
81 This view was conveyed to the author in a discussion wi th a 
senior Kenyan Foreign Office official, 30 September 1993. Altho~gh the 
ClIl-rent Sudanese mediation is being conducted ~::,der ~he ausplces of 
The other reason that encouraged, and supported 
Kenya's mediation had to do with the interests of 
western business concerns. These had an interest in the 
region, and indeed, 
money by Uganda. 82 
some were still owed vast sums of 
As these western business concerns 
did not want their interests further compromised, they 
supported Kenyan mediation efforts in Uganda. 83 In this 
perspective, Kenyan mediation in the Uganda conflict was 
inter alia an act in the service of these various 
business interests. 
The Choice of Mediator 
In pushing for mediation in the Ugandan conflict, 
there was another compelling need on Kenya's part. This 
was President Moi's wish to promote and consolidate his 
image as a regional peacemaker. 84 During his tenure as 
Chairman of the OAU, he had had a high profile in the 
OAU's efforts to manage some of Africa's more 
intractable conflicts85 such as the Chad conflict and 
IGADD, the sessions have taken place in Kenya. Kenya's interests are 
the same as they were in 1985. In both mediations, the search is for 
broad regional stability, which is in Kenya's interests. Kenya's role 
in the Sudan mediation gives credence to Amoo and Zartman's view that 
in mediations conducted under regional organisations, the role of 
individual states is paramount, and the organisation merely provides 
"a locus and a flag" for such activities. See Amoo & Zartman, 
'Mediation by Regional Organisations: The Organisation for African 
Unity (OAU) in Chad' in Bercovitch,J. & Rubin,J.Z. (Eds) Mediation in 
International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management 
(London: Macmillan, 1992) pp.131-148:131. 
82 See Mamdani, M. Imperialism and Fascism in Uganda op.cit., 
p.98. 
83 Kabwegyere, op.cit. He argues that people like Tiny Rowland 
were influential behind the scene players in the mediation. 
84 See Chapter 2 on undertaking mediation as a way to achieve a 
certain image, especially, Carnevale,P.J. 'Mediat~on of I~ternation~l 
Conflict' in Oskamp, S. (Ed) International Confl~ct Nat~onal Publ~c 
Policy Issues (Beverley Hills: Sage Publicatio?s, 1985) pp:87~105i 
also, Rothchild,D. & Hertzell,C. 'Great and Medlum Power Medlat~ons: 
Angola' in Zartman, I. W. (Ed) Resolving Regional Conflicts: Internat~onal 
Perspectives (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1991) pp.39-57. 
85 See Chazan,N., Mortimer,R., 
Poli tics and Society in Contemporary 
Rienner, 1992-2nd ed.) p.356. 
Ravenhill,J. & Rothchild,D. 
Africa (Boulder I CO.: Lynne 
Western Sahara. 86 He fel t a void in this high profile 
once he relinquished the Chairmanship of the OAU. In 
order to fill the void left after he vacated the 
chairmanship of the OAU, he felt that the time was rlpe 
to try and assert his personality - and his imprint - on 
the international relations of the region. The Uganda 
conflict provided him with an apt opportunity to pursue 
this goal. 87 
However, the Vlew of Moi as regional peacemaker was 
not subscribed to by all the Ugandan parties. Some 
Ugandan officialdom felt that Uganda was being used as 
a pawn in Moi's need to construct a Pax Nairobiana which 
in his V1Slon would consolidate his role in history. 88 
Although there was the impression amongst others that he 
was genuine in his perception of himself and his role as 
an honest broker for peace, contending influences around 
him eventually destroyed that lmage, and in so doing 
influenced negatively the mediation itself.89 There were 
broadly two such contending influences, both part of the 
bureaucratic politics of Kenya. One was a group of 
officials close to Moi, who took the Vlew that the 
Ugandans should be left alone to their own devices if 
they were unwilling to negotiate an agreement to end 
their conflict: this group was not interested ln the 
Uganda conflict as a regional or diplomatic problem, and 
had no interest beyond the immediate environment of 
Kenyan power politics. The second was a group of 
officials who had business interests in both countries, 
and who saw a negotiated settlement of the Uganda 
conflict as the only way to maintain that business edge. 
86 For example, the Nairobi sesssion of the Implementat ion 
Committee set up by the OAU Assembly in June 1981 by ~esoluti~n 
AHG/Res.103 (XVIII), which President Moi chaired, was acclalmed as ,a 
tremendous achievement of the OAU" by Tanzanian Foreign Minister Sallm 
Salim. See The Weekly Review, 28 August 1981, p.13. 
87 Kiplagat, op.cit. 
88 Ocan, op.cit. 
89 See Chapter 8 on the influence of Kenyan bureaucratic p21itics 
on the conduct of the mediation. 
The bureaucratic wrangling between these groups90 served 
to send conflicting signals to the Ugandan parties, 91 
and inevitably this dented the image that Moi was 
endeavouring to create. 
There also arose the feeling amongst some Ugandan 
parties that Moi's interest was purely the personal one 
of promoting his image, and that therefore, he could not 
see or appreciate the pitfalls, complexity, and 
diversity of the conflict. This was a view held dear by 
some quarters in the NRM, who thus saw Moi's approach to 
the mediation as being simplistic, and one which in 
their view, suited General Okello, whose modest 
educational and professional background made him prone 
to being simplistic. Thus Moi's personal interest in the 
mediation appeared to be more than his interest in any 
solutions to the conflict, 92 and hence rendered him at 
best, an unsuitable mediator. 
Tanzania, Nyerere and the Mediation 
Despite these misgivings on the part of some 
Ugandan parties, the choice of Moi as mediator 
eventually evolved from the situation. It was 
especially given a boost by Nyerere' s reluctance to 
mediate in the conflict, and his non-acceptability to 
some of the Ugandan parties. There are several reasons 
why Tanzania, and Nyerere personally, were not pre-
disposed to involve themselves in the mediation, and 
this section will examine each of them in turn. 
90 There were however sub-groups within these two: see Chapter 8 
for a detailed analysis. 
91 An articulate analysis of how Kenyan bureaucratic politics 
influenced the perception of the Ugandan partie~ was made by Ralph.O<?an 
in an interview with the author. The observatlons on Kenyan polltlcs 
coincides with the author's own. For example, the defection of the 
Ugandan ambassador in Kenya during the mediation brought to light many 
irregular financial dealings that could not have been underta~en 
without collaboration from influential quarters in Kenya. See Da~ly 
Nation, 10 November 1985, p.1, 28. 
92 This is the analysis of Kabwegyere, op. ci t . As The Weekly 
Topic editorialised later, the "assumption is that the peace t~a~ Moi 
can offer has become as much Moi's affair as that of the Mllltary 
Council and the NRM/NRA." See The Weekly Topic (Kampala) 2 December, 
1985, p.3. 
Firstly, the internal situation in Tanzania and its 
commitments elsewhere on the continent made the choice 
of Tanzania as mediator diffl'cult. D ' omestlcally, 
Tanzania was In a stage of transition, and was 
preoccupied wi th the change of guard from Nyerere to 
Mwinyi. Since Nyerere was busy winding up his long 
tenure in office and installing his succcesor, the time 
was inopportune for him to involve himself wi th the 
mediation. Internationally, Tanzania was getting 
exhausted from its involvement , In the conflicts In 
southern Africa. As Tanzania was thus heavily involved 
both economically and militarily In places such as 
Namibia and Mozambique (and Uganda where it had soldiers 
stationed), it was not ready to take on other diplomatic 
commitments like the Uganda mediation. 93 
Secondly, al though some of the parties In the 
conflict, such as Tito Okello (who had spent his years 
of exile in Tanzania, and knew it and the people well) , 
would have preferred to have Nyerere undertake the 
mediation, certain factors militated against this. 
Tanzania had become increasingly deeply involved In 
Ugandan affairs after the liberation. It was therefore 
felt by some of the parties that Tanzania would neither 
be the best venue, nor Nyerere the most suitable 
mediator In the conflict. Further, Nyerere was a 
supporter of Obote, and was greatly antipathetic to 
soldiers in politics. Therefore the view emerged that 
for these reasons, Nyerere considered it bad policy, and 
detrimental to his image to involve himself wi th the 
Okellos. 94 In this analysis, Nyerere preferred to keep 
93 Kiplagat, op.cit. 
94 Tito Okello who was Chairman of the Military Council and Head 
of State, and General Basilio Okello who was Chief of the De:ence 
Forces, and who had carried out the coup against Obc~e. 
his distance, 95 
mediation. 96 
and probably 
The Politics of the Venue 
encouraged Kenya's 
The search for a mediator In the Uganda conflict 
was coterminous with the search for a venue for the 
mediation. As all three parties (the Okello government, 
the NRM and the mediator) had in mind different venues, 
there was intense political lobbying before the choice 
of Nairobi was eventually reached. 
Tito Okello had indicated an earlier willingness to 
meet the NRA In any neighbouring country, and had 
mentioned Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan and Zaire as possible 
venues. 97 However both he and the Military Council 
would have preferred the mediation to take place In 
Tanzania, because having lived there during his exile, 
he knew Tanzania and its people well, and would have 
been comfortable, and probably enj oyed some support 
there. But for reasons mentioned earlier, Tanzania was 
not very keen to host the negotiations, and therefore 
this venue did not materialise. Indeed, the proposed 
talks between the military government and the NRM which 
Okello had scheduled to take place in Dar-es-Salaam, 
aborted because the NRM did not show up. 99 The NRM 
claimed that their non-attendance at those abortive 
talks was because they had not been consulted on the 
venue, which was not one of their preferred choices, and 
that in any event,their flight was denied landing rights 
95 Kabwegyere, op.cit. Indeed, Tanzania's official position as 
stated by its Foreign Minister, was that Tanzania's position on Uganda 
was "neutral, observant, and cautious": see, The Weekly Review 
(Nairobi), August 23, 1985, p.13. 
96 For example, the Tanzanian High Commission in Kampala wor~ed 
closely with its Kenyan counterpart on the mediation. This.inform~t7on 
was supplied to the author by a senior Kenyan foreign offlce offlclal 
in a communication with the author dated 18 November 1994. 
97 See The Kenya Times, August 2, 1985 p.l. 
98 The Weekly Revieh' (Nairobi) August 16, 1985, p.15; see Chap'er 
7 for details. 
in Dar-es-Salaam by the Tanzanian aviation 
authorities. 99 
The NRM had, on the other hand, made their choice 
of venue clear earlier on. 
NRM had stated that: 
In a press statement, the 
"We are ready to attend the talks at any of the 
following venues: Arusha, Bungoma, Tororo or any 
other neutral venue provided satisfactory security 
arrangements are made for all parties. Tororo 
would be the ideal venue as it 1S within 
Uganda. ,,100 
But although it so stated its preferred venue for the 
mediation, the NRM's position on this 1ssue was not 
dogmatic, and was probably intended to move the Okello 
government away from the choice of Dar-es-Salaam, which 
the NRM, fearing Nyerere's influence, was not keen on. 
Indeed, as is argued below, the NRM was only reluctantly 
persuaded to accept Nairobi as a venue. They accepted 
Nairobi eventually for tactical reasons: Slnce most of 
the NRM' s supporters were res ident there, it was an 
acceptable venue to them for the mediation. 101 
On the other hand, as part of Kenya's efforts to 
construct a Pax Nairobiana, it was keen that the 
mediation should take place in Nairobi, and lobbied 
heavily for it.102 Ironically, although Kenya was keen 
to play the role of peacemaker, it almost lost the 
initiative to Tanzania by being officially non-commital 
about the new government 1n Uganda after Obote was 
overthrown. Indeed, it was not until Okello had visited 
Tanzania twice officially that he held his first talks 
with President Moi.103 Because of this silence, and 
99 NRM Press Statement, 14 August, 1985. 
100 NRM Press Statement, 9 August, 1985. 
101 Information from an interview with Ambassador Joseph 
Tomusange, Ugandan Ambassador to Kenya, Nairobi, 7 May, 1993. 
102 According to a senior Kenyan official, ir: a commun.ic.at.ion with 
the author dated 18 November 1994, the mediatl0n was lnltlated by 
President Moi. 
103 See The Weekl}'Review (Nairobi) August 23,1985 p.l?. 
since it was almost a month after the coup before Okello 
paid Kenya an official visit, Kenya saw its opportunity 
to playa central role in a Ugandan peace slipping away, 
and was thus galvanised into action. 
The Diplomacy of the 1985 Mediation 
The pre-mediation stages of the 1985 mediation also 
evolved their own narrower diplomatic concerns. 104 These 
partly reflected the interests of the other actors 
involved, and suggested the broad strategies that each 
party intended to adopt at the mediation itself. They 
also to some extent reflected the differing philosophies 
of the NRM and the Okello government. A strategic map 
of the actors in the Uganda mediation will be drawn 1n 
the following section. This will be a useful prelude to 
an examination of the reasons why each of the parties 1n 
conflict chose to go to mediation. 
A Strategic Map of the Actors 
The interests of Kenya and Tanzania in Uganda and 
its conflict have been mentioned above. But apart from 
these two neighbouring states, 
Uganda, and influenced the 
others had interests in 
mediation. 105 Prominent 
among these was the United Kingdom. The relationship 
between the United Kingdom and Uganda was historical,106 
but the United Kingdom also had commercial interests in 
the region, which continued conflict in Uganda had put 
in jeopardy. Indeed, after the liberation of Uganda in 
1979, the United Kingdom government had allocated 
assistance to help the new Uganda government restore law 
and order, 107 and was involved in several Commonweal th 
104 The pre-mediation stages of the Uganda mediation are discussed 
at length in Chapter 7. 
105 That is, the audience: see Chapter 2, notably, Mitchell, 'The 
Motives for Mediation' op.cit.; and Wall,J.A. 'Mediation: An Analys~s, 
Review and Proposed Research' 25 Journal of Conflict Resolut~on 




Mukwaya,A.K.K. Anglo-Ugandan Relations With 
the Period Following Uganda's Independence 
University of Durham, October, 1987). 
107 Ibid., p.453. 
Special 
(Ph.D. 
operations to restore peace to Uganda. In keeping with 
this policy, it also made an offer to help restore law 
and order after the Okello coup in 1985. But this did 
not materialise because the conditions attached, namely 
that Tito Okello first put his house In order and 
establish a stable political system were impossible to 
implement in the prevailing conditions of Uganda. Not 
only was the UNLA losing ground to the NRA, but the 
safety of the British personnel envisaged in the offer 
could not be guaranteed. lOB Nevertheles s the Uni ted 
Kingdom was an important actor in the mediation, and 
played a role In trying to move the parties to an 
agreement, thereby strengthening Moi's hand during the 
mediation. This was done by sending a top military 
commander to advise both sides about redeployment and 
training of the military forces of both parties once an 
Agreement was concluded. 109 Secondly, the United Kingdom 
issued a statement through the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office that although aid to Uganda had been suspended, 
its wish was for the aid to resume as soon as security 
improved: and that it could only be assured that any aid 
was used for the benefit of the people of Uganda if 
there was a political settlement to the conflict.llo 
Egypt played a very important role in the whole 
process of the mediation. Egyptian foreign policy 
towards Uganda is based on the politics of the River 
Nile of which both countries are co- riparians, 111 and 
has been always to support the regime In power In 
Uganda. Because of this policy, Egypt not only sided 
with the military government in the conflict, but also 
108 Ibid., p.454. 
109 Daily Nation, 7 December 1985, p.24. 
110 Ibid. 
111 See Odidi Okidi,C. 'International Law and the Lake Victoria 
and River Nile Basins' in Odidi Okidi,C. (Ed) Natural Resources and the 
Development of Lake Victoria Basin of Kenya (Institute for 
Development Studies, University of Nairobi: Occassional Paper No. 34 
of 1979) pp.101-158, who has ~ade a detailed survey of the developmen~ 
of the legal regime of the Nlle. 
supplied the regime with arms. As will be seen ln 
Chapter Seven, Egyptian supply of satellite intelligence 
to the Tito Okello regime during the mediation112 
effectively ended any commitment that the military 
government had to negotiating with the NRA. 
Apart from these major actors, the cast also 
included others who played a lesser and sometimes 
passlve role. These included the United States, which, 
being a supplier of arms to Egypt must have been privy 
to Egyptian supply of military hardware to the Okello 
reglme. Cuba, on the other hand, supported the NRM, and 
welcomed their victory in 1986, and observers thought it 
highly likely that a Cuba-NRM line was opened during the 
mediation. 113 Cuban support for the NRA was in part 
sentimental, based on empathy because of the historical 
similarities of their revolutions, and the means by 
which they came into power. Israel, which was busy 
trying to reverse the OAU embargo against its members 
having diplomatic links with it, wanted to play an 
active role, and indeed offered the Okello government 
mil i tary and economic aid. 114 However, the of fer for 
aid was rejected by the Tito Okello reglme, which 
considered it impolitic to accept aid from both Egypt 
and Israel. 
Zaire was also keenly interested ln a peaceful 
Uganda because, being a neighbour with shared borders 
and some ethnic communities, any instability in Uganda 
necessarily affected the stability of Zaire. Probably 
as a resul t of this fear, President Mobutu invi ted 
Museveni to Zaire in early August 1985, and impressed on 
him the need to reach a reconciliation with the Okello 
regime.115 He also met Tito Okello during the mediation, 
112 Ocan, op. cit. 
113 The Okello regime thought so, according to Ocan, op.cit. 
114 Ibid. 
115 See Mission to Freedom (Kampala: NRM Publications, 1986) 
p.301. 
and this may have formed part of the pressure on Tito 
Okello to attend the mediation, which he later did. 116 
Libya also had interests in the Uganda conflict, 
and in the mediation. Libyan interests in Uganda had 
reached a high peak during Amin's regime. Not only was 
Libya one of the Amin regime's source of funds, but it 
also encouraged Amin's Islamisation policy, by which 
Amin claimed (in response to Libyan military and 
economlC aid) Uganda to be a Moslem state. 117 Also 
during the civil war (1980-1986), Libya was one of the 
states which funded the NRA. The outcome of the 
mediation was therefore important to Libya because were 
it favourable to the NRM, Libya would thereby be ensured 
of a friendly regime in post-mediation Uganda. 11s 
Sudan, which shares both borders and ethnic 
communities with Uganda, and which has for that reason 
been a constant factor in the Ugandan conflict, 119 was 
also an interested party in the mediation. Not only had 
the Anya Nya traditionally used Uganda as a base for 
their operations, but it was to the Sudan that Obote's 
supporters ran after the 1971 coup, as did Amin's 
supporters after his downfall ln 1979. With its own 
severe civil war, and the prolonged conflict in Uganda, 
there was always a spillover of conflict between the two 
countries. 120 In addition, the Okellos had recruited 
116 See Weekly Topic 25 November, 1985, p.2. 
117 Even though only about 5.6% of the Ugandan population was 
Moslem. See Rowe, J . A. 'Islam Under Amin: A Case of Dej a Vu?' in 
Hansen, H. B. & Twaddle, M. (Eds) Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development 
(London: James Currey, 1991) pp.267-279:267. 
118 Indeed, after the NRA's victory in 1986 Uganda strengthened 
its ties with Libya, and received generous assistance in loans, oil, 
and military expertise. See Throup,D. 'Kenya's Relations with 
Museveni's Uganda' in Hansen,H.B. & Twaddle,M. (Eds) Changing Uganda: 
The Dilemmas of Structural Adjustment and Revolutionary Change (London: 
James Currey, 1991) pp.187-196:193. 
119 See Woodward, P. 'Uganda and southern Sudan: Peripheral 
Politics and Neighbour Relations' in Hansen,H.B. & Twaddle,M. (Eds) 
Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development op.cit., pp.224-238. 
120 See Woodward,P. 'Uganda and southern Sudan 1986-9: New Regimes 
.md Peripheral Politics' in Hansen,H.B. & Twaddle,M. (Eds) Changing 
Uganda op.cit., pp.178-186:179. See also the discussion on territory 
heavily from Amin's old supporters ln the Sudan in the 
fight against the NRA. 121 Thus, Sudan must have hoped 
that a settlement in the Uganda conflict would be 
reached, as much for Uganda's benefit as for its own. 
The Decision to Negotiate: The Military Government 
During Obote's second tenure between 1980 and 1985, 
he had consistently refused to negotiate with the NRA 
and other groups fighting against his government, 
preferring instead to pursue a military victory against 
them. 122 As many of the people who had been in Obote' s 
cabinet were also in Tito Okello's, it was surprising 
that the Okello government agreed to negotiations so 
soon after taking over power. There are however a 
complex of both domestic and external reasons why the 
military government was eventually constrained to attend 
the negotiations in Nairobi. 
The first domestic reason had to do with Tito 
Okello's relationship with power, and with the office he 
assumed after the 1985 coup. The coup itself was 
carried out by General Basilio Okello, who in deference 
to Tito Okello's seniority and age, persuaded him to be 
head of state: thus Tito Okello was a 'reluctant 
president' .123 He took over the presidency because he 
thought he could halt the fighting then going on ln 
Uganda by forming a broad based government. However, 
having taken over power, he realised that a change of 
government alone was insufficient to bring about peace. 
Mamdani describes graphically the situation then 
obtaining: 
"The Lutwa-Okello regime wanted both power and 
peace. But its social base was too narrow i it 
could not have both. It had to choose. To keep 
power it was willing to unite wi,th all f07'ces 
whether politically organised .. ,or slmply organlsed 
and conflict in Chapter 3. 
121 Woodward, 'Uganda and southern Sudan: Neighbour Relations and 
Peripheral Politics' op.cit., p.237. 
122 See Chapter 5. 
123 This apt phrase belongs to Ocan, op.cit. 
as a~ed ~angs, and allow them to maintain their 
organl.satl.ona~ harn:ony. From this partial autonomy 
of armed factl.ons l.n the nominal national army of 
the Obote period, the Lutwa-Okello coup of July 
1985 gave Uganda totally liberated and autonomous 
armed factions. As the regime was transformed into 
~ coali.tion of independent armed gangs, Kampala 
l.ncreasl.ngly came to resemble Beirut with each 
factior: contr,?l~ing, i,ts own territo;y, and the 
brutall.ty of cl.vl.l-ml.ll.tary relations increasingly 
evoked comparisons with Haiti." 124 
In these circumstances, Tito Okello125 was therefore 
easily persuaded that attending the mediation in Nairobi 
was the best way to seek a solution to the prevailing 
state of chaos. 
In coming to the decision to attend the mediation 
however, there were important influences operating on 
Tito Okello. The most powerful of these was the Foreign 
Minister, Olara Otunnu, who was also his nephew. Two 
views emerge as to the basis of Olara Otunnu's influence 
on Okello. The first is that he manipulated Okello in 
pursuit of his own personal agenda, whose centrepiece 
was that the success of the Okello government in the 
negotiations would place him in a position to later 
claim power by 'inheritance.' 126 This view is disputed 
because although Otunnu had great influence on Tito 
Okello, the system and institutions that Okello 
inherited were too weak to carry an arrangement whereby 
leadership changed hands by 'inheritance'. Further, it 
was unlikely that a person from the West Nile area would 
124 Mamdani,M. NRA/NRM: Two Years in Power (Kampala: Progressive 
Publishing House, 1988) p.5. 
125 The two main players in the 1985 coup were both called Okello, 
and they are sometimes distinguished in the literature ~y,reference to 
their middle names. Mutibwa observes wryly that on selzln~ ~ower ~he 
Okellos set about addressing the challenges the new admlnlstratlon 
would face in the next few months, and "[f]irst of all, they promoted 
themselves, thinking about their names in particular. ,Tl to soon 
discovered that he had always had a third name - Lutwa - WhlCh he now 
began to use; at the same time, Bazilio remembered he had ~een called 
'Olara', which he threw in as his second name. General Tlto Okello-
Lutwa was the Chairman of the Military Council and the head,of state, 
while ... Bazilio Olara Okello was Lieutenant-General and Chlef of , the 
Defence Forces." See Mutibwa, P. Uganda Since Independence, op, Clt, , 
p.168. 
126 This is the view of Kabwegyere, op.cit. 
have been able to take power in Uganda so soon after 
Amin.127 The second and bet ter view lS that Otunnu' s 
influence on Okello was based on his own strongly held 
beliefs. He believed that soldiers could not work 
towards peace, and therefore the only way to restore 
stability in Uganda was through negotiations. He also 
considered a pacific approach through negotiations to be 
the only way to stem the bloodshed in Uganda. From his 
diplomatic experience as Ugandan ambassador to the 
United Nations, he was also convinced that the Okello 
cabinet under Muwanga, which had also served under Obote 
and was therefore prlvy to the atrocities of that 
regime, would attract no credibility domestically or 
internationally. Therefore that cabinet had to be 
disbanded, and new arrangements negotiated in Nairobi. 
Muwanga's sacking on the eve of the negotiations is used 
as authority for this proposition .128 
The second domestic reason that prompted Tito 
Okello to choose negotiations was that his regime was 
politically and militarily weak. Not 





which had began during Obote's regime and led to his 
overthrow not abated, but they also rendered Tito 
Okello's regime insecure. The coup also brought In a 
new and inexperienced team to the ruling Military 
Council. This altered the chemistry between the 
personalities In the ruling group inter se, and did 
nothing to enhance their solidarity. The military 
government also lacked overwhelming support amongst the 
population. By overthrowing Obote, they lost the support 
of the UPC, whose stronghold was in the western parts of 
Uganda, while the Baganda in the south were lukewarm In 
their support because they saw the Okellos as 
127 Ocan,op.cit. 
128 See The Kenya Times, August 26 1985, p.l. There was also 
speculation that Muwanga's dismissal was in response to one of ~he.pre­
conditions set by the NRM for their participation at the ~e~otlatlons. 
Both elements were likely considerations in the declslon of the 
military government. 
northerners, and therefore hostile. Thus, Okello' s 
regime had severe internal political problems, which In 
their view, negotiations would help to ease, if not to 
solve. 
Militarily, the UNLA was in a very weak position. 
Soon after the coup, the NRA captured the town of 
Masaka, cutting off supplies to Okello's soldiers and 
supporters In the north. 129 Al though the Egyptians 
airlifted supplies to the north, Okello's position on 
the ground nevertheless remained untenable. Accepting to 
go to mediation was therefore a response to, and an 
attempt to ease these 
this position however, 
military realities .130 
there were still some 
Despite 
In the 
Military Council, such as Basilio Okello, who urged for 
a military solution to the conflict. 131 Particularly, 
Basilio Okello had a personal score to settle with 
Museveni, against whose NRA he had fought Slnce 1980, 
and who had accused him of being a murderer. To him, 
the whole peace process only served to obscure, and 
interfere with that desire. Although Tito Okello's Vlew 
prevailed, these differences In perception132 later 
affected negatively the ability of the Military 
government's delegation to negotiate effectively In 
Nairobi.133 
The Tito Okello regime's lack of support 
domestically was reflected internationally. Tito 
Okello's inability to explain his case and the July coup 
129 See further, Chapter 7. 
130 Some, like Ambassador Tomusange op.cit., consider the NRA's 
strong military position to have been the major factor that influenced 
the military government to agree to negotiations. 
131 This group of " aggressive military colleagues" maintained 
strong pressure on Tito Okello throughout the mediation. See The Kenya 
Times 9 December 1985, p.1. 
132 According to one observer of the Ugandan conflict at that 
time while Tito Okello and Museveni were not 'sworn enemies', the:e 
were' serious differences between Museveni and Basilio Okello. Th~s 
insight was communicated to the author in a letter dated 18 ~~~;·,'~mber 
1994 . 
133 See Chapters 7 and 8. 
internationally greatly hindered international support 
for his regime. His inability to articulate his cause 
has been blamed on his illiteracy: not only was the only 
international language he commanded (and poorly at that) 
kiswahili, but his lack of education and training made 
him unable to see the larger picture: he became the 
victim of his own inadequacies .134 Agreeing to attend 
the negotiations in Nairobi was thus a means by which 
the military government would to try and garner 
international legitimacy. 
The Decision to Negotiate: The NRM 
The strategy that the NRA adopted in their war 
against Obote' s government was a protracted people's 
war. This goes through three phases: guerilla warfare, 
mobile warfare, and conventional warfare. 135 By the coup 
in 1985, this war was In the final stage, that of 
conventional warfare. The NRA was therefore on the last 
leg of attaining power, and by their own account, had 
the upper hand In the civil war .136 There was little 
incentive for the NRM to attend the Nairobi 
negotiations. 
tactical and 
That they did so was prompted mainly by 
diplomatic considerations, which are 
examined below. 
Once the idea of mediation was suggested and the 
Okello government had indicated its willingness to 
attend the mediation In Nairobi, the NRM was pushed into 
a position where it could potentially have appeared to 
be the obstacle to peace in Uganda. It could therefore 
have declined to attend the negotiations, and be seen as 
the obstacle to peace, or it could have attended, and 
thus convinced the world, and especially its supporters, 
134 And as Prof. Kabwegyere argues correctly op.cit., those 
inadequacies should have disqualified him from office in the first 
place. 
135 Museveni, Y. ' The Progress of the People's War' 
Selected Articles on the Uganda Resistance War 
Publications, 1986) pp.8-23:11. 
in Museveni, Y . 
(Kampala: NRM 
136 See Museveni' s assessment In ' Who Is Winning the War?' in 
Museveni,Y. What Is ~frica's Problem?:Selected Speeches and Writings 
on ..-ltrica op.cit., pp.142-147. 
that it was willing to work 
Diplomatically, the NRM was pressured 
whereby it could not have declined 
towards peace. 
into a posi tion 
to attend the 
negotiations. 137 Particularly, 
he would later need the 
Museveni understood that 
support of the west In 
rebuilding Uganda. And because the signals he was 
get ting from the NRM' s western supporters encouraged 
negotiations, it could not decline to negotiate and 
still retain that support in future. 
The NRM also felt that since the negotiations In 
Nairobi were said to be about sharing power, it had 
nothing to lose by participating in such talks. 13B This 
view is partly supported by the NRM's demands at the 
negotiations themselves. The demand of parity In 
representation with the UNLA In the Military Council, 
which is examined in detail In the next chapter, was 
indeed one of the difficult points during the 
mediation. 139 There were also some forces within the 
NRM, especially the smaller groups affiliated to it, 
which felt strongly that the NRM should participate in 
the negotiations. These groups were unsure of the 
broader aims of the NRM agenda, partly because they did 
not understand NRM policy fully. They therefore saw the 
negotiations as a means of guaranteeing their own 
interests, hence the pressure they exerted on NRM 
leadership to attend the negotiations .140 
During the whole pre-negotiation period, the NRM 
emphasised that Uganda was in a state of terror, and 
that the bloodshed had to stop. The further position of 
the NRM was that the people then ruling Uganda, 
especially In Tito Okello's cabinet, were the very 
137 See Museveni, 'Ours is a Fundamental Change' in Wha t Is 
Africa's Problem? op.cit., pp.21-27:23 wh~ stat.es tha.t .pressure from 
the international community played a part ln thls deC1Slon. 
138 Kabwegyere, op. ci t. 
139 For a list of NRM demands and proposals, see Mission to 
Freedom op.cit., pp.310-314. 
140 Mukwaya, op.cit. 
people who were responsible for the bloodshed going on 
in Uganda. In the NRM's view, it was morally wrong to 
sit and negotiate with such people, whom it considered 
criminals. However, because the negotiations were about 
peace in Uganda, "in [the] spirit of reconciliation and 
peace ... [the] NRM accepted to go to the conference table 
with these people who have presided over the killing of 











initiative, and put the military 
defensive. 
Nairobi 
seize the diplomatic 
government on the 
It has been claimed that by attending the Nairobi 
negotiations, the NRM merely intended to buy time, 1n 
order to prepare itself for the eventual taking of power 
militarily.142 This view 1S also popular in the Kenyan 
establishment, where it 1S argued, ex post facto, that 
Museveni's antipathy towards his interlocutors compelled 
him to remain at the negotiating table for diplomatic 
reasons, while wag1ng a relentless war against the 
military government .143 However, the better V1ew 1S that 
1n agreeing to mediation, the NRM hoped that the problem 
of peace could be resolved by negotiation. It 
especially expected that the proposal that people who 
had blood on their hands should not be included in any 
future Ugandan government would be accepted. The germ 
of the decision to settle the matter militarily was 
planted during the mediation, and matured in the period 
immediately after the signing of the Agreement. 144 As 
Museveni has noted, during the mediation and soon after, 
141 Mission to Freedom op.cit., p.304. 
142 Kabwegyere, op. ci t . 
143 Interview with a senior official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Kenya: Nairobi, 15 May, 1993. 
144 See Chapter 7 for a discussion of the tension between t-he 
political and the military track in the Uganda mediation. 
"I saw then that the whole process was a farce. We 
tried peacefully to push the case that the Amin 
elements, and people like Bazilio Okello, who had 
killed people in broad daylight, must be excluded 
from government ... We therefore made our position 
very clear: we were not going to take part in any 
government which included and involved criminals. 
Unfortunately these people believed they had 
tricked us. Tito Okello, for instance, carne back 
saying that my signing of the agreement showed that 
they had removed the teeth from the salambwa 
(poisonous snake). ,,145 
In addition, the NRM constantly warned during the 
negotiations that it would 'liberate Uganda' should the 
negotiations fail. 146 It would therefore seem that the 
decision to resort to military means was one that was 
not so much pre-determined, as one that evolved in the 
course of the mediation. 
145 Museveni, 'Ours is a Fundamental Change' op.cit., p.23. 
146 
pp.1,5. 
f Ie Th e Daily Nation (Nairobi) 17 November 1985, See or examp , 
Chapter Seven 
The Uganda Mediation, August-December 1985 
Introduction 
The view that the proper analysis of the Uganda, or 
any other, mediation requires that both its diplomatic 
and mediation aspects be taken into account was 
canvassed in Chapter One. In this regard, Chapter Six 
examined the diplomatic context of the Uganda mediation, 
including inter alia, the pattern of relationships 
between the parties, the OAU's position on the conflict, 
the background to Kenya's mediation, the choi ce of 
mediator, and the reasons behind the parties' decision 
to attend the negotiations. 
This chapter will examine the mediation context of 
the Uganda peace negotiations of 1985. To facilitate 
analysis, the negotiations will be divided into three 
basic stages: the pre-mediation, mediation, and post-
mediation (or implementation) stages. Certain technical 
aspects of the mediation stage will be considered, 
particularly the strategies and tactics adopted by the 
parties, the negotiating environment, the threats by the 
mediator, and the problem of re-entry. The difficulties 
of implementation, and a critical comment thereon will 
also be offered. A critique of the Uganda mediation 
process will be the subject of Chapter Eight. 
To appreciate fully the 1985 mediation, it should 
be viewed against the historical perspective of earlier 
attempts at negotiating the political future and peace 
in Uganda. In this context, the Uganda mediation of 
1985 had some historical precedents, which are mentioned 
below. 
The Lancaster House negotiations of 1961/62, and 
the Moshi Conference of 1979 were earlier attempts by 
Ugandans to negotiate their political future. 1 The 1985 
mediation can be distinguished from these earlier 
attempts on fundamental grounds. The Lancaster House 
negotiations through which the UPC-KY alliance which had 
been forged earlier was formalised,2 were about the 
terms on which independence was to be realised, as much 
as about the constitutional safeguards for some of the 
ethnic communities of Uganda, such as the kingdoms. At 
Lancaster House, unlike ln Nairobi twenty four years 
later, the negotiations did not take place against the 
backdrop of civil war.3 While Lancaster House was about 
the collapse of colonial institutions, Nairobi was about 
collapsed national institutions. Whereas Lancaster 
House was about the creation and protection of emerging 
national institutions, Nairobi was about their 
rebuilding. 
The Moshi Conference and the arrangements it 
reached, was about unifying diverse opposition groups, 
and creating a common front through which the Amin 
regime could be removed and succeeded. As was argued in 
Chapter Five, Moshi failed signally to address important 
issues about constitutional authority and division of 
power after Amin, leading to the eventual collapse of 
the Moshi arrangements. Lancaster House involved 
1 See Chapter 5. 
2 Okoth argues that like the UPC-KY alliance which was a fifty-
fifty arrangement, the Nairobi Peace Agreement had little chance of 
working. See Okoth, P. G. ' The Foreign. Policy. of Uganda To~ar:d 
Kenya and Tanzania Since Independence' ln Oyugl,W.O. (Ed) Pol~t~cs.and 
Administration in East Africa (Nairobi: Konrad Adenauer Foundatl0n, 
1992) pp.359-394:379. 
3 The point is sometimes made that the way in whic~ Uganda 
attained independence can help to explai~ t~e t~end the confllct later 
took. Unlike Kenya which engaged the Brltlsh ln the Mau Ma~ war and 
thus learnt the horror and meaning of conflict, Uganda dld not go 
through a similar experience before its independence. ,Hence, not 
having felt the full weight of bloody conflict: Ugandans dld not seek 
to avoid it after independence, thus the post-lndependence pat~ern o~ 
conflict in Uganda. This analysis was suggested ?y Pr~f.A.N~lmba~l 
(Director, Makerere Institute of Social Research) ln an lntervlew wlth 
the author, Kampala, 24 May 1993. 
negotiations between the colonial government and its 
greatest political challengers. Unlike Moshi, Nairobi 
involved negotiations between an incumbent government 
and its greatest military challenger. In Nairobi, the 
interlocutors had since Moshi seen their common purpose 
collapse, and found themselves on opposing sides of the 
table, and the battleground. The Moshi Conference took 
place against the backdrop of the Tanzania-Uganda war, 
which Tanzania was winning decisively,4 and of which the 
participants at Moshi were encouraged to take advantage. 
Nairobi took place amid an internal war, In which the 
parties involved had fought each other if not to a 
stalemate, then to near exhaustion. Whereas Moshi was 
about hopes of how the dreams of the exiles could be 
crystallised and saved for posterity, Nairobi was about 
broken dreams and differing perceptions about how they 
could be recreated. 
The Parties and the Negotiating Agenda 
As was noted in Chapter Five, the parties whose 
conflict was mediated In Nairobi In 1985 were the 
Military Government of Tito Okello which came to office 
through a coup in July 1985, and the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni, whose military 
arm, the National Resistance Army (NRA) had since 1980 
engaged Obote's second regime, and later Tito Okello's 
government in a protracted people's war. As will be 
indicated in this chapter, during the month between the 
coup on 27 July, and the commencement of the mediation 
on 26 August, the military government co-opted the other 
fighting groups and the political parties by giving 
their leaders ministerial posts and later, during the 
mediation, seats in the Military Council. The NRM had 
declined to be co-opted, and being the largest and most 
successful of the fighting groups, was able to insist 
that the negotiations be between it and the government. 
4 Arend,A.C. & Beck,R.J. International Lawan3 the Use of Force: 




major lssues were at the heart of the 
These were 'Disarmament and Ceasefire' i 
'Composition, powers and procedure of the Military 
Council'i and 'Security', especially the creation and 
composition of a new national army. Other matters like 
the creation of an observer force, the length of the 
interim period between the conclusion of the mediation 
and the holding of elections, prosecution of persons who 
served under Amin, and the holding of a national 
conference, were discussed under these three broad 
items. 
The two parties began 
positions on the three major 
Regarding the Military Council, 
with widely divergent 
i terns of the agenda. 
the NRM proposed that 
representation therein be divided equally between it and 
the UNLA, that the Vice Chairman be a member of the NRM, 
and that the powers of Head of State should only be 
exercised by the Chairman in Council. Further, the NRM 
proposed that the co-option of members of the other 
fighting groups and the political parties that 
participated in the 1980 elections be decided subsequent 
to the mediation and on criteria to be determined by the 
fully constituted Military Council. s 
The military government maintained that parity of 
representation in the Military Council was unacceptable, 
and initially offered the NRA SlX seats. It also 
proposed that the question of the vice-chairmanship be 
considered by the fully constituted Military Council, as 
should the representation of the political parties. But 
it also maintained that for peace and reconciliation to 
be achieved in Uganda, all fighting groups should be 
represented in the Military Council. 6 
These opposed positions underlined the fact that ln 
the view of both parties, the Military Council would be 
5 See Mission to Freedom: Collected Issues of Uganda Resistance 
News, 1981-1 0 85 (Kampala: NRM Publications, 1990) pp.311-312. 
6 See Government Aide Memoire, dated Nairobi, 27 September 1985: 
reproduced in Weekly Topic (Kampala) 18 October 1985 p.4. 
the prlmary source of power in the interim period. They 
were each intent on placing themselves in such a way 
that the balance of representation would fall ln their 
favour. Thus, the NRM, aware that the other fighting 
groups had been co-opted to the cabinet, preferred at 
this stage that the representation of these others in 
the Council be decided later by the fully constituted 
Military Council. In that way, the NRM could hope to 
block the future representation of these other groups in 
the Military Council should the balance of power there 
appear to lean in favour of the UNLA. The military 
government preferred that the details of the 
representation of the other fighting groups be 
determined at the negotiations, since in this way it 
would be ensured of an inbuilt and formalised core of 
their supporters in the Military Council, even were they 
to accept the notion of parity during the negotiations. 
The question of disarmament and ceasefire was also 
complicated by the different motives of both parties. 
During the pre-negotiation period the two parties had 
agreed on a ceasefire on 24 August 1985, in order to 
allow the 'process of peace' to be pursued more 
seriously.7 This ceasefire held until September. The 
ceasefire that was the subject of negotiations was 
however the one which would obtain after the conclusion 
of the negotiations. The positions of the two sides 
were again initially divergent on this. 
The NRM was agreeable to putting into effect and 
observing a ceasefire, but attached stringent conditions 
to this undertaking. These were that the UNLA should 
stop recruiting ex-Amin soldiers, demobilise them, and 
disarm those they had already armed. Further, that no 
soldier or other personnel under the command or control 
of the military government should engage in robbery, 
rape or murder, or any act in violation of the human 
rights of the civilian population. It also demanded that 
all security personnel under the military government who 
7 NRM Press Release, 24 August 1985. 
had committed crimes since the coup should be 
disciplined immediately, and that such disciplining 
should become a routine practice. It further required 
that the UNLA should not mobilise and deploy their 
troops without first seeking and securing the NRA's 
agreement. The NRM also insisted that the military 
government should stop the importation of arms from 
outside Uganda, and that all NRM political detainees 
should be released immediately. Furthermore, it urged 
that all these conditions should be widely publicised 
throughout the country.B 
The government agreed that all parties should 
observe an immediate and effective ceasefire upon the 
conclusion of the agreement. But it insisted that in the 
interim, all commanders should ensure strict discipline 
within their forces, and particularly that the 
"harassment of civilians, attacks on police posts, 
hij acking of vehicles, robbing of banks, blocking of 
roads etc,,9 should stop forthwith. Additionally, the 
government stipulated the conditions that all parties 
should stop recruitment, mobilisation and deployment of 
forces, ensure that there were no non-Ugandans in their 
ranks, and that the acquisition of arms should cease. 10 
These differing conditions for effecting a 
ceasefire were framed carefully, in order to reflect the 
relative military position of both parties. The NRM, 
feeling stronger militarily, set conditions such as 
those on recruitment, securlng their agreement before 
mobilisation and deployment of troops, and the 
importation of arms which the UNLA could not implement 
and remain a viable fighting force, and hence a serlOUS 
interlocutor In the negotiations. The military 
government felt greatly the military and political 
pressure resulting from NRM military activities such as 
8 Mission to Freedom op. cit., p. 311. 
9 Aide Memoire, 27 September, 1985. 
10 Ibid. 
attacks on police stations (a source of arms for the 
NRA) and the robbing of banks (a source of revenue for 
the NRA) ,11 and accordingly sought an arrangement for a 
ceasefire that would ease that pressure. 
On disarmament and the creation of a new national 
army, the government insisted on the complete 
disarmament of all the fighting forces, and required the 
NRM to make a firm commitment to disarm. On the new 
national army, the government argued that although 
Uganda needed a new national army, a mere merger of the 
current fighting forces would only compound the problem 
of factionalism in the military. 
that only some of the present 
It therefore proposed 
fighting forces be 
incorporated into the army, in proportions that the 
Military Council would deem appropriate. The NRM 
rejected the position that complete disarmament of all 
the fighting forces was a precondition for a genuine 
peace. They contended that since the government 
controlled the other coercive instruments of the state 
such as the police force, prison and security services, 
complete disarming of the fighting forces would 
effectively leave the military government still armed, 
and the NRA completely disarmed. 12 Hence the NRM tabled 
the proposal that since the NRA already had in the field 
a well organised and disciplined force, it should be 
utilised in the formation of the new national army, by 
integrating it in part or in whole with the good 
elements from the UNLA and the other fighting forces. 
The NRM proposed further that the new army be composed 
of four thousand soldiers from the NRA, and a similar 
number from combined UNLA and other fighting forces. 13 
Thus, whereas the government's preoccupation was with 
looking for ways to render the NRA force ineffective, 
11 See' Interview with an NRA Commander' Weekly Topic (Kampala) 
9 October 1985, p.6. 
12 Mission to Freedom op.cit., p.312. 
13 Ibid. 
the NRM was concerned with maintaining its strength and 
military advantage, which would continue to ensure a 
strong bargaining position during the negotiations and 
after. 
Military versus Political Issues 
One of the early complicating matters in the Uganda 
mediation was the disagreement between the parties on 
whether the negotiations should be centred on military 
or political matters. 14 Right from the pre-negotiation 
period, the NRM had argued that the negotiations should 
primarily be about a military rather than purely 
political solution. 1s The NRM's rationale for this 
demand was that since it did not recognise Okello as 
Head of State, he and his representatives should only 
attend the negotiations as members of the UNLA, and not 
as the Uganda Government .16 The military government 
rejected this demand, and insisted that the negotiations 
were about the search for a political solution to the 
conflict. The NRM's attitude was informed by its strong 
military position ln the period leading to the 
mediation. But as one editorial observed, 
" ... in this country's present situation, it may 
well border on naivity (sic) to hope and clammer 
for a 'political solution' as the political groups 
without military wings have so far been 
marginalised in the peace process. But our recent 
history at least teaches us that the purely 
military or military-brokered solution has never 
been able to deliver a popularly desired democratic 
result. ,,17 
The NRM also considered that it had the support of the 
Ugandan people, and therefore felt able to pressurise 
the government on this issue. In this regard, the NRM 
enjoyed all the circumstances that can prevent a shift 
14 This is a broader statement of the problem discussed in Chapter 
6, of whether or not the NRM attended the negotiations merely to buy 
time. 
15 The hTeeklyRevieh', (Nairobi) 30 August 1985 p.3. 
16 Keesing'8 Contemporary Archives Vo1.31, No.12 (1985) p.34025. 
17 Weekly Topic (Kampala) 27 September 1985, p.3. 
from the military to the political arena ln a conflict, 
namely 
"the irrepresible belief in the righteousness of 
one's, cause; the assurance of one's own survival 
and vlctory; the determinati?n,to pursue victory at 
wha~ever cost ... to the Opposltlon; the certainty of 
0TIU11potence that sheer power will overwhelm and 
destroy the opposition; the conviction that 
external resource~ a~d su~port ~ill be forthcoming 
no matter what dlfflcultles arlse; the certainty 
that the people's interests are being well served 
and that their fervour and loyalty to the cause 
will survive all trials and tribulations; the 
absolute refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the 
other side; the deep suspicion that any 
conciliatory manoeuvre of the other side is 
devious, a tactic to confuse or gain time or some 
other advantage; and the belief that once a degree 
of military superiority is gained then the other 
side will be compelled to negotiate on one's own 
terms" is 
The military government did not wish the 
negotiations to take place within a military context, 
since to have done so would have enabled the NRM to 
ralse the sensitive question of its legitimacy. It would 
also have been a bad strategy because it would have 
enabled the NRM to negotiate on its own terms, and press 
its military demands. To avoid this eventuality, neither 
Tito Okello the Head of State, nor his Chief of Staff, 
Lt.General Basilio Okello attended the negotiations. The 
government delegation was composed of people who were 
only competent - and mandated - to negotiate political 
matters. 19 Although this was a clever tactic to adopt 
at that stage, it will be argued later that Tito 
Okello's non-participation was not a wise move in terms 
of the overall negotiations. Indeed, the negotiations 
were later prevented from breaking down partly because 
Tito Okello was consequently pressurised to participate 
in the later stages of the mediation. 
18 Wiseman, H. 'The Parameters of the Process of Conflict 
Resolution in Central America' in Child,J. (Ed) Conflict in Cent"-'al 
Americc'i: Approaches to Peace and Securi ty (London: C. Hurst & Co., 
1 c, 8 6) pp. 69- 8 7 : 73 . 
19 The Weekly Revieh', 30 August 1985 p. 3. 
Stages of the Uganda Mediation 
The Ii terature surveyed In Chapter Two revealed 
that modern analyses of mediation have departed from 
traditional ones, particularly in the recognition that 
the process of mediation is larger than just across-the-
table negotiation. Thus, various writers have 
identified several stages of negotiation which, although 
analytically distinct, are symbiotic. For analytical 
purposes, there can be various stages In the whole 
protracted negotiation process such as Saunders's five 
stages,20 or various stages within each major one, such 
as Zartman's three stages of the actual negotiation, 21 
or Mitchell's four stages of conflict termination (i.e. 
the decision that compromise lS preferable to continued 
conflict, communication of this willingness to 
negotiate, the negotiation itself, and the 
implementation process.)22 An adapted form of Saunders's 
formulation will be used to analyse the Uganda 
mediation. Hence, three main stages in that negotiation 
process will be referred to. The pre-negotiation stage 
(which includes the first three of the stages outlined 
by Saunders, namely, defining the problem, producing a 
commitment to a negotiated settlement, and arranglng a 
negotiation); the actual negotiation, and the post-
mediation or implementation stage. These last two are 
the same as the fourth and fifth stages in Saunders's 
formulation. 
One of the characteristics of the Uganda mediation 
was the large number of adjournments that took place, 
ostensibly to enable the parties (especially the 
military government delegation whose leader was absent 
20 Saunders, H. H. 'We Need a Larger Theory of Negot ia t ion: The 
Importance of the Pre-Negotiation Phases' 1 Negotiation Journal (1985) 
pp.249-262:255-261. 
21 Z t I W 'Negotiation: Theory and Reality' in ar man, . . . 
Bendahmane, D. B. & McDonald, J . W . (Eds) In terna tional Negotia t~ on: Art all] 
Science (Washington: Foreign Service Institute, 1984) pp.1- 8:2. 
22 Mitchell,C.R. 'Ending Conflicts and Wars: Judgment, Rationality 
and Entrapment' 43 International Social Science Journal (1991) pp.35-
55:35. 
for much of the mediation), to return home for 
consultations. This characteristic is noteworthy because 
significant developments, both political and military, 
took place during those adj ournments, and were often 
responsible for progress (or sometimes lack of it) at 
the negotiating table. Indeed, it would be true to 
argue that during the negotiation stage and after, the 
Uganda conflict developed along two paths. One path 
consisted of negotiating sessions where the parties 
tried to work out a political solution to the conflict. 
In the other, which was interspersed between these 
sessions, and then contemporaneous with them, the 
parties tested each other militarily, weighing the 
possibilities of a military solution to the conflict. 
However, these two paths were not entirely parallel, 
since they crossed at times during the mediation. This 
feature of the Uganda mediation will be discussed later 
in the sections on the negotiation and post-negotiation 
stages. 
The Pre-Negotiation Stages 
Some of the developments during the pre-negotiation 
stages of the Uganda mediation formed part of the 
diplomatic context of the conflict in Uganda, and were 
discussed in Chapter Six. This section will analyse only 
those developments during this stage which were directly 
related to the negotiation phase of the conflict. Most 
important amongst these were the formulation by both 
parties of a programme for the recovery of Uganda; Tito 
Okello's co-option of the political parties and minor 
fighting groups; attempts at making peace during the 
pre-negotiation period, namely the calls for a round 
table conference and the aborted Dar-es-Salaam talks; 
the appointment and dismissal of Paolo Muwanga as 
Executive Prime Minister; and the military position of 
both parties at the commencement of the mediation. 
Programmes for the Recovery of Uganda 
It has been claimed that one of the reasons why the 
military government has come to be perceived as the 
'loser' in the Uganda mediation is because Tito Okello, 
the nominal leader of the government delegation at the 
mediation, lacked vision. 23 By this it is normally meant 
that having taken over power in Uganda, he had no clear 
idea as to its future. Conversely, Museveni lS often 
seen as having had an ideologically coherent and 
sophisticated vision for the future of Uganda. 24 This 
difference between the two parties was evident during 
the pre-negotiation stages, and was responsible for some 
of the disagreements between them in the negotiations. 
During its tenure, Tito Okello's government did not 
produce a policy document outlining its vision for the 
future of Uganda. 2s However, on 10 August 1985 Tito 
Okello made his first policy statement Slnce taking 
power. That speech outlined a Six Point Programme of the 
aims of his administration. The maln priorities were 
ending the fighting between the factions In Uganda, 
establishing unity and reconciliation, preventing 
revenge and victimisation as a result of the change of 
government, resettling refugees and displaced persons, 
re-establishing law and order, and bringing about 
economic recovery.26 In contrast, the NRM had formulated 
a Ten Point Programme, which included such aspects as 
the strict observance of human rights, set ting up an 
international commission to investigate crlmes 
especially genocide committed during the Amin and 
Obote regimes, drawing up and enforcing a leadership 
code, rehabilitating the economy, and basic social 
services. 27 The NRM insisted that the programme should 
23 Such as Ralph Ocan In an interview with the author, Kampala, 
27 May, 1993. 
24 For example, Prof. Kabwegyere, in an interview wi th the author, 
Kampala, 25 May, 1993. 
25 See, 'Interview with an NRA Commander' Weekly Topic 9 October 
1985, p.6. 
26 Keesing's Contemporary Archives Vo1.31 No.12 (1985) p.34025. 
27 See Missicn to Freedom op.cit., pp.313-314. Many of these are 
l"tOflected in the constitution being discussed currently in ugan~)a: see 
The Draft Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (Kampala, 199_). 
form part of any agreement reached ln Nairobi, and thus 
be binding on all parties. 
The amount of detail in each programme suggests the 
relative seriousness with which the parties considered 
the problem of, and the basis for Ugandan recovery. For 
the NRM, the restoration of peace and democracy, and 
respect for human rights were "the cardinal principles 
which must form the basis of the peace talks", 2Bwi th 
other matters being secondary. For the Military 
government, problems like the protection of human rights 
could be addressed later, once the new Military Council 
was constituted, and should not therefore be discussed 
in detail during the mediation. These differing, and 
indeed polarised perceptions on the future of Uganda, 
which crystallised as early as the pre-negotiation 
stage, were to colour the background against which the 
mediation took place. 
The Military Government's Co-Option of Other Groups 
Having taken over power in July 1985, the military 
government was aware, as Tito Okello pointed out in his 
speech on 10 August, that "recent history had shown that 
no single group could succeed ln bringing peace to 
Uganda. ,,29 The military government therefore realised 
that to achieve peace, and to remain in power, it was 
necessary to get support from the other fighting groups, 
and the political parties. Towards this end, the 
military government set about trying to build a broad 
based government. This process took the form of co-
opting these other groups into the Military Council and 
the Cabinet. 
With the exception of the NRA, all the fighting 
groups were willing and indeed keen, to be so co-opted. 
This was formalised in an Agreement between them and the 
military government on 19 August 1985. The timing of 
this Agreement, following so soon after Tito Okello's 
28 NRM Press Statement, 9 August 1985. 
29 See Keesing's Contemporary .Archives op.cit., p.34025. 
August 10 speech which was made at a ceremony releasing 
thousands of prisoners, is significant given the state 
of the four groups with whom the Agreement was 
concluded. Although it had earlier been engaged in the 
war against Obote, the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM) was 
by 1985 largely non-operational, and was therefore 
agreeable when Okello made his offer. Not only was their 
leader appointed to the Military Council, but its ranks 
were boosted significantly when hundreds of the released 
prisoners joined it.30 The Federal Democratic Movement 
(FEDEMU) was also not significantly effective by the 
1985 coup. Its ranks too were greatly expanded by the 
released prisoners, who on joining were issued with UNLA 
uniforms and armed. 31 The Uganda National Rescue Front 
(UNRF) which consisted mainly of Amin's Nubian 
supporters, also joined the UNLA, and their two top 
leaders were rewarded with seats ln the Military 
Council. 32 The Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) was, 
together with the UNRF, one of the two parties formed to 
fight Obote after the fall of Amin. It too was made up 
mostly of Nubians, and after the Agreement with the 
military government, it recruited several hundreds of 
men from the south Sudan to help in the fight against 
the NRA. Significantly, their leader Wilson Toko, was 
made Vice Chairman of the Military Council. 33 Later, in 
the absence of Tito Okello, he led the government's 
delegation at many of the sessions during the mediation 
ln Nairobi. 
Although the NRA had stated that it would "reply 
positively,,34 to the government's appeal to join the new 
30 Mutibwa, P. Uganda Since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled 
Hopes (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1992) p.170. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., p.171. 
33 Ibid., p.172. 
34 See Keesing's Contempc~-3~T .~rchives, Vo1.31 No.12 (1985) 
p.34024. 
coalition, it never did so. The intended marriage 
between the NRA and the UNLA failed because the military 
government did not meet the NRA's conditions for such a 
merger. These were equal representation in the Military 
Council,35 full consultation between the NRA and UNLA on 
all decisions regarding the setting up of an interim 
administration including political appointments, and 
that people who were involved in the atrocities during 
the Amin and Obote eras not be appointed. 36 These 
conditions remained on the NRM agenda and were raised 
later during the mediation. The inability of the NRA 
and the military government to reach agreement on them 
meant that by the commencement of the mediation, all the 
other fighting forces were ranged against the NRM at the 
negotiations. 
The leaders of the pOlitical parties were rewarded 
with ministerial posts on allying themselves with the 
military government. Prior to this, they too had laid 
down certain conditions. These were that the Military 
Council be committed to negotiations geared towards the 
cessation of fighting in Uganda; that all political 
prlsoners 
committed 
be set free; that the Military Council be 
to, and work towards holding a general 
election within one year, and that those serving in the 
interim administration be creditable and acceptable to 
all parties. 37 
The biggest of these political parties was the 
Democratic Party (DP). The DP had not enj oyed power 
since they won the 1962 elections and formed the interim 
government prior to independence. 38 They acclaimed the 
overthrow of Obote whom they considered an enemy, and 
welcomed the opportunity to regain the political 
prominence which the rigging of the 1980 election had 
35 Weekly Topic 5 August 1985 p.2. 
36 NRA Press Statement, 6 August 1985. 
37 Weekly Topic, 5 August 1985 pp .1-2. 
38 See Chapter 5. 
denied them. 39 The other two . partles, the Uganda 
People's Movement (UPM) and the Conservative Party (CP) 
also joined the military government, and their leaders 
were rewarded with ministerial postS.40 Although the co-
option of the fighting groups and the political parties 
should have isolated the NRA/M, the military government 
was aware that any arrangements which excluded the NRA/M 
were at best weak. Indeed, far from weakening the 
NRA/M, the coalition between the government, the 
fighting groups, and the political parties rendered it 
a more determined, and as the negotiations later were to 
prove, a formidable negotiating partner. 
Earlier Attempts at Negotiation 
The mediation in Nairobi was the culmination of a 
longer process of the search for a peaceful solution to 
the Uganda conflict. The roots of this process lay In 
the pre-negotiation stages. As was noted in Chapter 
Five, during his second tenure Obote had rejected 
resolutely any suggestions that the conflict be settled 
peacefully, and pressed instead for a military solution. 
However, once he was overthrown in July 1985, 
suggestions that negotiations be attempted were renewed 
by diverse sources. This led to two developments which 
reflected the shape of the Nairobi mediation, and 
underlined the Vlew evinced In the Nairobi Peace 
Agreement 41 that a national convention would be 
ultimately necessary to cement the terms of any peace 
the parties reached in Nairobi. 42 The two developments 
were the calls for a round table conference, and the 
Dar-es-Salaam fiasco. 
39 Mut ibwa, P. Uganda Since Independence op. ci t ., p. 171. See also 
Chapter 5. 
40 Ibid. 
41 In full, The Uganda Peace Talks Agreement for The Restoration 
of Peace to The Sovereign State of The Republic of Uganda (Nairobi: 
Government Printers, Kenya, 1985). 
42 See Article 15 of the Nairobi Peace Agreement. 
Calls for a Round Table Conference 
The first mention of a round table conference after 
the July coup was in an 'ultimatum' issued on 2 August 
by the Uganda Democratic Redemption Union (UDRU) , which 
consisted of people like former president Godfrey 
Binaisa who were opposed to the new military regime. The 
ultimatum was contained in a statement calling for the 
dissolution of the military government and the 
appointment of a caretaker administration. It also 
proposed that the military rulers convene a round table 
conference outside Uganda, to be attended by all parties 
and forces "that have participated in nation-building 
since 1962. ,,43 Furthermore, in a letter to Tito Okello 
on 29 July 1985, the Secretary-General of the Uganda 
Patriotic Movement (UPM) , Bidandi Ssali proposed that 
the Government of National Unity which the military 
government was in the process of forming be 
"very temporary, only serving as a prelude to a 
'National Unity Conference', for the purpose of 
harnessing all shades of political philosophy and 
hammer out a working relationship that should form 
the basis for a truly national government. ,,44 
The UPM had in mind a forum along the lines of the Moshi 
Conference, albeit a more systematic and elaborate 
version of . t 45 1 . In agreelng to work with the military 
government, the Democratic Party (DP) , also issued 
conditions (which were adopted also by the Conservative 
Party (CP)), requiring that the Military Council be 
committed to negotiations aimed at the cessation of 
fighting in the country. 46 
These other parties agreed to cooperate with the 
mil i tary government pending the convening of such a 
round table (or national) conference. Unlike them, the 
NRM issued conditions which it insisted be accepted in 
43 Kenya Times, 3 August 1985 p.1. 
44 Letter reproduced in Weekly Topic, 5 August 1985 p.8. 
45 Ibid. See Chapter 5 for details of the Moshi Conference. 
~ 6 Weekly Topic, 5 August 1985 p.1. 
toto before it could attend such a conference, which it 
supported in principle. It insisted that for there to 
a lasting peace, proper mechanisms had to be worked out 
by all political groups, but primarily by "the two 
principal opponents: UNLA and NRA,,47 
that the 'instruments of force' could 
in the sole control of the UNLA. 
It also argued 
no longer be left 
It submitted that 
since the NRA was primarily responsible for overthrowing 
Obote, it should be given fifty per cent of the seats in 
the Mil i tary Council. 48 Further, because the NRM was 
irked by not being consulted In the formation of the 
Military Council after the coup and In subsequent 
appointments, it required that the military government 
cease to make further appointments without consulting 
it.49 Clearly therefore, the NRM did not envlsage 
attending such a conference in a subsidiary role to the 
UNLA. 
The Aborted Dar-es-Salaam Talks 
The conditions stipulated by the NRM would have 
meant that it would have attended any round table 
conference as an equal partner with the military 
government. But the military government did not 
contemplate any arrangement whereby its pre-eminence 
would be submerged. It was nevertheless clear that no 
lasting solution could be attained without the 
participation of the NRA/NRM. Consequently, Tito Okello 
offered to meet the NRA in any neighbouring country such 
as Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan or Zaire. 50 This offer 
underlined two things. It marked the shelving of a 
multilateral approach to peace in Uganda, and signalled 
the Okello government's recognition that the NRM/NRA was 
a force to be contended with. Hence, any serious peace 
47 Mission to Freedom op. cit., pp. 293-294. 
48 Kenya Times, 7 August 1985 p.l. 
49 Nision to Freedom op.cit., p.295. 
50 Kenya Times, 2 August 1985 p.l. 
process would have to be primarily bilateral, between 
the NRM and the military government. 51 
The offer for bilateral talks by Tito Okello was a 
small but significant victory for the NRM in its fight 
against marginalisation in Uganda politics. 52 The NRM 
pressed its advantage by announcing that it was willing 
to hold talks with the military government, provided 
three conditions were met. These were that the UNLA did 
not participate in the talks as a government delegation, 
nor was Tito Okello to attend as Head of State, but as 
the leader of the UNLA since in the NRM's view the UNLA 
was only partly responsible for the overthrow of Obote. 
Secondly, the NRM required that Kenya and Tanzania be 
fully involved on an equal basis in all the preparations 
and processes of such peace talks. Thirdly, the NRM 
expressed its readiness to attend such talks In Arusha 
(Tanzania), Bungoma (Kenya), Tororo (Uganda), or at any 
other neutral venue, provided satisfactory security 
arrangements were made for all parties. 53 
Tito Okello, one of whose first acts on taking 
power was to calIon President Nyerere In Dar-es-
Salaam,54 announced on 10 August that he would meet the 
NRM's leaders In Dar-es-Salaam on 13 August. That 
announcement did not mention whether the NRM's pre-
conditions had been accepted. There followed an exchange 
of telexes In which the NRM complained to the UNLA about 
the arbitrary nature of the announcement and its silence 
on the conditions. The NRM advised the UNLA leadership 
finally that it could not attend the proposed talks in 
those circumstances. The UNLA leaders replied that they 
would proceed to Dar-es-Salaam anyway, and hope to meet 
51 The question of whether a bilateral or multilateral approach 
would have been better is discussed later in this chapter. 
52 See Mission to Freedom op.cit., p.310. 
53 NRM Press Statement, 9 August 1985. 
54 See The h!t"t:'kl)' Reviel'v' , 30 August 1985 p. 3. 
the NRM there. 55 The UNLA delegation travelled to Dar-
es-Salaam and waited for the NRM delegation in vain. 
The NRM failed to attend the Dar-es-Salaam talks 
because glven Tanzania's pervasive involvement ln 
Ugandan politics Slnce the liberation, it could not 
count on Nyerere to be "an entirely neutral front in 
peace talks between the two parties. ,,56 Museveni also 
believed that he was only prevented from taking power 
after the liberation by Tanzanian influence in favour of 
Obote,57 and was therefore not keen on Tanzanian 
mediation. Thus, having got Tito Okello's government to 
agree on holding talks, the NRM intended to press their 
advantage by holding out for a different venue. And 
because the government did not respond to the pre-
conditions demanded earlier, the NRM expressed its 
unwillingness to hold open ended talks. 
The Dar-es-Salaam talks thus not having 
materialised, but still realising that he had to come to 
terms with the NRA, Tito Okello went back to the drawing 
board to search for an alternative venue acceptable to 
the NRM. He held his first meeting with President Moi 
in Nairobi on 19 August supposedly to brief him on "the 
strategy [they] were adopting to bring about 
reconciliation among 
meeting between Olara 
Ugandans" . 59 There followed a 
Otunnu, the Ugandan Foreign 
Minister and Museveni ln Nairobi on 20 August, to 
"arrange as soon as possible for talks to take place". 59 
Both these were a successful search for Nairobi as an 
alternative venue, with the NRM's acceptance of it.60 
55 NRM Press Statement, 14 August 1985. 
56 See The Weekly Review, 30 August 1985, p.3. 
57 Thi sis a view expressed by Dr. A. Mukwaya, Dept. of 
Government, Makerere University, in an interview with the author, 
Kampala, 27 May 1993. 
58 Kenya Times, 20 August 1985 pp.1,20. 
59 Kenya Times, 21 August 1985 p.24. 
60 See Chapter 6 on the politics surrounding the venue. 
Muwanga's Dismissal as Executive Prime Minister 
Ever since the coup in July, the NRM had insisted 
that no appointments to high public office should be 
made without its consultation. In the absence of such 
consultation, the NRM adopted a policy of non-
recognition of the "Military Council, Tito as Head of 
State, Muwanga as Prime Minister and other appointments 
and decisions the ... junta has been making. ,,61 The 
appointment of Muwanga as Executive Prime Minister on 31 
July especially irked the NRM leadership. As Chairman 
of the Military Council in 1980, he had presided over 
the rigged elections which brought Obote back to 
power. 62 
Defence, 
As Obote's Vice President and Minister for 
he had presided over mass killings especially 
In the Luwero Triangle63 at the height of the war 
against the Obote regime. To the NRM, people like 
Muwanga and others who had served in earlier regimes 
would only perpetuate the brutal policies of those 
governments,64 and therefore did not merit appointment 
to high public office. 
The Military Council and the cabinet were also 
divided about Muwanga's appointment. 65 His dismissal as 
Prime Minister on the eve of the mediation on August 25, 
was seen by some as a response to the NRM's demands for 
his removal. 66 It was also evidence that the cut and 
thrust of negotiation had commenced in earnest as early 
as the pre-negotiation stage. 
In terms of the mediation, Muwanga's dismissal had 
dual significance. It can be viewed as an attempt by 
the military government to attend the talks as a united 
61 Mission to Freedom op.cit., p.296. 
62 See Chapter 5. 
63 Mutibwa, P. Uganda Since Independence op.cit., p.184. 
64 NRM Press Statement, 21 August 1985. 
65 rveekly Review, 30 August 1985 p.3. 
66 Kenya Times, 26 August 1985 p.1. 
group, undi vided by the appointment of Muwanga . 67 In 
terms of negotiating strategy, this was a sound move, 
given that the spirit in which the military government 
negotiated could determine its future. The dismissal 
can also be seen as a concession to the NRM. 68 Viewed as 
such, its effect was to exert psychological pressure on 
the NRM at the outset of the negotiations, because 
having thus made a major concession the government could 
thereby put pressure on the NRM to do the same. It could 
also glve the military government a big diplomatic 
boost, since its international constituency69 would view 
the concession as a sign of its intention to negotiate 
in good faith, and thus encourage the NRM to demonstrate 
concretely a similar intention by making a comparable 
compromise. 70 
The Military Position, August 1985 
One of the things that characterised the Uganda 
mediation was the continued fighting between the UNLA 
and the NRA during much of the mediation. Although the 
two parties had agreed on a ceasefire during the pre-
mediation period on 24 August, it only held until 
September. The informality of the August ceasefire 
probably best explains why it broke down. 71 A formal 
ceasefire to obtain during the mediation was not 
discussed or agreed on at the outset of the mediation. 
This might explain why the parties felt at liberty to 
back their negotiating demands by military action. 
67 Weekly Review, 30 August 1985 p. 3. 
68 Ibid. 
69 On which see Mitchell,C.R. 'The Motives for Mediation' in 
Mitchell,C.R. & Webb,K. (Eds) New Approaches to International Mediation 
(Westport,CT.: Greenwood Press, 1988) pp.29-51. See also Chapter 2. 
70 This depends on whether or not the NRM perceived the dismissal 
as a conciliatory gesture, and whether the actio~ ?y the government 
fulfilled all the ingredients of a successful conc~ll~tory gesture. O? 
. . M't h 11 C R 'A Willlngness to Talk conclllatory gestures, see, 1 c e , . . . . 
(George Mason University, Centre for Conflict Analysis and Resolution: 
Occassional Paper No.4, 1990). 
71 The status of the ceasefire and its consequences fer 
mediation is discussed later in this chapter, and in Chapter 8. 
~he 
Because military activity between the parties influenced 
the trend of the mediation, this section will outline 
the military balance between them at the outset of the 
mediation. 
The NRA was convinced that Obote's overthrow was 
only possible because of the success of its military 
activities since 1980, and that the UNLA's takeover was 
merely the coup de grace. 72 Therefore, the NRM argued 
that the refusal to accede to their demands (especially 
about equal representation in the Military Council and 
consultation before appointments to public office were 
made), was evidence of the coup leaders' intention to 
continue reaping where they had not sown. To them, the 
Nairobi mediation was all about how this primacy of 
their contribution to Obote's ouster could be formally 
recognised in post-mediation Uganda. 
In the run-up to the mediation, the 'protracted 
people's war' had entered the stage of conventional 
war.73 Al though the NRA could count numerous mil i tary 
successes,74 the UNLA was still to be reckoned with, and 
had recently been boosted when the smaller fighting 
forces joined up with it in August 1985. There was a 
temporary stalemate as witnessed by the ceasefire of 24 
August. But it was one which both parties hoped (and 
probably intended) to break during the negotiations, as 
the resumed fighting between them during the mediation 
suggested. That Museveni could also issue a series of 
ul timata to the government to proceed to the 
negotiations or face further fighting, lends additional 
support for this view. 75 It also gives some credence to 
72 Museveni, Y . ' After abote: What?' in Museveni, Y. Selected 
Articles on the Uganda Resistance War (Kampala: NRM Publications, 1986) 
pp.76-83:76-77. 
73 See Chapter 6; also Museveni, Y. ' Who Is winni~g. the war:' . in 
Museveni, Y. What Is Africa's Problem? Speeches and Wr~t~ngs on .J,~r~ca 
(Kampala: NRM Publications, 1992) pp.142-147:146. 
74 Ibid., p. 1~ 5 i see further, Chapter 5. 
75 See The Kenya Times, August 22 1985 pp.1,20; also 24 August, 
1985 pp.1,20. 
the proposition that neither the UNLA nor the NRA had an 
unequivocal commitment to a political solution at the 
outset of the negotiations. 76 Indeed, the opinion has 
been expressed that the NRM saw its control of western 
Uganda as a military advantage to be consolidated during 
the negotiations. 77 In that view, the success of that 
consolidation led it later to abrogate the Nairobi 
Agreement in order to "complete the war". 79 
The Mediation Stage 
The actual mediation of the Uganda conflict took 
place In five phases, between August 26 and December 17 
1985. This section aims to outline the discussions that 
took place during each of the five phases, and to 
comment on the developments that occurred during the 
adjournments in between them. It will also comment on 
the main issues arising from this stage in terms of the 
process of negotiation and mediation. The first of 
these tasks will enable an assessment of what the 
parties gained or lost in the mediation relative to 
their initial positions. The second will facilitate a 
technical assessment of the whole process. 
The First Phase 
The first phase of the mediation stage was preceded 
by separate informal consultations between the two 
groups,79 and was devoted to preliminary statements, and 
a discussion of the agenda. The parties also restated 
their positions. Those of the NRM were already public 
and had been widely publicised, while the government 
articulated its proposals for the first time. As 
outlined earlier in this chapter, the positions of the 
two parties differed In several material respects. 
76 See Ocan, op.cit., and Kabwegyere, op.cit. 
77 For example as discussed later in this Chapter ~ the tJRt<' s 
declaration of an interim administration in western Uganda ln November, 
during the course of the mediation. 
78 Ambassador Joseph Tomusange, Ugandan Ambassador to Kenya, in 
an interview with the author, Nairobi, 7 May, 1993. 
79 Kenya Times, 27 August 1985 p.1. 
These differences were not on the identity of the main 
items, but on the divergent views on how they should be 
effected. 
The negotiations adjourned on the second day, ln 
order to give both parties time to hold further 
consultations. No date was set for the resumption of 
the mediation, 80 but both parties were quick to 
emphasise that the negotiations "had not reached a 
deadlock ... bu thad s impl y been pos tponed . ,,81 No 
significant developments took place during this first 
adjournment, and indeed the ceasefire of 24 August held 
throughout. There is also no record that at this stage 
the consultations involved any third party. 
The Second Phase 
The second phase of the mediation was preoccupied 
with the difficult question of representation in the 
Military Council. The NRM's demand for parity of 
representation ln the Military Council 82 was resisted 
strenuously by the military government. Their differing 
positions reflected earlier developments and views that 
had been articulated during the pre-negotiation stage. 
But the UNLA now stated explicitly its view that it was 
the major military force in Uganda and should therefore 
be allocated half the seats ln the Council. It 
submitted that although among the other fighting groups 
the NRM was primus inter pares, that position should 
only be reflected in the distribution of the other half 
of the seats in the Military Council. Tito Okello was 
absent during this phase, and the government delegation 
was not authorised to make any major decision on 
military matters. Hence it sought an adjournment to 
facilitate further consultations in Kampala,B3 and thus 
the second phase was adjourned on 5 September. 
80 See Kenya Times, 28 August 1985 p.1. 
81 Weekly Review 6 September 1985 p .18. 
82 Weekly Review, 20 September 1985 p.15. 
83 The Weekly Review, 13 September 1985 p.19. 
The second adjournment witnessed several 
significant developments. The most important was the 
collapse of the ceasefire of 24 August, and the 
resumption of fighting between the UNLA and the NRA. 8 .. 
These developments ensured that the mediation could not 
resume as planned, and was thus further postponed. 
During this fighting, the NRA attacked government 
positions at Kawanda and Mubende north of Kampala,8s and 
cut off the town of Masaka86 and the whole of western 
Uganda, thus setting the ground for a major 
confrontation between it and the UNLA. 87 Both sides 
blamed each other for this resumption of hostilities. 
During this second adjournment, 
it had no government reiterated that 
sharing power with the NRM 
the military 
intentions of 
on the basis of equal 
representation in the Military Council. 88 While this 
might have been taken as a normal tactic during 
negotiations, it was followed by a major development on 
14 September, when the military government expanded the 
Military Council from twelve to sixteen members. The 
four new members were the leaders of the four fighting 
groups89 which had signed a separate Agreement with the 
government during the pre-negotiation stage. This action 
was intended further to isolate the NRM from the other 
military and political groups, whose alliance with the 
government still held. Indeed, these other groups issued 
separate statements in support of the government. FEDEMU 
criticised the NRM's demand for equal representation, 
and argued that Museveni had no alternative but to work 
out a solution with the government, and that "it is not 
84 Ibid. 
85 Sunday Nation (Nairobi), 15 September 1985 p. 28. 
86 The Sunday Times (Nairobi), 22 September 1985 p. 24. 
87 The Weekly Review, 20 September 1985 p.15. 
88 Ibid. 
89 See Sunday Nation, 15 September 1985 pp.1,28. 
membership of the Military Council that is a crucial 
matter at the present, but the formation of a new 
national army ... ,,90 Similarly, the Democratic Party 
issued a statement urging for the peace talks to resume. 
It stated further that Uganda's problems were political, 
and could not be solved mil i tarily . 91 
A significant political development was the entry 
of Tanzania into the Uganda peace process, through a 
series of meetings between Nyerere, Ugandan Prime 
Minister Waligo, and Museveni ln Dar-es-Salaam.92 
According to an Aide Memoire issued by the military 
government during the third phase of the mediation, at 
these meetings Museveni undertook to drop the demand for 
parity, and accept six seats in the Military Council. 93 
While the NRM's continued insistence on parity during 
the third phase might not appear to bear this out, it is 
likely that Museveni had made such an undertaking, but 
reconsidered it later when the Military Council was 
arbi trarily expanded from twelve to sixteen members. 
Apart from these meetings, Nyerere also held discussions 
later with Tito Okello and Foreign Affairs minister 
Olara Otunnu ln Dar-es-Salaam, and accompanied Tito 
Okello to a meeting with President Moi thereafter. 94 The 
mediation resumed soon after these meetings. 
The Third Phase 
The third phase of the mediation was the longest 
and most intense. Unlike the earlier two phases, it 
took place amidst continuing fighting between the two 
parties. Ironically, although both leaders of delegation 
did not participate in the negotiations during this 
important phase, preferring to leave their deputies in 
90 The Weekly Revi ew, 13 September 1985 p.19. 
91 The Weekly Review, 20 September 1985 p.15. 
92 See The Kenya Times, 15 September 1985 P .1-
93 Aide Memoire dated Nairobi, 27 September, 1985. 
94 The Weekly Review, 27 September 1985 p .15. 
charge, for the first time the positions of the two 
Parties became modified somewhat . , pavlng the wa~/ to 
eventual agreement. Apart from military developments, 
the adj ournment after this phase also witnessed two 
important political developments which had a bearing on 
the mediation. These were a joint statement by 
Presidents Nyerere and Moi, and a threat by the mediator 
to pullout of the mediation. 
During this phase of the mediation, the lssue of 
representation in the Military Council was discussed 
further. The questions of disarmament, and the fate of 
ex-Amin soldiers was also discussed. On representation 
in the Military Council, the government now increased 
its offer of seats to the NRM from four to six. 95 Thus 
out of a proposed twenty seats, the UNLA would have 
eight excluding the Chairman's, the NRM six seats, with 
the remainder to be shared by the other four fighting 
groups.96 For the first time, the NRM accepted the idea 
of the representation of the other fighting groups, but 
with the proviso that they should be acceptable to all 
the parties involved. 97 It also concurred with the 
proposal that Tito Okello remain as Head of State, with 
the caveat that in return, the NRM would secure the Vice 
Chairmanship of the Council. 98 On representation, the 
NRM counter-proposed that the UNLA and the NRM take 
seven seats each, excluding the seat for the Chairman. 
Disarmament remained a contentious issue. The 
government suggested the disarming of all fighting 
groups, and proposed that the governments of Kenya, 
Tanzania, and the United Kingdom be requested to provide 
a peacekeeping force to assist in the process of 
disarmament. In its view, once these matters were agreed 
upon, all other pending issues could be discussed later 
95 Weekly Topic, 27 September 1985 p .1. 
96 The Weekly Review, 4 October 1985 p .13. 
97 Weekly Topic, 27 September 1985 p.l. 
98 The Weekly Revi ew, 4 October 1985 p. 13 . 
ln Kampala, by the fully constituted Military Council. 99 
The NRM however disagreed on the modalities of 
disarmament, and on the philosophy of k a peace eeping 
force. It argued that to disarm all the fighting groups 
without doing anything about the other coercive organs 
of state would effectively leave the military government 
armed, and the NRA disarmed. It argued further that the 
notion of a force was not foreign peacekeeping 
the status of the consistent conflict as an 
internal affair .100 Although the government revised its 
with 
proposal on disarmament to cover all the other coercive 
organs of state, the NRM still rej ected the idea. It 
reiterated that its strongest political base was the 
army, and to disarm it would ln effect politically 
disarm the NRM. 101 
The NRM also rej ected the government's proposal 
that all other outstanding issues be discussed and 
agreed on later by the fully constituted Military 
Council. It raised the lssue of ex-Amin men, their 
recruitment and punishment. That the NRM should ralse 
this lssue was not surprising: it had consistently 
criticised the government for recruiting these into the 
UNLA, despite the atrocities they had committed during 
Amin's regime. This proved to be a difficult point in 
the negotiations. The government argued that like the 
UNLA, the NRA had recruited ex-Amin men to its ranks. 
More fundamentally, it raised the pertinent issue of the 
criteria to be used in deciding what was to define an 
ex-Amin man. The definitional issue arose whether a 
soldier was to be deemed an ex-Amin man on the basis of 
how long he had served that regime, or on the basis of 
the rank he had held. 102 Agreement could not be reached 
99 Ibid. 
100 This echoed OAU policy, and contradicts Museveni' s l~ter blame 
of the OAU for not getting involved in the Uganda confl1ct. See 
Chapter 4. 
101 The Weekl)" Review, 11 October 1985 p.21. 
102 The Weekly Review, 11 October 1985 pp.21-:=:::. 
on these . lssues. 
consultation on 
followed. 
The parties agreed to hold further 
them during the adjournment that 
The vexed question of the composition of the new 
army was also raised during this phase. The NRM proposed 
that the nucleus of the new army be composed of four 
thousand men and officers from the NRA, and a similar 
number from the the UNLA and its allies. The government 
rejected this proposal. It argued that the mere merger 
of current forces would compound the problem of 
factionalism. It proposed instead that the new army be 
composed of some elements from the present forces ln 
numbers that the Military Council would deem 
appropriate. It also insisted that the specific 
representation of the other fighting groups in the new 
national army be specified during the negotiations .103 
A committee of eight was formed to reconcile these 
positions and report back during the next phase. 104 
The two parties continued fighting during this 
third phase of the mediation. The UNLA conducted several 
operations in the Luwero Triangle area,105 and regained 
control of the main road to the north of the country, 
between Kampala and Gulu. The NRA on the other hand 
captured the army barracks at Kisajjagirwa on the 
outskirts of Masaka. 106 
During the adjournment following the third phase, 
two developments that had a bearing on the mediation 
took place. The first was a Joint Communique issued 
following a meeting between President Moi and President 
Nyerere, who had travelled to Nairobi to pay a farewell 
courtesy calIon President Moi. In that meeting, 
Nyerere and Moi agreed that no East African Country 
would intervene militarily in the Uganda conflict. They 
103 Weekly Topic, 1 November 1985 p.1. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Sunday NatiC'n, 29 September 1985 p.32. 
106 Ibid., p.l. 
stated the joint position that Kenya and Tanzania were 
not prepared to intervene militarily in Uganda's ci~il 
war. They also warned that unless the Ugandans laid 
down their arms, and an agreed Ugandan government asked 
for help in training a new national army, no East 
African country, either singly or jointly, would 
participate in a peacekeeping force in Uganda. 107 
Two things need to be noted about this Kenya-Tanzanian 
carrot and stick policy. The' carrot', that neither 
country was 'prepared' to intervene militarily, was a 
very mild one indeed. The 'stick' was stronger: by 
saying that they would not participate In a peacekeeping 
force In the absence of a request by an agreed on 
government of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania gave a clear 
signal that if the Ugandan parties failed to agree, 
neither of the two countries would involve itself in the 
conflict any longer. 
The second significant development during this 
adjournment was the first threat by the mediator that 
unless the parties reached an agreement during the 
fourth seSSlon, he would cease to be a party to the 
mediation. 108 This threat lS discussed later In this 
chapter, but it is worth noting that the reason advanced 
for the threat were the numerous adjournments requested 
by the negotiating parties. 109 
The Fourth Phase 
Agreement was virtually reached on the outstanding 
issues during the fourth phase, which took place during 
the heaviest fighting between the two sides. 
Significantly, both Tito Okello and Museveni attended 
this session: Okello for the first time, and Museveni 
for the first time since the second adjournment. The 
107 Text of the communique is reproduced in Sunday Nation, 27 
O b 1985 5 se e also p.1 on a press conference by Nyerere. cto er p. ; 
108 The Weekly Review, 25 October 1985 p.9. 
109 See The Weekly Review, 25 October 1985 p.9; indeed, ~he fourth 
. f·l d to begin as scheduled because most of the t
T
JI:lda 
seSSlon al e . b t d· the 
government delegates involved were sald to e at en lng ~ 
Commonwealth summit in Bahamas: Weekly Review, 25 October 1985 p.9. 
issues negotiated during this phase were representation 
in the Military Council, disarmament and a peacekeeping 
force, the status of the other fightl'ng groups, a 
ceasefire, and eX-Amin soldiers. 
For the first time, the government accepted the 
notion of power sharing with the NRM in an expanded 
Military Council. 110 It offered Museveni the Vice 
Chairmanship of the Military Council, and seven seats 
for the NRA in the Council. The government was however 
still keen on some foreign 'assistance' to monitor the 
process of complete disarmament and the building of a 
new national army. Indeed, it proposed an expansion of 
such foreign forces to include Nigeria, India and 
Canada. 111 It also maintained the position that the new 
national army should be broad- based and representative 
of the country as a whole, rather than being a simple 
merger of existing forces. In its view, all the fighting 
groups should also be represented ln the Military 
Council, since "the exclusion of certain groups from the 
political process had bedevilled the country's recent 
history. ,,112 For the first time also, the government 
floated the proposal that a national conference 
representative of the whole country be convened later to 
discuss such key issues as the future constitutional 
framework, elections, and the length of the interim 
period. 113 
The NRM accepted the seven seats offered by the 
government provided the UNLA had a similar number, but 
took a hard position regarding the other fighting 
groups. The NRM now argued that the situation had 
changed since the last phase. In its view, Slnce the 
other groups had taken up arms against the NRA, they had 
110 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vo1.31 No.12 (1985) p.34025. 
111 The Weekly Review, 1 November 1985 p.4. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
become effectively "enemies of the NRM" 114 It th f . ere ore 
submitted that the de facto position on the ground was 
that there were two belligerents on the field: the NRA 
on the one hand, and the UNLA supported by the other 
fighting groups on the other, and" [in] this case, the 
fighting groups had forfeited their privilege of being 
represented on the Military Council as separate 
entities."11s Hence its proposal that there be one seat 
for the Chairman and Head of State, seven seats each for 
the UNLA and the NRM, and that the fully constituted 
Military Council should later consider co-opting the 
other groups. 
The NRM maintained its position that complete 
disarmament was not necessary to achieve a genulne 
peace. It suggested that the nucleus of the new army 
comprise an equal number of carefully selected officers 
and men from the NRA and the UNLA: and that while that 
nucleus army should be armed, all other fighting groups 
and security forces would be disarmed, and placed in 
specified assembly points awaiting their absorption into 
other security organs, or a return to civilian life. 116 
It maintained its earlier position on ex-Amin men. But 
it softened its position somewhat by arguing that while 
ln principle officers who had served under Amin should 
not serve in the new army, they could be allowed to 
serve if that was necessary to fill in places, provided 
that they were carefully vetted and screened. At this 
stage, the NRM dropped its objection to foreign forces, 
but insisted that such forces should be observers rather 
than peacekeeping forces. In their view, "history has 
shown that peacekeeping forces are not effective" I 117 
and a foreign peacekeeping force would impinge on the 
sovereignty of Uganda. 
114 Ibid., p.5. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
11 7 Ibid. 
The NRM offered to effect an immedl'ate ' ceaseflre, 
but attached a qualifier, and two stringent conditions 
to the offer. It stated that the ceasefire should only 
be for the duration of the current phase; that it should 
only be implemented after the dismissal from the armed 
forces of troops formerly loyal to Amin, and the court 
martial of those of them who had been accused of 
committing crimes against civilians since the July 
COUp.118 Further, and even more stringent, the NRM 
stated that such a ceasefire should be implemented In a 
way that did not change the de facto position of the two 
forces on the ground. Furthermore, the ceasefire should 
not be construed to require the opening of roads and 
removing of mines, and should be limited to actual 
fighting and the immediate cessation of all acts In 
violation of the human rights of the civilian 
population. 119 
Not surprisingly, the government delegation found 
these demands difficult, and in its view unrealistic. 
The greatest difficulty, was with the ex-Amin soldiers, 
and the exclusion of the other fighting groups from the 
Military Council. On the former, it argued that since 
the July coup, many Ugandan soldiers had returned from 
exile in Zaire and the Sudan, and being citizens were 
entitled to join the army if they wished. On the 
latter, the government delegation argued that to demand 
for the exclusion of the other fighting groups In effect 
escalated the conflict to another level. It therefore 
considered the demands of the NRM to be unrealistic, and 
not "based on any obj ect i ve cri teria . ,,120 wi th the 
positions of the two parties thus stalemated, the fourth 
phase of the mediation was adj ourned to facilitate 
consultations. However, the points of disagreement had 
118 Keesing's Contemporary Archives op.cit., p.3..J:025. 
119 The Weekly Review, 1 November, 1985 pp.4-5. 
120 Ibid., p.5. 
sufficiently narrowed for a joint drafting committee to 
be formed to draft what had already been agreed upon .121 
During this adj ournment, heavy fighting between the 
UNLA and the NRA continued, leading inter alia to the 
siege of Mbarara. 122 The most dramatic development 
however, was the announcement by Museveni on 4 November , 
that the NRM had set up its own interim administration 
in those areas already under its control, pending an 
agreement with the military government .123 The NRM 
explained this action as purely humanitarian, and 
disclosed that it had already appointed a Chief 
Administrator, and established seventeen departments to 
deal inter alia with finance, education, and 
minerals. 124 The military 
alleging that Museveni and 
government responded 
the NRM were seeking 
by 
to 
polarise Uganda, to divide it into Bantu and Nilotic 
factions, and exploiting their differences in order to 
galn power in Uganda. 
NRM of having no 
It also accused Museveni and the 
respect for the internal and 
international boundaries of Uganda. The DP also issued 
a statement in which it attacked Museveni of trying to 
divide Uganda, and of frustrating progress ln the 
Nairobi mediation. 125 
The Fifth Phase 
The fifth phase of the mediation took place over 
several sessions, ln between which part of the 
government delegation travelled back and forth to 
Kampala to hold consultations with the Military Council. 
In this phase, agreement was reached on future 
representation in the Military Council. The NRM agreed 
eventually on the representation of the other fighting 
121 The Weekly Review, 8 November 1985 p .16. 
122 See Sunday Nation, 17 November 1985 pp.1,5. 
123 The Weekly Review, 8 November 1985 p .16. 
124 Keesing's Contemporary Archi'l.Tes op.cit., p.34026. 
125 The Weekly Review, 8 N~;\'ember 1985 p .16. 
groups 1n the Council, and accepted the government's 
proposals that there be one seat for the Chairman and 
Head of State, seven seats each for the UNLA and NRA, 
two seats for FEDEMU, and one each for FUNA, UFM and 
UNRF.126 In addit1' on, l't was d h agree t at the composition 
of the new national army consist of 3,700 men for the 
UNLA, 3,580 men for the NRM, and 1,200 for the other 
four fighting groups .127 Although the NRM would have 
preferred strict parity in the representation of the NRA 
in the new national army, its proposal that recruits be 
vet ted was accepted by the government. 128 Most of the 
discussion that followed during the rest of this phase 
was concerned with the technicalities of drafting. 
Military developments however did not reflect the 
terms reached at the negotiations. During this phase 
and in the period after, fighting escalated to such an 
extent that it was thought that the whole peace process 
would collapse .129 This escalation of hostilities even 
as the negotiators were hammering out a final agreement, 
reflected the concurrent military and political tracks 
that had co-existed uneasily throughout the mediation. 
The NRM's declaration of an interim administration In 
those parts of the country under its control was an 
early indicator that the NRM was beginning to lean 
towards the military track, as was Museveni's statement 
at a press conference on December 1 that the talks must 
be over by the end of that week, and" [i]f they do not 
f 1 , bl" 130 end then there are other ways 0 so v1ng pro ems. 
Several signing ceremonies in Nairobi failed to 
take place because of the non-attendance by the military 
government delegation, which was said to be holding 
126 See Article 2 (1) of the Agreement. 
127 See Article 7 (1) of the Agreement. 
128 See Article 7 (2) of the Agreement. 
129 See The Weekly Review, 6 December 1985 pp.l0-ll. 
130 Daily Nation, 2 December 1985 p.l. 
meetings to discuss the draft Agreement with the army 
commanders 1n Kampala. 131 This suggested that the 
military government was divided as to which of the two 
tracks to follow. This is the background of uncertainty 
against which the mediator issued the second of his 
ultimata, when he told the two parties to "[e]ither sign 
the treaty ... or go back to Uganda and continue 
fighting,,132 The effect of this threat and Museveni' s 
response to it will be considered in a later section. 
But it 1S worth observing that the response was 
responsible for the cool relations between the two for 
the rest of the mediation, and indeed, even after 
Museveni took over power in Uganda. 133 
New Demands and the December 13 Consultations 
The signing of the Nairobi Agreement was postponed 
several times. During the periods in between, the two 
parties engaged 1n rna] or military battles, 134 and blamed 
each other for the delay in signing the Agreement135 and 
of raising fresh demands through the press. 136 It was 
not, however, until 11 December that the Military 
Council, significantly through a press release, raised 
three "outstanding issues" which it required the NRM to 
act on before the Agreement could be signed. 
The first issue was that the NRM dissolve its 
interim administration in western Uganda, Slnce such an 
administration constituted a "grave threat to the 
integrity of uganda".137 The government further required 
the NRM publicly to revoke its administration there. 
131 See The Weekly Review, 6 December 1985 p .10. 
132 Ibid. 
133 This insight was conveyed to the author in an interview with 
a senior Kenyan foreign service official, Kampala, 20 May, 1993. 
134 See The Weekly Review, 6 December 1985 P .11. 
135 See for example, Daily Nation, 7 December 1985 pp.1,24. 
136 Daily Nation, 9 December 1985 pp .1,24. 
137 Daily Nation, 12 December 1985 P .1. 
The second issue was that the ratio of recruitment to 
the new national army that had been agreed on during the 
negotiations should not necessarily be followed in 
future recruitment. The Military Council argued that 
the Agreement formula had been accepted only for the 
purposes of making an "immediate start", and could not 
be extended beyond the initial period. It contended 
further that if the Agreement formula was to be made 
permanent, it would negate the importance of creating a 
broad based and representative national army. 138 The 
third issue was that the details of the operations of 
the Joint Implementation Committee (JIC) be deferred and 
dealt with by the fully constituted Military Council 
after the Agreement was signed. 139 
These lssues were the subj ect of a negotiating 
seSSlon held on 13 December. This seSSlon reached 
compromises on some of the issues. There is no record 
that the NRM publicly revoked their interim 
administration, or at all. However, the terms of the 
Nairobi Agreement suggest that an accommodation was 
worked out on the ratio of recruitment into the new 
national army after the initial period. There is thus 
provision for the formulation of a new defence policy to 
determine the functions, s~ze, nature, name and 
composi tion of the new national army. 140 On the subj ect 
of the JIC, the Agreement dropped reference to a joint 
implementation committee, and instead placed the 
responsibility for implementation on the Military 
Council. 141 While this was a concession to the 
government, the later provision that in the process of 
such implementation the Military Council would not be 
bound by the two thirds majority rule, but by consensus, 
was a concession to the NRM which had wanted to have a 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Article 1 (a). Emphasis added. 
141 Article 17(1). 
j oint implementation council. 142 The importance of this 
session however, lies not so much in the accommodation 
that was reached, but in two events which indicated the 
nature of the military government's decision making, and 
suggest why the mediation dragged on for so many months. 
Although Tito Okello was present at the December 13 
meeting, he left before the session was over, and was 
said to have done so in order "to telephone his Military 
Council colleagues in Kampala to discuss the obstacles 
that had held up the signing of the accord. ,,143 
Secondly, al though the signing was scheduled to take 
place the following day, this did not happen because of 
the "non-arrival later in the day, of two members of the 
Ugandan delegation who had left early In the morning for 
further consultations with other members of the Military 
Council In Kampala". 144 These two events suggest that 
either the military government's preparation for the 
mediation and its general decision making were erratic, 
or that there was a fear within the ranks of the 
negotiators of a problem of re-entry, or both. 
A Technical Assessment of the Mediation Stage 
There are certain factors regarding the mediation 
stage which, because they affected the conduct and 
outcome of the negotiations, merit further discussion. 
These are the strategies adopted by the parties, the 
cohesiveness of the delegations, the threats by the 
mediator, and the negotiating environment. 
The Strategies Adopted by the Parties 
Two main strategies marked the Uganda mediation. 
These were the non-attendance of the leaders of both 
delegations at many of the sessions, and the use of 
adjournments as a negotiating tactic. 
142 Article 17(2). 
143 Daily Nation, 14 December 1985 p .1. 
144 Sunday I\:cltion, 15 December 1985 p.l. 
Tito Okello's rationale In not attending the 
negotiations failed, because t 1 no on y were military 
matters discussed In the t' t' nego la lons, but questions 
were also raised about his good faith, leading to 
Museveni's decision not to attend some of the sessions. 
Thus, when Tito Okello stayed away from the mediation, 
the NRM saw this as evidence that the military 
government was not taking the mediation seriously 
enough. After Tito Okello failed to attend the second 
phase of the negotiations, Museveni also decided to stay 
away. The NRM argued that Tito Okello was staying away 
because he was too busy preparing his forces, and in 
those circumstances, Museveni concluded that he too had 
to go back and mobilise his own forces. 145 
Adjournments as a Negotiating Tactic 
Tito Okello's non-attendance was linked to the 
adoption by the government side of adj ournments as a 
negotiating tactic. There are two ways of interpreting 
the government delegation's resort to adjournments. 
Firstly, that because their chairman was not present at 
most of the sessions, they needed the adjournments In 
order to consult him. Secondly, that the true authority 
in Uganda was the Military Council, and the delegation 
had no power to agree on anything without clearance by 
the Council. 146 The second of these arguments lS the 
more compelling. 
resided In the 
Evidently the locus of power in Uganda 
Military Council since Tito Okello 
himself was forced to consult it before binding the 
government, as was suggested by his telephoning Kampala 
during the crucial December 13 session. Tito Okello was 
also operating from a very weak position. Although the 
decision to negotiate was partly aimed at placating 
those in the Military Council who favoured negotiations, 
145 See The Weekly Review, 25 October 1985 p. 9. 
146 As Bercovitch notes, if representatives lack power or authori~y 
to take decisions or make concessions, the process of meaningful 
conflict settlement becomes difficult. See Bercovitch,J. 
'International Mediation: A Study of the Incidence, Strategies and 
Condi t ions of Successful Outcomes' 21 Ceni lict ani Coopera tion (1986) 
pp.155-168:160. 
some of these wanted Tito Okello to stay in power for 
some time, pending their establishing themselves in a 
position where they could take over power from him. H~ 
There were however some diehards ln the Military 
Council, such as Basilio Okello, who were convinced that 
the NRA could be defeated militarily. 
Because of this disunity in the Military Council, 
developments at the negotiations needed to be debated in 
the Council as the mediation proceeded. Although Tito 
Okello tried to placate the NRM and some in the Military 
Council by dismissing Muwanga on the eve of the 
mediation, his hands nevertheless remained tied by the 
dissension within the Council. Tito Okello's great 
weakness was in not being able to read the nuances of 
the power play amongst members of the Council. As he was 
unable to do this, his own later attendance did not 
help, and the negotiations became extremely difficult to 
conduct14B because of the need to conduct 'negotiations 
within negotiations' in the Military Council during the 
adjournments. 
Cohesiveness of the Delegations 
The internal cohesion of a party, and whether it 
can be maintained has been identified a crucial variable 
ln determining the outcome of mediation .149 Not 
surprisingly, the disunity in the Military Council was 
reflected in the government delegation to the 
mediation,150 and ln this they played into the NRM's 
hands. The government delegation's hands were already 
tied for lack of a clear line of authority and decision 
making back home. Therefore, it resorted to requesting 
147 See Chapter 6. 
148 See Mukwaya, op.cit. 
149 See Mitchell,C.R. The Structure of International Conflict 
(London: Macmillan, 1981) p.187. 
150 According to a Kenyan participant in the mediatio~ ,in a 
communication with the author dated 18 November 1994, the mllltahry 
, 1 f' t t" and was hence t e government's delegatlon had a "mot ey 0 ln eres s I 
less well organised of the two. 
frequent adjournments for consultations, and thus risked 
being seen as the one delaying progress In the 
mediation. The NRM took advantage of this by engaging in 
brinkmanship, particularly by insisting on taking 
positions which appeared inflexible. It was able to do 
this because unlike the government side, the NRM had a 
clear line of authority. Museveni's presence at many of 
the sessions meant further that decisions could be 
reached without the need for further consultations. 
There is evidence that the NRM's brinkmanship was not 
uninformed, and was backed by 'intelligence' about the 
thinking of the government delegation. Thus, the NRM 
delegation made inroads into the government delegation, 
by establishing contacts with some of its members. 
Hence, the NRM was able to avail itself of vital 
intelligence provided to it by contacts 
government delegation. 151 
The Threats by the Mediator 
In the 
There were two threats issued by the mediator 
during the whole mediation. The first was on 20 October, 
when President Moi warned the parties that unless they 
reached a settlement during the fourth phase, he would 
withdraw from the mediation. 152 The second was issued on 
2 December, when he told the parties either to sign the 
Agreement or go back to Uganda and continue fighting. 153 
These threats were made out of frustration with the 
parties, whom Moi thought were taking too long to reach 
an agreement, and were not showing a sufficient 
commi tment to the peace process. 154 
The reason given for the first threat In October 
was that there were too many requests for adjournments. 
That apart, during this period the fighting in Uganda 
151 See Ocan, op.cit. 
152 The Weekly Review, 25 October 1985 p. 9. 
153 The Weekly Review, 6 December 1985 p .10. 
154 This insight was gained from B.A.Kiplagat (Permanen~ 
1983-1991) in an Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya, 
interview with the author, Nairobi, 4 June 1993. 
intensified, and the mediator was forced constantly to 
urge the parties to observe 
the mediation a chance 
a ceasefire in order to give 
to work. 155 The continued 
fighting raised questions in the mediator's mind as to 
whether the parties were in earnest about working out an 
agreement, or whether they had decided on a military 
option.
156 
It is significant that after this threat was 
issued, the parties came back to the negotiating table, 
and made significant progress during the fourth phase. 
The second threat was issued after the signing of 
the Agreement had been postponed several times by the 
non-attendance of the government delegation. This non-
attendance was explained by the fact that the government 
delegation was still busy consulting with the Military 
Council in Kampala, and on one occasion, because some in 
the delegation were said to be away attending the 
Commonwealth summit in the Bahamas. The second of the 
mediator's threats was made on the same day that the NRM 
"threatened to return to the battle front if a peace 
agreement from the Nairobi talks is not signed by the 
end of [the] week. ,,157 It is difficult to tell which of 
these two threats worked: but significantly, after the 
second threat, Tito Okello sent a special message to 
President Moi, carried personally by General Basilio 
Okello,158 and a final negotiating session was held on 
13 December, with the Agreement being signed eventually 
on 17 December 1985. 
What lS illustrative here however, is Museveni's 
response to the second threat issued by the mediator. 
155 This problem has also arisen in the current (1994) Sudanese 
mediation being held under the auspices of IGADD (Int~r-Gover~ment~l 
Authority on Drought and Development) chaired ~y ~resldent MOl: H1S 
call for a ceasefire as the mediation was contlnulng resulted ln the 
formalisation of one from July 25 1994. But the Sudanese governmen~ 
. . I nly See The Standard may have accepted 1 t for tactlca reasons 0 . 
(Nairobi) 24 July, 1994, p.6. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Daily Nation, 2 December 1985 p.l. 
158 See The Kenya Times, 3 December 1985 p.l. 
His response was that "We did not force President Moi to 
chair the talks ... It lS an honour for him to be the 
vanguard of this peace process ... I am not going to be 
intimidated by that ... We can go back home and talk 
there. ,,159 Th' s l response suggests that at that stage the 
NRM felt confident that it could pursue the military 
option to ending the conflict. Furthermore it suggests 
that the negotiating environment had been damaged 
irreparably, and in a way in which the parties lost 
their faith in the whole process, and possibly also in 
the mediator. 
The Negotiating Environment 
From October 1985 onwards, the tempo of military 
engagement between the two parties increased 
significantly. This raised doubts as to whether the 
parties were committed to a peaceful solution to the 
conflict, or whether they had decided on a military 
solution. Indeed, the threats by the mediator to pull 
out are best seen In this light. The escalation In 
fighting was partly responsible for negatively affecting 
the negotiating environment. From the point of view of 
the NRM, Tito Okello's continued non-attendance while 
the UNLA repeatedly engaged NRA forces rendered the 
negotiating environment almost irrevocably unsuited to 
serious negotiations. From the Military Council's point 







heightened by intelligence 
to Okello's troops In the 
north.160 
supplied 
It also provided the Okello with 
satellite intelligence, which showed arms from Tanzania 
being delivered to the NRM by ship to Masaka, which the 
NRA captured soon thereafter. 161 This latter development 
convinced the Military Council that the NRM was not 
159 The Weekly Review, 6 December 1985 p.11. 
160 Kiplagat, op.cit. 
161 See Ocan, op.cit. 
committed to a peaceful solution, and may explain why 
the fighting increased at that stage of the mediation. 
Taken together, these external influences on the 
negotiating environment led to the conclusion amongst 
the parties that this environment was irremediably 
poisoned. They therefore lost faith In the whole 
process, as was witnessed by the resumed fighting 
between them during the mediation .162 Indeed, by the 
conclusion of the mediation, neither party expected 
anything useful to come out of it, 163 or indeed, had any 
intention of abiding by any agreement reached. 164 In the 
end, the parties only attended the signing ceremony as 
a personal courtesy to President Moi. 165 
The Implementation Stage 
Once the Agreement was signed on 17 December 1985, 
the problems of its implementation became manifest. 
These were complicated because by then, the commitment 
of the parties to its success was less than full. In 
turn, this was further compounded by the whole bilateral 
nature of the process, which occasioned severe problems 
of re-entry. This section will summarise the main terms 
of the Agreement, and consider the problems and efforts 
at its implementation, and its eventual breakdown. A 
critical comment on the Agreement will be offered 
thereafter. 
The Nairobi Peace Agreement 
The Nairobi Peace Agreement (or The Uganda Peace 
Talks Agreement) is a fairly brief document, containing 
eighteen articles, and four substantive annexes. It 
covered the main items of the agendas proposed by both 
parties at the beginning of the mediation. It provided 
for a ceasefire to be effective on the day of signature, 
and included many of the terms of the ceasefire proposed 
162 Oean, op. eit. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Kabwegyere, op.eit. 
165 Oean, op.eit. 
by the NRM during the fourth phase of the mediation. 
For example, it provided that all members of the 
security forces or any combatant forces who had violated 
human rights since 27 July 1985 would be punished, and 
such disciplining would become a routine practice .166 It 
also established the representation in a twenty member 
Military Council, with the Chairman and Head of State 
having one seat, the UNLA seven seats, the NRA seven 
seats, FEDEMU two seats, and the FUNA, UNRF and UFM 
having one seat each. 167 The Agreement provided further 
that the Head of State at the time of slgnlng would be 
the Head of State and Chairman of the Military 
Council,168 that the Chairman of the High Command of the 
NRA would be the Vice Chairman,169 and that at no time 
should the Chairman and Vice Chairman be members of the 
same political party or combatant force .170 It further 
provided that all powers of the Head of State should be 
exercised by him in Council, 171 and that decisions of 
the Military Council would be by consensus, except In 
matters affecting the provisions of the Agreement, the 
interim period and its programme, political appointments 
and promotions including those to the security services, 
review of decrees, rehabilitation of war ravaged areas, 
violations of human rights, promulgation of a new 
constitution, and the admission and dismissal of members 
to the Military Council, which would be decided by a two 
thirds maj ority, reached by secret ballot. 172 
Article 6 of the Agreement provided for the 
formulation of a National Code of Conduct, to prescribe 
166 Article 1 (g) of the Agreement. 
167 Article 2 (1) of the Agreement. 
168 Articles 3(1) and 3(4) of the Agreement. 
169 Article 1 (5) . 
170 Article 1 (7) . 
171 Article 4 (2) of the Agreement. 
172 Article 1 (a) to Article 1 (g) . 
of the Military the qualifications for membership 
Council, the Cabinet, and other public 
the formulation of such a code, it 
offices. Pending 
provided that the 
42 of the 1967 
. . 
proVlslons of articles 41 and 
constitution would apply. 173 The provisions regarding 
the new national army, its Slze and representation 
reflected, but only barely, the preoccupation of the 
UNLA with its pre-eminence. Thus the Agreement provided 
that the new 8,480 man army would be composed of 3,700 
soldiers from the UNLA, 3,580 from the NRA, and 1,200 
from FEDEMU, UFM, UNRF and FUNA.174 In addition, the 
personnel of the new army would be selected and vetted 
by a committee established by the Military Council. 
The Agreement provided for a Monitoring or Observer 
Force, to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire, 
assist in disarmament, monitor the movement of troops to 
agreed assembly points, assist in the collection of arms 
from demobilised soldiers, and in the recruitment and 
training of the new national army. 175 Such a Monitoring 
or Observer force would be invited by the Uganda 
government from four Commonweal th countries, namely, 
Kenya, Tanzania, the Uni ted Kingdom and Canada. 176 
Significantly, of these four, only Kenya and Tanzania 
had indicated their willingness to participate subject 
to the conditions mentioned earlier. There 1S no 
evidence that Canada was approached, and the Uni ted 
Kingdom declined to send a force to Uganda on the basis 
that it was not party to the Agreement, and that it was 
. 177 for the Ugandans themselves to superv1se any peace. 
173 These are on qualifications for appointment to the cabinet and 
public offices. This is interesting, given the problems of the 1967 
constitution: see Chapter 5. 
174 Article 7(1) of the Agreement. 
175 Article 10 (1) (a) to Article 10 (1) (g) . 
176 Article 10 (1) . 
177 The Kenya Times, 19 December, 1985 p.9, quoting th~ Minis,::~r 
of State in the Foreign and Comm~nweal~h Off~ce, Malco~ R~fkl~J. ~I~~: 
legalistic response masks the Unlted Klngdom s unea.se In. l;S rela
1 
'on 
with Uganda. It had had its fingers burnt before ln Amln s expu Sl 
It did, however, send SlX military advisers to liaise 
wi th both sides, and to advise on redeployment and 
training once the Peace Agreement was signed. 1-8 
In what was a significant victory for the NRM, the 
Agreement provided that persons who served in Idi Amin's 
regime and who were known to have committed "atrocities 
and other heinous crimes" would be punished, and that 
persons who had served in the State Research Bureau in 
Amin' s regime should be inel igible to join the new 
national army. It also provided that soldiers who served 
in the army during Amin's rule, but who did not fall 
into these two categories, would be vetted and screened 
before being allowed to join the new national army. 179 
It lS noteworthy that al though this was a bilateral 
agreement between the military government and the NRM, 
the Agreement provided in article 15 that a national 
convention would be convened to discuss inter alia, the 
tenure of the interim government, the future 
constitutional framework, elections, and the national 
army. Participation at such a convention would consist 
of representatives from all districts, national 
institutions, political parties, religious groups and 
the Military Council. 
Obstacles to the Implementation of the Nairobi Agreement 
Although it was on the face of it as reasonable a 
document as could be hoped for in the circumstances, the 
implementation of 
encountered several 
its abrogation and 
between the parties. 
the Nairobi Peace Agreement 
difficulties which led eventually to 
to the resumption of hostilities 
Probably the biggest impediment to 
its implementation was the fact that although negotiated 
of the Asians in 1972, and humiliated in the Dennis Hill affair: See 
Kyemba,H. State of Blood: The Inside Story of Idi Amin's ~eign 
of Fear (London: Corgi, 1977). But it had nevertheless contlnu~d 
trading with Uganda even during the human rights exce~ses of the Aml~ 
and abote regimes. It therefore probably feared that If the Agreemen L 
failed, its relations with Uganda would worsen. 
178 See Daily Nation, 7 December 1985 pp.1,24. 
179 Article 13 of the Agreement. 
over so many months, the Agreement did not manage to 
break the psychological barriers that existed between 
the two parties. 
There is some evidence that the military government 
moved fast in trying to implement the provisions of the 
Agreement. Thus, the Reconnaisance team which was to 
assess the requirements of the Monitoring and Observer 
team was invited with dispatch, and arrived in Kampala 
on 21 December. 180 In addition, the military government 
began taking steps, like establishing identities, 
towards the release of NRA/NRM political prisoners, ln 
accordance with article 1 (h) of the Agreement. 181 
However, the implementation of the Agreement 
required cooperation between the two parties, and this 
was slow ln forthcoming. For example, by the end of 
December, the full Military Council was not yet 
constituted because the NRA had yet to name its nomlnees 
to the Council. 182 Although the military government 
claimed that the ceasefire required under the Agreement 
was in place and holding, 183 there were press reports 
that the violence ln the country was continuing 
unabated: and that the UNLA was to blame for this 
violence, Slnce Tito Okello could not control his 
troops.184 There is evidence that UNLA troops were 
and terrorising of responsible for some of the looting 
civilians after the Agreement was 
suggested that they did this in the 
signed. It was 
belief that the 
signing of the Agreement would signal the end of their 
employment ln the Uganda army. That Tito Okello 
requested the international community for three hundred 
180 See Sunday Nation, 22 December 1985 p.l. 
181 See The Kenya Times, 23 December 1985 P .1. 
182 According to the Foreign Minister, Olara 
interview in The Sunday Times, 29 December 1985 p.4. 
183 Ibid. 
Otunnu in an 
184 See Weekly Topic, 30 December 1985 p.1; also, The Sun--iay 
Times, 24 December 1985 p.24. 
million dollars to resettle the disarmed and demobilised 
soldiers lends credence to this view. 185 The NRM 
considered these activities of the UNLA soldiers to 
constitute a breach of the Agreement, and indeed called 
on Okello to resign or face 'action' by the NRA in 
"defence of suffering Ugandans". 186 But the government 
also accused the NRA of breaching the Agreement 
especially by launching offensives against government 
troops, and refusing to open a key road to the south-
west of Uganda. Tito Okello and his government saw 
these actions as a violation of the letter and spirit of 
the Nairobi Peace Agreement. 187 
Apart from the problem of re-entry which both 
parties faced, there was also a psychological and a 
military reason why the Agreement failed to be 
implemented. The psychological reason was that the NRM 
did not believe that the government had accepted it in 
good faith: and that therefore the military government 
would continue to perpetrate terror in Uganda, thus 
rendering the marrlage between them unworkable. 1BB 
Further, during the implementation period the NRM came 
to the conclusion that both it and the government still 
had a different vision of a peaceful Uganda, and that 
there was no common purpose between them. 189 Therefore, 
the NRM considered itself compelled to abrogate the 
Agreement, in order to continue and complete the war, 
thereby putting in place its own policies in Uganda 
without the obstacle of the accommodations reached in 
Nairobi.190 This psychological divide between the two 
parties was sharply illustrated by a speech which Tito 
185 The Weekly Review, 3 January 1986 p .11. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid., pp.11-12. 
188 Ambassador Tomusange, op.cit. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
Okello made upon return from the signing, ln which he 
referred to the salambwa (poisonous k) b . sna e elng finally 
tamed. 191 This, th h' more an anyt lng else contributed to 
the loss of confidence within the NRM that peace would 
be achieved just because an Agreement had been signed, 
and that 
"the peace pact was a trap for the NRA/NRM who 
were called in to join the round table in a' room 
where the doors would be locked once they had 
entered. It was the same old game again: bring in 
your opponents, use them for as long as you need 
them, and then eliminate them. ,,192 
The military reason which operated against the 
implementation of the Nairobi Agreement had its roots in 
the negotiation period. During that period, the two 
sides were not willing to agree on fundamental lssues, 
hence the many delaying adjornments. Museveni was aware 
that Tito Okello was not leading a very stable regime, 
and that he was therefore using the negotiations to buy 
time to stabilise his reglme. But the NRM was also 
using the negotiations to consolidate their military 
position. Given these circumstances, neither side 
eventually believed fully ln the mediation as a means of 
attaining peace in Uganda. Thus, at the back of both 
their minds was the belief that the sure solution to the 
conflict ln Uganda was a military one. Hence the 
fighting which continued during the negotiations. 
During that fighting, the NRA captured and controlled a 
substantial part of Ugandan territory, and felt 
confident enough to form an interim administration In 
western Uganda. In these circumstances, the NRM saw no 
t 193 reason to abide by the terms of the Agreemen . 
The Problem of Re-Entry 
191 See Museveni' s swearing in speech on 29 January, 1986: in 
Museveni,Y. What Is Africa's Problem? Speeches and l\'ritings on .:1,~rica 
op.cit., p.23. 
192 Mutibwa, P. Uganda Since Independence op.cit., pp.174-175. 
193 These views are partly articulated by Mukwaya, CF·cit. 
Apart from these psychologl'cal d ' an mllitary 
factors, the implementation of the N' alrobi Peace 
Agreement was greatly hampered because both sides 
experienced problems of re-entry. Although both parties 
experienced this problem in varying degrees, neither of 
them managed to convince their constituencies as to any 
merit in the arrangements made under the Agreement. 
The military government had the more severe 
problems of re-entry, which were experienced on two 
fronts. As was mentioned above, the ordinary soldiers 
were unwilling to surrender arms, because of the fear 
that implementation of the Agreement would leave them 
not only demobilised, but also unemployed. The other 
fighting groups which had allied themselves with the 
UNLA and the military government also began to question 
the whole philosophy behind a peace in Uganda based 
solely on a bilateral agreement between the government 
and the NRM. 
The other fighting groups had for some time argued 
that the agreement being negotiated In Nairobi was 
purely a negotiation between the military government and 
the NRM. Their perception of the Uganda peace process 
was therefore that any agreement reached between the 
government and the NRM was only one of what would be a 
series of bilateral arrangements between the government 
and all the parties involved. 194 In their oplnlon, as 
expressed In a statement of 31 October 1985, their 
agreement to be co-opted by the government was without 
prejudice to 'final agreements' about their full 
respective representation in the Military Council, 195 In 
their view therefore, the Nairobi negotiations between 
the government and the NRM were only a limited forum for 
peace in Uganda. The pressing for a national conference 
by the government during the talks, and the provision 
194 The only difference to them was that it had taken the NRj'; 
longer to reach a bilateral agreement with the mili~a~y government. 
This view was expressed for example by FEDEMU's publlClty secretary, 
interviewed in the Weekly Topic 30 December 1985, p.12. 
195 Weekly Topic, 1 November 1985 p .1. 
for such a conference in article 15 of the Agreement was 
intended to cater for this problem. This however does 
not seem to have settled the problem of these other 
groups, because they announced in November that since 
they were not party to the Nairobi negotiations, they 
would not be bound by the outcome .196 
with this kind of conceptual problem unresolved, it 
is not surprising that, like the government, the other 
fighting groups also experienced their own problems of 
re-entry, and were unable to sell the Nairobi Peace 
Agreement to their soldiers. 197 Hence like those of the 
UNLA, these soldiers completely declined to lay down 
their arms, and those of FUNA and the UNRF categorically 
refused to be demobilised. 198 Thus, with its own troops 
and those of its allies refusing to lay down their arms 
and continuing their looting and killing of civilians, 
"the regime could not implement the peace agreement in 
the area of security, which happened to be its most 
important part." 199 
The NRM also had its own problems of re-entry, 
whose sources were some of the fighting men in the NRA, 
and the public in the areas controlled by the NRA. The 
NRM's propaganda against the Obote and Tito Okello 
regimes during the war, was that the war was aimed at 
cleaning the system of those who had been responsible 
for the collapse of national institutions, and the 
killing of thousands of Ugandans. That this propaganda 
was effective was evident because some officers and men 
of the NRA insisted that there be a thorough sweep of 
196 Mirambo, K. 'The Juridical Basis of the Uganda Peace Talks' 
Weekly Topic, 25 November 1985 pp.4,ll:4. 
197 Tito Okello's statement at the signing ceremony that "There 
is no victor or vanquished under this settlement ... Th~ a~rangement 
entered into and the various responsibilities assigned wlthln the 
. f ower" was probably a Agreement do not represent an equatlon 0 p . 
.. . 1 h' h h h ped thus to stem. See Tlto reallsatl0n of thlS prob em, w lC eo. . 18 
Okello's speech at the signing ceremony ln The Kenya T~mes 
December 1985, p.5. 
198 Mutibwa, P. Uganda Since Independence op.cit., p.175. 
199 Ibid. 
the whole system. They maintained that the arrangements 
worked out In Nairobi would arrest this cleaning up 
process. They were therefore opposed not only to the 
negotiations, but also to any attempt by the NRM to 
implement the Nairobi Agreement. 200 
In addition to these, the citizens In the southern 
areas of Uganda which were controlled by the NRA made 
two representations. They maintained that it was now 
time to end the domination by northerners In Ugandan 
politics, and that the NRM should not therefore agree to 
any arrangements that would frustrate that process. 201 
They also argued that for the NRM to abide by the 
Nairobi Peace Agreement would open up their areas to 
government soldiers, whose notoriety for killings and 
other atrocities against civilians was nationwide. There 
was therefore great pressure from this constituency of 
the NRM not to abide by the terms of the Nairobi Peace 
Agreement. 202 The NRM was therefore caught in between 
being seen to implement the Agreement, but at the same 
time avoid giving the impression to its constituents 
that it had entered into an arrangement that was a "sell 
out. ,,203 
Comments on the Nairobi Peace Agreement 
A critical analysis of the Uganda mediation will be 
carried In Chapter Eight. But some comments on the 
process leading to the signing of the Nairobi Peace 
Agreement are in order, particularly in an effort to 
understand why, since it was meant to provide for peace 
in Uganda, it was abrogated within two months of its 
signature. 
Firstly, as the re-entry problems the military 
government experienced suggest, the participants at the 
mediation were too narrowly based. While it is true 
200 See Weekly Topic, 25 November 1985 p.12. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Mutibwa, P. Uganda Since In~iependence op.cit., p.l?3. 
that the government and the NRM were the two maj or 
forces, and although some of the political parties were 
represented through their leaders (such as 
of the DP, and Toko of the UNRF, who were 
government delegation), the negotiations 
stood a better chance had all the political 
fighting groups been incorporated into 
Ssemogerere 




process. Such a multilateral approach would have 
ensured that the interests of different parts of the 
Ugandan community were represented, and that the peace 
arrived at was truly comprehensive. Moreover, a 
multilateral framework might have reduced the 
psychological problems that the government and the NRM 
experienced with each other. 
Secondly, the eventual fate of the Nairobi Peace 
Agreement represented a failed strategy on the part of 
Tito Okello and his government. Their strategy was 
essentially, one of 'divide and rule'. They hoped by co-
opting the political parties and the other fighting 
groups to isolate the NRA/NRM, and thereby to put 
pressure on it to reach an agreement. The great failure 
of this strategy lay in its conceptual ineptitude. It 
was an attempt to enforce a framework for peace that was 
both bilateral and multilateral, but with little input 
from one to the other, and hence the re-entry problems 
that the government later experienced with the fighting 
groups. Since the government insisted on the bilateral 
approach, a more sophisticated arrangement might have 
been to construct a series of bilateral agreements 
between itself and the other parties, with the terms of 
such agreements being ratified eventually at a 
multilateral forum. 204 This would have been more time 
consuming, but with the active involvement and 
204 Something in the nature of the negotiations between Italy and 
Yugoslavia over Trieste, where separate bilateral ~egotiations between 
Britain and the United States with first, Yugoslav1a, then Italy, were 
later ratified at a multilateral forum between all of them. ~ee, 
Novak,B.C. Trieste,1941-1954: The Ethnic, Political and Ideolog~cal 
Struggle (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1970) 
p.450. 
participation of the mediator, it might have availed a 
more lasting path to peace. 
Thirdly, and this point will be touched on In the 
next chapter, the parties did not formalise a ceasefire 
to obtain during the mediation, and this contributed to 
the eventual fate of the Agreement. Instead, they 
operated on a ceasefire which because of its informality 
they did not feel constrained to observe. Neither, for 
that matter, did the mediator have a solid basis on 
which to insist that the parties cease hostilities, and 
concentrate on the political track to peace. In such a 
situation, one of the mediator's strong points is that 
he confers legitimacy and credibility to any agreement 
the parties may reach. Had the mediator insisted on a 
formal ceasefire, he would thereby have improved the 
likelihood of the parties' compliance with it, since the 
adversaries would have had an obligation to him.205 
Furthermore, had there been a formal ceasefire at the 
outset of the mediation, the parties may have felt less 
constrained to test each other militarily, which led to 
their conclusion that a military solution was possible. 
And their refusal to formalise a ceasefire may have 
prompted the mediator to withdraw at an early stage, 
since it would have suggested their lack of commitment 
to the mediation. 
Fourthly, proceeding directly to negotiation on 
complex technical matters ignored the need to try and 
bridge the psychological gap that existed between the 
parties. As was later evident in the implementation 
stage, this psychological barrier stood between the 
parties and the implementation of the Agreement. 
Tactically therefore, had the first sessions of the 
mediation been devoted more to breaking down (or at 
least reducing) these psychological barriers, than In 
205 See Kriesberg, L. 'Formal and (uasi -Mediators in Internat ional 
Disputes: An Exploratory Analysis' 28 Journal of Peace F:e:,::earch (1991) 
pp . 1 " - 2 7 : 25 . 
delving into highly contentious and complex mat ters, :06 
this might have contributed to the greater success of 
the mediation. 
Lastly, it may be true that as Kabwegyere has 
argued, the approach to the mediation was simplistic. 207 
By this criticism should be understood not just the 
conceptual approach, but the whole structural apparatus 
of the mediation. Conceptually, the conduct of the 
mediation was not particularly sophisticated. Because 
the ra~son d' etre of the whole exercise was seen as 
agreeing on, and signing (any) document, the complexity 
of the mediation process, and the multi-level character 
of the issues and process were not sufficiently taken on 
board, or at all. One of the criticisms levelled 
against the Agreement was that it was mainly concerned 
with perpetuating the regime in power in Uganda. 20B This 
is perhaps not surprising, given that the mediator was 
not only a neighbouring Head of State, who probably 
looked on the NRM as rebels, but was also 
heterogenous. 209 The Uganda mediation, and its outcome, 
might have been different had it been undertaken not by 
a lone heterogenous mediator, but by multiple mediators, 
at least one of whom was exogenous. 210 This idea 1S 
developed in the next chapter: but it needs noting here 
that as it was, the structural set up of the mediation, 
and the identity of the mediator probably created 
psychological barriers to recognising both parties as 
equal in the mediation, hence the perception about the 
Agreement noted above. 
206 See further, Chapter 8. 
207 Kabwegyere, op.cit. 
208 Mutibwa, P. Uganda Since Independence op. ci t ., p. 174. 
209 This concept is developed in the next chapter. Briefl~, it 
means that he is exogenous because he is an outside party, but 1: at 
the same time endogenous because he is from the same confl1ct sysem, 
and is therefore directly affected by the conflict. 
210 Thi s idea is mooted in Chapt er 1. 
Chapter Eight 
A Critical Analysis of the Uganda Mediation 
Introduction 
The analytical framework formulated for this study 
In Chapter One was based on the argument that In 
the process of analysing conflict, more than just 
mediation itself should be examined. It was posited 
should also take into that a proper analytical framework 
account the regional background 
question (Chapter Three); the 
of the conflict In 
institutional milieu 
within which the management of conflicts in the reglon 
takes place (Chapter Four); the historical background of 
the particular conflict (Chapter Five); its diplomatic 
context (Chapter Six), and its mediation context 
(Chapter Seven) . It was suggested that only by having 
this background in mind can the nuances and interplay of 
different levels In the process of a particular 
mediation, and its complexity be understood and 
appreciated. 
Chapter Seven carried a detailed account of the 
Uganda mediation, and considered its development from 
the pre-negotiation to the post-mediation stages. It 
was noted that although the Uganda mediation resulted In 
the signing of a Peace Agreement between the parties, it 
was abrogated within two months of its signature. That 
stage of the conflict ended effectively when the NRA 
seized Kampala, and Museveni was installed as President 
on 26 January 1986. 1 
1 This study is concerned with the Uganda con~li~t until, i~s 
management in the 1985 mediation. There were post-medlatlon confll~ts 
because as Vayrynen notes, future conflicts are founde~ on new SOC10-
economic transformations, and their management must walt for 'hese t~ 
reveal themselves. See Vayrynen,R. 'To Settle or to Trans:orrr .. 
, l' f N tl' nal and Internatlonal Perspectlves on the Reso utlon 0 a 0 
Several reasons were advanced for the bre~ity of 
the life of the Nairobi Peace Agreement. These include 
the problem of re-entry, poor choice of strategy on the 
part of the military government, and tactical failure 
especially to formalise a ceasefire to obtain during the 
mediation, and to take time, before engaging ln 
negotiation of technical matters, to bridge the 
psychological gap that existed between the parties. It 
was also suggested that usage of a single track of 
diplomacy, and the identity of the mediator may have 
contributed significantly to the outcome. 
This chapter will pull all those, and other threads 
together, ln a critical assessment of the Uganda 
mediation. At the outset, a comment will be offered on 
mediation outcomes and on whether the Uganda mediation 
was a success or a failure. Such an assessment involves 
more than simplistic judgmentalism: for, although the 
sum of a particular mediation may be judged to be a 
failure, some of its parts may still contain positive 
elements. Thus, the contribution of a particular 
mediation to knowledge does not rest only on the 
positive judgment as to its outcome. 2 
Certain other matters will be analysed under three 
broad headings: the technical aspects of the Uganda 
mediation (the question of impartiality, the technical 
conduct of the mediation, and the ripeness of the 
conflict for mediation); the environmental factors 
influencing the mediation particularly as they concern 
the mediator, and the diplomacy of the Uganda mediation. 
This latter will consider whether the correct diplomatic 
track was used in the mediation, and what an alternative 
approach might have been. 
Outcomes of Mediation 
. t . in Conflict- Theory: Conflicts' in Vayrynen,R. (Ed) New D~rec ~ons . 
f l . T forma t~ 0;] (London: S I }e Conflict Resolution and Con ~ct rans . 
Publications, 1991) pp.1-25:23. 
2 This point is also made by Haas, R. N. 
United States and Keqional Disputes (New 
University Press, 1990) pp.18-27. 
Conflicts Unend.~::.1: The 
Haven & Lond.m: Yale 
Bercovitch has identified three conceptual and 
methodological difficulties in the study of outcomes, 
which he argues is the most difficult part of the study 
of third party involvement in conflict. The first is 
the temporal problem of when intervention terminates, 
that is, at what time an examination of outcomes should 
commence. The second is the problem of the cri teria 
used for determining outcomes, since conflict outcomes 
rarely manifest themselves in clear-cut phenomena. The 
third is the problem of the perception of outcomes, 
which arises because outcomes that appear satisfactory 
to one party may be perceived by the other as containing 
the seeds of future conflict: and outcomes that are 
considered useful at one moment may subsequently be 
perceived as less useful. 3 To these, Kriesberg adds the 
further difficulty that while the mediation may have 
been excellent, the background circumstances may have 
been unsuitable; and whereas the mediation may have been 
clumsy, the conflict may still have moved towards a 
solution, the moment being ripe for resolution. 4 
Bercovitch further identifies five outcomes that 
may be considered successful. These are stopping 
hostilities, abating, isolating, restraining or settling 
conflict. 5 More succinctly, Bercovitch et al have 
formulated a 'success index' for successful mediation. 
By this, mediation is fully successful when it is given 
credit for making a great difference to, or settling a 
dispute; it is partially successful when its efforts 
initiate negotiations and some dialogue between the 
parties; it achieves limited success when it attains 
only a ceasefire or a break in hostilities; and lS 
3 Bercovitch,J. Social Conflict and Third Parties: Strategies of 
Conflict Resolution (Boulder,CO.: Westview Press, 1984) pp.112-113. 
4 Kriesberg,L. 'Formal and Quasi-Mediators in International 
Disputes: An Exploratory Analysis' 28 Journal of Peace Research (1991) 
pp.19-27:20. 
5 Bercovitch, J. Social Conflicts and Third Parties op.cit., 
p .114. 
unsuccessful when it has no discernible impact on the 
conflict.6 
Kriesberg offers a more parsimonious 'success 
index', namely that a successful outcome is one in which 
there is further movement in the course of a conflict, 
such that it moves from escalation to de-escalation; or 
where negotiations have moved towards an agreed upon 
settlement; or where a settlement contributes towards an 
enduring solution. 7 
To Burton, a successful outcome . 1S one 1n which 
resolution, rather than mere settlement, is achieved. 
In this view, traditional modes of dispute settlement 
address negotiable interests, while conflict resolution 
involves shared values such as identity and recognition, 
which are not negotiable. s Conflict resolution assumes 
that "given a full understanding of the shared goals, 
and an appreciation of the environmental constraints, 
the ... parties would ... resolve their conflict. ,,9 While 
settlement involves power bargaining and is likely to be 
short lived,lO resolution is based on the parties' 
analysis of the causes of their conflict, leading to 
resolution, which is positive for all, and hence more 
enduring. 11 Burton also refers to a 'special' meaning of 
settlement, where parties in power bargaining 
circumstances accept an agreement which does not satisfy 
6 Bercovitch, J., Anagnoson,J.T. & Wille,D. 'Some conceptual 
Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in 
International Relations' 28 Journal of Peace Research (1991) pp. 7-17: 9-
10i see also Chapter 2. 
7 F 1 and Quasl'-Mediators in International Kriesberg, 'orma 
Disputes' op.cit., p.19. 
8 Burton,J.W. 'Conflict Resolution as a Political ~hilosophy' in 
Sandole,D.J.D. & van der Merwe,H. (Eds) Conflict Resolut~on Theory an~ 
Practice: Integration and Application (Manchester & New York. 
Manchester University Press, 1993) pp.55-64:55. 
. C fll' ct Resolution' 9 Burton, J. W. 'Unfinished Business ln .on . 
Burton,J.W. & Dukes,F. (Eds) Conflict: Read~ngs ~n Management 
Resolution (London: Macmillan, 1990) pp.328-335:329. 
in 
and 
10 Burton,J.W. Conflict: Resolution and Provention 
Macmillan, 1990) pp.188-193. 
(London: 
11 Ib ' d 196 See also Chapter 1. 1 ., p. . 
expectations, demands or the . , requlrements of justice. 
Because such a set tlement may be acceptable 1.n the 
circumstances, the dispute could be said to be 
, resolved' .12 
The Outcome of the Uganda Mediation 
In Burtonian terms, the Uganda conflict was 
settled, not resolved. This is not surprising Slnce the 
mediation was undertaken within a power political 
framework. The three conceptual problems outlined by 
Bercovitch are manifest In the Uganda mediation, 
although In varylng degrees. Thus, although an 
Agreement was signed on 17 December 1985, the temporal 
problem arose from the provision that there was to be 
third party presence to monitor its implementation, 
hence the involvement of the third party was to continue 
after the mediation was over. The second problem is less 
manifest, because the parties were fairly well agreed as 
to the outcome they wanted, namely an Agreement that 
laid out the future structure of peace in Uganda, within 
a power sharing framework. The problem of perception of 
the Agreement also arose, since al though the parties 
were ad idem when they concluded the Peace Agreement, 
they (especially the NRM) came to view it later as an 
unsatisfactory basis on which to guarantee peace In 
Uganda. 
Quite clearly, the Uganda mediation was not fully 
successful: because of the temporal problem, it cannot 
be said whether the mediation can be "given credit for 
making a great difference to, or settling the 
dispute" .13 It created a structure of settlement which 
was short lived. However, the mediation was not wholly 
unsuccessful, because it cannot be argued that it made 
no discernible impact on the conflict. Al though the 
12 Burton,J.W. & Dukes,F. Conflict: Practices in Management, 
Settlement and Resolution (London: Macmillan, 199~) p.17? This idea 
of 'resolution' is akin to the layman's understandIng of the term: se~ 
Chapter 1. 
13 Bercovitch et ai, 'Some Conceptual Issues ~nd Empirical 7rends 
in the Study of Successful Mediation' op.cit., p.9. 
Agreement negotiated broke down Soon after the 
mediation, nevertheless the parties had sat down and 
engaged in dialogue for four months. And although the 
ceasefire that the parties had agreed upon before the 
mediation broke down during the negotiations, the 
resumed hostilities can be seen as a tactic by the 
parties to enhance their bargaining position, and partly 
as a consequence of the technical conduct of the 
mediation. Additionally, whereas the perceptions of the 
parties as to the felicity of the outcome later 
diverged, there is no doubt that at the completion of 
the mediation, they shared broadly similar perceptions 
on the utility of the outcome .14 The judgment on the 
Uganda mediation which 1S consistent with these 
considerations is therefore that it was partially 
successful. This conclusion 1S different from that 
commonly reached in the few writings on the Uganda peace 
process. The rare literature that even mentions the 
Uganda mediation does so en passant, and considers it a 
failure without presenting evidence .15 These writings 
overlook the fact that 
"failure 1S not easy to identify in actuality. 
Failure is always relative, depending on the goal 
that was sought and not attained. Various parties 
to a fight have different objectives, and those 
objectives shift in the course of a conflict and 
its settlement. ,,16 
Technical Aspects of the Uganda Mediation 
This section will analyse three ma1n technical 
issues arising from the Uganda mediation. These are the 
question of impartiality (or lack of it) in mediation, 
14 See the speeches of Tito Okello and Yoweri Museveni at the 
. . of the Agreement The Kenya Times 18 December 1985 slgnlng ceremony . . 
pp.5-6, 21. This view is also subscribed to by some senlor Ugandan 
officials interviewed by the author. 
15 See for example Nabudere,D.W. 'External and Internal Fact~rs 
. . 'C' . , in Hansen, H. B . & in Uganda's Cont lnulng rlSlS ( d 
Twaddle, M. (Eds) Uganda Now: Between Decay and Developmen t Lon on: 
James Currey, 1991) pp. 299 - 312 : 311 . 
16 Kriesberg, 'Formal and Quasi-f\lediators 
Disputes' op.cit., p.19. 
in International 
the notion of rlpe moments for mediation, and the 
technical approach to the mediation. 
(Im)Qartiality and the Uganda Mediation 
The theme that impartiality is not necessary for 
the success of international mediation has Slnce 
Touval's artl' cle, 17 come t b t k o e a en as an important 
element In the analysis of mediation. In the power 
approach to mediation, all the parties are concerned 
with the pursuit of their own self interest, and hence 
the question is one not of whether a mediator lS 
impartial, but of whether it can provide an outcome 
acceptable to all the parties and their 
constituencies. 18 Thus, the mediator need not be 
impartial Slnce the relationships in the process are 
based on power, and delineated by the parties ability to 
bargain .19 
In re-assessing the centrality of impartiality in 
international mediation however, three interconnected 
factors need to be taken into account. Firstly, the 
theoretical framework used is of the essence: if, as is 
the case with Touval, Zartman and others, the framework 
used lS one of power politics, then the idea that 
impartiality lS not necessary 




study used in 
arriving at that formulation requires closer attention. 
If the case studies used are based on secondary sources, 
then the analyst is necessarily limited In his 
theorising and generalisations. Hence, the results 
arrived at are affected by the questions posed, those 
raised, and those neglected, and by the assumptions made 
17 Touval, S. 'Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical 
Considerations' 1 Jerusalem Journal of International Relations (1975) 
pp.51-70. See further, Chapter 2. 
18 I W & Touval,S. 'International Mediation: Conflict Zartman, . . 
Resolution and Power Politics' 41 Journal of Social Issues (1985) 
pp.27-45:37. 
19 See for example, Bacharach, S. B. & Lawler, E. J. 
Power, Tactics anJ Outcomes (San Fransisco: Jossey Bass, 





by the earlier researcher. 21 Thirdly, 
at the heart of generalisations about impartiality 
should be the question about the type of mediator. 
Whether the mediator is exogenous, endogenous, or as is 
argued in this study, heterogenous, 22 1S an important 
consideration in the whole issue of (im) partiality. 
Taken together, these factors suggest that impartiality 
is not so central to the success of international 
mediation. They also imply that where the mediator is 
not impartial, it could be for reasons different from 
those advanced by the power school of mediation. 
Within a non-power political framework, the 
management process is informed by a different set of 
assumptions, especially the analytical thrust which 
makes power irrelevant. 23 In a non-power approach, 
mediation is non-coercive and non-decision-making. The 
third party's role is to promote communication between 
the parties, 24 and to help them analyse their 
relationship and so discover options for are-perceived 
relationship.25 It does not define the problem, or take 
normative positions: 26 it "is wholly supportive of all 
20 Holsti,K.J. Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International 
Order, 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
p.2. 
21 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of this element. 
22 See the following sections of this chapter, and Chapter 1 for 
a discussion of this classification. 
23 See Burton, J. W. & Dukes, F. Conflict: Practices ~n Management, 
Settlement and Resolution op.cit., p.144. 
24 See Burton, J. W. Conflict and Communication: The U~e of 
Controlled Communication in International Relations (London: Macml.llan, 
1969) . 
25 Burton,J.W. Conflict: Resolution and Provention op.cit., 
pp.195-196. 
26 For a third party to define the problem is implici~ly to acc~pt 
B t 't t kes all partl.es to defl.ne 
the power framework of one party. u. l. a t t the expense 
a problem, since "The aim is to maximl.se goals no a A J R 'No 
of others but in the context of others." . See Groom, ...., 43 
I · . Theoretl.cal Perspectl.ve Compromise: Problem-so Vl.ng l.n a 86'83 85 
International Social Science Journal (1991) pp.77- . , . 
actors and adopts a no-fault, neutral position. ,,27 This 
is unlike mediation within power politics, where the 
mediator maintains his role and does not "allow the 
parties to solve their own conflict themselves.,,28 
Was Impartiality Expected in the Uganda Mediation? 
In the Uganda conflict, the question of 
impartiality was important in deciding the venue for the 
mediation. But once that was decided, it became less 
so. Thus, although Tito Okello and the military 
government would have wanted the mediation to take place 
in Dar-es-Salaam, the NRM rejected that venue (and 
Nyerere as the mediator) because of past Tanzanian 
involvement in the conflict. In their Vlew, this 
rendered Nyerere not impartial enough, and the venue not 
sufficiently neutral, hence the NRM's decision not to 
attend the abortive Dar-es-Salaam talks. 29 During the 
early pre-negotiation stage, the Tito Okello government 
felt itself sufficiently strong to try and impose a 
mediator on the conflict. That mediator would in their 
view, (given the past history of the conflict, and 
especially Tanzanian involvement in the liberation and 
after) ,30 have lent his weight in their favour. This is 
precisely the formulation that the NRM rejected. 
Once a different venue was agreed on, the focus of 
impartiality shifted since by then, the NRM felt itself 
to be the stronger party. Having caused the mediation to 
move from Dar-es-Salaam to Nairobi where the environment 
was more conducive to it, the NRM was less interested in 
the question of impartiality of the mediator. 31 On the 
27 Burton,J.W. Conflict: Resolution and Provention op.cit., p.204. 
28 Touval,S. & Zartman,I.W. 'Introduction: M:di~tio~ in Theory' 
in Touval,S. & Zartman,I.W. (Eds) International Med~at~on ~n Theory an~ 
Practice (Boulder,CO.: Westview Press, 1985) .pp:7-17:11. Touval an 
Zartman discuss mediation within a power polltlcal framework. 
29 See Chapter 7. 
30 See Chapter 6. 
. b he argued that at this 31 In an interview Wl th Prof. T. Ka wegyere .' . 
d h 'th impartlallty as ln stage the NRM were not concerne so muc Wl. " ' 
havin~ the mediator endorse the justice of thelr posltl0n. 
other hand, the Tito Okello reg1'me - or some people in 
it - were convinced that because of the close relations 
Kenya and the second Obote regime had forged in the 
latter part of the conflict, Kenya was too self-
interested to deliver any form of' , 1mpart1ality. 
Okello's regime was however under great military 
pressure from the NRM, and found no way out of agreeing 
to the venue. It insisted on bringing Nyerere into the 
peace process by holding consultations with him during 
the mediation. This suggests that it saw that role of 
Nyerere as protection against the mediator's supposed 
partiality. 
Was Impartiality Delivered? 
The mediator in the Uganda conflict does not fit 
into the typology of endogenous or exogenous,32 since he 
displayed characteristics of both. He was exogenous 
because the conflict was in a different country from his 
own, and was in that sense an 'outsider'. But he also 
had endogenous attributes because although the conflict 
was in a territorially different state, it was one that 
affected relations within the whole region. 33 
was closely involved in the conflict in 
As Kenya 
terms of 
territorial contiguity and shared ethnic groups, 34 it 
had more than passing endogenic characteristics vis-a-
vis the Uganda conflict. 35 Hence, the mediator in the 
Uganda conflict was also an 'insider'. This type of 
mediator, who is both endogenous and exogenous, has been 
identified in this study as heterogenous. This notion 
possesses some elements of the idea of an ' insider 
32 See Bercovitch, J. Social Conflict and Third Parties op. cit., 
p.11. See also Chapter 1. 
33 See Chapter 6. 
34 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of these factors. 
35 This broadens the definition of an exoge~ous med~ator offe:ed 
b B 't h J Social Conflicts and Third Part~es Op.C1t.~ To h1m, y erCOV1 c , . . k b the art1es to a 
endogenous conflict management 1S underta en Y p fl' . 
conflict when they negotiate bilaterally. But on~e th~ con h 1C~ 1~ seen in wider terms, as a system that involves part1es ot,er t an JUs 
the ones in violent conflict, then others (s~ch as Kenya .1n .th: Uganda 
conflict) can be considered to have endogen1c character1st1C-. 
partial' as developed by Wehr and Lederach: that lS a 
mediator 
"from wit,hin the, conflict whose acceptability to 
the c~nfllctan~s lS, r?oted not on distance from the 
confllct ?r obJectlvlty regarding the issues, but 
rather In connectedness ... with the conflict 
parties. [This] comes partly from the fact that 
tI:e me,diators do not leave the post-negotiation 
sltuatlon. They are part of it and must live with 
the consequences of their work. They must continue 
to relate to the conflictants who have trusted 
their commitment to a just and durable 
settlement. ,,36 
This differs slightly from the idea of a heterogenous 
mediator In that the 'insider-partial' contemplates a 
mediator who is endogenous, and whose authority is based 
almost wholly on trust and a personal relationship with 
the parties. 37 But it captures nicely the notion of such 
a mediator being connected to the parties by more than 
just the conflict, as lS the case with an exogenous 
mediator. In this respect, because he does not leave the 
post-negotiation situation, the insider-partial can 
engage in a 'continuous mediation' 39 
Being so closely connected with the conflict, a 
heterogenous mediator cannot deliver impartiality. 
Unlike an exogenous mediator, whom the power school of 
mediation have in mind in rejecting impartiality as a 
requirement for successful mediation, the reasons why a 
heterogenous mediator (or, indeed, an endogenous one) 
cannot deliver impartiality are explicable not only by 
power or self-interest: they are also psychological. In 
the Uganda mediation, because of this psychological 
factor, the mediator could not be fully impartial, and 
therefore tended to lean towards the party it felt to 
36 Wehr, P. & Lederach, J . P. 'Mediat ing Confl ict in Central America' 
28 Journal of Peace Research (1991) pp.85-98:87. 
37 Ibid., p. 87. 
38 See Chapter 2, especially Brouillet,A. 'Media~ion as a 
Technique of Dispute Set tlement : Appraisal and Prospe~!ts' . in 
. 1 c fl'ct Resoluti "1 (Boulder,CO.: .~e~:tvlew Thakur,R. (Ed) Internat~ona on ~ " 
Press, 1988) pp.165-173:172. 
have a stronger case on the various issues. 39 Thus quite 
clearly, depending on the theoretical perspective taken, 
the questions asked of the parties, and the nature of 
the mediator, there is sufficient basis to argue that 
mediator (im) partiality 1S related to factors beyond 
those of power and 
contemplates. 4o It will 
that the place of one of 
the mediation structure it 
be submitted in this chapter 
the other pillars of the power 
theories of mediation, namely leverage, can be similarly 
re-interpreted. 
'Ripe Moment' and the Uganda Conflict 
Chapter Two noted that the literature envisages the 
device of ripe moments, or windows of opportunity, by 
which a third party can gauge whether the time is ripe 
for mediation. A ripe moment exists when the parties to 
a conflict mutually decide that they cannot pursue their 
goals unilaterally at an acceptable price, and therefore 
become amenable to the search for a joint solution. Such 
a ripe moment is characterised by a mutually hurting 
stalemate, with a way out,41 or a formula. The hurting 
stalemate begins when one side considers itself unable 
to resolve or win the conflict by itself, and it peaks 
when the other side arrives at the same conclusion. When 
the stalemate begins to hurt, and neither party can run 
away from it, there is a 'costly dead end', and 
"Each party must begin to feel uncomfortable with 
the costly dead end that it has reached. This 
plateau must be perceived by both sides not as a 
momentary resting ground, but as a flat, unpl~asant 
terrain stretching into the future, prov1d1ng no 
later possibilities for decisive escalation or 
graceful escape. ,,42 
39 This insight is owed to Ambassador B. A. Kiplagat, and was 
communicated in an interview with the author. 
40 See Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. 
41 Zartman, I. W. 'Alternative Attempts at cri~is Manage~ent: 
. . h G R (Ed) New Issues ~n InternatIonal 
Concepts and Processes' ln Wln am, . '. 1988) P 199-22',' 21' 
Crisis Management (Boulder, CO.: WestVlew Press, P . _. -'. 
42 & T 1 S 'Mediation: The Role of Third-Party Zartman,I.W. ouva,. b K M 'Ei~\ 
Di lomac and Informal Peacemaking' in Brown,S.J. Schrau , ',' \ l0 
Re~olvin~ Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era (Washlngton: 
Zartman has further introduced the notion of 
'regime change', which is an 
rendition of this trend of 
apparently more elegant 
thinking. In Zartman's 
'regime change' theory, conflict is seen as "an 
earthquake, a shifting of structures and relations that 
produces strains to the point where a specific 
restructuring is required. ,,43 Regimes are generally 
challenged continuously, and are reaffirmed when they 
overcome those confrontations successfully and reassert 
their structures. But, 
"at times the challenges accumulate and begin to 
represent growing structural shifts, new issues, or 
an exhaustion of old answers ... Negotiation is 
necessary to create the replacement regime and have 
it accepted since there is no authority or decision 
rule in international relations to formalize a new 
order. ,,44 
Zartman argues ul timately that the method chosen for 
conflict management depends on how the conflict is 
perceived. If it is seen as a clash of wills, its 
management requires finding a formula that turns a zero-
sum into a positive-sum conflict. If it is considered 
to be a confrontation of cost-benefit calculations, its 
management involves the creation of ripe moments. If the 
conflict is judged to be an event in a regime change, 
its management calls for easing the transition of 
regimes. Finally, if it is reckoned to be a mutual 
standoff, its management entails the use of power to 
reach a favourable outcome. 45 
These approaches are somewhat 
tested against the Uganda mediation. 
problematic when 
Although the ideas 
United States Institute of Peace, 1992) pp.241-261:251. 
43 Zartman, I. W. 'Conflict and Resolution: Contest, Cost, and 
Change' in Zartman,I.W. (Ed) Resolving Regional Conflicts: 
International Perspectives (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1991) 
pp.11-22:18. 
44 Ibid., p.19. The Zimbabwe conflict is given as an i~lustrat~on 
of this' there was a change from the old colonial (Rhodes1an) r:g~me 
to a ne~ one, represented by an independent Zim,bab.we. The t ranS1 t lon 
was effected through the Lancaster House negot1at1ons. 
45 Zartman, 'Conflict and Resolution: Contest, Cost, and Change' 
op . cit., p. 21 . 
can be made to fit into the Uganda mediation, the fit is 
rather loose. This suggests that the notion of ripe 
moments (and indeed that of hurting stalemate) needs to 
be treated carefully. Further, the ripe moment 
contemplated by Zartman is evidenced only through a 
presumably protracted conflict, whereas the hurting 
stalemate is largely military. Thus, if Zartman's 
formulation is adopted, it would be difficult to explain 
why the Uganda mediation was at best only partially 
successful. The rest of this section will examine these 
issues in greater detail. 
The Uganda Mediation: Contest, Cost, and Change 
In positing that the way in which a conflict 1S 
perceived can determine its method of management, 
Zartman has made a useful contribution. However as the 
Uganda conflict demonstrates, it is one which 1S not 
always applicable in complex situations. Zartman does 
not elucidate whether the operative perception of the 
conflict is that of the mediator, or of the parties. 
Therefore, his formulation does not explain 
satisfactorily what would happen in a complex situation, 
where the perception of each conflictant is different 
from that of the mediator, and where the perception of 
the parties inter se differs. Such situations render his 
general formulation inadequate as a basis from which to 
proceed. 
In the Uganda conflict the mediator and the parties 
looked at the conflict through different conceptual 
lenses. There could therefore have been little agreement 
as to the approach to be adopted, contrary to Zartman's 
formulation. Some in Tito Okello's government like 
Basilio Okello, saw the conflict as a clash of wills, as 
did Museveni to a lesser extent. 46 Others, especially 
those who had a personal stake 1n Tito Okello's 
'47 'd' t l' n terms of a cost-benefit surv1val, perce1ve 1 
46 See Chapter 6. 
47 See Chapter 5 for details. 
calculation. In contrast, the NRM considered the 
conflict (and the mediation) in terms of a regime 
change. This is clearly evident from the positions it 
adopted during the mediation, and in the statements it 
made during the pre-negotiation stages and after. 48 
Finally, the mediator viewed the conflict as a mutual 
stand-off between the military government and the NRM. 
Hence his adoption of a Realist strategy which as was 
argued in Chapter Seven, was also simplistic in that it 
saw any peace treaty as a sufficient solution. 49 
Consequently, because the differing perceptions of 
the parties and the mediator rendered the conflict more 
complex, it would have been difficult to choose one 
amongst the strategies suggested by Zartman. A more 
useful approach would have been as Mitchell has argued, 
to search for areas of asymmetry between the parties. 
Having identified them, an approach to the management of 
the conflict that took these into account could have 
been devised. 50 
Ripe Moments and the Uganda Mediation 
The ripe moment for the mediation of the Uganda 
conflict was considered to be the period following the 
coup in July 1985. Upon a cursory examination, that 
period provided all the ingredients of a militarily 
hurting stalemate, and hence, the moment was thought to 
be ripe for mediation. There was also a formula, namely 
the power sharing framework that was finally negotiated, 
which can be seen as an attempt to ease a regime change 
in Uganda. But upon closer analysis, this neat package 
contains fool's gold. The stalemate that existed was 
48 See Chapters 6 and 7, 
49 It was not the Realist strategy per se that was simplistic: but 
his application of it, That even a Realist strategy can be a hlghly 
, , 'd 'P'll P R Negotiating Peace: War complex undertaklng 1S eV1 ent 1n 1 ar, , , , ' 
, , (P' t 'Princeton Unlverslty Termination as a Barga~n~ng Process rlnce on, 
Press, 1983), 
50 11 R ' Class1' fying Conflicts: Asymmetry and Resolu~ion' Mi tche , C, , t 1 
in Zartman, I ,W, (Ed) Resolving Regiona,l Conflicts ~ I;nt~~a u~~~~a 
Perspectives op, cit" pp, 23-38, The quest10n of asymme ry 
conflict is discussed later in this chapter, 
one 
The 
which had developed during the 1980-85 ci~il war. 
parties between whom it had developed were the NRA 
the second Obote and government. No stalemate had yet 
developed between the NRA and the Okello regime. Had the 
Obote regime survived, there would have been a hurting 
stalemate, which might have created a ripe moment for 
negotiation. Moreover, the regime that was changing was 
the Obote, rather than the Tito Okello one. Although 
the Okello government proclaimed itself as a new regime, 
its composition and indeed the entire civil service 
structure, 
created a 
was that of the predecessor regime. 51 This 
perceptual problem. While the Okello 
government proceeded to the mediation on the basis that 
the aim was to absorb the NRM into that structure, the 
NRM participated ln the negotiations in order to 
facilitate a transition from one reglme (Obote) to 
another (NRM) one. Thus, applying Zartman's notion of 
ripe moments and a hurting stalemate to this conflict 
suggests that their formulation, as it stands, can be 
misleading. 
A further problem is that the literature seems to 
suggest that Zartman-type hurting stalemates are 
primarily discernible militarily. However, a military 
stalemate is only one of the ingredients of a stalemate. 
There should also be an economlC, social, ideological 
and diplomatic hurting stalemate. In the Uganda 
conflict, the military stalemate that was developing 
when Obote was overthrown was also accompanied by a 
social, diplomatic and ideological stalemate. Neither 
party could explain its position in the conflict fully 
to the outside world. Particularly, Obote's earlier 
ability to do that had dissolved ln the negative 
publicity that his government had attracted over human 
51 As Ralph Ocan pointed out to the author in an inte~vi~w, those 
officials who ran into hiding during the July coup w:re lnv~~e~kb~~k 
by the Okello government to continue with their ~utles: tee 0 
d 'th tlng new struc~ures, government was therefore not conce~ne Wl, crea 
or even a new philosophy, but contlnued wlth the old. 
rights abuses, 52 and in the perception internationally 
that he was not equal to the task of leading Uganda. 53 
Although Tito Okello's government had the chance to 
explain itself internationally and thus counter the 
NRM's stronger ideological and diplomatic basis,54 Tito 
Okello's personal inability to articulate the policies 
of his government55 made this difficult. 
Enlarging the Notion of Ripe Moment in Internal Conflict 
The period after the July 1985 coup was a false 
ripe moment for the mediation of the Uganda conflict, 
and this best explains the short life of the Nairobi 
Peace Agreement. There are many reasons that can be 
adduced to explain the failure of Peace Agreements. 
Writing about Peace Agreements 
conflict, Pillar observes that 
ln international 
"Most provisions of a peace agreement other than 
the ceasefire itself cannot be implemented 
immediately. Given the usual level of distrust 
between two warring states, there may be 
considerable doubt as to whether they will be 
implemented at all. Therefore, governments 
negotiating a peace agreement usually try to assure 
that they will have sanctions to impose on the 
adversary if he does not keep his part of the 
bargain ... The greatest sanction is to start a new 
war. ,,56 
52 See Furley,O. 'Britain From Amin to Museveni: Blind Eye 
Diplomacy' in Rupesinghe,K. (Ed) Conflict Resolution in Uganda (London 
& Athens,OH.: James Currey & Ohio University Press, 1989) pp.275-294; 
also, Amnesty International, Uganda: Evidence of Torture (London: Doc: 
AFR 59/06/85) . 
53 See chapter 5 and 6; also Sathyamurthy, T.V. 'Uganda's Political 
System, 1962-1990: The Balance Between Exte~n~l a~d I~ternal 
Influences' in Oyugi, W. 0. (Ed) Poli tics and Adm~n~strat~on ~n East 
Africa (Nairobi: Konrad Adeneur Foundation, 1992) pp.503-536. 
54 For example through the appointment of people like ol~ra­
Otunnu who was then Uganda's Permanent Representative ~o the Unlted 
Nation~ in New York, but who had not lived in Uganda durlng the Obote 
excesses. 
55 Ocan, op.cit., Kabwegyere, op.cit., and Kiplagat op.cit., all 
'1' of Tl'to Okello to artl'culate his cause. See also note this inabl lty 
Chapter 6. 
. . P War Termina tion as a Bargaining 56 Pillar, P.R. Negot~at~ng eace: 
Process op.cit., p.231. 
This . true, and 1S can also be used to explain the 
failure of the Nairobi Peace Agreement to endure. But 
Pillar's formulation . meritorious 1S only when the 
conflict was mediated, or otherwise managed within the 
framework of ripe moments as set out by Zartman. In the 
conditions of some internal conflicts,57 the 'true' ripe 
moments are likely to appear long before those 
postulated by Zartman, which are evidenced by war 
between the parties. The Uganda conflict illustrates 
this submission. 
During the Uganda conflict, diverse groups which 
were opposed to the Amin regime met in Moshi in March 
1979,5B at the behest of President Nyerere, who wanted 
to remove Amin from power as the logical conclusion to 
the Tanzania-Uganda war, which Tanzania was winning 
decisively.59 However, Nyerere did not want to be seen 
as being responsible for the removal of another head of 
state, and therefore wanted Ugandan opposition groups 1n 
exile to be at the forefront of that process. 60 These 
groups therefore met in Moshi, and drew up a framework 
for the government of Uganda after Amin. 61 This 
structure was in place for barely a year, during which, 
as the overthrow of the Lule and Binaisa administrations 
discussed in Chapter Five show, the mechanisms of its 
functioning were severely tested. The Moshi 
arrangements failed inter alia62 because there was no 
'disinterested' third party to help these diverse groups 
57 Such as in Uganda, and later in Ethiopia: these are discussed 
later in this chapter. 
58 See Chapters 5 and 6 for details of the Moshi Conference. 
59 Arend,A.C. & Beck,R.J. International Law and the Use of Force: 
Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm (London & New York: Routledge, 1993) 
pp.123-124. 
60 This information was conveyed to the author by a 
Tanzanian diplomat in an interview, Paris, 23 December 1993. 
61 These are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
senior 
62 Other reasons for the failure of the Moshi Arrangements are 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
work out lasting arrangements that would take into 
account their manifold differences. Such a third party 
would also have helped to initiate and formulate ideas 
on important aspects such as the basis of constitutional 
authority, 63 which would have avoided the eventual 
collapse of the Moshi arrangements. 64 
Moshi would have been the ripe moment for some form 
of third party involvement. 65 At Moshi, the parties 
involved were preoccupied with working out the basis of 
the post-Amin government of Uganda. Because there was 
little doubt that Amin would be overthrown, they had the 
opportunity of creating a structure for peace from a 
clean slate. Indeed, because Amin's falling government 
was not involved in this Conference, the participants 
were not burdened by the need to accommodate a regime 
that was internationally abhorred. There was also 
considerable unity amongst those groups in Moshi, even 
though being based on euphoria, it later disintegrated. 
During the Moshi Conference it was recognised that any 
future structure for peace ln Uganda could not be 
created by the participants individually, but had to be 
a consensual effort. Moshi was a unique moment in the 
whole history of the Uganda conflict, and one truly ripe 
for third party involvement. 
Had a third party been involved at Moshi, the 
question of the identity of such a third party, and the 
role it would have played, would have arisen. Tanzanian 
reluctance to be engaged in the discussions at Moshi 
indicated that such a party could not have been a state, 
63 This can be contrasted with the Lancaster House negotiations 
on Rhodesia, where the question of the constitution was seen.bY the 
mediator as a primary issue to be resolved. See ~ord Carr1ngton, 
Reflect on Things Past: The Memoirs of Lord Carr~ngton (Glasgow: 
Fontana, 1989) Chapter 13. 
64 Prof. Kabwegyere was the Chairman at Moshi, but being Ugandan, 
and an interested party (i.e. endogenous), he could not effectively 
have played such a third party role. 
65 The pre-Moshi Conference in January 1979 (See Chapter .5) could 
f t' in the confl1ct were also have been. However, too ew par 1es . f 11 
represented then for any arrangements to be discussed me~n1~g : t~~ 




have been hampered by the OAU principle 
interference in the internal affairs of 
states. 66 In those circumstances, track one 
participation at Moshi would not have worked. Track two 
diplomacy might have worked at Moshi. It would have 
enjoyed the merit of not being hampered by OAU official 
doctrine about non-interference in the internal affairs 
of states. 67 However, in the Moshi situation, track two 
diplomacy might have encountered problems convincing the 
participants about the need for its involvement at that 
stage of the conflict. 68 Besides, track two diplomacy 
may have lacked the authority and the standing to make 
a cogent case for participation. 69 
These reservations may not have been sufficient to 
condemn track two diplomacy had it been tried in Moshi. 
Because one of the greatest complaints of post-Amin 
governments in Uganda has been that the OAU kept silent 
during the Amin years,70 it is possible that a track two 
framework, based on the participation of both endogenous 
66 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of this OAU principle. 
67 See Chapter 2; also, Burton,J.W & Dukes,F. conflic.t: Practices 
in Management, Settlement and Resolution (London: ~acmlllan,. 1990) 
p.139, who argue that one of the merits of track t~O.dlpl~macy lS that 
eo Ie engaged in it are not constrained by offlclal tles:. ~ee for 
~xa~ple the World Council of Churches mediation in the Sudan C~Vl~ wa~, 
discussed in Chapter 4: see in this respect, Assefa:H. Med~at~on ~n 
Civil Wars-Approaches and Strategies: The ~udan confl~hct (MBOUd~d~:, CO i~ 
, 987) 1 'World Councll of Churc es e la 10n 
Westvlew Pres~, 1 .i a .so, bb K (Eds) New Approches to 
the Sudan CiVll War' ln Mltchell,C.R. & We , . ) 147-
International Mediation (Westport,CT.: Greenwood Press, 1988 pp. 
167. 
, d h ld have had "no business 
68 As Kabwegyere op. Cl t. note , t ey wou h' k e J' erk react ion 
, d ff'" But t lS ne -involving themselves ln a Ugan an a alr., f the Conf erence had 
does not necessarily represent the reactlons 0 
such a suggestion been mooted. 
69 are for example also also relevant to the 1994 These arguments 
conflict in Rwanda. 
70 See Chapter 6. 
and exogenous actors, 71 might have been able to make the 
kind of entre that track one was unable to make. 
The role of track two at that stage of the conflict 
need not have been an ambitious one. It would have been 
restricted to suggesting ideas and formulae for the 
future constitutional basis of leadership in Uganda. It 
could also have helped identify the different levels of 
the conflict, and the complexities of their 
interconnections. It would thus have enabled the parties 
at Moshi to see the conflict from a larger perspective, 
and hence define their problem more clearly. More 
importantly, it would have carved a future role for 
itself in the conflict. This would have entailed 
undertaking supportive (consultative) efforts 1n 
implementing the arrangements reached, once the parties 
went back and became involved themselves in the business 
of governing. 72 Had such a supportive role in the form 
of a ' continuing mediation,73 been available, it 1S 
possible that the conflict would not have developed in 
the ways that it did after the liberation. 
The ripe moments being suggested for internal 
conflict are evident before a conflict changes its 
character, and develops into a full scale armed 
conflict. As with all ripe moments however, it is 
difficult to tell when precisely they are manifested. 74 
In the Uganda conflict, it would have been difficult to 
71 As is clear for example from the views of Ambassador Tomusange 
as expressed to the author in an interview on 7. May 1~93, there would 
need to be some Africans in a mixed group, lncludlng exogenous 
actors. Mazrui' s suggestion of eminent African p.ersons ~nclud~ng 
community leaders, women and clergy (see Mazrul,A.A. Managlng 
Conflicts from Within: An African Agenda' (Paper . pr~sented ~t 
the OAU Workshop on The OAU and Conflict Management ~n Afr~ca, AddlS 
Ababa 19-22 May 1993.) is one idea for the endogenous and heterogenous 
, . d' Ch t 9 are an component. People with 'influence' as dlscusse ln .ap er 
example of the exogenous component of dual track confllct management. 
72 This is a relevant component of the role of track two diplomacy 
of giving early warning, as suggested in Chapter 9. 
73 Of the sort mentioned by Brouillet, 'Mediation as a Technique 
of Dispute Settlement' op.cit. 
74 See Chapter 2. 
the conflict manager, 
analyst. 
Although this difficulty might be a problem for 
there is no such problem for the conf 1 ict 
tell accurately when the Amin regime was finally 1n t~e 
last stages of collapse. But as Ott argues, 
" fl' con 1C~S do not remain completely static over an': 
substan~la~ length of time. While few are amenable 
to med1atlon at any given point, it seems 
reasonable that at some time in their life historv 
~any prot~acted conflicts will be susceptible to 
1nterventlon by a third party. The task of 
statesmanship will be to remain alert to such 
mom~nts and exploi~ them. With proper timing, the 
medlator may provlde the critical impetus to a 
set tlement . ,,75 
This difficulty ln determining precisely when such 
a r1pe moment exists 1n internal conflict may have been 
partly responsible for the failure of Jimmy Carter's 
mediation efforts in the Eritrean conflict. The Eritrean 
conflict at that stage resembled in many respects the 
Ugandan conflict in 1979. In both, the governments in 
power were falling, and were not expected to last long. 
In both, the parties wanted to meet and formulate an 
agenda for the structure of peace after the incumbent 
reglmes fell. In the Eritrean conflict however, the 
Carter involvement included the Mengitsu government 1n 
the deliberations and not surprisingly, his efforts to 
mediate failed. He had identified the ripe moment to 
intervene in that type of conflict, but purported to 
play a role which was wrong for the prevailing 
circumstances. This 1S a further explanation for 
Carter's failure, to that offered by Ottaway, who argues 
that the effort failed because the conflict was 
transitional. 76 The following section argues that the 
notion of a transitional conflict may also be used to 
explain why the Uganda mediation was only partially 
successful. 
The Uganda Conflict as Transitional 
75 Ott,M. 'Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution: 
Cases' 26 International Organization (1972) pp.595-618:618. 
Two 
76 Ottaway,M. 'Mediation in a Transitional Conflict: Eritre~' iI, 
1 . R' 1 C ntlict-s' Internat~onal Zartman, I . W. (Ed) Reso v~nq eg~ona 0 L. 
Pel'::"ptytives ,'f'. cit., pp. 69-81: 78. 
A transitional conflict "is by definition not 
stalemated. What makes it transitional lS precisely the 
fact that new elements have been added and thus the 
balance of forces among the parties has been altered. 1177 
In a transitional conflict, prevailing conditions make 
negotiations unfavourable, and a clear-cut victory is 
not possible because the goals of the parties are in a 
state of flux. 78 In a transitional conflict, conditions 
like a hurting stalemate are absent. Thus, third party 
involvement in the conflict at that stage can either be 
seen as coming too early (i.e. before the 'new' conflict 
has defined itself), or too late (i.e. long after the 
rlpe moment in the old conflict has corne and gone). 79 
This concept can be used to explain the Uganda conflict, 
and its partially successful outcome. 
In the Uganda conflict, the NRA had Slnce 1980 
waged a civil war against the Obote regime, following 
the rigged elections of that year. 80 Al though in the 
earlier stages some other groups, such as the Uganda 
Freedom Movement (UFM) and the Federal Democratic 
Movement (FEDEMU) had taken part in the war against 
Obote's government, by 1985 the NRA was the pre-eminent 
fighting group, and was more or less singlehandedly 
spearheading the war. 81 By the 1985 coup, the NRA and 
the Obote forces were heading towards a stalemate. But 
the coup arrested this process. Until the coup, the war 
and the issues to be settled were bilateral between the 
Obote government and the NRA. Following the coup, the 
military government professed to have broken from the 
Obote regime which it had overthrown. 
77 Ibid., p. 80. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., p.70. 
80 For a comment on the 
Conunonweal th in rvol-ld Poli tics 
Publishing, 1988) pp.51-52. 




see Chan,S. The 
Crook Academic 
fighting forces which had until the coup been virtuall 
. y 
morlbund reappeared, and laid some claim for reward for 
participating in the war against Obote. Thus following 
the coup the conflict map changed somewhat. Since these 
other players now re-entered the picture, the conflict 
required to be managed multilaterally, to take their 
interests into account. B2 
By the start of the mediation just one month after 
the coup, the conflict was in a state of transition. The 
old bilateral conflict between the NRA and the Obote 
government had been overtaken by events (the coup), and 
thus any earlier ripe moment for its mediation was no 
longer operative. The conflict also became multilateral, 
and because this was a new development, its parameters 
were still unfolding. Indeed, the military government 
was undecided on whether it should adopt a bilateral or 
multilateral approach to ending the conflict. B) In 
August 1985 when the mediation began, the conflict was 
still in a state of transition, and this reduced the 
chances for a fully successful mediation. 
One of the problems that further confused the whole 
mediation was the perception of the parties about the 
transitional conflict. The NRM asserted that there was 
no difference between the Tito Okello government and the 
Obote regime which it had fought over the years. It also 
argued that the other fighting groups had no stake in 
any negotiations on a structure of peace, since they had 
not contributed to Obote's downfall. In the NRM's 
perception, the old bilateral structure had not changed 
by virtue only of the coup. The military government on 
the other hand considered that the structure of the 
conflict had been changed by the coup and by the entry 
82 See Chapter 7 where it is argued that one reason why th: Uganda 
. . 1 f 1 was because a bllateral mediatlon was only partlal y success u , '1
' fl' t th t requlred a multllatera approach was adopted ln a con lC a 
solution. 
83 It tried to form a broad based government by cO-2Fti:~1 :he 
, , h ' while at t->1e same tlme 
other political partles an~ flg tllng grto~PtSl,/ons be~ween~it- and ~he 
laying the groundwork for bllatera nego la ' w 
NRA/M, 
of the other fighting groups into the equation. To them, 
the negotiations were a basis for easing the process of 
transition, hence their talk about building a broad 
based coalition. 
The mediation itself came too late to find a 
solution to the old conflict, and too early to address 
effectively the issues of the new one, which was still 
developing. It was not fully successful because inter 
alia, this conceptual problem was not addressed at the 
outset. Consequently, most of the mediation revolved 
around the old bilateral conflict, and failed to address 
the emerging issues of the new, multilateral one. Not 
surprisingly, the military government could not sell the 
agreement to its multilateral partners who declined to 
be disarmed. This pushed the solution of the conflict 
eventually to the mili tary track. 84 
The Technical Conduct of the Mediation 
It was argued earlier that the 
negative judgment about the sum of 
positive, or 
a particular 
mediation is not the only delineation of its usefulness. 
Whatever the judgment might be, the contribution of a 
completed mediation to knowledge can lie as much in the 
things that were done properly, as in those that were 
not. The former permits comparisons with other 
mediations, and the latter can suggest pitfalls to be 
avoided in similar cases. 8S Both can form equally 
validly the basis for formulating future research 
programmes. 
In that spirit, this section will examine some of 
the technicalities of the mediation stage that had an 
84 " '1' n the Uganda mediation between the The cont1nu1ng tens10n 
political and military track is discussed in Chapter 7, 
85 A comparison between the Uganda mediation and the current 
mediation of the Sudanese conflict, both undertaken, by the same 
mediator, would for example be a very valuable exe7c1~e. Some as 
officials participating in the current Sudan med1at1on (such
d 
10 
Ambassador Philip Mwanzia, in a communication with the author date h 
October 1994; and Mr.M.Kahende in a communication with t~e 't:~: ~~ 
dated 18 November 1994), argue (wrongly) that there ~~, 11 cratic 
compare between the two conflicts. That such a strong 1 10Syn . 
, d f re and more comparat1ve view exists only underl1nes the nee or ~o 
studies to be undertaken, as was suggested 1n Chapter 1. 
important bearing on the outcome of the 
mediation. The focus will be from the perspective 




problems that arose during the mediation. In this 
regard, the question of leverage and its relationship to 
the mediation will be analysed, as will the threats 
issued by the mediator and their impact on the process 
of the Uganda mediation. The important lssue of the 
psychological barriers between the parties and the 
mediator's response to them will be commented upon. It 
will be suggested that ln technical terms at least, the 
Uganda mediation can be summarised as a case of the 
'missing' mediator. 
The Influence of Leverage: Active and Passive Mediation 
The language of 'leverage' is the language of the 
power theories of mediation. In them, power in mediation 
is often referred to as leverage. S6 There are four 
sources of leverage in mediation: the ability to portray 
an alternative future as better than the continuing 
conflict; the ability to produce an attractive position 
from each party's needs; the availability of resources 
that the mediator commands, and the availability of 
resources that the mediator can add to the outcome. S7 
The whole essence of leverage "is to worsen the dilemma 
of the parties that are rejecting mediation and to keep 
them ln search of a solution. "ss Because the mediator 
also has interests ln the mediation which he would like 
to protect,S9 leverage is also used to ensure that those 
mediator concerns are realised as much as possible. But 
not all leverage can guarantee these results, and some 
of its forms, such as economic leverage can, because of 
intertwined international economic relationships, fail 
86 Zartman & Touval, 'Mediation: The Role of Third- Party Diplomacy 
and Informal Peacemaking' op.cit., p.254. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid., p.255. 
89 See chapter 6 on the mediator's interests 
conflict. 
in the Uganda 
to induce the required response. Indeed the~' can 
produce perverse results, and thus be 
counterproducti ve. 90 
The Uganda mediation suggests that leverage can be 
conceived as a tool in the hands of the mediator, who 
wields it depending on whether he chooses to be an 
active or a passive mediator. Whether or not a mediator 
adopts an active or a passive role is different from 
describing him as 'powerful' or 





negotiating environment, and on whether the parties 
perceive the mediator in those terms. The former depend 
on the mediator, and on whether he chooses activity or 
passivity from the repertoire of strategies open to him, 
and depending on the interests he wants to protect. 91 
The mediator in the Uganda conflict had limited 
sources of leverage. While he could persuade the parties 
that their proper future lay in a negotiated settlement 
(which he did, by addressing not only the parties, but 
their constituencies and his own ln many public 
statements), he could not effectively 'worsen the 
dilemma' of a recalcitrant party. This was not a failure 
on the mediator's part, nor indeed solely a matter of 
limited sources of leverage. Kenya's, and President 
Moi's own interests in the mediation lay in creating a 
structure for peace ln Uganda that would maintain the 
primacy of Kenya's interests. And Moi's personal 
interests would be served by his being acclaimed as the 
broker of the peace in Uganda. 92 The realisation of 
these interests lay ln an outcome ln which both 
conflictants participated without coercion, and the 
90 Hormats, R.D. 
Leverage' in Kipper,J. 
Perspective (Boulder, 
253:233. 
'The Politics and Limitations of Economic 
& Saunders,H.H. (Eds) The Middle East in Global 
co. & Oxford: Westview Press, 1991) pp.233-
91 See Mitchell,C.R. 'The Motives for Mediation' ~~ Mitchell,~.R. 
& Webb,K. (Eds) New Approaches to International ,\;ellat1.cn op.Cl~., 
pp.29-51. 
92 See Chapter 6 for a discussion of these asp~cts. 
Nairobi Agreement reflects this concern. Within that 
structure, the mediator could not worsen the dilemma of 
one party alone, since any such attempt would have had 
to apply to both parties simul taneously . In that 
situation, any action against either conflictant would 
automatically have hurt the other equally. This would 
have threatened Kenya's post-mediation relationship with 
whichever government came to power in Uganda. 93 As will 
be argued later, although there could have been the 
possibility of applying leverage on the military 
government, the bureaucratic politics of Kenya made this 
difficult for Moi to do. Also, the Ugandan economy was 
near collapse, and its institutions had broken down. The 
concern of the Ugandans was with the basics of life, 
which they were fulfilling locally rather than in the 
international market place. In this view, leverage would 
not have worsened Uganda's dilemma. 94 These are two 
contexts in which the mediator's threats can be seen. 
Because of these limitations on the mediator's use 
of some important sources of leverage, he resorted to a 
passive strategy in mediating the Uganda conflict. This 
choice of strategy can be contrasted to President 
Carter's strategy in the Camp David Negotiations. 95 In 
that mediation, Carter was able effectively to use 
leverage on both parties but without the severe 
limitations on his ability to do so that faced Moi in 
the Uganda mediation. Thus, Carter was able to choose an 
active strategy as the one best suited to ensure United 
States' interests in the Middle East, and his own 
93 As Zartman and Touval note, the mediator is also motivated by 
his own position in the area, and therefore seeks "to maintain close 
ties with one side while improving ties with the other." . See 
Zartman,I.W. & Touval,S. 'Conclusion: Mediation in ~he,?ry ~nd Pract~ce' 
in Touval,S. & Zartman,I.W. (Eds) International Med~at~on ~n Theory and 
Practice (Boulder,CO.: Westview Press, 1985) pp.251-268:257. 
94 This felicitous argument was communicated to ~h~ ~uthor.b~ Mr. 
Stephen Loyatum (formerly Head of the Africa and OAU D~v~s~on'hM~n~str3YO 
) . . t . w with the aut or on of Foreign Affairs, Kenya , ~n an ~n erv~e 
September 1994. 
95 On which see Bercovi tch, J. 'A Case Study of M:diat ion, as ~ 
, ' 1 t' ,The Camp Dav~d Experlo?nce Method of Internat~onal Confl~ct Reso u ~on, 
12 Review of International Studies (1986) pp.43-65. 
personal preoccupations (especially with his reputation, 
on which he had staked the success of the mediation) . 
Deadlines and the Mediator's Threats 
It has been suggested above that applying leverage 
on the parties jointly would have threatened interests 
that the mediator wanted to preserve. Because the 
mediator's environment militated against his application 
of leverage on either party individually, he resorted to 
the use of threats. In this view, the threats were 
intended to have an effect similar to that of leverage. 
However, there is another more traditional perception of 
the role of threats in mediation: their use as a shock 
device to break a deadlock, and to instill a sense of 
urgency on the parties. In either case, the threat is 
only as effective as the parties' perception of its 
seriousness. Only if they take it seriously can the 
threat gal vanise them into action. 96 This section is 
concerned with this technical aspect of the use of 
threats. 
The Uganda mediation dragged on for four months, 
during which the parties especially the government 
delegation requested numerous adj ournments to 
facilitate consultations with higher authorities. 
Indeed, more time was spent in adjournments during the 
four months of the mediation stage than on actual around 
the table negotiations. 97 In the course of the 













speculation on whether the mediation had broken down. 
The second was issued on 2 December, after the 
negotiations had been concluded, and after the signing 
ceremony had been postponed several times by the non-
96 This is comparable to the related notion of ~e~dlin~s, Whic: 
Zartman and Berman see as "the commonest way of formallslng tlme cost 
and of providing an external constraint". See Zartman, I . W 1 & 
Berman,M.R. The Practical Negotiator (New Haven & London: Ya e 
University Press, 1982) pp.191-192. 
. . h . d' t the view that e','en 97 This statement 1.S made W1.t out preJu lce 0 . . 
. d . t 1 part of thenegotlatlons. adjournments can be cons1.dere as an ln egra 
attendance of the military government's delegation. 98 
The first threat was accompanied by a deadline, but had 
loose objectives since it only required the parties to 
'make progress' at the forthcoming fourth phase, failing 
which the mediator would wi thdraw from the process. 99 
The second threat also had a deadline, whose essence was 
that unless the parties signed the Agreement by the 
third of December, they could go back to Uganda and 
fight it out.100 
The first threat seemed to have the desired effect, 
since the parties resumed negotiations, and indeed made 
substantial progress during the subsequent phase. This 
may also have been because the parties experienced a 
military deadlock at about that time, even though this 
was not quite a hurting stalemate. The second threat 
had little effect on the parties since even after its 
deadline, the signing was postponed several times until 
it was eventually signed on 17th December. Two examples 
demonstrate that the second deadline had little effect. 
Firstly, Museveni's response to the threat was to argue 
that the mediator was not being forced to play that 
role, and that the Ugandan parties could as well go back 
and set tIe their problems in Uganda. 101 Secondly, the 
threat did not stop the military government re-opening 
lssues, since it proceeded to give conditions which it 
insisted the NRM had to fulfil before the signing could 
take place. Indeed, a special session was convened on 13 
December to discusss these concerns of the military 
government. These developments lead to the conclusion 
that by December, the parties considered the role of the 
mediator to be complete, and therefore the threat had no 
effect. The mediator's passive role may by then have 
suggested to the parties that the threat could not be 
98 See Chapter 7 for the details. 
99 See The Weekly Review 25 October 1985 p.9. 
100 See The Weekly Revi ew, 6 December 1985 p. 10. 
101 Ibid., p.ll. 
backed effectively, and hence that they could 19nore it 
safely. 
This use of mediator threats In the Uganda 
mediation can agal' b d n e compare and contrasted wi th 
their use during the Camp David mediation. One big 
difference was that the Camp David negotiations were set 
to last for thirteen days, whereas the Uganda mediation 
was more open ended, and in the event lasted for four 
months. Because there was a time limit to the Camp David 
negotiations, the threat issued by Carter (that he would 
withdraw unless the parties reached an agreement the 
following dayl02) was effective not because the process 
was taking too long, but because the time limit was 
expiring. In Camp David the mediator adopted an active 
strategy because he had leverage, and therefore his 
threat was taken seriously, and worked. In the Uganda 
mediation, the mediator was passive because he could not 
exercise serious leverage, 103 and therefore the success 
of the first threat was qualified, and the second had 
little or no effect. The lesson to be derived from this 
is that where a mediation is open ended in terms of time 
limit, a mediator's threat lS less likely to be 
effective than where the duration of the mediation lS 
limited. Also, although the threat itself should be 
accompanied by a time limit, its effect on the parties 
depends on whether or not they consider the mediator to 
have sufficient power to back the threat with positive 
action. 
Psychological Barriers Between the Parties 
As was suggested in the last Chapter, the fact that 
the psychological barriers separating the parties at the 
beginning of the mediation were still present and 
probably more pronounced - at the end of it contributed 
f M d · t' as a Method of 102 Bercovitch, 'A Case Study 0 e la lon 
International Conflict Resolution' op cit pp.57-58. 
103 According to a participant in the mediation, the rr,""di~tor 
not even threaten to apply any leverage at any time dur.ln'J 
mediation. This information was communicated to the author in 
letter dated 18 November 1994. 
to the breakdown of the Nairobi Peace Agreement. 
Consequently, during the post-negotiation stage, neither 
party was convinced of the good faith of the other. This 
can be attributed largely to the failure of the process 
to give the parties room to explore their differences 
and overcome these barriers. The failure of this to 
happen illustrates the view that the inability to leave 
attitudes altered is one of the fundamental weaknesses 
of conventional mediation. 104 There was clearly a need 
for the parties in the Uganda mediation to go through a 
process of ' confirming': that is, a dialogue between 
them that would have led to an acceptance of each 
others' fundamental values and self -worth .105 
There are two ways by which the process of changing 
parties' perceptions about each other can be effected. 
One entails initially going through a process of 
interactive problem-solving, or something in the nature 
of what Montville calls a 'walk through history'. The 
purpose is to "elicit specific grievances and wounds of 
the groups ... in conflict which have not been 
acknowledged by the side responsible for inflicting 
them" .106 In essence, this calls for the transformation 
of victimhood psychology through interaction between the 
parties, thereby shaping a new political and social 
contract between previous enemies. 107 This process can 
take place prior to the mediation, and is geared to 
104 See Mitchell,C.R. The Structure of International Conflict 
(London: Macmillan, 1981) pp.312-313. 
105 See Montville,J.V. 'The Healing Function in Political confl~ct 
Resolution' in Sandole,D.J.D. & van der Merwe,H. (Eds) c~nfl~ct 
Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Appl~cat~on 
(Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press, 1993) .pp.112-
127:115. This is an idea that Montiville had developed earller: see 
Montville 'The Arrow and the Olive Branch: The Case for Track .Two 
Diplomacy: in McDonald,J.W. & Bendahmane,D.B. (Eds) Co~flict ReBolut~on: 
Track Two Diplomacy (Washington: Foreign Service Instltute, 1987) pp.5-
20. 
. f POll' tical Conflict 106 Montville, 'The Healing Functlon 0 
Resolution' op.cit., p.115. 
107 Ibid., p.120. 
overcoming psychological barriers. I . t 1S not aimed at 
resolving the conflict, since 
This 
"[a~ ?ettlement must ultimately take place at the 
pol1t1cal level, through political and diplomatic 
processes. But to the extent that such barriers 
can be ove~co~e, new possibilities may be created 
for .n~got1at10ns on the basis of objective 
cond7t10ns an~ current interests. As long as these 
barr1er~ pers1st, the parties are locked into rigid 
assumpt10ns and postures rooted 1n past 
history. ,,108 
approach . 1S not always feasible because to be 
effective, it needs to have taken place prior to the 
negotiations, yet often the parties wish to go to 
mediation immediately. It also has the drawback that the 
increased communication it contemplates may serve to 
increase the areas of disagreement rather than reduce 
them. 109 
The alternative approach accomodates such a process 
within the context of the mediation itself, or at least 
runs contemporaneously with it. This is the process of 
what Saunders has termed 'squaring the circle'. 110 It 
involves balancing the conflicting needs to concentrate 
on the (technical) negotiation process and get results 
from it, and the need to take into consideration the 
wider political and psychological factors. As Saunders 
notes, a process that concentrates exclusively on 
negotiations risks two dangers. It runs the risk of 
becoming so absorbed in the technical aspects of 
negotiation, that the impression is given that the 
ultimate purpose of creating a new relationship is being 
ignored. Secondly, concentrating on the mediation 
process requires the parties to have a clear picture of 
108 Kelman,H.C. 'Interactive Problem-Solving: A Social-
Psychological Approach to Conflict Resolution' in ~urton,J. & 
Dukes, F. (Eds) Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolut~on (London: 
Macmillan, 1990) pp.199-215:203. 
109 Bercovitch, , A Case Study of Mediation as a Method of 
International Conflict Resolution' op.cit., pp.44-45. 
110 Saunders,H.H. 'A Broader Peace Process for the Middle Eas~' 
in Kipper,J. & Saunders,H.H. (Eds) The Middle East in Global 
Perspective op.cit., pp.300-341:303-304. 
their destination without "shaping political debate to 
change perceptions in important constituencies and to 
build support for that Pl' ctur ,,111 Th e. us, effective 
mediation requires not only that the technical dimension 
be taken into account, but also the political (and 
psychological) dimension, through which the fundamental 
fears and hopes of the parties are addressed. 
Serious psychological barriers separated the 
parties in the Uganda conflict. To Tito Okello, the NRA 
represented the biggest hindrance to his efforts to 
rebuild Uganda. Both he and his supporters ln the 
Military Council were convinced that an NRM government 
would be bent on revenge against them.1l2 They were also 
persuaded that should Museveni take over power, he would 
seek to redraw the ethnic balance especially in the UNLA 
and the Military Council, that was at that time ln 
favour of the Acholis, who had overthrown Obote. 
On his part, Museveni believed that the military 
government was composed of criminals and murderers, who 
had served during the brutal Amin and Obote regimes. To 
Museveni and the NRM, a new Uganda could not be built 
under the supervision of people who had blood on their 
hands, and who had participated in the prolongation of 
Uganda's darkes t days. Nei ther did Museveni bel ieve 
that the military government was dedicated to the kind 
of fundamental changes which he had espoused in his 
vision for Uganda. 
In these circumstances, any agreement reached was 
bound to encounter serious difficulties In 
implementation. This psychological gulf could not be 
bridged by technical negotiations alone. Rather I it 
called for an opportunity for both parties to explore 
the basis of each other's perceptions, and to appreciate 
111 Ibid., p.304. 
112 Indeed, in his first policy speech after taking over pow~r, 
. h 'l't~vernme'~' as belnq Ti to Okello stated one of the alms of t e ml 1 ary 9,' h . 
to Pi',-'vent "revenge and victimisation as a :~sult of the ~', ~.,a7i:8~) 
government". See Keesing I sCan tempCL'1.l'y .:U-~~!1~ ves, Vol. 31, ,'" ~ 
p.34025. See also Chapter 7. 
that perhaps they shared a common purpose, which they 
could be committed jointly to fulfil. The failure of the 
Nairobi mediation in this respect was in concentrating 
on the negotiation process and on concluding an 
Agreement, without addressing the fundamental question 
of whether the parties appreciated each other's 
commitment to make it work. 
Agreement could not endure. 
The Question of Personality 
Devoid of this limb, the 
These psychological barriers between the parties 
were also reflected in the very different personalities 
of the parties to the Uganda mediation. As Druckman has 
argued, there 1S a clear relationship between 
personality and negotiation behaviour .113 In his 
findings, personality affects the negotiation behaviour 
of the parties during the various stages of a 
negotiation. 
In the Uganda mediation, the personalities of the 
ma1n protagonists could not have been more different. 
Tito Okello was an old man, and an old soldier. He had 
joined the colonial army during the 1940s, and was 
promoted to officer rank only after independence. But 
for this, Tito Okello could never have become an 
officer, much less a General of the Ugandan army. The 
army he had joined emphasised in its African recruits 
not intellectual, but martial qualities, 114 physical 
fitness, and respect for authority. Accordingly, skills 
which a modern statesman finds useful for his task, like 
communication and the ability to see the larger picture 
were not a highly developed or cultivated part of Tito 
Okello's personality. He was a simple man, 
unintellectual and unassuming, and not at horne in the 
world of modern diplomacy. 
113 Druckman, D. 'Social- Psychological Approaches to the S.t udy of 
) N tia ti"lS· SocIal -Negotiation' in Druckman,D. (Ed ego '-.: . 1'177) 
Psychological Perspectives {Beverley Hills: Sage publlcatlonhs
l
, : 1 
h d · . n on psyc 0 0 nca pp .15-44 . See Chapter 2 for furt er lSCUSS10 
approaches. 
114 See Chapter 5 on this colonial policy. 
Yoweri Museveni on the other hand, had in abundance 
all those qualities which Tito Okello lacked. K much 
younger, articulate, and intellectual man, Museveni had 
won his revolutionary spurs in the rough and tumble of 
Dar-es-Salaam University politics in the early 1970s, 
and in the Mozambiquan war of liberation where he ser'.~ed 
. h' 115 an apprentlces lp. He had a broad sense of history, 
and saw himself very much as the Ugandan statesman-in-
waiting. His execution of a guerilla war had been in 
pursuit of making an ideological mark In Africa. He saw 
himself as having a mission and a vocation to 
accomplish this dream.116 
Given these divergent personalities and the 
inevitable clash between them, the mediation was never 
going to be an easy exercise. The mediator's task in 





interlocutors In the 
they strategy by which 
would both have come to see the value of working towards 
a common purpose. Instead, the personality gap between 
them was allowed to grow, and in the end, was 
pronounced 
beginning. 
(if not more) than it had been 




negotiations themselves, and especially lD the 
implementation period, owed much to this factor. 
The Case of the 'Missing' Mediator 
The last section considered some of the technical 
problems that faced the mediator during the Uganda 
mediation. It argued that because the mediator was 
restricted in his ability to exert some leverage on the 
parties, he chose a passive strategy in the belief that 
it best suited the circumstances. It was also contended 
that since the mediator's hands were tied In this way, 
the closest he could have come to exerting some form of 
115 See an interview wi th Yoweri Museveni, The Kenya Times, 3 
November 1985, p.4. 
116 This insight was communicated to the au,::hor by Ambass<,dcr 
Kiplagdt in an interview with the author. 
leverage was to issue threats to the parties. The point 
was made further that the mediator In the Uganda 
mediation did not provide (or insist on) an opportunity 
for the parties to try and bridge the vast psychological 
and personality gap that divided them. Thus, the 
structure for peace agreed on by addressing only 
technical issues later encountered severe problems of 
implementation. 
It has been argued that President Moi's approach to 
the Uganda mediation was 'simplistic', in the sense that 
In the pursuit of his own goals (particularly the wish 
to construct a Pax Nairobiana, and consolidate his image 
as a regional peacemaker), he overlooked the underlying 
causes and lssues In the Uganda conflict. 117 This lS 
unduly harsh, and not a little revisionist. The valid 
criticism that can be made about the conduct of the 
Uganda mediation, lS that the mediator's 
conceptualisation of its technical aspects was not 
founded on a sufficiently profound view of the diversity 
and complexity of the mediation process .119 The Vlew 
that seemed to have been adopted was that the conclusion 
of an Agreement was the goal to secure. In this 
perspective, its successful conclusion was to be the 
yardstick by which the mediator's reputation would be 
measured, and assured. 
This was not a belief all the parties shared. The 
repeated postponing of the signing of the Agreement 
lends some weight to the claim that the parties were not 
convinced fully that the Agreement would work: and hence 
that their eventual attendance and signature of the 
Agreement was merely a courtesy to the mediator. 119 The 
117 This is an opinion strongly expressed by Prof. Kabwegy~re, in 
an interview with the author. 
118 Which as Bercovitch has illustrated, is very diverse indeed: 
see Bercovitch,J. 'The Structure and Diversity .of Mediation in 
International Relations' in Bercovitch,J. & Rubln,J.Z. (Eds) fl' t 
Me,-iia tion in International Relations: Mul tiple Approaches to Con Ie 
Management (London: Macmillan, 1992) pp.1-29. 
119 Ocan op. ci t. See also Chapter 7. 
choice of a passive strategy, although it has its own 
theoretical justifications, was probably not eventually 
best suited to a mediation of this type of conflict. 
That strategy gave the parties to the conflict a lot of 
room to call the shots, even those that were clearly In 
the mediator's province. For instance, as was noted In 
Chapter Seven, the parties were not encouraged to 
formalise a ceasefire to obtain during the mediation. 
Because the operative ceasefire was unilateral, 120 they 
felt able to break it during the mediation, and to step 
up their military engagement with each other. Had a 
formal ceasefire been arranged, it would have imposed an 
obligation on the parties to observe it .121 Since this 
was not done, the mediator was reduced to a bystander as 
the parties moved the process from negotiation to the 
military track. 
Furthermore, the failure to appreciate the 
different levels on which the process should proceed 
meant that the important question of the psychological 
basis of the parties' relationship was not addressed. In 
the event, the divergence in their perception of the 
conflict and of each other's motives rendered the 
Nairobi Agreement difficult to implement. The problem 
therefore, was that the choice of strategy chosen by the 
mediator gradually led to the loss of the mediator's 
initiative, and with it eventually, to the perception by 
the parties (as witnessed by their ignoring the second 
threat by the mediator), that the mediator had lost 
control of the process. The problem with the 
technicalities of the negotiation stage of the Uganda 
120 In that the conflictants agreed on it on their own. This is 
comparable to the situation obta~ning in the. current (August 1994) 
mediation of the Sudan conflict: ln that confllct the Sudanese 
government announced a 'unilateral ceasefire' beginning 2.1 J~ly 1994, 
following a general appeal by the Chairman of the medlatlon gro,;!p 
(President Moi) while opening the third round of talks. However, .1t 
is noteworthy that the ceasefire coincided with the start of the ral~y 
season during which the movement of northern (government) troops h1n 
, . b . peded greatly. See T e southern Sudan would ln any case e 1m 
Standard (Nairobi), 24 July 1994, p.G. 
121 See Kriesberg, 'Formal and Quasi-Mediators in International 
disputes' op.cit., p.25. 
mediation was therefore not so much one of an inept 
mediator, as one of the 'missing' mediator. 
Environmental Influences on the Uganda Mediation 
This section will consider the environmental milieu 
within which the Uganda mediation took place. It will 
argue that apart from the economic, military and social 
environment
122 
there were three other categories of 
environmental influences on the mediator: the 
diplomatic, the bureaucratic, and arising from this, the 
psychological environment. 123 It will be submitted that 
there are two types of psychological environment: that 
of the parties which was discussed earlier, and that of 
the mediator. It will be suggested that the interplay of 
all these environmental influences on the mediator ln 
the Uganda mediation merits the conclusion that there 
should be more than one mediator in the mediation of 
internal conflicts. 
The Diplomatic Environment 
An early rendition of the environment of mediation 
was Wall's mediation paradigm. In it, he perce i ved 
mediation as a triangular bargaining process involving 
not only the intermediary and the parties, but 
interaction between the intermediary and the 
constituents of the adversaries, between the 
intermediary and his own constituency, and between one 
or both of the adversaries and the intermediary's 
constituency. 124 This 'paradigm' was found to be 
restrictive, and was honed and developed further by 
Mitchell. To him, there is interaction with a wider 
122 The mediator appreciated the influence of. these, especially 
the loss of human life resulting from the confllct, and drew t~e 
parties attention to them in public speeches: see for example. ~~~ 
speech on Kenya's Jamuhuri (Independence) day: text reproduced In Da~ } 
Nation, 13 December 1985, p.27. 
123 These have been an important factor in ot~er .media.tions: for 
example, their influence in the Rho~esian negot.la~ lons IS ~~e~~l: 
detailed in Chan, S. The Commonweal th ~n World Pol~ t~cs 0 P . 
pp.36-39. 
124 Wall J A 'Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed , . . .) 157-180 See 
Research' 25 Journal of Conflict Resolut~on (1981 pp. . 
further literature in Chapter 2. 
audience before which the confl' t ' 1C 1S enacted. This 
audience comprises governments or organisations acting 
in support of either of the adversaries (1' e pat " rons or 
allies); groups with a direct interest in some specific 
value deriving directly from the adversaries, or in some 
general good they wish to see preserved (i.e. affected 
others); and those with no immediate or direct interest 
either in the dispute itself or in the regional system 
affected, but who have a general interest 1n the 
preservation of international stability and the 
upholding of shared values. 125 
In the Uganda conflict, the allies or patrons 
included countries such as Egypt, which supported the 
Okello government, and Tanzania, which later on during 
the mediation was said to have supported the NRM .126 The 
affected others included countries like the Sudan and 
Zaire, which wanted the conflict in Uganda to be settled 
lest it diffuse into their terrritories .127 The audience 
with an interest in preserving international stability 
or upholding shared values included organisations such 
as the United Nations, and the Organisation of African 
Unity.12B 
Mitchell has argued cogently that mediation can be 
seen as one strategy amongst many that the third party 
adopts in its endeavour to fulfill certain roles. He has 
further posi ted that the choice of strategy may be 
limited by the resources available to the third 
party.129 As was pointed out in Chapter Six, Kenya 
wanted to play several roles in undertaking the Uganda 
125 Mitchell,C.R. 'The Motives for Mediation' in Mitchell,C.R. & 
Webb,K. (Eds) New Approaches to International Mediation (Westport,CT.: 
Greenwood Press, 1988) pp.29-51:36i see also Chapter 2. On the 
diplomatic environment of the Uganda conflict, see Chapter 6. 
126 Ocan op. ci t ., and Chapter 6. 
127 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of diffusion of conflict. 
128 See Chapter 4 on the cooperation between the UN and ~h.=. OAU 
in the management of conflicts in Africa. 
129 Mitchell, 'The Motives for Mediation' op.cit., pp.48-49. 
mediation. In the re' 1 d' glona lplomatic environment, 
mediation was seen as a vehicle for enhancing Kenya's 
(and President Moi's) lmage as a regional peacemaker. 
Kenya also expected to reap some rewards from Uganda in 
terms of resources and alliance against Tanzania in the 
regional balance of power. Thus, in undertaking the 
mediation Kenya was responding to the regional 
diplomatic environment, in which it wanted to exclude, 
or at least counter, the influence of Tanzania which had 
been on the rlse at least Slnce the liberation of 
Uganda. 
The Bureaucratic Environment 
In terms of the mediator's constituency, the part 
of the domestic environment that affected the conduct of 
the Uganda mediation was not so much the larger public, 
as the ruling elite, and the bureaucratic fights amongst 
them. 130 Although President Moi considered that 
undertaking the Uganda mediation would also enhance his 
reputation at home, his 'landslide' election as 
President in 1983 left him with no opponents with whom 
he felt a need to compete for domestic influence, or a 
domestic audience which he wanted particularly to 
impress. The concern therefore was to consolidate his 
reputation as an international statesman. In this field, 
in the view of some, he had won his spurs as Chairman of 
the OAU in the early 1980's, and in his involvement in 
that capacity in the management of the conflicts in Chad 
and Western Sahara. 131 
But within the bureaucratic politics of Kenya, his 
attention as mediator was divided, and this had an 
important bearing on the conduct (and possibly the 
outcome) of the Uganda mediation. wi thin the Kenyan 
establishment, four main groups strove for pre-eminence 
in influencing the mediator. The first consisted of 
130 For example, Mitchell has noted that the intensity of intra-
. . . . . ble in t-he process 0:" the 
Party struggle lS a cruclal determlnlng varla ~ f . . . M't h 11 C R The Structure 0 termlnatlon of the confllct. See l c e , ' . 
International Conflict op.cit., p.1S7. 
131 This is discussed in Chapter 6, 
figures in the foreign policy establishment, who had a 
professional interest in the mediation a d h , n w 0 were 
keen that it should succeed. The second were a sub-set 
of this group; they had an interest in the mediation 
because they also had interests, especially business 
ones, in Uganda, which they wanted to preserve. The 
third group was outside the foreign policy 
establishment, and consisted of those who, although 
their business interests in Uganda had flourished during 
the years of conflict, were experiencing difficulties in 
getting their money remitted; they were therefore keen 
on a solution to a conflict which was adversely 
affecting their interests. 132 Lastly, there were those 
in the establishment who were close to the centre of 
power, and whose main concern was not related to the 
conflict in Uganda as a regional and diplomatic problem, 
but with the dynamics of Kenyan power politics. This 
group was concerned to ensure that their local influence 
was not submerged into the process of the conduct of 
diplomacy. On that basis they countered or opposed 
recommendations made about the mediation by those 
interested in its successful outcome. 133 
Permeating these various groups were individuals 
within the Kenyan bureaucratic and business 
establishment whose ties and connections with Uganda 
were sentimental. A large cross - section of these had 
been educated in Uganda's premier institutions such as 
Budo College and Makerere University. These old school 
ties with Uganda (and Ugandans) gave this group of 
people a personal interest in the stability of Uganda. 
They had many friends in Uganda inside and outside the 
political establishment, and had indeed suffered the 
132 For some in these groups, the ties were also personal. Those 
of them who came from the areas around the Kenya-Uganda border, had had 
their ethnic communities (and in some cases families) divided by the 
border For them their interests were not just business ones, b~t 
family·ones as well. See Chapter 3 on the relationship between ethnlC 
communities and the borders that separate them. 
133 The author owes this insight on the influence of Keny~n 
bureacratic politics on the Uganda mediation to t~e elegan~ analysls 
of Ocan, op.cit. His own observations support thls analysls. 
personal loss of friends during the conflict. They 
therefore hoped for, and encouraged any process that 
would restore peace to Uganda.134 
The Psychological Environment 
At the centre of this interplay of bureaucratic 
politics was the mediator, who not surprisingly, was 
faced with often conflicting advice as to which policy 
to follow.135 He therefore had to deal with a 
psychological environment that was not conducive to the 
creative conduct of mediation. This complex 
psychological environment, and the bureaucratic politics 
that engendered it, were compounded by the fact that the 
various groups were al so represented in the Kenyan 
delegation to the mediation. 136 
Two results followed from this. Not surprisingly, 
the Ugandan parties noticed and became affected by the 
strains of this environment. They came gradually to the 
view that the negotiating environment was irremediably 
poisoned,137 and that the mediation could not proceed as 
it should. In this perception, having reached that 
conclusion, their interest in the whole process waned 
and they continued only as a courtesy to the mediator. 
The mediator also became emotionally tired, and 
impatient with the progress of the mediation, hence the 
threats he issued to the parties. 13B This gives rise to 
the question whether it is not preferable to have 
multiple mediators in this sort of conflict. The 
following section addresses this issue. 
The Case for Multiple Mediators 
134 This pertinent analysis was offered by Loyatum, op. cit. 
135 He was personally and politically close to individuals within 
each of these four groups. 
136 See The Uganda Peace Talks Agreement for the Restorat~on c: t 
Peace to The Sovereign State of the Republic of Uganda (Nalrobl: 
Government Printers, 1985) Annexture 'E', p.20. 
137 Ocan, op. cit. 
138 K· 1 t P Cl.· t He attributes the emotional fatigue to the l.p aga , o. . b h f .. 
fact that the process was dragging on too. lo~g! ~owever ot actolS 
played a role in this, and were probably lndlV1Sl.ble. 
The Uganda mediation Supports the 
~Ilew that it lS 
preferable to have more than one mediator. There are 
several reasons why multiple mediators are considered to 
be advantageous. Where there are multiple mediators, 
individual mediators have the opportunity to unburden 
themselves emotionally, such that all the problems are 
not carried on one set of shoulders. I thO n lS way, 
mediators can keep a proper perspective on 
the 
the 
mediation, and on the lssues arising. 139 Mul tiple 
mediation is also collaborative: lssues and approaches 
are discussed by more than one person. Furthermore, 
multiple mediators can rein In any tendency of a lone 
mediator to take sides with one of the parties. Because 
there would be more than just one point of Vlew, 
mUltiple mediators can be more innovative than a single 
mediator. Multiple mediators also widen the structure 
of the conflict, and hence of the mediation process. 
Where multiple mediators are exogenous, that identity 
automatically widens the mediation environment. Further, 
whatever their identity, multiple mediators bring 
different perspectives, and can thus expand the agenda 
and hence enrich the discussions. They can contribute 
different points of Vlew and bring their varylng 
experiences to bear on the proceedings. Multiple 
mediators can also curb or discourage any tendency of a 
single mediator to stick to a failing strategy either 
because of bureaucratic inertia, or because his 
credibility may be on the line. 140 Consistent with the 
earlier discussion of the psychological environment, 
multiple mediators would also be less prone to be 
affected by the demands of a particular bureaucratic or 
psychological environment. Where the other mediators are 
139 Kiplagat, op.cit. 
140 These last four are discussed in Spiegel,M.A. 'The ~:c~mibia 
Negotiations and the Problem of Neutrality' in TOUV~~'S. & 
. 1 ~'t' . Theory -1.,]1 rraC.ICe Zartman,I.W.{Eds) Internat~ona MeLl2a len In c.' • 
(Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1986) pp.111-139:119-120. 
exogenous, they are not hostage to the vicissitudes of 
the power politics of a particular country.141 
There are however disadvantages of having multiple 
mediators, the most salient being that such mediators 
could slow negotiations down, because of the need for 
consultations at each stage and on each strategy .142 
Also, disagreements on policy or approach, and 
divergencies ln interest between collective mediators 
can lead to the collapse of the whole process.143 
There was a single mediator in the Uganda conflict. 
As argued earlier, his heterogenous nature militated 
against any impartiality to which he may have aspired, 
curtailed his effectiveness, and could have contributed 
to his emotional fatigue. The question that arises 
therefore, is what type of co-mediator would be most 
effective. The view subscribed to here is that a co-
mediator should not also be heterogenous, because that 
would only compound the problems experienced by a like 
mediator. As Wehr and Lederach144 contend, there is much 
to commend an 'insider-partial' (a species of endogenous 
third party) especially in the type of conflicts in 
Central America. Nevertheless, a stronger case can be 
made for an exogenous co-mediator in internal conflicts. 
Although such a co-mediator may start with the 
disadvantage of not understanding the various nuances of 
an internal (or even regional) conflict, (s)he could 
still make an invaluable contribution to the mediation 
process, because (s)he would bring experience and 
141 This latter can also be an advantage of a lone ex~ge~ous 
mediator, and is noted by Umbricht,V.H. Mult~later~~ Med~at~on: 
Practical Experiences and Lessons (Dordrecht: Martlnus N1Jhoff, 1988). 
142 Spiegel, 'The Namibia Negotiations and the 
Neutrality' op.cit., p.120. 
Problem of 
143 This point is illustrated in Jabri' s discussion of th.e Western 
. . .., th Namibian confllct. See Contact Groups's coalltlon medlatlon ln e G' The 
Jabri V ' European Involvement in the Western ~ontac~ Crhoup S' & 
' . .. M d' tlon' ln an,. 
Stress and Convenience of Coalltlon, e la . 'llan 1993) 




Wehr & Lederach ' Mediating Conflict in Central America' 
knowledge from other conflicts. And such diversit~· could 
enhance the profile of, and enrich the mediation 
process. 
Tracks of Diplomacy and the Uganda Conflict 
One of the themes pursued in several parts of this 
study 145 has been that the two currently known tracks of 
diplomacy exhibit certain problems when they are 
resorted to individually in conflict management. It has 
been argued that track one diplomacy, because of its 
formality and its connections with official policy, is 
not always a suitable, 
track from which to 
or indeed always an acceptable 
proceed. 146 It was noted that 
whereas track two diplomacy has registered some 
important successes in conflict management in Africa, 
notably in the Sudan mediation of 1972, it displays 
certain structural weaknesses, mostly to do with its 
very unofficial character. It was observed that in OAU 
practice for example, these approaches have appeared to 
be mutually antipathetic, and hence the strategies of 
one have not been brought to the aid of the other. 147 
Consequently this study has proposed that it lS 
useful to formulate dual track diplomatic approach which 
would build on the strengths of track one and track two, 
and seek to avoid their weaknesses. 148 It has suggested 
that such an approach would enrich conflict management 
by bringing out the multi-level nature of conflict, and 
the complexity of the mediation process. 
The Operative Track in the Uganda Mediation 
The Uganda mediation was managed exclusively within 
track one, and at no time during the Uganda conflict was 
track two used, or even contemplated. Although it was 
managed through track one, the Uganda mediation is an 
important contribution to conflict management in Africa. 
145 See especially Chapter 1 and Chapter 4. 
146 See Chapter 2. 
147 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of this prcl' lem. 
148 See chapter 1 and Chapter 4. 
, 
It 1S significant because it 1S one of the very few 
track one, non-OAU African mediations. It was suggested 
above that by using the sucess index formulated by 
Bercovitch, the Uganda mediat1'on can b ' e Judged to have 
been partially successful. However, 1m t t par an aspects 
including the type of mediator and its technical 
conduct, conspired against its emergence as a fully 
successful mediation. Indeed, the Agreement it gave rise 
to was short lived, and this must necessarily temper any 
judgments as to the quality of its outcome. It will 
therefore be argued that a different diplomatic approach 
might, 1n the particular conditions of the Uganda 
conflict, have registered a more enduring outcome. 
Track Two Diplomacy and the Moshi Conference 
The idea that the notion of a ripe moment needs to 
be enlarged to encompass different periods in the life 
cycle of a conflict from those suggested by Zartman, was 
addressed earlier. It was suggested that in the Ugandan 
kind of internal conflict it 1S possible for such a true 
r1pe moment to be discerned at a stage long before the 
conventional Zartman-type one becomes evident. In the 
Uganda conflict, such a ripe moment was evident during 
the Moshi Conference in 1979. What marked that stage of 
the conflict was the fact that it was then common 
knowledge that the Amin regime would soon fall. Thus, 
the Amin government was not invited to participate. The 
deliberations at Moshi were not a negotiation between 
the Amin government and its opponents, but a negotiation 
between his opponents about the structure of the system 
when they took over power. 
Two reasons explain why the moment was r1pe for 
some kind of third party involvement at Moshi. Although 
the participants shared a common purpose at that time, 
there were nevertheless conflicts between them, born of 
the diversity of ideological, ethnic, and other 
considerations. The involvement of a third party who was 
not part of the euphoria would thus have helped the 
participants to direct their minds to those issues which 
were potentially conflict generating. One such issue was 
the consti tutional basis of future power, 149 
indeed later proved to be the undoing of the 
spiri t' .150 
which 
'Moshi 
Although the participants at Moshi were not then 
overtly in conflict, the very nature of the role they 
intended to play upon their return to Uganda (they were, 
in Kelman's term, political actors151 ) made them 
potential candidates for violent conflict. 152 Indeed, 
this turned out to be the case within twenty months of 
their return. Thus, some third party involvement at 
that time might have helped them to focus on the major 
issues, and possibly avoided the violent conflict that 
followed. Such third party involvement at that stage 
would for instance have been devoted to reducing the 
asymmet ry153 that later led to the next phase of the 
Uganda conflict. 
Asymmetry and the Moshi Conference 
The proceedings at Moshi were conducted as though 
the participants' similarities of concern would prevail 
after the liberation. But right from the Lule regime, it 
became clear that the unity of Moshi concealed an 
asymmetry on what each considered to be 
political agenda and goals, and how they 




149 Some observers (like Dr. A. Mukwaya of the Department of 
Poli tical Science, Makerere Uni versi ty, in an interview wi th the author 
on 24 May 1993), consider that this question should have been 
discussed more thoroughly than it was. 
150 See Chapter 5. 
151 Kelman, 'Interactive Problem-Solving: A Social-Psychological 
Approach to Conflict Resolution' op.cit., p.205. 
152 Consistent with the obj ecti vist perspective d.iscussed ~n 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, there was structura~ conflict WhlCh they dld 
not however need to perceive for it to be eXlstent. 
153 See Mitchell, 'Classifying Conflicts: Asymmetry and 
Resolution' op.cit. 
154 Mukwaya, op. cit., notes that the Moshi resolutions did not 
reflect the key issues facing Uganda at the time (e "g, heal ~~h 
education, and institution building). He concludes not e.ntl,re,ly ~1 m 
tongue in cheek that the Moshi Conference "was the most flctltl0llS or 
of conference". 
Conference had failed to take into account the 
expectations of the population of Uganda, which had 
different views as to the form and structures of 
government and decision making in post-Amin Uganda. The 
leadership also became insecure and vulnerable because 
their perception of the legal structures, especially the 
constitutional basis of their authority, were not shared 
by all: hence the collapse of the first two post-
liberation governments. 155 
A track one involvement at the Moshi stage of the 
Uganda conflict would not have been feasible. Although 
the Amin regime was falling and illegitimate, it was 
still the government ln power. Hence official policy 
would not have allowed another state to become involved. 
Indeed, the OAU Charter, which enjoins member states not 




the moment was 
invol vement .156 Therefore, 
rlpe for third party 
invol vement, it would have had to be restricted to 
tracks other than official ones. 
The Roles of Dual Diplomacy 
As was argued earlier, 157 dual diplomatic conflict 
management is based on the cooperation of track one and 
track two in the management of the same conflict. Its 
maj or concern would be to bring out and address the 
multi-level nature of the conflict, and the complexity 
of its management process. For instance, whereas the 
track one approach of the OAU to conflict management 
predisposes it to deal only with inter-state 
conflicts,15B and whereas track two conflict management 
ln Africa has addressed itself only with internal 
155 See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of these. 
156 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of this policy. 
157 See chapter 1 and Chapter 4. 
158 At least ll1 OAU practice: see Chapter 4. 
conflict,159 dual diplomacy would address both aspects 
of conflict simultaneously since, as Rothchild and 
Hertzell have shown, many conflicts possess a dual 
inter- state and intra- state character. 160 
In addressing this complexity of conflict, dual 
diplomacy would play certain roles. It would play an 
analytical role, and hence those involved should include 
people with diverse knowledge of conflict and its 
analytical processes. 161 This analytical role would take 
into account both the inter-state and intra-state 
character of conflict, and put at the disposal of the 
parties an awareness of the complexi ties involved in 
each of these dimensions. It would seek to analyse the 
plurality of players and their multi-dimensional 
concerns, while emphasising that conflicts and the 
actors involved in them are not static. 162 It would also 
operate on the basis that the conflict could have 
resulted from an asymmetry of the parties interests and 
perceptions, and would therefore identify and analyse 
the areas and nature of asymmetry ln a particular 
conflict .163 Finally, in its analytical role dual 
diplomacy would fit these concerns within a regional 
context because as was argued in Chapter One, conflict 
management that does not take a regional perspective is 
unlikely to be effective. 
Secondly, dual diplomacy would play a supportive 
role. In this role, it would address the psychological, 
personality, and perceptual concerns that affect the 
159 Ibid. 
160 Rothchild, D. & Hertzell, C. 'Great and Medium Power Mediations: 
Angola' in Zartman, I. W. (Ed) Resolving Regional Conflicts: 
International Perspectives op.cit., pp.39-57. 
161 See Chapter 9. 
162 See Chapter 2; also, Vayrynen,R. 'To Settle ~r to Tra~~~o~m; 
Perspectives on the Resolution of National and Internatlonal Con lC s 
op.cit., pp.1-25. 
163 See Mitchell, f I · t Asyrnmet ry and 'Classifying Con lC s: 
Resolution' op.cit. 
relationships between parties l.n conflict. It would 
thereby have an important pre-negotiation function in 
the style of Ronald Fisher's third party 
consul tation. 164 Instead of operating as distinct 
process, track one and track two processes would be 
organically linked to the formal processes of one dual 
track. Thus, rather than being two distinct processes, 
consultation and mediation would be integral limbs of 
the same diplomatic track. Hence, dual 
embody a process by which, under the 




history,165 while at the same time negotiating a 
solution to their conflict. 166 
Thirdly, dual diplomacy would play a monitoring 
role. It would be concerned not only to get the parties 
eventually to agree, but also to remain within the 
conflict system and perform a sort of institutionalised 
continuous management of the conflict. 167 In rendering 
a consultative role to the parties after the completion 
of the mediation, the track two component would be the 
more dominant one in this relationship. The rationale 
for this is that since conflicts transform and re-emerge 
in different shapes, 168 dual diplomacy in this role 
would monitor the nerve (and pulse) of a conflict as it 
evolves. 169 In this context, dual diplomacy would 
164 See Chapter 2; also, Fisher,R. & Keashly,L. 'The Potential 
Complementality of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency 
Model of Third Party Intervention' 23 Journal of Peace Research 
(1991) pp.29-42. 
165 Montville, 'The Healing Function in Political Conflict 
Resolution' op.cit. 
166 See Chapter 9. 
167 In the style suggested by Brouillet, 'Mediation as a Technique 
of Dispute Settlement' op.cit., p.172. 
168 See Vayrynen, 'To Settle or to Transform? Perspe~tives on the 
Resolution of National and International Conflicts' Op.Clt. 
169 And hence, for example, provide an early warning of ~hen the 
., . f h d See Rupeslnghe, K. 
confl1ct 1S gett1ng out 0 an. .' P I (London' 
'Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy: A D1SCUSS10n aper . 
International Alert, 1993). 
provide the optimum mix for the concerns of track 
and track two diplomacy in conflict management. 
Dual Diplomacy and the Uganda Mediation 
one 
Although as was noted earlier the operative track 
of diplomacy In the Uganda mediation was track one, it 
lS possible In hindsight to pinpoint aspects of that 
mediation that would have been conducted differently had 
an alternative approach been adopted. This section will 
mention some of these. 
In the Uganda mediation, there was some awareness 
of the international character of the conflict, and 
hence the choice of the mediator's role, or strategy. 
However, there was little recognition by the parties and 
the mediator that neither the conflict nor the players 
were static, nor an appreciation of its transitional 
character. There was also the assumption that the 
interests of the military government and those of the 
NRM were symmetrical, and hence the single minded 
pursuit of an Agreement to be signed at the end of the 
mediation. Further, the awareness of the 
internationalised character of the conflict was not 
developed and put in the context of regional conflict 
management. Had this been done, comparisons with other 
similar conflicts like the Sudan one, and its mediation 
In 1972 would have pertinently informed the 
mediation. 170 This would have raised the profile of the 
mediation to a level where the parties would have been 
encouraged to address the issue of how after the 
Agreement was reached and signed, it could have been 
made to endure, unlike the Sudanese one. 
Because the parties approached the Uganda mediation 
from a power political framework, not all the parties 
interested in the conflict were identified. This is a 
major pitfall of the legalistic approach of track one 
170 Although the wee mediation in the Sudan conflict was a tra~k 
two approach in its inception, which used track one methodol~:;ry In 
. b' d the· T .anda reality. And equally pertinent to the pOlnt elng ~a ~, .' t-
mediation should have served as a guide to later medlatlcns Ilke ~he 
current Sudanese one, which is indeed being mediated by the same 
mediator. 
diplomatic conflict management. In the Uganda conflict, 
apart from the military government and the NRM, diverse 
other parties and interests were involved in the 
conflict. These included other military groups, the 
political parties, and churches. Because they were not 
involved in the mediation, severe problems of re-entry 
were experienced, leading to the eventual abrogation of 
the Nairobi Peace Agreement. The track two component of 
dual diplomacy could have been invaluable in this 
regard. It would have helped to identify and involve all 
the other parties and constituencies, without whom a 
sel f - sus taining resol u t ion could not be reached. 171 
The Uganda mediation did not address the 
psychological environment within which the conflict was 
taking place. Particularly, perhaps because he saw the 
parties as unitary, 172 the mediator did not address the 
multi-dimensional threads that linked Tito Okello's 
military government and the NRM to the wider interests 
over which the Uganda conflict had developed over 
time. l73 A walk through the history of the Uganda 
conflict could have enabled the psychological gap 
between the parties to be identified and bridged, or at 
least lessened. It would also have highlighted the 
truism that every conflict has a memory. 174 A 
realisation of this would have enabled the mediator to 
influence the discourse during the mediation in a 
171 J R 'N C mJ.·se Problem-solving in a See Groom,A .. , 0 ompro : 
Theoretical Perspective' op.cit. 
172 As Putnam has shown, actors in negotiations are no~ unitary. 
See Putnam,R.D. 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The LOglC of Two-
Level Games' 42 International Organization (1988) pp.427-460. 
173 See Chapter 5. 
174 See Rangarajan, L.N. The Limitation of Conflict: A Theory of 
Bargaining and Negotiation (London: Croom H~lm, 1985). p.7. In ~th~~ 
words "[t]he shared and accumulated experlence ... bUllt p k 
memor~ of various trials and errors (which) becomes part of. the s~~ch 
of knowledge of a community and forms ... the backgrou~d agalnsst ~ lC 
1 M 'Validity ln Human Clence new ... claims are evaluated." Sa ner, .... ..' esearch 
Research' in Kvale,S. (Ed) Issues of Val~d~ty ~n Qual~t~at~ve R 
(Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1986) pp.47-71:54. 
direction that would have taken cognisance 
the parties relationship with that history. 
Finally, although the Nairobi Peace 
of each of 
Agreement 
provided for moni toring acti vi ties, 175 these were track 
one type monitoring activities which were directed at 
'enforcing' observance of the peace. They were not part 
of a self-sustaining arrangement, and could not 
therefore have ensured an enduring peace in Uganda. In 
this respect, the mediator's hands were tied by the 
track of diplomacy employed. Because track one lS 
concerned with settlement of a conflict, 176 it could not 
engage in the kind of monitoring activities contemplated 
in the previous section. Hence, as the implementation 
stage of the Uganda mediation revealed, it was difficult 
to carry out a continuing mediation within the 
conceptual framework and political confines of a purely 
track one approach. 
In all these instances, a dual diplomatic approach 
could have made a significant contribution to the 
process of the Uganda mediation, and indeed to its 
eventual outcome. Had such a diplomatic approach been 
adopted, Uganda may well have enjoyed a different kind 
of peace. 
The Uganda Mediation and African Conflict Management 
Although this critique of the Uganda mediation lS 
necessarily ex post facto, it should not however mask 
one of the most significant achievements of that 
mediation. As was noted In Chapter Four, the OAU's 
strict interpretation of the principle of nOD-
interference in the internal affairs of states, has also 
been embraced fully by its member states. It has led the 
OAU to ignore many of Africa's most serious conflicts. 
The result has been that even third party involvement by 
way of conflict management has come to be interpreted as 
constituting interference In internal affairs of a 
175 See Article 10 of the Agreement. 
176 See Chapter 1. 
(member) state.
177 
In this setting, the fear of African 
leaders has been that such involvement would necessarily 
be condemned by their peers as interference. Hence, 
they have preferred not to involve themselves in intra-
African conflict management. The Uganda mediation shows 
this fear to be unwarranted. 
The Uganda mediation of 1985 gives the lie to the 
perception that invol vement by way of conflict 
management would necesssarily be seen as interference in 
the internal affairs of a state. By mediating in the 
Uganda conflict, Kenya ran the risk - given the OAU 
principle of non-interference - of being condemned for 
interfering in Uganda's internal affairs. No such 
criticism or condemnation was forthcoming from either 
Uganda, the OAU, or any member state. The OAU position 
was to the extent of this single case, demonstrated to 
be unfounded. The lesson of the Uganda mediation is that 
the OAU principle of non-interference ought to be 
revised or re- interpreted. Once this 1S done, the 
principle of I African solutions to African problems' 
would be given new meaning, and a new lease of life. 
Because it was a pioneering undertaking, the Uganda 
mediation 1S of great value as a precedent. It 
represents a starting point on which future African non-
OAU conflict management can build. 
177 See Chapter 4. 
Chapter Nine 
Conclusions: Conflict and Diplomacy in Africa 
Introduction 
This study has investigated and analysed the Uganda 
mediation of 1985. It has done so within a broad 
analyti~al framework as specified in Chapter One. The 
flavour of the study is African, and its particular 
locale the internal conflict in Uganda leading to the 
1985 mediation. However, the conclusions drawn from 
that experlence are relevant to internal 
elsewhere. The broader application 
conflict 
of the 
generalisations drawn might be mitigated because of the 
single case study. But as was argued in Chapter One, 
the way out lies In more (single) case studies 
undertaken. These would eventually enable the 
comparative analysis of 
provide greater impetus 
development. 
their findings, and hence 
for disciplinary growth and 
This chapter will draw conclusions on the broad 
analytical context of conflict management in Africa. It 
will note that there is currently a conceptual crisis 
about conflict management in Africa, and outline its 
implications for the theory and practice of mediation. 
Drawing from the conclusions reached in Chapter Eight, 
suggestions will be made as to how that crisis can be 




The Analytical Context of Conflict 
Whether conflict analysts engage . 1n the textual 




mediation, and hence 
to whom and with what 
effect" , 2 or whether their analysis 1S more general, 
attention must be paid to a broader analytical 
background. This study noted that this background 
includes the regional context of the conflict and its 
management, 3 its historical context, 4 the diplomatic 
context of the conflict,S and its mediation context. 6 Of 
these, the diplomatic and mediation contexts are the 
most salient for management, because they suggest the 
tools that can be used for efficient conflict 
management. 
The Diplomatic and Mediation Contexts 
The broad diplomatic context involves investigating 
the wider international relations dimension within which 
a conflict is situated. 7 This context permits the 
identification of the diverse actors in a conflict, and 
suggests inter alia the strategies that a mediator can 
adopt, B and the extent of the internationalisation of 
conflict. 
The mediation context considers the narrower 
diplomatic milieu within which the process of management 
1 See Webb,K. Third Party Intervention and the Ending of Wa:s: A 
Preliminary Approach (Kent Paper in Politics and Internatlonal 
Relations, (1994) Series 3, No.7) p.28. 
2 Zartman,I.W. 'Conflict Reduction: Prevention, Managemen~, a~d 
R 1 t · , . D F M & Zartman I W (Eds) Conflict Resolut~on ~n eso u lon ln eng, . . . "'. . 
Africa (Washington: The Brooklngs Instltutlon, 1991) 
pp.299-319:314. 
3 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
4 See Chapter 5. 
5 See Chapter 6 . 
6 See Chapter 7. 
7 See Chapter 6 for this context of the Uganda conflict. 
• • I I 
8 See Mitchell,C.R. 'The Motives for Med1at1on. In 
Mitchell, C. R. & Webb, K. (Eds) New APproache~9~~:~ternat~onal 
Mediation (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1988) pp. 
1S carried out, and identifies inter alia the d' 1 ' 1p omatlc 
track resorted to 1n management, and the stages and 
phases of the mediation process. As was noted in the 
study,9 confining management of certain types of 
conflict to particular diplomatic tracks leads 
eventually to only one level of conflict being 
addressed, and to the richness and complexity of the 
conflict management process being ignored. As the 
following sections will show, the approach of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to conflict 
management is based on the myth of non-interference, and 
on the consequent creation of a false dichotomy between 
internal and inter- state conflicts, and hence of the 
diplomatic tracks of their management. 
The Myth of Non-Interference 
Article 3(2) of the OAU Charter enjoins members not 
to interfere in the internal affairs of states. It has 
been widely interpreted in OAU circles to mean that any 
kind of involvement would constitute interference ln the 
internal affairs of states. It has also come to be 
construed to mean that even involvement by way of 
management should be condemned as interference. The fear 
of being accused of involvement contrary to that 
principle has affected adversely the structure of OAU 
and African conflict management. There are thus, for 
example, very few non-OAU African mediations on record. 
But as the Kenyan mediatory involvement in the Uganda 
conflict demonstrated, involvement by way of management 
need not give rise to such condemnation. 
If the OAU is to enhance its conflict management 
capabilities, article 3(2) must be reviewed critically, 
with a view to its amendment, or at least re-
interpretation. Such a reV1ew would take into account 
the fact that international conflict has domestic 
1 that even what may sources. 10 It would also revea -
9 See Chapter 4. 
10 See for example, Burton,J.W. Global Conflict: The DomestL~ 
Sources of International Crises (Brighton: Wheatshea: Books, 1984). 
appear upon a cursory look to be an internal conflict is 
eventually internationalised by the multiplicity of 
actors and interests, the permeability of borders and 
shared ethnic communities ,11 and the 
internationalisation of human rights. 12 Further, the 
very introduction of 
(including official 
a third party into the conflict 
statements of the OAU disavowing 
particular conflict) ln itself 
internationalises conflict and therefore renders the 
involvement . ln a 
non- interference rationale nugatory. 13 
The False Dichotomy 
The DAU's fidelity to a strict interpretation of 
the Charter provision on non-interference has led it to 
construct a false internal and inter-state dichotomy of 
conflict. In practice this dichotomy has been extended 
to the diplomatic tracks used for management. Because 
it professes to be bound not to interfere ln the 
internal affairs of states, the DAU has declined to be 
involved in those conflicts which it considered to be 
internal. The resul t has been that track one (OAU) 
conflict management 
which it defined 
has 
as 




11 See Chapter 3. Chapter 6 demonstrates the role of, these in 
influencing Kenya's decision to mediate in the Uganda confl1ct. 
12 See Chapter 1. 
, h P 1 't' 1 and Socio-Economic 13 By the Declarat~on on teo ~ ~ca , 
Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Tak~ngu~~~~~s~~ ~~: 
World (1990), the OAU Heads of State and ~ove,rnmens eaedy resolution 
Secretary-General to investigate means of aC,h1ev1ng a ~ , the OAU's 
of all conflicts in, Africa. ~s ~as noted 1n Chapte~onfl~~ts is that 
view, the problem w1th manag1ng 1ntra-st~te nents from within the 
member states are unwilling to accept the1r oppo d' See 
d d 't f status 1n any procee 1ngs. 
same country being accor e par1 y 0 fl' t ' Africa: Proposals for 
Renort of the Secretary-General con ~c s ~n 1 t' 
~ , fl' t P ention and Reso u ~on an OAU Mechan~sm for Con ~c r~v 'f a rationale for its 
(CM/1710 (LVI)) p, 7, The OAU 1S search1ng
fl
,o\s but in a way that 
t · . t I con 1C , engagemen 1n 1n erna , ' . I The concept of 
will preserve the non-1nterference pr1nc7P e, 'd a way out of 
internationalisation of confl1ct may prov1 e 
this problem, 
considered to be internal have 
through track two diplomacy. 14 
fallen to be managed 
As the examples cited in Chapter Four show, this 
dichotomy is false. Conflicts such as that in Chad had 
clear characteristics of both elements. In Biafra on 
the other hand, there was considerable international 
involvement, and the conflict could not thus be 
dismissed purely as an internal affair. 
This approach has had deleterious effects on the 
development of conflict management in Africa. It has 
meant that conflicts have only been managed through one 
diplomatic track, even when their complexity demanded 
alternative or dual management tracks. Worse, it has 
meant that the lessons from one track of diplomacy have 
not been used in the service of the other. It also 
suggests another more serious false dichotomy: the 
different methodologies of track one and track two 
conflict management have been considered to be distinct, 
even though as was suggested with respect to the Uganda 
mediation, extrapolation of some elements of one track 
to the other could contribute to successful conflict 
managemen t . 15 
Yet, because every conflict operates at different 
levels, its proper management is necessarily a complex 
undertaking. In the negotiations over Zimbabwe's 
independence for example, although a solution was 
14 See Chapter 4. Nevertheless there are conflicts in which the 
OAU involved itself in although on the face of it theX were in~ernal, 
such as the Western Sahara conflict. The OAU's rat10nale ~s ~hat 
although they are internal, such conflicts offend another prl~clple 
which the OAU holds more dear, namely the principle of ~he sanc~lty ~f 
the borders inherited at independence. This principle 1S ens~rlned in 
article 3(3) of the Charter as the respect for the sover~lgnty and 
terri torial integrity of each state. In Eri trea, the OAU cons1dered the 
conflict to be an internal affair of Ethiopia (se~ Chapter 4). The 
Eri trean revolution especially after the fall of Meng1 tsu pr~sented the 
OAU with a fai t accompli in which the OAU had no cholce but to 
recognise the new Eritrean'state. As Kamanu notes, the p~in~ipl~ of 
territorial integrity has been "elevated to an absolu~e principle by 
the OAU: see Kamanu,O.S. 'Secession and the Rlght, of Se~f­
Determination: An OAU Dilemma' 12 Journal of Modern Afr~can Stud~eB 
(1974) pp.355-376:360. 
15 See Chapter 8. 
reached through track one at Lancaster House, 16 track 
two diplomacy also made its own unheralded input .17 In 
the Sudan conflict, settlement was reached through track 
two diplomacy using track one methodology, and with a 
reluctant helping hand from track one through Haile 
Selassie's intervention. 1s Unlike these two, the Uganda 
mediation took place exclusively within track one 
diplomacy, and this could explain its outcome. 
The Uganda mediation suggests that neither track is 
equipped individually to address this multitude of 
levels and complexity of conflict management. The 
future way out lies in adopting a dual approach that 
brings the methodologies of track one and track two 
diplomacy into the service of the management of the same 
conflict. Because track one actors are still the 
dominant players in the international system, 19 it is 
unlikely that their role in conflict management will be 
reduced. 20 On the other hand, important elements like 
psychological and perceptual ones are unlikely properly 
to be catered for through track one diplomacy. Indeed, 
the methodologies of track two diplomacy are designed to 
address these very issues. As Chapter Eight suggests, 
the way out is not as Burton proposes, to elevate track 
16 See Chan,S. The Commonwealth in World Politics (London: Lester 
Crook Academic Publishing, 1988) Ch.4 for an account of the Lancaster 
House negotiations leading to Zimbabwe's independence. 
17 See for example, Elliot,H.P. 'Informal Contributions, Toward 
Settlement' in Bendahmane,D.B.& McDonald,J.W. (Eds) Perpect~,ves on 
Negotiations: Four Case Studies and Interpretations (Washlngton: 
Foreign Service Institute, 1986) pp.188-193. 
18 ff H Mediation in Civil Wars: Approaches and See Ase a, . 7) 
Strategies - The Sudan Conflict (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 198 . 
19 This is not to admit that they are the only players in that 
system, but to accept a fact of international life. 
such the United Nations 
20 Indeed, track one plaY,ers . as lict mana ement: see 
contemplate an enhancement of thelr role ln co~f D' 1 g 
Boutros-Ghali,B. An Agenda for ~eace: preventl;~ ul~;;~t~ationsl 
Peacemaking and Peace-keep1ng (New Yor. n 
1992) . 
two to be the main conflict management track,21 but to 
move towards a dual track one and track two conflict 
management. 
Prospects: Dual Diplomacy in Conflict Management 
Certain hypotheses which were investigated in the 
case study lend credence to the view that a dual 
diplomatic approach to conflict management could be the 
most efficacious. A dual diplomatic approach as 
conceptualised here means one that brings track one and 
track two diplomacy together in the management of the 
same conflict. It is not 'dual' in the sense used 
elsewhere of two track one approaches operating 
simultaneously in the same conflict. 22 Neither does it 
imply merely the independent presence of both tracks in 
the field. 23 The beauty of a dual diplomatic approach 
lies in the possibility of addressing the various levels 
of the same conflict, and further enriching the 
complexity of the mediation process. 
Identity of the Third Party 
The traditional classification of mediators as 
either endogenous or exogenous24 is unsatisfactory. In 
(internal) conflicts, once the larger context of the 
conflict is taken into account it becomes clear that as 
was the case with the mediator in the Uganda conflict, 
a third party can have a more complex character than in 
21 Burton,J.W. 'Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy' in 
Sandole,D.J.D. & van der Merwe,H. (Eds) Conflict Resolution Theory and 
Practice: Integration and Application (Manchester & New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1993) pp.55-64:58. 
22 As was the case in the Afghanistan conflict: see Bokhari,I.H. 
'Evolution of a Dual Negotiation Process: Afghanistan'. in 
Zartman,I.W. (Ed) Resolving Regional Conflicts: Internat~onal 
Perspectives (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1991) pp.58-68. 
23 As in Zimbabwe, where Low notes that between 1977 and 197~ ~at 
least five tracks were being followed simultan.eously ~t. offlclal 
governmental levels. There were also five or ~lX unofflclal I • 
tracks." See Low,S. 'The Owen-Vance Perlod: 1977-197.9 .In 
Bendahmane,D.B. & McDonald,J.W. (Eds) Perspectives on Negot~at~onB 
op.cit., pp.165-170:165. 
24 See for instance in Bercovitch, J. So.cial Confli~ts 
and Third Parties: Strategies for Confl1ct Resolut~on 
(Boulder,CO.: Westview Press, 1984) p.11. 
The characterisation of a third 
devised in 
this 
of mediator, a heterogenous one, was 
study to cater for this complexity.25 
However, it was demonstrated that al though the 
parties may choose a heterogenous mediator, his complex 
relationship with the conflict renders him unsuited to 
address some of the more important aspects of conflict 
management such as the attitudes and perceptions of the 
parties. The tension between his endogenous and 
exogenous personality complicates this task. In this 
tension, the exogenous aspect (mediation) calls for a 
track one orientation, while the endogenous aspects 
(creative decision making26 ) call ideally for track two 
approches. This 1S especially so when the parties 
require to 'take a walk through history', discover the 
true causes of their conflictual relationship, and 
acknowledge mutual responsibility for the conflict.27 In 
this latter respect, his endogeneity and its wider 
connections with the conflict system make him an 
integral party to the conflict, from which, like Moi 1n 
the Uganda mediation, emotionally he cannot distance 
himself. Hence, this study suggested that a 
heterogenous mediator should be supported preferably by 
an exogenous one. 
The co-mediator should be exogenous because 
functions such as encouraging the parties to explore the 
psychological dimensions of their conflict, cannot be 
undertaken effectively by either an endogenous or 
heterogenous mediator. Being so closely connected to 
the conflict, they may be unable to see the wood for the 
trees. The level at which the exogenous co-mediator 
should perform is at the level of attitudes, and this is 
25 See Chapter 1 and Chapter 8. 
26 See Bercovitch,J. Social Conflict an3 Thi"--j Parties op.cit., 
p.11 (f igure 1. 3) . 
27 See Montvilee,J.V. 'The Healing Function of Political Conflict 
Resolution' in Sandole,D.J.D.& van der Merwe,H. (Eds) ConfliL~': 
Resolution Theory and Practice op.cit., pp.112-127:11S. 
ideally a track two funct1'on. Th f ere ore the exogenous 
co-mediator is best a track two player. Bringing the 
knowledge and methodology of track two to bear could 
eventually contr1'bute to a f I success u outcome. 28 As 
Zartman and Touval note, 
"As long a~ they coordinate their activities, 
several med1ators are usually ... better than one 
Althoug~ official mediators are usually needed a~ 
the c~1ef actors and coordinators, unofficial 
(that 1S, non-state) mediators may be effective 
persuaders and they may be useful in helping to re-
orient the perceptions of the parties' values and 
opportunities. ,,29 
Environmental Influences on Mediation 
Environmental influences on mediation are diverse 
and complex. Whether they relate to the bureaucratic 
politics of which a track one mediator is a part, or 
whether they are perceptual, the Uganda mediation 
suggests that these cannot be managed within the 
confines of a purely track one approach. 
It was suggested that one of the problems with the 
Uganda mediation was the inability of the parties to 
bridge the psychological gaps that separated them, and 
hence address the conflict at the level of attitudes. 
They were unable to do this because the conceptual 
apparatus of track one diplomacy lays little emphasis on 
this important environmental element. But if a track 
two component had been included in the mediation, it 
could have been possible for this dimension to be 
addressed, contributing 
outcome, and possibly 
eventually to an 
even the resolution 
enduring 
of the 
conflict. This process could, for example, have been 
effected through a process in the nature of Ronald 
28 For example, in the process leading to the signing of an 
Israeli-PLO Agreement in 1993,impo~tant .t~ack two diplomacy was 
undertaken by a Norwegian team, and thlS facl1ltated the successful re-
entry of the process to track one. See Rosenfel~,S.S. 'Clever Oslo Can 
Play an Ongoing Role' International Herald Tr~bune, 18-19 September 
1993, p.6. 
29 Zartman, I. W. & Touval, S. 'Mediation: The Role of Third Party 
Diplomacy and Informal Peacemaking' in Brown,S.J. & Schraub,K.~. (Eds) 
Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges tor a New Era (Washlngton: 
United States Institute of Peace, 1992) pp.241-161:257. 
Fisher's third t par y consultation, which attempts to 
improve communication between the parties and to analyse 
their relationship,30 and in a more developed form, to 
complement mediation especially in the pre-negotiation 
stages. 31 
Complementing Track One: Knowledge as Influence 
The relationship between mediation and leverage 
within a power political framework is well documented.32 
Leverage is a source of mediator power, and has been 
described as the "ticket to mediation" .33 Through it, 
the mediator is able to induce the parties towards an 
outcome that 1S acceptable to all of them. The 
mediator's source of leverage in this approach lies in 
his ability to manipulate the parties by shifting his 
weight in favour of either, and in the parties interests 
in the side payments that the mediator can offer or 
withold. 34 
Non-power (track two) diplomacy on the other hand 
has a completely different source of 'leverage' on the 
parties. This is not manipulative, and is not based on 
a power relationship, and hence is better described as 
'influence'. This influence lies in the third party's 
knowledge and expertise. This knowledge is not of the 
30 Fisher, R. 'Third Party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup 
Conflict Resolution' 27 Journal of Conflict Resolution (1983) pp.301-
334. 
31 See Fisher, R. & Keashly, L. 'The Potential Complementali ty of 
Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party 
Intervention' 28 Journal of Peace Research (1991) pp.29-42. 
32 See for example, Touval,S. & Zartman,I.W. 
'Introduction: Mediation in Theory' in Touval,S. & 
Zartman,I.W. (Eds) International Mediation in Theory and 
Practice (Boulder,CO.: Westview Press, 1985) pp.7-
17; Zartman,I.W & Touval,S. 'Conclusion: Mediation in 
Theory and Practice' in Touval, S. & Zartm~n, I. W. (~ds) 
International Mediation in Theory and Pract~ce Op.C1t., 
pp.251-268:263; Zartman,I.W. & Touval,S. 'Int~r~ational 
Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power PolltlCS' 41 
Journal of Social Issues (1985) pp.27-45:40-43. 
33 Zartman & Touval, 'International Mediation: Conflict Resolution 
and Power Politics' op.cit., p.40. 
34 Ibid. 
technicalities of mediation, or of the conflict35 but 
lies 
"in the humar; relations skills of sharing feelings 
and, percept7ons, understanding the dynamics of 
soclal relatl0nships and being knowledgeable of the 
sources and processes of conflict and resolution 
methods. ,,36 
As Burton notes, track two diplomacy offers a menu 
"that signals no prejudice, no fault, no value 
judgments, no pre-conditions, no selected 
ingredients, but ... whatever ingredients are 
required to satisfy the ... values and human needs of 
all concerned. ,,37 
In a power framework,although the mediator 
possesses sources of leverage such as economic ones, his 
relationship with the conflict system could militate 
against his resort to them. Where the mediator is 
heterogenous, this problem is compounded because the 
effects of that leverage may affect adversely his post-
mediation relationship with the parties. In the Uganda 
mediation, although some track one sources of leverage 
(such as the ability of Kenya to effect a blockade on 
Uganda which is landlocked), were available, the 
mediator was loath to use them because in the nature of 
the conflict, and the relationship of the mediator with 
it ,this would have hurt both parties equally. More 
importantly as was noted earlier, the situation in 
Uganda was not conducive to any effective use of 
leverage. 38 Being trapped within a track one framework, 
any influence the mediator may have had with the parties 
was rendered ineffective, not least because of Kenyan 
bureaucratic environment mentioned in Chapter Eight 
35 See Light, M. ' Problem-Solving Workshops: Th: R.ole of 
Scholarship in Conflict resolution' in Banks,M. (Ed) c~nfl~ct ~~ World 
Society: A New Perspective on International Relat~ons (Brlghton: 
Wheat sheaf Books, 1984) pp.146-160:154. 
36 Fisher, 'Third Party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup 
Conflict Resolution' op.cit., p.305. 
37 Burton,J.W. Conflict: Resolution and Provention (London: 
Macmillan, 1990) p.222. 
38 See Chapter 6 and Chapter 8. 
which led the parties to conclude that the negotiating 
environment was irretrievably poisoned. 
In this kind of situation, the management process 
would have been enriched had the mediator been supported 
by those with the sort of influence noted earlier, which 
is not based on manipulation and power, but on knowledge 
about conflicts and the analytical processes of their 
resolution. This kind of knowledge is highly developed 
in track two diplomacy,39 and can usefully supplement a 
mediator's limited sources of leverage. Bringing this 
source of influence to bear on track one conflict 
management is a useful way through which track one and 
track two diplomacy can collaborate in the endeavour to 
seek more meaningful and enduring outcomes to conflict. 
Managing Transitional Conflicts 
The argument that conflicts which are transitional 
cannot be successfully managed40 is disproved by the 
Uganda mediation. Like the Eritrean conflict in 1990, it 
too was transitional. However, this statement 1S 
tempered by the fact that the Uganda mediation was only 
partially successful. 41 The reasons for its partial 
success however are related to the mode of management, 
rather than to the transitional character of the 
conflict. Perhaps because of its very transitional 
character, the Uganda conflict required a more complex, 
dual diplomatic approach to its management, the 
modalities of which have been suggested above. The 
transitional nature of such a conflict means that the 
39 See for example Burton,J.W. Conflict: Resol~tion and Pr~venti~n 
op.cit.; also, Burton,J.W. & Dukes,F. Confl~c~: Pract~ces ~n 
Management, Settlement and Resolution (London: Mac~111an, 1990). In 
international mediation, the mediator can be mot1vated by h1s own 
position in the area, and thus seeks "to maintain close ties with one 
side while improving ties with the o~he~." :~artman & Touva~, 
'Conclusion: Mediation in Theory and Pract1ce Op.C1t., p.257. B~t 1n 
the Uganda mediation, the conf.lict was ~nternal, and the ~ed1a~or 
wanted to maintain close ties w1th both s1des: Kenya wanted 1ts t1es 
with Uganda to be assured whichever side 'won'. See Chapter 6 for 
a discussion of this. 
40 See Ottaway,M. 'Mediation in a Transiti~nal con~lict: Eritrea' 
in Zartman,I.W. (Ed) Resolving Regional Confl~cts Op.C1t., pp.69-81. 
41 See Chapter 8 for a discussion of the outcome of the Uganda 
mediation. 
parties are still coming to terms with their conflictual 
relationship. In such a case, the methodologies of 
track two diplomacy, which explore conflict from the 
level of attitudes, can be brought to bear usefully in 
that process. Eventually, this would greatly enhance 
the ability of the track one component of this dual 
approach to help the parties settle those matters which 
are negotiable. This is illustrated for example in the 
current negotiations between Israel and the PLO. 
Dual Diplomacy and the Problem of Re Entry 
One of the problems of the mediation process lS the 
concern whether the parties will be able to re-enter 
their domestic environments successfully, and 'sell' the 
outcome of the mediation to their constituents. This 
problem has two related levels: shaping the parties' 
perceptions by getting them to have a commitment to 
implementing the Agreement, and shaping the perceptions 
of their constituents so that they can 'buy' the 
Agreement, and hence legitimise it. As both Wal1 42 and 
Mitchel1 43 emphasise, parties In mediation are not 
unitary: they have wider constituencies and audiences 
which they must have In contemplation. They must 
therefore ensure that they "do not get so far ahead of 
the parade that they can no longer hear the music. ,,44 
In the Panama Canal negotiations for example, such 
a consensus was built through delegation members 
undertaking a "massive public relations campaign" in the 
country and In Congress, during and after the 
negotiations. 45 In the Uganda mediation, the Nairobi 
42 Wall, J . A. 'Mediation: An Analysis, Review, and 
Proposed Research' 25 Journal of Conflict Resolution (1981) 
pp.157-180. 
43 Mitchell, 'The Motives for Mediation' op.cit. 
44 Colosi,T. 'A Model for Negotiation and Mediation' 
in Bendahmane D. B . & McDonald, J . W. (Eds) In terna tional 
Negotiation: Art ;nd Science (Washington: Foreign service Insti'ute, 
1984) pp.15-33:19. 
45 See Druckman, D. 'Four Cases of conflict Managemen~: Lessons 
Learned' in Bendahmane,D.B. & McDonald,J.W. (Eds) Perspectives on 
Negotiations op.cit., pp.263-288:284. 
Peace Agreement was abrogated within a few weeks of its 
signature because neither party could sell it to their 
constituents. This re-entry problem could have been 
eased by adopting a dual diplomatic approach. This has 
already been suggested wi th respect to the level of 
perception of the parties. Had track two diplomacy been 
incorporated in the process, it could have complemented 
track one by identifying all the parties to the 
conflict,46 and engaging In grassroots conflict 
management. This entails undertaking the education of 
the constituents at the grassroots level about the peace 
process, its meaning and expectations. 
Track Two Diplomacy and Conflicts in Africa 
This plea for a dual diplomatic approach does not 
mean that the two diplomatic approaches must be 
submerged permanently into each other. As was noted In 
Chapters Two and Four, track two diplomacy in Africa lS 
still underdeveloped, and there is room for its further 
growth. Indeed, providing that the present OAU conflict 
management structures remaln, track two diplomacy will 
continue to enjoy vast potential for conflict management 
In Africa. 
This is not a mystic hope. As Chapter Four showed, 
there are still many conflicts in Africa which the OAU 
under its present principles declines (and presumably 
will continue to decline) to manage, on the basis that 
they are the internal affairs of the states concerned. 
In these cases, track two can go where track one fears 
to tread. It has been suggested for example that a 
track two involvement at the Moshi Conference47 could 
have made a great difference to the future trend of 
conflict in Uganda. 
46 Since as Groom notes, all parties necessary for the self-
sustaining resolution of the conflict must be present. See 
Groom,A.J.R. 'No Compromise: Problem-solving in a Theore~ical 
Perspective' 43 International Social Science Journal (1991) pp.77-
86:85. 
47 And indeed at the pre-Moshi conference, where the ~genda for 
the Moshi conference was drawn. See Chapter 5. 
Perhaps 
relevance of 
in Africa 1S 
the strongest case to be made for the 
track two diplomacy to conflict management 
that it would bring with it a perspective 
that current As Mujaju notes, 
"far too many [OAU] heads of state lack 
the ... stature and disposition to perform a 
mediating role in the continent. M 
leaders in Africa lack. 
any ... are 
burdened by recurrent crises at home while others 
with a military background may lack ' 
the ... disposition to handle diplomatic tasks. They 
do not exercise it in their own countries i they 
cannot so easily cultivate it abroad. ,,48 
Track Two Diplomacy and Non-Interference 
Although the urgent need for the OAU to review its 
Charter generally and the provision on non-interference 
in particular was suggested earlier 1n this chapter, it 
is unlikely that this will happen soon. The OAU's innate 
conservatism, and the skeletons 1n the (internal) 
cupboards of many regimes in Africa will see to this.49 
As long as this trend prevails, the dual diplomatic 
track suggested above can not be realised fully, since 
member states will still plead non-interference and 
hence neither follow Kenya's example in its mediation of 
the Uganda conflict, nor agree to methodologies which 
may bring their legitimacy to the fore. 
Nevertheless, track two diplomacy can make a 
valuable contribution to conflict management in Africa. 
The continuing expansion of the bases for 
internationalisation of internal conflict will mean that 
even though notionally track two diplomacy could still 
be restricted to the management of apparently internal 
48 Mujaju,A.B. 'Internal Conflict and its 
in Rupesinghe,K. (Ed) Conflict Res~luti~n 
Athens,OH.: James Currey & Ohio Unlverslty 
274:272. 
International Context' 
in Uganda (London & 
Press, 1989) pp.249-
49 The Declaration on the political and socio-Economic Situatic:n 
. Af' . t made some kind of conceptual breakthrough l.n 
~n r ~ ca , op . C 1 ., dd d b t h 
recognising that internal conflicts also need to be a resse d y h e 
OAU But it had in mind only situations where complete ~r er as 
broken down like in Liberia and Somalia, and where ~he con~llcts ha~e 
diffused into neighbouring countries. What the OAU l~ wo~klng ~owar s 
is a lego-normative framework through which interventlon In suc
G 
case~ 
can be justified in its Councils: see Report of the Secretary- enera 
on Conflicts in Africa, op.cit., p.12. 
conflict ( 1 ike the wee , 1n the Sudan), international 
and their entry into the awareness of such conflicts, 
domain of public discourse w1'll 'd prOV1 e track two 
diplomacy with valuable support for its conflict 
management endeavours. 
There is also evidence that in future, conflicts in 
Africa and elsewhere will be predominantly internal. 50 
As the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Liberia suggest, these are likely to have a strong bias 
towards self-determination. Two emerging notions of 
the international . self-determination will colour 
conflict map. The first is internal self-determination, 
which as Michalska writes, 
The 
"is directed against authoritarian regimes ... not 
only against external interference but mainly 
against internal interference. This is a right to 
struggle against all forms of arbitrary oppression 
of peoples." 51 
second notion of self-determination 
, 
1S loosely 
termed 'post'colonial' self-determination, which is an 
"idea of self-determination within areas such as 
the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia. 
In ... these ... cases, self-determination represents 
a conflict between those who live within a 
territory and those who are part of a wider ethnic 
group with members both inside and outside the 
terri tory. ,,52 
With the settlement of the South African 
conflict,S3 the OAU has lost the crutch it used hitherto 
50 See for example, Rupesinghe, K. ' Early Warning and Prevent i ve 
Diplomacy: A Discussion Paper' (London: In~erna~ional, Alert, 1993) i see 
also, International Alert, Internal Confl~cts ~n Afr~ca (London: 
International Alert, 1994). 
51 Michalska, A. ' Rights of Peoples to Self -Determinat~on . in 
International Law' in Twining, W. (Ed) Issues of Self-Determ~nat~on 
(Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1991) pp.71-90:83. 
52 International Alert, Preventive Diplomacy: A UN/NGO partne~ship 
in the 1990s (London: International Alert, 1993) p.~O, !he sa~len~e 
of this kind of conflict and its continuing potential in Africa is 
noted in Chapter 3. 
53 That conflict was settled, not resolved. Only now are the 
parties (especially at the grassroots level) going through a process 
of ' confirming' (engaging in dialogue which would lead tOM ant a~~~pt~n~e 
of each others fundamental values and self-worth:, se; on ,Vi e, .. 
'The Healing Function of Political Conflict Resolution Op.Clt., p.llS) 
to support the argument that self-determination refers 
only to external, and not to internal self-
determination.
54 
It will be faced increasingly with both 
these emerging claims to self-determination, whose human 
rights content will further internationalise them. But, 
as with non-interference, these are not concepts which 
the OAU or its member states are likely to embrace 
keenly. Hence, 
will probably 
the internal and inter-state dichotomy 
prevail for some time. But the 
internationalised nature 
self-determination could 
of these emerging claims 
mean that if track 
to 
two 
diplomatic efforts are directed to the identification 
and management of such conflicts, there will be wide 
international recognition and support for such 
endeavours. In this respect, an important aspect to 
which track two diplomacy can contribute is in giving 
early warning, and hence anticipate such conflicts 
before they become genocidal, as in Rwanda. This 
essentially requires a re-interpretation of the concept 
of ripe moments, as 1S suggested in the folowing 
section. 
Track Two and Re-Interpreting Ripe Momemts 
alia 
Zartman-type ripe moments 55 are identifiable inter 
by stalemates which hurt the parties, and which 
they cannot escape from, forcing 
negotiation and escalation. 
them to choose between 
The problem for the 
through the setting up of a Truth Commission: see McGreal,C. 
'Time to Dig up the Hatchet' The Guardian (London) 10 June 1994, p:2. 
But as'was evident in a discussion between the aut~or ,and,a s7n1or 
South African diplomat (Paris, May 1994), the Comm1SS10n 1S v1ew7d 
with a lot of suspicion in some South African quarters. Howe~er, ~~1~ 
underlines the importance of suc~ ,a process as a means y W 1C 
psychological gaps can be el1m1nated. 
54 Islam notes for example that the emergence o~ ~angladesh as an 
independent state in 1971 challenged th~ propos1t~on that se~;~ 
determination has no relevance beY0I1:d cO,lon1al context . from Katanga 
Islam,M.R. 'Secessionist Self-Determ1nat1on: sORme Less~n~1985) pp.211~ 
Biafra and Bangladesh' 22 Journal of Peace esearc 
221:211. 
55 See Chapter 2 and Chapter 8. 
conflict analyst or manager lS thus one of 
synchronisation: timing the third party's entry to 
coincide with the parties readiness to compromise or 
negotiate. 56 Ripe moments and hurting stalemates are 
essentially creatures of power politics and of track one 
diplomacy. They are felt only once the conflict becomes 
violent. In the OAU approach, the principle of non-
interference and the resulting internal and inter-state 
dichotomy of conflict means that only when the conflict 
has diffused into neighbouring states (and hence once 
states experlence the hurting stalemate) does the OAU 
invoke its conflict management mechanisms. This lS 
unsatisfactory: therefore, such ripe moments will be 
termed 'false' ripe moments. 
In some internal conflicts, the rlpe moment can be 
discerned long before the model formulated by Zartman 
becomes evident. At an earlier stage, third party 
involvement could make all the difference to the pattern 
of the conflict. A case in point is the Uganda conflict 
at the stage of the Moshi Conference of 1979. That 
conflict (and the conference) was considered by the OAU 
to be an internal affair of Uganda. 57 In the context of 
OAU conflict management, track one involvement by the 
OAU or individual member states would have been 
construed as offending the Charter. Yet the conflict at 
the Moshi stage was ripe for third party involvement. 
It was an almost classic situation for the engagement of 
track two diplomacy, which could have probably made a 
great difference to the future conflict In Uganda. 
Internal conflicts such as in Uganda (1979) and Ethiopia 
(1990) displayed 'true' ripe moments, which were however 
ignored because they were manifest at a stage when the 
conflicts were still considered to be an internal 
affair, and hence ones in which the OAU and its member 
56 Zartman & Touval, ' Conclusion: Mediation l.n Theory and 
Practice' op.cit., p.260. 
57 Even though the fact that the conference. was su~moned. by 
Tanzania, which was at war with Uganda, had already l.nternatl.OnallSed 
the conflict. 
two states choose not to involve themselves. But track 
diplomacy is not tied by such doctrinal baggage. It 
help by managing conflict at that 
can 
true ripe moment, or 
warning that the conflict is ripe for giving an early 
management. 
Conclusion 
This study has examined the management of internal 
conflict in Africa. In doing so, it has adopted an 
analytical framework that takes into account the diverse 
contexts within which such conflicts are manifested, and 
in which they should be analysed and managed. The theme 
running throughout the study is that conflict analysis 
and management must take into account the multi-level 
nature of every conflict, and hence the complexity of 
the management process. 
The locale in which this study 1S anchored 1S 
Africa and its internal conflicts, which like those 
elsewhere, are becoming internationalised at an 
increasingly early stage. The locality of the mooring 
does not however suggest peculiarity, or endorse an 
idiosyncratic view of the conflicts of a particular 
region. But it suggests the vastness of the sea of 
conflict, and the commonality of problems of the 
tempest-tossed human beings whose lives are lost or 
thrown adrift. 
The present chapter has made some suggestions about 
how the process of conflict management can be enriched 
further. This can be done by taking into account the 
reality of the various levels of a conflict. This is in 
recognition of the fact that rather than being a simple 
exercise in power bargaining, conflict management is a 
much more multi-dimensional and complex undertaking. 
Despite differences in historical causes, 
generalisations about conflict in one location can still 
be of value in enhancing knowledge about conflict and 
its management elsewhere. This might help to develop 
the discipline of conflict managment further. This 
study was aimed at making a modest contribution to that 
process. 
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